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The Productivity Commission
The Productivity Commission is the Commonwealth’s principal advisory body on microeconomic
reform. Its activities include:
¨  holding public inquiries and reporting on matters referred to it by Government
¨  providing secretariat and research services to government bodies
¨  investigating complaints about competitive neutrality
¨  reviewing and advising on regulation through its Office of Regulation Review and
¨  undertaking other relevant research and advice relevant to enhancing Australia’s
productivity.
The Commission provides independent analysis and advice, using processes that are open and
public and driven by concern for the well-being of the community as a whole.
Information on the Productivity Commission and its current work program can be found on the
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An agreement with formal treaty status between
governments regulating the conduct of trade in





A set of arrangements that regulate the operation of
international air services between two countries. These
arrangements usually comprise an Air Services
Agreement, any Memoranda of Understanding and any
exchanges of letters and/or notes
alliance An agreement between airlines to cooperate in the
provision or operation of some of their services on a
route, or on a regional or global basis
available seat
kilometres
The total number of seats offered multiplied by the
distance flown, used as a measure of air transport
passenger capacity
beyond rights The right of a carrier from one country to fly to another




See air services arrangements
blocked space
agreement
The purchase by one carrier of a block of seats from
another carrier for resale to passengers directly
break of gauge Change of aircraft, at an en-route point on an international
flight outside the home territory of the airline, to (on an
outbound trip) or from (on an inbound trip) another
aircraft having a smaller capacity
cabotage Provision of commercial domestic air services within a
country. Cabotage rights are classified as eitherINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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consecutive cabotage — the right of foreign-owned
airline(s) to fly a domestic flight stage within the host
country as a continuation of an international service (also
know as eighth freedom) — or standalone cabotage — the
unrestricted right of foreign-owned airline(s) to provide




The allocation of rights to individual airlines to fly
services available under ASAs
change of gauge See break of gauge
charter services See non-scheduled services
city pair An air route between two cities
city designation The designation of air services to particular cities, or a
choice of cities specified under an ASA
codesharing The assignment of one airline’s designator code (for





A computerised system which provides information to
subscribers (usually travel agents) on airline schedules,
fares and seat availability. It is used to make reservations
and issue tickets for passengers
dedicated freight
aircraft
An aircraft set up to transport freight only
double
disapproval
Arrangements in bilateral air service agreements whereby








The fall in average unit costs as airline output increases
economies of
scope
The fall in the average unit costs of two or more services   GLOSSARY
XV
that results when they are produced by one airline rather
than separately produced by different airlines
economies of
traffic density
The fall in average unit costs as the number of passengers
travelling on a particular route(s) increases
flag carrier A country’s national airline. Countries with only a
government-owned airline often identify the airline as the
national or flag carrier
freedoms of the
air
Types of international aviation rights established under
ASAs (see Box 3.1 for details on types of freedoms)
freight-tonne
kilometres
A metric tonne of freight or mail carried one kilometre
‘grandfather’
rights
The allocation of airport landing and take-off slots based
on the past and/or current allocation
hub and spoke
network
A network of routes operating through a central hub point.
Airlines may channel and increase traffic through hub
points, thereby creating economies of traffic density
interlining Carriage of passengers and/or freight by one airline on
behalf of another airline, based on a formal arrangement
(an interline agreement) between the airlines which
involves the coordination of baggage checks, carriage or
air cargo, for example, and the honouring of tickets




The right of a carrier from one country to fly to another
country via a third country (a form of fifth freedom rights)
landing and
take-off slots
A landing and/or take-off time at an airport
load factor The number of passengers carried as a percentage of the
number of seats available
Memorandum of
Understanding
An agreement between two parties. With regard to ASA’s,
it is a less formal type of agreement that may be as
binding as a formal agreement and may cover scheduled








A country’s policy of permitting more than one airline to




Any air transport enterprise only offering air transport




Flights performed for remuneration on an irregular basis.
[Both scheduled and non-scheduled airlines provide
non-scheduled services.] Usually refered to charter
services and can apply to either passengers or freight
‘open skies’
agreement
An agreement to remove restrictions on the ability of
airlines to operate services between two countries
origin–
destination traffic
A measure of airline (passenger) traffic between the
commencement point of an air passenger’s journey and







A trade agreement, not necessarily confined to a
geographic region, between more than two countries, but
not so many as to make it “multilateral”
‘regional ring-
fence’
A ring-fenced regional slot pool at Sydney Airport where
30 per cent of the airport’s peak capacity slots are held by
regional airlines. Swapping of these slots is not permitted




The number of paying passengers on an aircraft multiplied
by the number of kilometres flown, used as a measure of
air passenger travel services
revenue pooling An agreement between airlines to share all revenue on a
route or sector irrespective of the revenue generated by   GLOSSARY
XV
II
each individual airline on the route
route At its simplest level, an air service between two points
(usually cities)
scheduled airline Any air transport enterprise offering or operating a regular
air service according to a published timetable (although
many also operate non-scheduled services)
scheduled
services
Flights listed in a published timetable (or that are so
regular and frequent as to constitute a recognisably
systematic series) and performed for remuneration
single aviation
market
Two or more countries that have a formal agreement that
treats the countries as if they were one
single
designation
A country’s policy of permitting only one airline to
operate scheduled international air services between it and
other destinations
stage length The distance flown between take-off and landing
stopover rights The right of a carrier from one country to carry its own




All or majority ownership of an airline by citizens in the
country of registration. There is no internationally agreed
standard, so each country can determine what it accepts as
substantial ownership
tariff Passenger airfare and/or cargo rate
terminal slot A gate at an airport terminal for alighting and boarding of
passengers and/or freight at a specified time
thin route Route over which traffic and frequency is low
tonne kilometres
available
A measure of tonnes available for the carriage of freight,
mail and passengers, multiplied by the distance flown. A
measure of tonnage capacity, it can be for a single flight,
an airline or industry wide. Cost per tonne kilometresINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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available is often used as a measure of airline efficiency
tonne kilometres
performed
A measure of tonnes of freight, mail and passengers
actually carried, multiplied by the distance flown. It may
be measured for a single flight, an airline or industry wide
uplift–discharge
traffic
An airline’s (passenger) traffic between the points of
landing and take-off, as distinguished from origin–
destination traffic
undertaking The terms and conditions under which an airport owner
will provide access, as agreed with the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission
yield Airline revenue per unit of traffic. Passenger yield is
airline revenue per passenger kilometre
yield
management
Manipulation of prices to attempt to obtain the most
revenue from each flight. Yield management systems are
based on estimating the number of full fare tickets that
would be sold on a particular flight, then offering the
remaining tickets at varying discounts to induce demand
from more price-sensitive passengers. The discounted
tickets generally have conditions so they are less attractive
to those passengers who are willing to pay full fareXXI
OVERVIEW
KEY MESSAGES
·  The 50-year old bilateral system is unable to cope with the ever
growing demands for international air services.
·  The system’s constraints hurt airlines and their users — travellers and
the tourism and air freight industries.
·  The Australian Government, like many others, has been loosening the
restraints, but not fast enough.
·  Unilateral ‘open skies’ are not the solution for Australia.




·  Safety should not be compromised.
·  Special measures should be introduced to increase the scope for
international air services for regional Australia.
·  More transparent and consultative processes are needed in developing
Australia’s international air services negotiating framework.
·  The International Air Services Commission should continue, but its
role and processes should be streamlined and simplified.
·  An independent inquiry into airport capacity and use is needed.
For over half a century, international civil aviation has been
governed by a system of bilateral air service arrangements
(ASAs) between countries. There are now some 3000 ASAs
worldwide, 51 involving Australia.
ASAs set out the terms and conditions under which airlines can
fly. Typically they specify capacity, frequency, routes, cities,
ownership provisions, safety certification, price approval







Australia’s place in world aviation
Australian airlines were the sixth largest in the world in 1996 in terms of revenue
passenger kilometres. They carried around 43 per cent of the approximately 14 million
passengers flown to and from Australia in 1997 — Qantas having a 39 per cent share and
Ansett International having around 4 per cent.












Revenue passenger-kilometres (billion) by nationality of airlines
International Domestic
Australia’s international airlines have shared in the rapid growth of international passenger
and freight traffic, with average annual growth rates of 8.1  per  cent and 7.8  per  cent
respectively between 1986 and 1996. These growth rates, while still rapid in absolute
terms, are marginally lower than the global average and that achieved by airlines of North
America and the Asia–Pacific.
Unlike trade in goods, which is generally free unless
specifically restricted, trade in international air services
cannot occur unless it is explicitly permitted in ASAs.
Various ‘freedoms of the air’ allow airlines to fly to,
from, beyond, and between bilateral partners and other
countries. Other ‘positive’ provisions of ASAs allow for
them to undertake specific activities, such as setting up an
office, in the foreign bilateral partner country.
Restrictions on trade in goods are generally applied
uniformly to all trading partners that are members of the
World Trade Organization (WTO). In contrast, trade in






international framework of bilateral agreements. It is not
subject to the most favoured nation principle.
International air services are also largely excluded from
the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS).
Tight ASA restrictions on competition and trade have
turned the international airline industry into one of the
most regulated in the world. Airlines have attempted to
overcome some of the bilateral system’s constraints on
their operations by entering into various arrangements,
such as codeshares and alliances.
As evidence mounts of the inefficiencies flowing from
anticompetitive regulation of airlines, many countries
have been liberalising economic regulation. Driven by the
United States, bilateral ‘open skies’ agreements, which
remove most traffic and market access constraints on a
reciprocal basis, are spreading. Such policies commonly
remove constraints on capacity, frequency, city
designation, routes, intermediate and beyond rights, and
tariff setting.
New Zealand is also prepared, within a bilateral reciprocal
arrangement, to remove the requirement for national
ownership of designated carriers, and to negotiate on
cabotage (domestic carriage) and the rights for airlines to
operate international air services between other countries
without returning home. The United States has now
signed 30 bilateral ‘open skies’ ASAs; New Zealand has
signed six.
The bilateral system is coming under intense pressure.
While it is capable of accommodating more liberal
regulatory arrangements, major changes are proving
difficult to achieve through existing institutions such as
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and
the WTO. The APEC commitment to achieving free and
open trade and investment for industrialised economies by
2010, and for developing economies by 2020, may have
important implications, but so far little interest has been














Pressures on the bilateral system
·  Strong growth in air services is revealing the inflexibilities and inefficiencies of the
system.
·  Evidence from around the world of the benefits of aviation deregulation.
·  The spread of bilateral ‘open skies’ policies.
·  Consumer and business demands for better and seamless air services.
·  The use of codeshares, alliances and charters to overcome constraints of the
bilateral structure.
·  The low profits of most airlines and the growing reluctance of governments to
continue subsidising their airlines.
·  The pressure of global capital markets on airlines to improve performance.
·  Privatisation of airlines and airports.
·  The emergence of regional or plurilateral agreements, particularly developments in
the European Union.
World trade in most other goods and services is being
liberalised in a multilateral framework, producing
demonstrable gains in economic welfare. A different
system for international air services is increasingly
difficult to justify.
Over the past decade, Australian Governments have
embraced reform of Australia’s aviation policy. Australian
aviation and the airline industry have been transformed.
The two airline policy has been terminated, Qantas and
Australian Airlines have merged and been privatised,
multiple designation of airlines has been introduced and
Ansett has become an international airline. Australia and
New Zealand have implemented a Single Aviation Market
(with no restrictions on trans-Tasman flights or cabotage)
and most airports have been privatised.
Economic deregulation has been substantial, without
compromising effective safety regulation. Competition has
increased with more liberal ASAs, the entry of Ansett
International and a growing number of third country
competitors. Greater competition has reduced airfares and









the benefit of consumers.
Results of the Commission’s modelling of the effects of
greater competition on a number of Asian routes
following the entry of Ansett International show
significant economic welfare gains for Australia and for
the other countries served. Model estimates are that in
1997, for example, competition from Ansett reduced fares
between Australia and Hong Kong by almost 7 per cent
and increased traffic by over 5 per cent.
On the Asian routes served by Ansett, model estimates are
that Australian consumers benefited by nearly $90 million
in 1997, although Australian airlines’ profits are estimated
to have been reduced by almost $58 million, providing a
net increase in economic welfare of over $32 million.
The Australian Government has pursued a policy of
liberalisation of bilateral arrangements with other
countries. The Department of Transport and Regional
Development has been negotiating extra capacity ahead of
actual demand and expanded market and network
opportunities. Agreements are being negotiated with more
countries and the range of traffic and market access rights
is increasing. Australia has introduced multiple
designation of its airlines in all but seven of its 51 ASAs.
But this is a time-consuming and complex process, some







Despite liberalisation in many countries, most ASAs,
including Australia’s, still prevent airlines from operating
like other companies. They are restricted in developing
efficient networks and innovative travel products.
One reason for the slow progress of reform lies in the
ASAs themselves. The ‘positive list’ of activities that an
airline is allowed inhibits airlines from undertaking
anything for which there is no specific provision.
Airlines often require their governments to intercede for
them before they can develop new or expanded services.
In most other areas, international traders are able to do
anything that is not constrained by a ‘negative list’ of
specific restrictions. This gives companies much greater
freedom to do business, and importantly, to grow and
innovate.
Capacity is used as negotiating coin and is still restricted
in most bilateral agreements. Some of Australia’s most
highly trafficked routes have reached or are approaching
full capacity use, despite the recent reduction of demand
on most Asian routes.
Capacity constraints are credible only if they are binding,
or potentially binding. They can inhibit the growth of the
market, the airlines of the countries concerned, and
downstream industries such as tourism. If third country
carriers have capacity on such constrained routes,
consumers and tourists may not be greatly disadvantaged,
although prices are likely to be higher and choice
constrained. The airlines of the bilateral partners may lose
market share if they are restrained by capacity limits from









While the Australian Government’s policy has been to
negotiate capacity ‘ahead of demand’, this approach is
inherently arbitrary. It is based on assumptions about
airline operations in each country, prices and determinants
of demand which may change at short notice, or may not
be justified. In the Commission’s view, the removal of
restrictions on capacity in ASAs should be a high priority.
Australian and foreign capacity used as a percentage of negotiated























Foreign carriers Australian carriers
0 100 40 100 80 80 60 20 20 40 60
no fixed constraints
no fixed constraints
Notes:  Units are percentages. For detailed notes see Figure 5.2INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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The bilateral system restricts airlines’ ownership and
access to capital, where they fly, the number and
frequency of flights, the number of seats they can offer,
what types of aircraft they use, and how much they
charge. It influences the nature of competition between
airlines by controlling market entry and the quantity and
variety of rights allocated to particular airlines.
The system also influences airline costs —  usually
increasing costs by restricting airlines’ ability to operate
efficiently, develop new markets and more effective
networks. Increased costs and restricted competition lead
to higher prices.
Regulation of entry, frequency, capacity, routes and prices
keeps fares up and impedes the development of new travel
products. Liberalisation has already led to greater
competition, reduced fares, new routes and destinations,
and improved quality of service, but there is considerable
scope for further improvements.
Higher international airfares restrict growth in the
Australian tourism industry. Modelling estimates suggest
that lower fares resulting from Ansett International’s entry
on seven Asian routes may have increased net passenger
movements to Australia by almost 4 percent in 1997.
Inbound foreign tourists outnumber outbound Australian
holiday-makers by two to one.
Restrictions on city designation and capacity limitations
combine to make it costly for foreign airlines to land at
secondary gateways, impeding tourism development and
the availability of international air freight capacity in
regional Australia. Where a choice has to be made
between Sydney and regional gateways, Sydney is chosen.
The bilateral system has been built on the premise that
each country has its own substantially owned and
controlled designated national flag carrier(s). The result is
an international misallocation of resources as some
countries waste precious capital and other resources on
















The more efficient industries suffer, both from having to
compete for capital and other resources and from having
to use expensive international air transport. Conversely,
those countries with economically efficient airline
industries are unable to expand their airlines to their full
potential.
The global aviation industry has reached a critical point in
its development. The inefficiencies imposed on the world
aviation industry by the current bilateral system and the
benefits of more efficient, internationally competitive air
services are now apparent. Reciprocal ‘open skies’
agreements are spreading. If Australia does not move
rapidly, the rest of the world could liberalise around it.
Australia would be disadvantaged if air transport services
between other countries become relatively more efficient.
And Australian carriers would be disadvantaged in their
pursuit of new and larger international markets if other
markets liberalised ahead of ours.
The Commission has been asked to identify and evaluate
the costs and benefits of current arrangements which
restrict competition and trade in international air services
and options for further liberalisation, both within and
outside the bilateral framework. This inquiry is also part
of the Commonwealth’s review of legislation under the
Competition Principles Agreement.
The Commission has looked mainly at the economic
regulation of international air services, rather than
technical regulations governing the conduct, safety and
security of aviation. However, it has given consideration
to possible safety implications of economic liberalisation.
The current objectives of Australia’s international aviation
policy are not clearly stated. After a decade of reform, it
has been difficult for the Commission to piece them
together from a variety of Government documents. The
Australian Government should publish and keep up to
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If Australia is to develop the full potential of trade in
international air services to enhance Australian economic
welfare, it must enhance the efficiency and international
competitiveness of airlines serving Australia (both
Australian and foreign). Australian consumers, industries
and regions that depend on international air services (such
as tourism) would all benefit.
Of all of the bilateral system’s constraints on efficiency
and competition, probably the most fundamental is the
requirement that national flag carriers be locally owned
and controlled. Reform of national designation is critical
for liberalisation of the bilateral system but options are
limited. If an individual country changes the criteria for
designation of its airlines unilaterally, other countries may
refuse them access. National designation is required to
ensure that safety and technical standards of airlines are
effectively regulated, but local ownership is not.
Designation should be based on a less restrictive test that
does not require ownership by nationals. With the Asian
financial crisis focusing attention on the need for capital
to be used more efficiently in the airline industry, it may
be opportune to try again to achieve multilateral
agreement to liberalisation of the ownership and control
requirements.
The Australian Government should join with other like-
minded governments to push for reconsideration of this
issue by ICAO and APEC. In the meantime, Australia
should negotiate with its bilateral partners to incorporate
in its own ASAs more liberal means of designating
airlines which do not rely on ownership restrictions.
The Australian Government should join with other like-
minded governments to have the ICAO Secretariat’s 1994
proposals to liberalise ownership and control requirements
for national designation reconsidered for adoption on a
plurilateral or multilateral basis.
In the meantime, Australia’s ASAs should incorporate
more liberal means of designating airlines which do not














Australia could also invite neighbouring countries to
develop, and seek ICAO recognition of, a regional
approach to designation. New Zealand would seem an
obvious place to start, particularly as the Australia New
Zealand Single Aviation Market (SAM) already includes a
more liberal approach to ownership and control. An
obstacle could be the differences in approach which now
exist between Australia and New Zealand in their
international aviation policies. However, if the
recommendations outlined in this report were to be
adopted, the policies of the two countries would be more
closely aligned. Another option would be a wider South
Pacific regional grouping for designation.
Options for incremental improvements to the status quo
have been considered, but such changes would not go far
enough. The Commission has examined several options
for more extensive liberalisation of the international air
services framework. Concerted action is also required
internationally. Australia has played important roles in
such international negotiations in the past (for example,
the Cairns Group). It is time for Australia to do so again.
Options for liberalisation of air services
·  Unilateral ‘open skies’; and
·  Reciprocal liberalisation:
— Bilateral;
— Plurilateral open club; and
— Multilateral liberalisation through the WTO.
As a small country with limited bargaining power, it has
been in Australia’s best interests generally to liberalise
unilaterally. The Commission has examined the case for
Australia extending this approach to international air
services through unilateral ‘open skies’. But under the
entrenched bilateral system Australia cannot produce, let
alone trade, international air services without the approval















services would not ensure that competition and the
quantity and quality of air services would increase, or that
airfares would fall. Other countries could still restrict
entry and capacity.
Australia’s airlines could have their rights in foreign
markets frozen, and would be unable to expand as
markets grew. Consumers who would have preferred to
use Australian airlines, but are not able to do so, would
bear the costs of having to use less efficient or less
preferred carriers.
Accordingly, the Commission has concluded that, as long
as the rest of the world remains committed to the bilateral
system, a policy of unilateral open skies could make
Australia worse off than if it continued to negotiate
additional capacity with bilateral partners.
The Commission does not recommend unilateral ‘open
skies’ for Australia.
Because of the bilateral system regulating international air
services, Australia enjoys considerable bargaining power
which is not available for most of our other international
trade. Also Australia is quite a large country in aviation
terms. Much can therefore be achieved by liberalising on
a reciprocal basis with other countries, bilaterally,
plurilaterally and eventually, multilaterally.
Moving from a ‘positive list’ of restrictions in agreements
to a ‘negative list’ — all forms of trading would be
allowed unless explicitly restricted — would provide a
better basis both for liberalisation and for incorporation of












A bilateral reciprocal ‘open skies’ policy which removes
restrictions on access to each country’s markets, including
unlimited rights to intermediate and beyond points, would
loosen the regulatory corset which now constricts airline
growth. Airlines would be able to respond quickly to
market opportunities and pressures. While the airlines
could be expected to face greater competitive pressure,
they would also be better able to reduce their costs and
develop their markets.
Consumers and other users would benefit from greater
capacity and frequency, expanded networks, innovative
travel products and competitive fares. The costs to
governments and airlines of maintaining agreements
would be reduced.
The Commission recommends that Australia should seek
to negotiate reciprocal ‘open skies’ agreements on a
bilateral basis which would remove restrictions on:
·  capacity and frequency to, from, between and
beyond Australia and the bilateral aviation partner;
·  codesharing on each other’s airlines;
·  routes including points of access to the Australian
and the bilateral partner’s markets, intermediate and
beyond points;
·  multiple designation of airlines by Australia and the
bilateral partner;
·  ownership as a basis for airline designation; and
·  prices.
Such reciprocal agreements should also contain
restrictions on government subsidies where these are
significant. Australia should also be prepared to negotiate,
on a case by case basis, removal of restrictions on
cabotage and the development of ‘stand alone’ services
between the bilateral partners and third countries (so
called seventh freedom services).
Achieving the best results from bilateral reciprocal ‘open













strategic sequencing of negotiations with various
countries.
A number of countries may not be prepared to liberalise
their ASAs with Australia to the extent of negotiating
bilateral reciprocal ‘open skies’ agreements. Australia’s
strategy in such cases should be to renegotiate ASAs to
incorporate as much of the above package as possible.
But bilateral liberalisation can only go so far. It would not
be sufficient to permit the full development of global
airline networks. A concerted international effort is
needed.
A group of like-minded nations led by Australia could
develop an open club based on a common ‘open skies’
agreement. This would allow all carriers within the group
to fly freely among the members, subject to a common set
of rules. The agreement would best be couched as a
‘negative list’ of remaining restrictions. It should be open
to other countries to join on the same conditions.
A regional approach which was closed to non-members
may encourage competition within the group at the
expense of market access for non-members. The challenge
would be to ensure that regional or plurilateral agreements
were used as a stepping stone to global liberalisation, not
as an exclusive device to favour members. Openness is an
important feature of such agreements.
A common agreement would be simpler than the complex
set of reciprocal bilateral agreements it would replace.
Progress towards an open club could be achieved by
negotiating separately similar liberal bilateral agreements
among a series of partners, but this is likely to be too time
consuming and complex to achieve results comparable to
those of a single plurilateral agreement.














The benefits to members would grow in proportion to the
size of the network, while the opportunity costs of not
joining also would grow. Non-members would risk
becoming isolated from the increase in air traffic in
response to the more liberal conditions available within
the club. Countries that may be reluctant to negotiate
reciprocal ‘open skies’ agreements on a bilateral basis
may have little choice but to join the club.
To enhance the chances of this plurilateral open club
becoming a vehicle for widespread reform, it should:
·  not intentionally disadvantage outsiders any more
than the bilateral agreements it replaces;
·  have transparent rules;
·  allow non-members to join on the same terms and
conditions; and
·  contain provisions relating to competition policy,
particularly to constrain significant government
subsidies to airlines.
Ultimately, a liberal multilateral agreement under the
WTO which covers all or most countries would allow
international air services to develop in response to market
pressures. Efficient carriers would replace inefficient
carriers, and the removal of regulatory barriers to entry
would enhance competition. It would be easier to
administer and comply with than the current bilateral
system.
Given the entrenched position of the bilateral system, and
the difficulties of negotiating a truly liberal multilateral
agreement, reciprocal bilateral and plurilateral
liberalisation options may offer the best prospects for
achieving gains in the short to medium term. However, the
history of the International Telecommunications
Agreement illustrates that nations can move quickly to

















Australia could lend its support for the eventual inclusion
of air transport services in the GATS. The Commission
recommends that prior to the review of the GATS in 2000,
the Australian Government promote discussion among
WTO members to determine a process for including all air
services in the GATS.
Restrictions on the number and identity of Australian
cities available to foreign airlines can limit the potential
for tourism and regional development outside Sydney.
Enabling foreign airlines to serve a wider range of
destinations, both on their own and through codeshares
with Australian airlines, could encourage them to market a
wider range of Australian destinations. Easing these
restrictions could provide better services to secondary
gateways and stimulate tourism growth to the rest of
Australia.
The Commission recommends a package of bilateral
reciprocal and unilateral measures to improve
international air services to regional Australia.
Australia should follow the lead of the United Kingdom
and offer bilateral partners unlimited capacity to all
Australian international airports except Sydney, provided
that they offer the same rights in return. This would
provide extra capacity of a reciprocal, route-by-route basis
(for example, Melbourne to Milan, Adelaide to Stanstead
or Darwin to Kuching), outside the capacity entitlements
already negotiated in ASAs. This would help to reduce the
opportunity costs of foreign airlines operating to regional
areas. It would also provide niche opportunities for
Australian airlines to provide more diverse services. The
Commission recommends that this offer be made
immediately.
There is also scope for unilateral (unreciprocated) action.
The Commission recommends that the Australian
Government unilaterally remove restrictions on foreign
airlines’ access to secondary international airports
(airports other than Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and
Perth). Foreign airlines would still have to service these
cities within negotiated capacity, but would have greater





















This will not guarantee the start-up of services, but, along
with domestic codesharing and less restricted own-
stopover rights, could facilitate the development of new
and more innovative air services to regional Australia.
Regional economies and the tourism industry could
benefit, at little cost to Australian airlines.
Access to efficient airport infrastructure is essential for
efficient international air services. Much has been done to
reform Australian airports, but there is still significant
scope to increase efficiency through greater use of market
mechanisms.
Larger peak/off-peak price differentials for landing and
taking-off at capacity constrained airports would help to
allocate scarce airport infrastructure more efficiently.
Such pricing could even mean lower off-peak charges and
would reduce the need for new investment that is largely
required only for peak periods.
Recent changes to the operating and charging systems at
Sydney have reduced the scope for market mechanisms to
allocate scarce facilities at peak periods more efficiently.
Peak load pricing can easily operate in conjunction with
an airport slot management system, including the
reservation of slots for regional airlines.
There is also an in-principle argument in favour of
developing a formal market for landing and take-off slots
and terminal facilities, where capacity is a problem.
The Commission considers that there are a number of
issues relating to airport capacity, use, charges and access
which need further examination. It recommends that an
inquiry be held in conjunction with the review of the price
cap arrangements that is scheduled to be completed in
2001. The review should examine overall airport capacity
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During this inquiry, it became apparent that many
involved with international aviation in Australia did not
realise the extent to which Australia’s international
aviation policy has been liberalised already. Those
affected by international air services — such as State and
local governments, airports, the tourism and other user
industries — should be working more closely with DTRD
to improve Australia’s international air services. The
Commission recommends measures to improve DTRD’s
consultation processes and the transparency of policy.
Multiple designation has achieved significant benefits in
opening up a number of routes to greater competition. The
International Air Services Commission has played a
significant role, but its processes and guidelines could be
streamlined and simplified to provide a more certain
environment for airlines and lower administration and
compliance costs. The Commission recommends measures
to achieve this.
Australia should continue to support international efforts
through ICAO and other bodies to improve safety and
security on aircraft. Australia’s bilateral agreements
should also provide for enhanced safety accreditation
processes where the mutual recognition of safety
certification appears to be inadequate. Evidence presented
to this Inquiry has not convinced the Commission that














The Commission recommends that Australia should seek to negotiate
reciprocal ‘open skies’ agreements on a bilateral basis which would remove
restrictions on:
·  capacity and frequency to, from, between and beyond Australia and
the bilateral aviation partner;
·  codesharing on each other’s airlines;
·  routes, including points of access to the Australian and the bilateral
partner’s markets, intermediate and beyond points;
·  multiple designation of airlines by Australia and the bilateral partner;
·  ownership as a basis for airline designation; and
·  prices.
Such reciprocal agreements should also contain restrictions on government
subsidies where these are significant. Australia should also be prepared to
negotiate, on a case by case basis, removal of restrictions on cabotage and
the development of ‘stand alone’ services between the bilateral partners and
third countries (so called seventh freedom services).
Recommendation  9.5
Australia should invite like-minded countries to discuss the formation of an
open club of nations committed to liberalising international aviation
through a common plurilateral ‘open skies’ agreement.
Recommendation  9.6
The Australian Government should promote discussion within the WTO
membership to determine a process for including all air services in the
GATS.
Recommendation  9.1
The Australian Government should join with other like-minded
governments to have the ICAO Secretariat’s 1994 proposals to liberaliseINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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ownership and control requirements for national designation reconsidered
for adoption on a plurilateral or multilateral basis.
In the meantime, Australia’s own ASAs should be negotiated to incorporate
a more liberal means of designating airlines which does not rely on
ownership restrictions.
Recommendation  9.2
The Australian Government should invite neighbouring countries to
develop, and seek ICAO recognition for, a regional arrangement which
would enable relaxation of ownership and control criteria. Countries to be
considered should include New Zealand and the South Pacific Forum island
nations.
A regional reform package
Recommendation  9.4
As a step towards the further liberalisation of international air services, the
Commission recommends reforms to ASAs to benefit regional Australia,
encompassing both bilateral and unilateral elements:
Bilaterally, Australia should offer unlimited capacity to fly to all airports
other than Sydney, provided that Australian carriers are offered the same
routes on a reciprocal basis by their bilateral partners. The Australian
Government should take up the British offer of similar opportunities.
Unilaterally, Australia should offer, within negotiated capacity:
·  removal of restrictions on the number of points to be served and
designation of all cities in Australia other than Sydney, Melbourne,
Brisbane and Perth;
·  unrestricted rights for foreign airlines to codeshare to all points in
Australia on Australian domestic airlines; and
·  unrestricted rights for foreign airlines to carry their own-stopover
traffic.   RECOMMENDATIONS
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International Air Services Commission
Recommendation 7.1
Contested capacity should continue to be allocated by the IASC using a
public benefit test.
Recommendation 7.2
The objectives of the International Air Services Commission Act  1992
should be amended to:
‘enhance the welfare of Australians by promoting economic efficiency
through competition in the provision of international air services’.
Recommendation 7.3
The IASC should not be involved in assessing the viability of airlines, or
anticipating approvals by other government agencies.
Recommendation 7.4
When international capacity becomes available, or is applied for, it should
be advertised by DTRD.
Where an application for capacity is uncontested (that is, only one
applicant), or capacity is not constrained, the allocation of that capacity
should be approved automatically by DTRD.
It should be the responsibility of the airline to meet all other regulatory and
financial requirements before the commencement date.
Where an application is contested, the IASC should determine the
allocation of capacity.
Recommendation 7.5
Submissions should not be called for unless a contested allocation is
referred to the IASC.
Recommendation 7.6
The criteria used by the IASC to allocate contested capacity should be
simplified to focus on benefits from competition.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Recommendation 7.7
The start-up provisions should be removed from the Minister’s policy
statement.
Recommendation 7. 8
Capacity allocations should be made in perpetuity and the IASC should be
rigorous in enforcing the use-it-or-lose-it provisions.
Australia’s aviation policy and processes
Recommendation 5.1
The Commonwealth Government should publish, and keep up to date, a
statement of its aviation policy.
Recommendation 5.2
DTRD should develop a formal direct consultation process which
encompasses  all major interested parties to obtain their views on ASAs
being negotiated and ensure that it provides timely and informative
feedback on the outcomes of the ASA negotiation process.
Recommendation 5.3
An interdepartmental committee, chaired by DTRD, should be established
to consider and endorse all proposals relating to Australia’s air services
negotiating position. The committee should include the Departments of
Prime Minister and Cabinet, Treasury, Foreign Affairs and Trade, and
Industry Science and Tourism.
Recommendation 5.4
Confidentiality of ASAs should be limited strictly to those parts of the
arrangements specifically required by other governments. The reasons for
granting confidentiality of ASAs should be scrutinised closely. All other




The Commonwealth Government should commission an inquiry into airport
capacity, access and pricing in 2001. Such an inquiry should, at a
minimum, examine:
·  constraints that airports are imposing on Australia’s air services;
·  peak load pricing;
·  regulation of aeronautical charges;
·  the potential for the introduction of a market for slots; and
·  legislated access provisions.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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1 INTRODUCTION
International air services have developed within a complex web of regulations
under the framework of the Chicago Convention of 1944. The guiding
principles of this treaty are that each country has sovereignty over its own air
space and should have the opportunity to develop its own national airline
system.
Unlike most other forms of international trade and transport, which generally
are free unless specifically restricted, international air transport cannot occur
unless specifically authorised. This authorisation is accomplished through a
system of bilateral air services arrangements (ASAs) which grant the right to
various ‘freedoms of the air’ (Chapter 3).
There are over 3000 ASAs in operation worldwide, and Australia currently has
51 ASAs with its bilateral partners (DTRD sub. 33). The ASAs note in detail
the rights of each partner. They may specify not only the amount of capacity
allowed between the two countries, but also the frequency of flights, the type of
aircraft, the number of airlines which can be designated to fly, routes and
airports to be used, the intermediate and beyond points (and how they may be
used), and tariff setting mechanisms. They define both the opportunity for, and
the limits on, production and trade of international air services and competition
in the industry.
1.1 This inquiry
The Commonwealth Government asked the Productivity Commission to
examine the regulatory arrangements for Australia’s international air services,
their effects and policy options for greater liberalisation. The terms of reference
for the inquiry particularly direct the Commission to report on:
·  the structure and objectives of the regulatory framework in which
international air services operate;
·  the effects of the bilateral air services agreement framework on
competition in the global aviation market;
·  the effects of the bilateral air services agreement framework on
competition in Australia’s existing and potential international aviation
markets;INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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·  the effects of the International Air Services Commission (IASC) process of
allocating capacity entitlements;
·  the economy wide effects of the international aviation regulatory
framework and Australia’s approach to negotiating bilateral agreements;
·  the sectoral effects on tourism, consumers, air freight and the aviation
industry of the international aviation regulatory framework and Australia’s
approach to negotiating bilateral agreements; and
·  the scope, costs, benefits and economy wide effects of options for
liberalising and improving the current arrangements, both within and
outside the bilateral system.
This inquiry stems from the Government’s commitment — under the
Competition Principles Agreement — to review legislation that restricts
competition (Appendix B). Commonwealth, State and Territory governments in
April 1995 agreed to broaden the scope of competition policy and extend it to
previously exempt sectors of the economy. The inquiry is timely because
Australia has significantly changed its international air services policy in recent
years, including:
·  allowing more than one Australian carrier in Australia’s ASAs (multiple
designation);
·  relaxing restrictions on equity investment in Australian airlines;
·  removing restrictions to allow Australian carriers to develop integrated
domestic and international networks;
·  corporatising and privatising airlines, aviation services and airports; and
·  focusing on the interests of those affected by international air services,
including consumers, tourism operators, trade and regional interests as
well as the interests of Australian carriers.
The Australian and New Zealand governments implemented the Single Aviation
Market to allow airlines of Australia and New Zealand to fly unrestricted within
each other’s country and across the Tasman.
Further, there have been many developments in the international air services
market (such as the growth in global airline alliances) in the ten years since the
last extensive public inquiry on these matters (IAC 1989). In welcoming the
inquiry, a number of participants commented that it was appropriate given the
changes to the environment in which air services are operating, particularly on a
global basis.1   INTRODUCTION
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1.2 The Productivity Commission’s approach
This inquiry commenced at a time of transition for the Commission, as
indicated in the terms of reference. The inquiry was sent to the Industry
Commission under the Industry Commission Act 1989, pending parliamentary
passage of Bills to abolish the Industry Commission and to create the new
Productivity Commission. The Productivity Commission Act 1998 came into
force in April 1998, with the effect of changing the policy guidelines from those
applying at the start of the inquiry (Box 1.1).
Box 1.1 Factors the Commission must consider
The Commission, in undertaking this Inquiry, is bound by the Productivity Commission
Act 1998 to have regard for the need:
a)  to improve the overall economic performance of the economy through higher
productivity in the public and private sectors in order to achieve higher living standards
for all members of the Australian community; and
b) to reduce regulation of industry (including regulation by the States, Territories and
local government) where this is consistent with the social and economic goals of the
Commonwealth Government; and
c)  to encourage the development and growth of Australian industries that are efficient in
their use of resources, enterprising, innovative and internationally competitive; and
d)  to facilitate adjustment to structural changes in the economy and the avoidance of
social and economic hardships arising from those changes; and
e)  to recognise the interests of industries, employees, consumers and the community, likely
to be affected by measures proposed by the Commission; and
f)  to increase employment, including in regional areas; and
g)  to promote regional development; and
h)  to recognise the progress made by Australia’s trading partners in reducing both tariff
and non-tariff barriers; and
i)  to ensure that industry develops in a way that is ecologically sustainable; and
j)  for Australia to meet its international obligations and commitments.
Source: Productivity Commission Act 1998.
The terms of reference for this inquiry were necessarily framed in the context of
the Industry Commission’s policy guidelines, but they partly foreshadowed the
new legislation. They require evaluation not only of the economic effects of theINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
4
regulatory framework for international air services, including treaties,
legislation and subordinate legislation, but also of the efficiency and
effectiveness of various aspects of public administration.
The Commission’s approach to this inquiry has been to accommodate the likely
new requirements of the Productivity Commission Act at an early stage. The
new Act retains key features of the Industry Commission, including its economy
wide perspective, the powers of the Commission, the transparency of its
processes and the ability to protect information supplied on a commercial-in-
confidence basis. However, there are a number of differences. One relates to
econometric modelling.
Procedures were introduced to provide for independent scrutiny of econometric
modelling undertaken for this report in accordance with the Productivity
Commission Act. During the inquiry the Commission held several seminars to
explain its approach to the modelling and to seek comments from academics and
industry. The model is discussed in Appendix F. This modelling could not have
been undertaken without the support of the airline industry and the Department
of Transport and Regional Development. An independent reference panel was
appointed and the report of the reference panel is in Appendix G.
This inquiry is the Commission’s first review of legislation under the
Competition Principles Agreement. Thus, in addition to its own guidelines, the
Commission must account for the agreement’s requirements that legislation
should not restrict competition unless it can be demonstrated that:
·  the benefits of the restriction to the community as a whole outweigh the
costs; and
·  the objectives of the legislation can only be achieved by restricting
competition.
The Competition Principles Agreement also states that without limiting the
terms of reference of a review, the review should:
·  clarify the objectives of the legislation;
·  identify the nature of the restriction on competition;
·  analyse the likely effect of the restriction on competition and on the
economy generally;
·  assess and balance the costs and benefits of the restriction; and
·  consider alternative means for achieving the same result including non-
legislative approaches.
The Commission’s approach in this report reflects these various guidelines and
criteria, although they may not always be distinguishable.1   INTRODUCTION
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1.3 This report
The Commission has drawn on evidence from a range of sources, seeking input
from those with an interest in and knowledge of the international air transport
industry and its regulatory framework. On 18 June 1998 the Commission
released a draft report, and invited comment on the draft recommendations
contained in the report.
Over the life of the inquiry the Commission received 81 submissions from
Commonwealth and State governments and agencies, airlines, airports, unions
and Australian and international industry organisations. The Commission also
held two sets of public hearings before and after the release of the draft report.
The Commission has benefited from visiting many interested parties around
Australia for discussions. It also visited relevant international organisations,
governments and airlines in Singapore, Switzerland, Belgium, the United
Kingdom, the United States, Canada and New Zealand (Appendix A).
The Commission is pleased with the support for this inquiry from across the air
transport and tourism sectors and from governments and their agencies. The
Commission thanks participants for the effort, thoroughness and thoughtfulness
of their submissions, and for their unstinting assistance and courtesy during the
preparation of this report.
In this report, the Australian and world airline industries (Chapter 2) and the
regulatory framework in which they operate (Chapter 3) are described. Chapter
4 examines the international trends towards liberalisation and recent changes to
Australia’s aviation policy, both domestically and internationally. The
objectives of the Commonwealth Government’s existing aviation policy
(Chapter 5) are reviewed and the effects of the current regulatory system on the
airline industry, consumers, user industries (such as tourism) and the economy
as a whole are examined (Chapter 6).
The IASC and the allocation of capacity under multiple designation (Chapter 7),
and access to airport infrastructure (Chapter 8) are considered. Options for
reform and the Commission’s recommendations are provided in Chapter 9.7
2 THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
The airline industry has grown rapidly, with world traffic more than trebling
over the past two decades.1 The industry is changing structurally as it grows.
Where it was once composed predominantly of national flag carriers flying on a
point-to-point basis, many airlines are now seeking to form alliances both as a
way of overcoming some of the constraints of the regulatory system, and to
develop global networks offering users a ‘seamless’ international service.
Despite these changes the profitability of the worldwide industry generally has
been poor.
It is against this background that the Australian air transport market has been
through a dramatic transformation. Australia is on the rim of what has been the
fastest growing region in world air transport and has shared in the rapid growth
in international air traffic, with the number of overseas visitor arrivals to
Australia nearly trebling over the past decade. The recent Asian downturn has
curbed this growth to some extent, and is providing new challenges for
Australian and Asian airlines to respond to changing market circumstances.
Significant liberalisation of Australia’s ASAs has led to increased competition
on many routes into and out of Australia. This has occurred in a variety of
ways, including multiple designation of airlines and the entry of third country
carriers including those carrying passengers and freight from third countries to
Australia via their own country.
This chapter examines the place of Australia’s airlines in the world aviation
market place and the economic characteristics of the global aviation industry.
2.1 Australian airlines in the global airline industry
Approximately 1 200 airlines operate scheduled services worldwide, of which
some 300 fly internationally (Hanlon 1996; OECD 1997). Almost every country
in the world has its own national airline, with the United States having five of
the eight largest airlines in terms of revenue. The largest, American Airlines,
                                            
1  The main focus of this Inquiry is on scheduled international air services — that is, those that
operate to a published timetable. However, non-scheduled services, which include charter
services, are also considered. Airlines that operate scheduled services are referred to as
scheduled airlines, although many also operate some non-scheduled services.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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earned around $US18.6 billion in revenue in 1997, carrying around 81 million
passengers on 641 aircraft and employing 111 500 staff (Table 2.1).
Australia has five designated international airlines currently flying: Qantas,
Ansett International2, National Jet Systems, Asian Express and Flight West.
In 1997, Qantas operated a domestic and international fleet of 148 aircraft
(Table  2.1) and flew to 29 countries (sub.  25,  p.  3). Ansett International
commenced international operations in September 1993 and was operating
services to six Asian countries in March 1998 (sub.  42,  p.  15). It operates a
small fleet of aircraft in its own right, but also draws on aircraft operated by the
affiliated domestic operator, Ansett Australia. Together the two Ansett
companies operate a domestic and international fleet of 106 aircraft. National
Jet Systems is the third international scheduled passenger airline to operate out
of Australia in recent times. Predominantly a regional airline within the
Australian domestic market, National Jet Systems started scheduled
international services in January 1996 transporting passengers and freight
between Australia (including Christmas Island) and Indonesia and Singapore.
Asian Express operates a dedicated freight service to New Zealand, and Flight
West recently gained approval to operate services to Papua New Guinea.
Qantas and the Ansett group are significant airlines on a world scale, ranking
fifteenth and twenty-ninth respectively in terms of revenue in 1997 (Table 2.1).
Qantas was the third largest airline — behind Japan Airlines and All Nippon
Airways — in the Asia–Pacific region in 1997, while Ansett ranked ninth in the
region (Airline Business 1998).3 They are also significant employers, with a
combined workforce of over 47  000 people in 1997. In terms of full time
equivalent persons, employment at Qantas has grown from 25 000 in 1992–93,
the first year in which Qantas and Australian Airlines operated as a merged
entity, to 30 000 in 1997.
                                            
2 British Airways acquired a 25  per  cent stake in Qantas from the Commonwealth
Government in 1993. Qantas merged with Australian Airlines in that year. The
Commonwealth sold its remaining share of Qantas by public float in July 1995. Ansett
Holdings Limited, the holding company of the Ansett Australia group, is owned by Air New
Zealand (50 per cent) and News Limited (50 per cent). Ansett Holdings owns 49 per cent of
Ansett International, and via a joint venture company (International Airlines Investment
Holdings Limited), AMP and County Natwest own 51 per cent.
3  Where possible, this inquiry, has used the most reliable, authoritative and up-to-date data
available. It uses ICAO, DTRD and BTCE sources, along with more recent data sources
such as the Airline Business survey of the world’s 100 airlines. Confidentiality constraints
mean that many ABS data are not sufficiently disaggregated for use in the Inquiry.2   THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
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Qantas is substantially larger than the Ansett group, mainly as a result of its
much larger international business. In 1996–97, Qantas carried approximately
16.3  million passengers on scheduled services of whom 6.7  million
(41 per cent) were international passengers (Qantas 1997). International services
contributed over half of the Qantas group earnings (before interest and tax) of
$517  million in 1996–97 (Qantas 1997). In 1996–97, Ansett carried
13.5 million passengers, of whom over 700 000 were international passengers
(Ansett 1997). On this basis, international operations represented around
5 per cent of total Ansett group operations.4






US$ million million no. no.
1 American Airlines 18 570 81.00 111 500 641
2 United Airlines 17 378 84.20 91 779 575
3 Federal Express 15 872 0.00 114 636 609
4 British Airways 14 184 40.96 60 575 330
5 Delta Air Lines 13 590 101.15 63 441 543
6 Lufthansa 13 354 44.40 58 204 326
7 Northwest Airlines 10 226 54.70 50 000 405
8 Air France group 10 185 33.50 46 385 200
9 Japan Airlines 9 936 31.36 18 127 137
10 All Nippon Airways 8 798 40.83 15 200 139
...
15 Qantas 6 131 18.61 30 080 148
...
29 Ansett Australia 2 538 11.52 17067 106
a Data for some airlines — in particular Japan Airlines and All Nippon Airways — appear to contain
inconsistencies vis a vis those of other airlines with respect to implied employee and fleet productivity. It would
seem that the data are not collected on a consistent basis across airlines.
Source: Airline Business (1998).
                                            
4 Figures used are total revenue passengers uplifted.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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2.1.1 Passengers
Worldwide, 1996 saw scheduled airlines fly over 2000  billion domestic and
international revenue passenger-kilometres (RPKs).5 Airlines registered in the
United States accounted for over one third of this total world traffic
(ICAO 1996b).
In 1996, Australian airlines were the sixth largest in the world in RPK terms,
although they accounted for only 3 per cent of total world RPKs (Figure 2.1).
They carried around 43 per cent of the approximately 14.1 million passengers
flown to and from Australia6 in 1997 — Qantas having 38.5 per cent and Ansett
International around 4.4 per cent (DTRD unpublished). The Australian market
for international air passenger services is discussed in more detail in
Appendix C.
Figure 2.1 Scheduled air passenger traffic by country of airline
registration, 1996















                                            
5 This is a measure of demand based on the number of paying passengers on an aircraft
multiplied by the number of kilometres flown.
6  ‘Revenue’ passengers on scheduled flights. Excludes ‘non-revenue’ passengers (those who
paid less than 25 per cent of the standard air fare as defined by ICAO) and passengers on
charter flights. No separate data are available for the number of passengers on charter
flights, but in 1997 the capacity of charter flights approved was 98,000. Actual passengers
carried would have been less than this number.2   THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
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2.1.2 Freight
Freight is a relatively small part of the world’s scheduled air traffic and is often
a by-product of passenger services. Freight represented 28  per  cent of total
traffic by weight and earned 11 per cent of total revenue in 1996. Mail traffic
(which with freight makes up ‘air cargo’) comprises even smaller shares of total
weight carried and revenue earned at 2 and 1 per cent respectively (Table 2.2).








a Passenger revenue-tonne-kilometres include baggage. Excludes domestic operations within the Commonwealth
of Independent States. Data include both domestic and international flights.
Source: ICAO (forthcoming).
Scheduled airlines flew 89  billion freight tonne-kilometres in 1996
(ICAO 1997).7 Worldwide, around 60 per cent of this world traffic was carried
in the holds of passenger aircraft, with the remainder being flown on dedicated
freight services. US airlines accounted for the largest share (at around one
quarter) of freight (Figure 2.2).
Australian airlines carried around 2  per  cent of total global freight traffic in
1996, placing them tenth in the world (a lower place on the world ladder than
for passenger traffic) (Figure  2.2). Australia’s international airlines (mainly
Qantas) carried approximately 31 per cent of total Australian freight traffic in
and out of the country in 1996. Australia has a considerable imbalance in
freight, with inbound (import) freight far exceeding outbound (export) freight in
terms of both the value of the freight and the revenue earned on that freight. As
a consequence, Australian export freight rates are very low, reflecting marginal
rather than full costs (Chapter 6).
                                            
7 A freight tonne-kilometre refers to a metric tonne of freight or mail carried one kilometre.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Figure 2.2 Scheduled air freight, by country of airline registration,
1996
















Non-scheduled services (including charter) are performed by both scheduled
airlines and non-scheduled airlines. They comprised only 10  per  cent and
15  per  cent of total world passenger and freight traffic respectively in 1996
(ICAO forthcoming). Scheduled airlines carry more charter traffic and earn
more charter revenue than non-scheduled operators (Table 2.3).








Scheduled airlines 54 59 59
Non-scheduled operators 46 41 41
Total 100 100 100
Note: Data include international and domestic traffic. ICAO advises that the data for scheduled operators are
relatively unreliable because of poor reporting for this type of operation.
Source: ICAO (forthcoming).
Data for the analysis of charter traffic by country are available for scheduled
airlines only. These carriers generally use charter services to explore new2   THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
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markets or to cater for special events. Airlines registered in the United Kingdom
— carrying predominantly leisure travellers on inclusive holiday packages —
accounted for the largest share of the passenger charter market in 1996 (in
terms of revenue passenger kilometres). US carriers dominated the global
market for freight charter services (Table 2.4).
Table 2.4 Charter traffic carried by scheduled airlines, 1996
a











1 United Kingdom 28,015 1 United States 5,581
2 Germany 20,398 2 Russian Federation 1,190
3 United States 13,989 3 Netherlands 900
4 Russian Federation 12,590 4 Korea, Republic of 420
5 Spain 11,505 5 United Kingdom 211
6 Indonesia 6,929 6 Germany 153
7 China 4,179 7 Brazil 109
8 Netherlands 3,659 8 Israel 104
9 France 2,844 9 China 67
10 Switzerland 2,752 10 Ukraine 37
World total 138 756 World total 9 030
Australia 10 Australia 3
a These data are for both domestic and international services.
Source: ICAO (forthcoming).
Australian scheduled airlines’ share of world charter traffic is very small, with
less than one tenth of one per cent of the total passenger and freight markets in
1996. The number of freight charter flights (by scheduled and non-scheduled
airlines) to and from Australia grew significantly between 1992 and 1995 from
375 to 720 (DTRD 1996).8 However, passenger and freight charter traffic by
scheduled airlines decreased markedly from 1995 to 1996. Passenger charter
traffic decreased from 53.2  million RPKs in 1995 (ICAO 1996b) to only
10.0 million in 1996 (Table 2.4). The volume of charter traffic in the Australian
market is therefore not only very small relative to world charter traffic, but on
the basis of data available, highly variable.
                                            
8 There has been a decline in both passenger and freight charter capacity approved since 1995
(Appendix C).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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2.2 Growth and distribution of world air traffic
Air transport is a high growth industry, although the rate of growth has been
slowing as the industry becomes larger and more mature, and recently because
of the Asian crisis (Figure 2.3). Factors contributing to sustained growth in
traffic include economic growth, the growth in international trade and the
declining real cost of air travel (Doganis 1991). Demand characteristics of air
travel are discussed in Section 2.3.


















































Average annual growth of total TKP
Note: A tonne-kilometre performed (TKP) is one tonne of revenue load (passenger, freight or mail) carried for one
kilometre. The data for non-scheduled airlines are rough estimates due to poor reporting for this type of
operations.
Source: ICAO (forthcoming).
Growth was particularly rapid in the 1960s and 1970s. Average growth rates in
terms of tonne-kilometres performed fell from an average of 12 per cent per
year at that time to around 8  per  cent per year in the early 1980s
(ICAO various). They fell further to around 5 per cent per year between 1986
and 1995, declining strongly during the economic recession of the early 1990s.
Tensions in the Middle East (which culminated in the Gulf War) discouraged
many people from flying. The industry actually contracted in 1991. Traffic has
expanded since, and grew at between 4 and almost 10 per cent annually
between 1992 and 1996 (Figure 2.3). However, growth is slowing again as a
result of the recent Asian currency crisis (Box 2.1).2   THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
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Box 2.1 Implications of the Asian currency crisis
In 1997–98, several economies in East Asia experienced a currency crisis, as the
currencies of Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and the Republic of Korea
rapidly depreciated against the US dollar and other currencies, including the Australian
dollar.
This has led to slower growth, or even contraction, for several Asian economies. Demand
for international air services has fallen, and may fall further. Preliminary figures for the
year between March 1997 and March 1998 show a 12 per cent drop in the total number of
short term overseas visitors to Australia. Overseas visitor arrivals from Asia declined
approximately 29.5 per cent over the same period (China was the notable exception).
South East Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) accounted for
approximately 30 per cent of the fall, leaving North East Asia (China, Japan, the Republic
of Korea and Taiwan) accounting for 70 per cent. By country, the largest declines in
overseas visitors came from the Republic of Korea (84 per cent), Thailand (66 per cent),
Indonesia (57 per cent) and the Philippines (42 per cent). Japan, Australia’s largest source
of inbound short term visitors (at around 20 per cent) experienced a decline of 17 per cent
(ABS 1998).
This fall in Asian air travel has affected many international carriers. The Republic of
Korea’s two airlines, Korean Airlines and Asiana, have seen significant reductions in
domestic and international service load factors. These and other airlines, such as Air New
Zealand, Garuda Indonesia, Qantas and Ansett International, have reduced the number of
international services in the region. Philippines Airlines ceased services to Australia
altogether, Qantas responding by virtually doubling its own capacity on the route (Box
4.3). New aircraft orders have been deferred or cancelled.
Most of the growth of air traffic from 1986 to 1996 occurred in scheduled
international air traffic (Figure 2.3). Representing 46 per cent of world traffic in
1986, scheduled international services increased their share to 58 per cent in
1996. Non-scheduled services have grown rapidly too, although from a low
base.
The high growth rates in world international traffic mask differences in growth
from one part of the world to another (Table  2.5). Asian airlines had until
recently experienced growth rates well above the world average, whereas
growth in Africa has been more modest. The rapid growth of Asian airlines,
such as Cathay Pacific, Malaysia Airlines and Singapore Airlines changed the
structure of the industry. Carrying not much more than 10  per  cent of the
world’s international passenger and freight traffic in 1975, Asian airlines
accounted for over 30 per cent of traffic in 1996. The position of European andINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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other non-US airlines was eroded significantly: overall, European airlines’ share
of international traffic fell from just over half of the world’s total in 1975 to
around 35 per cent in 1996 (ICAO various).
Table 2.5 Growth and distribution of scheduled international
traffic, 1986 to 1996














Europe 34.8 9.0 33.1 7.1
Africa 3.4 5.6 1.8 3.8
Middle East 4.5 6.0 5.2 9.0
Asia–Pacific 30.6 10.2 37.7 11.4
North America 21.0 8.9 18.0 13.4
Latin America and
Caribbean
5.7 7.2 4.2 7.6
World 100.0 8.6 100.0 9.2
Source: ICAO (various).
One factor in the variation in growth rates by region is that regions are at
different stages of economic development (Hanlon 1996). The relatively rapid
growth in the international traffic carried by Asian airlines was associated with
an increase in the level of economic activity and personal income in the region.
Despite being in a mature growth stage, North American airlines have
maintained relatively high growth rates in international traffic (Table 2.5). This
growth has been associated with the expansion of previously domestic US
airlines into international markets following domestic deregulation in the 1980s
(Doganis 1991).
2.3 Growth in Australia’s international air transport industry
Growth of international passenger and freight traffic carried to and from
Australia has been rapid, with average annual growth rates of 8.1 per cent and
7.8 per cent respectively between 1986 and 1996 (ICAO various). Despite being
rapid in absolute terms, these rates were lower than the global averages, and
those achieved in the major markets of North America and the Asia–Pacific
region.2   THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
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2.3.1 Traffic carried to and from Australia
The number of passengers carried to and from Australia more than doubled
between 1986 and 1997 (Figure  2.4), with the number of overseas visitors
increasing at an average annual rate of 11.1 per cent. Traffic to and from South
East Asian countries and Japan grew most strongly. Taking a holiday was the
main purpose of overseas visitors to Australia in 1997 (accounting for
59  per  cent of all visitors), followed by visiting friends and relatives
(19 per cent) and business (10 per cent).
The number of Australian residents travelling overseas has also grown,
increasing at an average annual rate of 6.1  per  cent between 1986 to 1997.
Taking a holiday was the main reason for Australians travelling overseas in
1996, accounting for 47 per cent of all departures in 1996, followed by visiting
friends and relatives (24 per cent) and business (18 per cent).


































From a significantly lower base, freight has also grown considerably
(Figure 2.5). The value of inbound air freight grew by an average of 9 per cent
per year between 1988–89 and 1996–97. Outbound air freight grew by an
average of 12 per cent per annum over the same period.
The Australian international air transport industry and markets are discussed
further in Appendix C.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Figure 2.5 Value of air freight carried annually to and from
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Around 70 per cent of total (scheduled and unscheduled) passenger traffic to
and from Australia in the year ended April 1998 occurred between Australia and
ten foreign countries (Table 2.6). The trans-Tasman route attracted the highest
volume of passenger traffic, reflecting New Zealand’s proximity to Australia as
well as family, cultural and trade links. Fifteen  per  cent of Australia’s total
international passenger traffic in the year ended April 1998 was between
Australia and New Zealand. Asian countries feature prominently among the top
ten, particularly Japan. Indeed, if traffic were measured only in terms of
inbound passenger numbers, Japan would be the most important market. The
United States and the United Kingdom are also major markets.2   THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
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Table 2.6 Passengers to and from Australia by foreign economy,
year ended April 1998
a
Between Australia and: Passengers Proportion of total
New Zealand 2 236 516 15.1
Japan 1 723 710 11.6
United Kingdom 1 591 425 10.7
United States 1 402 831 9.5
Indonesia 930 967 6.3
Singapore 747 515 5.0
Hong Kong 608 148 4.1
Malaysia 483 403 3.3
Taiwan 375 385 2.5
Korea, Republic of 369 070 2.5
Other countries 4 335 552 29.3
All countries 14 804 522 100.0
a These are origin-destination data which show the number of passengers who commence or finish their journeys
in the foreign countries listed.
Source: DTRD (unpublished)
2.4 Demand characteristics of air travel
Air travel is a means to an end, not an end in itself. People travel in order to
undertake business at their destination, to visit friends and relatives or have a
holiday. Air freight is also an intermediate product. Thus, the demand for air
services is derived from the demand for the products of business and leisure
activity and the need to deliver freight rapidly and in a time sensitive manner.
Many factors influence the consumption of passenger air services, particularly
airfares and income (broadly defined). Other influences on demand include
population growth, the social environment, attitudes to travel, and quality
factors such as the speed, safety and convenience of air travel (Doganis 1991).
Particularly important is the type of traveller. Air passengers can be broadly
divided into two categories:
·  leisure passengers, who include holiday travellers and those visiting
friends and relatives; and
·  business passengers.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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For a study of the Australian industry each of these can be further subdivided
into:
·  inbound and outbound foreign passengers;
·  inbound and outbound Australian passengers;
·  third country foreign passengers who travel on an Australian airline
between foreign airports; and
·  Australian passengers flying between foreign airports on a foreign airline.
The demand for air travel is not a demand for a single product, even over a
given route. Hence, provision of a range of services can meet a variety of types
of demand. For example, demand would be expected to respond positively to
higher frequencies over a given route as business travellers are induced to make
trips that would not otherwise have been convenient. Some passengers want
cheap ‘no-frills’ service, others want more expensive but more attentive service.
There has been considerable research on the characteristics of the demand for
international air services. The general consensus is that the demand for airline
travel is highly elastic with respect to income, but generally somewhat less
elastic with respect to fares (for example, BTCE 1995).
2.4.1 Income elasticity
A community’s rising level of income stimulates the demand for air travel in
two main ways, a rise in private disposable incomes leads to higher expenditure
on leisure travel and higher economic activity increases the demand for business
travel.
Both historical and cross sectional data show the high responsiveness of air
travel to income (Hanlon 1996). Worldwide demand for air travel has grown
much faster than Gross Domestic Product, both because of rising incomes and a
decline in the real costs of air travel. The rapid growth of air services in the
Asia Pacific region in recent years is partly attributed to rapidly rising incomes
in those countries. But worldwide demand has also fluctuated markedly with
cyclical changes in world income. The worldwide recession of the early 1990’s
contributed to a decline in air travel in 1991, the first time this had occurred
(Figure 2.3). Similarly slowing or negative rates of growth in many Asian
countries have already contributed to reductions in international air travel in the
region (Box 2.1).
Evidence from domestic and international studies suggest that the income
elasticity of demand for international air services is of the order of 2, meaning a
1 per cent increase in income will result in a 2 per cent increase in the demand2   THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
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for air services (Tretheway and Oum 1992). More specific evidence for the
Australian market suggests that inbound leisure travel may be highly sensitive to
income, and that there are large differences between countries in the
responsiveness of air travel to Australia to changes in income (BTCE 1995).
These differences may be attributable to both the level and distribution of
income in each country. Thus, a rise in average income may not have as great
an effect if income is distributed unevenly.
The rapid growth in air travel over many years raises questions about the
maturity of markets and when saturation might be reached. This will vary from
market to market, but it is apparent that in many cases considerable latent
demand still exists. In some ways air travel is still a ‘young’ growing market —
there are many potential customers who have not yet travelled internationally,
or who have done so only to a limited extent. Even in the United States and the
United Kingdom there are large proportions of the population who rarely if ever
fly (Hanlon 1996). Income growth is therefore expected to continue to have a
major influence on the demand for air travel, particularly in developing
countries.
2.4.2 Price elasticity
Changes in the consumption of air travel are also attributable to changes in air
fares, although business travel is generally less sensitive to changes in air fares
than leisure travel. This is partly because business travellers often need to fly at
short notice to specific destinations, and usually at company rather than
personal expense.
Leisure travel is more discretionary, usually at personal expense and is often
planned well ahead. Many leisure travellers are visiting friends or relatives, and
so have a specific destination, but others may choose between multiple
destinations. Further, expenditure on leisure travel is discretionary, so it
competes with expenditure on many other goods and services such as home
entertainment systems, swimming pools and restaurant dining. Given the many
possible substitutes, leisure travellers tend to be sensitive to changes in the
overall costs of travel. As the airfare is only a part of the overall cost of a trip,
the demand for air services will be less price elastic than the demand for
tourism as a whole, particularly where alternative modes of travel are limited, as
they are to and from Australia. Like many other international transactions, the
demand for travel is also sensitive to changes in costs induced by changes in the
exchange rate.
Airlines are able to influence demand for their services through loyalty
programs such as frequent flyer schemes. The key to frequent flyer programs isINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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being able to offer customers a large and useful network, so such programs are
often a feature of alliances between airlines. Members of Ansett’s frequent flyer
program, for example, can accrue and redeem frequent flyer points when
travelling on services operated by eleven international airlines (sub. 19, p. 21).
Specific evidence of the degree to which consumption of air services responds
to changes in airfares is varied. Gillen, Harris and Oum (1997) note that most
‘... studies indicate an elasticity with respect to price of less than -1 for business
travel and an upper range elasticity for leisure travellers of -1.65 (p. 45) They
adopted a median value of -1.35 in their modelling of the effects of
liberalisation on air services in Canada. The Bureau of Transport and
Communication Economics (BTCE 1995) estimated price elasticities of demand
for inbound (to Australia) and outbound (from Australia) leisure and business
travellers. While these estimates may be questioned on various grounds, and
vary markedly from one country to the next and between inbound and outbound
travel, they are relatively consistent in showing the demand for leisure travel to
be considerably more price elastic than the demand for business travel
(Appendix F).
The price elasticity of demand will vary with market characteristics. For
example, an inbound market dominated by tourists might be particularly price
sensitive where other destinations are close substitutes for Australia. On the
other hand, where air fares are part of a total travel package, demand for air
travel may be relatively unresponsive to price. This is because the price of the
airfare is disguised, and may be a relatively small component of the cost of the
total package (which could also include accommodation, meals and tours among
other things). Japanese and Korean tourists are often cited as examples, and this
is supported by the relatively low (in absolute terms) elasticities of demand
estimated by the BTCE for tourists from those countries (Appendix E)
Changes in the mix of travellers over time and across regions have important
implications for airline pricing and average yields. For example, business travel
by Australian residents has been growing faster than leisure travel, meaning that
the overall demand for air travel by Australian residents may be becoming more
price inelastic (Appendix C). However, leisure travel far exceeds business
travel, and at the global level is growing faster (Hanlon 1996). To the extent
that this is reflected in Australia’s inbound traffic, the demand may be
becoming more price elastic over time.
2.4.3 Non price effects
Non-price characteristics are also important influences on demand, especially
for business travellers. Airlines attempt to differentiate themselves by offering2   THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
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different non-price benefits such as frequency and convenience of service,
access to airport lounges and quality of in-flight service. The perceived safety
record of airlines can also be a major marketing advantage for airlines in
competing for customers. Qantas claimed that non-price factors:
... aim to make the journey easier, safer and more comfortable for passengers and
are a competitive response by airlines. Improvements can be seen in terms of
improved schedules, ease of purchase, and service on the ground and in the air
(sub. 25, p. 14).
Evidence suggests that airlines take advantage of the price insensitivity of
business travellers by charging high prices and compete instead through non-
price attributes. Qantas (sub.  25) claimed that leisure travellers are also
becoming more sensitive to these non-price factors especially service, frequency
and convenience of connections.
2.4.4 Yield management
Airline tickets are non-transferable in principle. They are in practice
significantly less transferable for international flights than for domestic flights,
but electronic ticketing (which requires personal identification) is tending to
make domestic tickets less transferable. Non-transferability helps airlines to
segment markets. Not only can they offer a substantial differentiation of product
on the one aircraft (by offering different classes of travel, conditions of advance
purchase and cancellation and so on), but they can also charge different prices
for similar seats on an aircraft. Airlines can tailor prices to classes of customers
and, for price inelastic customers, set fares significantly above the marginal or
average costs of supplying the service. Thus business class fares are higher than
economy class fares both because they provide passengers with a higher
standard of service, and because business class users are often unable to avoid
booking (and altering reservations) at short notice and are prepared to pay for
this convenience.
Given enough knowledge about the preferences of different groups of travellers,
and the use of powerful computer reservations systems (CRSs), airlines can
vary the price almost continuously — both across classes of passengers and
over time — as a means of increasing yields. Yield management systems
operate in parallel with the use of consolidators (or wholesalers) to provide
consumers with a wide choice of carriers, prices, routes and times.
These techniques may raise some concerns about anticompetitive behaviour,
and may appear inequitable when different travellers are charged different
prices for similar seats on the same flight. Further, the development of more
sophisticated yield management systems based on personal travel andINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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expenditure preferences, and the vertical integration of airlines and travel agents
may act to constrain transparency and consumer choice.
There are however, some economic and social advantages of price
discrimination. It may enhance economic efficiency: given that the marginal
cost of carrying an extra passenger is well below average cost, price
discrimination allows the airline to cover its fixed costs with highly priced
business and economy fares and still cover marginal costs with its discounted
fares. Price discrimination also has some equity advantages: it allows travel by
some who would be unable to afford the airfare under uniform pricing and it
may allow the operation of some flights that otherwise would not be viable.
However, some passengers will pay more — often significantly more — than
they would if uniform pricing applied.
Like other commercial airlines, the major Australian airlines use sophisticated
yield management systems to improve yields and overall efficiency. Qantas
noted that it:
... has invested heavily in staff, product standards and yield management systems
to ensure that its efficiency objectives are met (sub. 25, p. 20).
Air New Zealand also stated that:
Yield management systems continue to be used within alliances, with benefits to
both airlines and consumers. Airlines maximise the use of their capacity, and
consumers get access to the lowest market fares (sub. 6, p. 6).
2.5 The demand for freight
Air transport plays a significant role in the movement of high-value and/or time-
sensitive freight and mail. Timely and efficient air freight services can help
Australian firms compete with rivals for export markets and facilitate imports of
inputs. It is an increasingly important means of global implementation of just-
in-time inventory management systems. Inadequate air links can hold back trade
and investment relationships.
More than 90 per cent of Australian international air freight is carried in the
belly-holds of passenger aircraft. Because freight carriage on many routes is
essentially a by-product of the carriage of passengers, charges can be very low,
essentially related to the marginal fuel cost of carrying extra weight.
Less than 10 per cent of Australia’s international air freight is carried in
dedicated freighter aircraft, operated predominantly by foreign airlines.
Dedicated freight services operate overnight across the Tasman and to Asia, the
United States and Europe.2   THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
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Air freighted imports consist mostly of high-value, high-tech manufactured
goods, such as computers and other electronic goods, whereas exports are
dominated by perishable primary products of much lower market value.
Demand tends to be highly price elastic where low value to weight cargo is
concerned, restricting airlines’ ability to raise tariffs even on routes with limited
competition. The consequence is that these export commodities attract amongst
the world’s lowest rates for carriage by air (sub. 25, p. 5). For example, freight
rates ex-Australia to Tokyo can be as low as $1.32 per kilogram, and those to
Singapore $0.53 per kilogram (HRSC 1996, p. 6).
As freight into Australia has a much higher value per kilogram, and there is a
greater demand for space, freight rates are higher. Import freight rates to Sydney
from Tokyo and Singapore are reported as being $12.44 per kilogram and $5.82
per kilogram respectively (HRSC 1996, p. 6).
Freight charges for dedicated freight services and ad hoc freight charters need to
cover the full costs of operating aircraft, at least on average. Australia’s
typically high value to weight import cargo can support some dedicated
services, but most of its perishable primary product exports cannot. The
inability of many exporters to meet the cost of providing dedicated air freight
capacity means that many dedicated freighters leave Australia empty to collect
higher yielding freight from alternative sources. Having brought freight into
Australia, a freighter may fly empty from Sydney to Singapore to pick up cargo,
then fly on to Tokyo. Freight operators would be reluctant to carry low value,
low return freight if it compromised their ability to carry high value high return
freight on a subsequent leg. Expanding on the example given, a freight operator
may be reluctant to carry primary produce from Australia to Tokyo via
Singapore if it meant that yields on the Singapore to Tokyo leg were reduced
substantially.
2.6 The economics of airlines
The production and cost characteristics of international airlines have important
implications for industry structure and the competitiveness of Australia’s
airlines. If large airlines can achieve significantly lower costs through
economies of scale and scope, the consequences of liberalisation may be
profound, especially for smaller carriers. Airlines are also only one part of a
larger air transport industry which includes aircraft manufacturers, aircraft
lessors, airports, travel agents, ground handlers, caterers, and computer
reservation systems service suppliers. Competitive outcomes at one level may
depend closely on vertical linkages between firms operating at different levels
within the industry.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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2.6.1 Economies of network size and traffic density
The size of an airline’s network (economies of network size) and the traffic
flows over that network (economies of traffic density) influence airline costs.
As networks become larger, the number of possible city-pairs rises
exponentially. The required fleet of aircraft also increases rapidly. Average cost
will decrease to the extent that fixed costs can be spread over a greater quantity
and variety of output. For example, airlines can reduce their average in-house
engineering and maintenance costs as they increase their fleet of aircraft
(Qantas sub. 25, p. 16). Similarly the Ansett group and Air New Zealand are
looking at ways of rationalising their respective maintenance facilities in
Australia and New Zealand to benefit from economies of scale (Thomas 1998).
Lower engineering and maintenance costs per aircraft translate into lower costs
per unit of output. And economies may be achieved as the number of city pairs
increases, by sharing some overhead costs (such as information technology
systems) over the increased range of products. Thus, economies of network size
encompass both of the more traditional concepts of economies of scale and
scope.
Oum and Zhang (1997) suggested that mildly increasing returns to scale may
derive from operating characteristics such as load factor, stage length, network
size and scale of outputs. If an airline’s average length of haul increases as its
network grows, for example, the average cost per RPK can fall as the airline can
take advantage of larger aircraft and fewer intermediate stops
(Oum and Zhang 1997).
Economies associated with traffic density can be significant and may help
explain the development of hub and spoke systems in many markets. Economies
of traffic density occur when increasing the amount of traffic on an existing
route leads to lower unit costs. Unit costs decrease when the size of the aircraft
used increases, the number of seats filled on an aircraft rises and fixed indirect
costs are spread over more passengers and freight. These unit costs include
route-specific costs such as ticketing, sales, promotion and terminal lease or
ownership costs.
Empirical studies of the United States and Canadian domestic passenger
markets suggest that there are significant economies associated with traffic
density (Caves, Christensen and Tretheway 1984; Gillen, Oum and Tretheway
1985). Caves, Christensen and Tretheway (1984) estimated that a one per cent
increase in the number of passengers would increase total costs by only 0.8 per
cent. Another study found that costs of US airlines decreased by 0.1 per cent
cost for a 1 per cent increase in the use of hub and spoke routing (McShan and
Windle 1989).2   THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
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An airline may be able to operate a hub and spoke system better as it grows and
develops a larger network. By channelling traffic through hubs, economies of
traffic density may be achieved. Thus, economies of network size and density
may be achieved simultaneously. ‘Hubbing’ significantly reduces the number of
aircraft required to join city-pairs, albeit with connections through the hub
(Figure 2.6).
Figure 2.6 Hub and spoke routes and linear routes
Hub-and-spoke routes  Linear routes
10 routes, linked to a hub 5 linear routes, allows only 5
allows up to 45 city-pairs to be serviced city-pairs to be serviced
Source: Based on Hanlon (1996).
The degree to which Australian airlines can benefit from economies of network
size and density is influenced by their networks, by geography and by the
regulatory structure. This can involve the integration of regional feeder airlines,
and the domestic and international components of their businesses. Hubbing
through Sydney allows Qantas and Ansett to draw together international
travellers in the one spot and operate their subsequent international legs more
efficiently. It is more difficult for the Australian airlines to develop efficient
hubbing practices in other countries, though some cases exist. Qantas uses
Singapore as a hub for combining passenger flows from different Australian
cities, then to operate beyond services to Europe.
Qantas stated that future economies of size:
... are likely to be achieved internally through the granting of fifth and seventh























Qantas-British Airways lounges in Bangkok, Los Angeles, Singapore, Hong Kong
and Manila derive economies of density advantages (sub. 25, p. 16).
Ansett International also stands to gain from economies of network size and
density. A relatively new entrant to international travel, Ansett International has
yet to develop an extensive international network in its own right and (other
things being the same) may be expected to have higher unit costs than Qantas,
which operates a much larger international fleet. However, Ansett International
and Ansett Australia benefit from their close working relationship and their
ability to share costs between the domestic and international networks.
The interactions between the cost characteristics of airlines, consumer
preferences for seamless travel, and the regulatory structure have important
implications for the structure of the international airline industry. Airlines have
responded to these and other pressures by forming alliances which enable them
to offer global services and to reduce costs (Chapter 6).
2.6.2 Comparison of productivity and costs
Airlines are coming under intense pressure to improve efficiency as the
regulatory environment relaxes and competition increases. But each airline
operates different networks and thus faces different challenges. Some, such as
Qantas, Singapore Airlines and Cathay Pacific, have long stage lengths which
help them to keep lower average costs per RPK. Other airlines that have more
closely networked operations may be able to develop more economic hub-and-
spoke systems and thus gain a competitive edge.
Some costs are relatively common to all airlines, including fuel and oil, aircraft
ownership and day-to-day maintenance costs. Airlines can decrease these costs
through judicious purchasing policies, network design and careful matching of
aircraft to loads. Typically, labour accounts for around 30 per cent of an
airline’s costs. Labour costs vary from country to country and may be an
important source of competitive strength, so airlines use global sourcing of
some labour inputs. Some airlines have data processing facilities in low-wage
countries, and many undertake major maintenance work outside their base
country.
A breakdown of the average operating expenses of ICAO airlines is shown in
Figure 2.7. Flight operations, which include flight crew salaries and expenses,
aircraft fuel and oil, and other factors (such as insurance, rental and training) are
the largest single contributor to airline costs, accounting for 27 per cent. Next in
magnitude after flight operations are user charges and station expenses. These
incorporate landing and other associated airport charges (Chapter 8 provides
further information regarding airport charges).2   THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
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Note: Preliminary data. The Commonwealth of Independent States has been omitted in the calculation of these
figures.
Source: ICAO (unpublished).
The input prices facing airlines and the efficiency with which airlines use inputs
will determine their overall cost competitiveness. Using 1993 ICAO data, Oum
and Yu (1997) estimated the cost competitiveness of different airlines relative to
American Airlines, and over time (Table 2.7).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Table 2.7 Differences in cost competitiveness of international
airlines relative to American Airlines, 1993
a
Source of cost differences
Input prices  (1) Efficiency  (2) Cost competitiveness  (3)=(1)+(2)
%% %
North America
American 0 0 0
United 3.7 -3.8 -0.1
Delta 7.4 -5.6 1.8
Northwest 4.6 -9.9 -5.3
Continental -11.4 -0.7 -12.1
US Air 2.6 17.4 19.9
Air Canada -11.5 19.9 8.5
Canadian -8.6 13.7 5
Asia Pacific
Japan Airlines 38.4 14.3 52.7
All Nippon 40.4 23.1 63.5
Singapore -20.3 3.9 -16.3
Korean -23.8 0.8 -22.9
Cathay -6.4 2.6 -3.8
Qantas -8.9 11.6 2.7
Thai -52.1 42.9 -9.3
Europe
Air France 8.8 12.4 21.2
Lufthansa 16.8 3.8 20.6
British Airways -2.9 10.2 7.3
SAS 25.4 17 42.4
KLM 16 -5.3 10.7
Swissair 35.5 2.8 38.3
Iberia 5.1 16.4 21.5
a Table shows the contribution of input prices and efficiency to the cost competitiveness of airlines relative to
American Airlines. A positive figure indicates higher input prices or poorer efficiency, and poorer cost
competitiveness.
Source: Oum and Yu (1997).
Oum and Yu’s analysis covered 22 airlines, including Qantas (but not Ansett).
The airlines were grouped into three regional groups: Northern America, Asia–
Pacific, and Europe. It was found that, with the exception of the Japanese
carriers, Asian carriers were generally more cost competitive than American
carriers and that this predominantly resulted from lower input prices. The2   THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
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American carriers, in turn, were more cost competitive than the European
carriers, and this was attributed to the combined effects of lower input prices
and better productive efficiency. However, Oum and Yu noted that the
European carriers’ productive efficiency improved relative to that of American
Airlines between 1986 and 1993.
Oum and Yu (1997) decomposed observed unit cost differentials into the effects
of differences in input prices, productive efficiencies and other variables such as
stage length and size and mix of output (scheduled passenger, freight, non-
scheduled, and incidental businesses). Sources of difference such as stage
length can be substantial. Qantas, for example, had an observed actual cost
difference from American Airlines of 24.6 per cent, meaning that its average
cost (per  RPK) was significantly lower than that of American Airlines. But
Qantas could have been expected to have nearly 25 per cent lower costs simply
as a result of its longer stage lengths, implying that it was roughly on par with
American Airlines for all other factors in aggregate.
Oum and Yu (1997) removed the effects of stage length and mix of output from
their analysis to focus on how cost competitive the sample airlines may be in
the same market conditions. Cost competitiveness is determined by (a) what
input they pay and (b) how efficiently they produce their services. The results
suggest that the overall cost competitiveness of Qantas compared with most
other airlines reasonably favourably (with some exceptions such as Korean
Airlines, Singapore, Continental and Thai International) in 1993 (Table 2.7).
Over the period 1986 to 1993 Oum and Yu (1997) noted that among the Asia–
Pacific carriers, Qantas (and Korean Air):
... were able to improve their cost competitive positions through significant
efficiency improvements despite rising input prices (p. 167).
The improvement for Qantas was most notable between the 1990 to 1993 period
when its cost competitiveness rose from a disadvantage (relative to American
Airlines) of over 20 per cent to a disadvantage of only 2.7 per cent. That is,
accounting for differences in input prices and operating characteristics, Qantas’
costs were over 20 per cent greater than those of American Airlines in 1990 but
only 2.7 per cent greater in 1993 (Oum and Yu 1997).
More recent evidence suggests that Qantas has achieved even greater cost
savings and efficiency improvements. Some partial measures of productivity
suggest that Qantas has continued to improve its productive efficiency. RPKs
per employee grew from 1932 in 1993 to 2342 in 1997, and average use for all
aircraft operated by Qantas (domestic and international) increased from 9.9
hours per day to 12.1 over the same period (Qantas 1997). The Ansett group has
made similar improvements. Between 1992–93 and 1996–97, RPKs perINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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employee increased from 665 to 997 (Ansett Holdings Ltd 1997). However, it is
unclear to what extent changes in contracting out by either airline may have
influenced these partial measures of productivity.9
2.6.3 Vertical linkages
Some parts of the air transport industry are highly concentrated and firms
operating in them have substantial market power. These include airline
manufacturers (two manufacturers of large commercial jets globally), airports
(regional monopolies), computer reservation systems (CRSs) (three systems
Amadeus, Galileo and Sabre account for the large majority of world aviation
trade, and have substantial market shares on a regional basis), ground handling
(varies from country to country with some monopolies present), and catering
(two major companies have 40 per cent of the world market, seven have 70 per
cent) (Airline Business 1998).
In some cases, airlines have attempted to gain a competitive edge over their
rivals by establishing a presence in a more concentrated upstream or
downstream sector. This may create some savings through economies of scope
and lower transactions costs, but more importantly may be used to restrict
competitors through high charges or less favourable access to services. One of
the most celebrated cases of this occurred when CRS systems were first
developed. Airlines which developed and owned major systems were able to
favour themselves by retaining the most prominent parts of computer displays.
This became such an important competitive issue that codes of conduct were
introduced in the United States and Europe to discourage screen bias. This
lessened the advantages for individual airlines to own these systems to the
extent that shared ownership of systems by airlines has become common
(Hanlon 1996).
Some concern was shown during this inquiry over linkages which some
overseas airlines have with airports and ground handling facilities in their home
country, either directly through the airline itself or through the common
ownership of airlines, airports and ground handling services by the government.
The Chicago convention and many ASAs require non discriminatory treatment
of foreign and national airlines (Chapter 8). However, this does not prevent high
charges being levied, which through common ownership, may act to the
advantage of the incumbent airline and its owners.
                                            
9  For example, the Australian and International Pilots Association stated that: ‘When airlines
state employee levels and productivity there is a distinct tendency to not mention subsidiary
divisions that carry out vital work for the parent company.’ (sub. 61, p. 8)2   THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
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Another area where vertical linkages may be anti-competitive is between the
airlines and travel agents. Reflecting a common practice worldwide, both
Qantas and Ansett have travel agent subsidiaries (Qantas Travel Centres) and
(Traveland) respectively. This practice has many advantages for the airlines,
including giving preferences to the parent’s air services over those of
competitors.
2.7 Airline profitability
Despite a history of traffic growth, the profitability of the global airline industry
has been cyclical but relatively poor on average. In many cases airlines have
performed so poorly they are dependent on Government subsidy (Chapter 3). In
turn, low profitability is in some cases partly the product of obligations imposed
by governments on national airlines.
Doganis (1991) identified five phases of the industry between 1960 and the late
1980s. The first phase, which lasted through the 1960s, involved a period of
relatively strong profitability as unit cost reductions more than compensated for
decreases in load factors, revenue yields and fares. This was especially marked
in the mid-1960s. The second phase (from 1968 to 1975) involved poor
financial results, largely as a result of declining load factors and rising fuel
prices. Doganis (1991) noted that fuel prices doubled in the four months
between September 1973 and January 1974 and continued to rise thereafter: in
mid-1975 fuel prices were three times the level of the previous two years
(p. 18). There followed a short three year phase between 1975 and 1978 when
the prices of fuel and other costs declined in real terms and demand was
buoyant.
The fourth phase (1979 to 1983) meant large losses for the industry. Again,
some of the blame was attributed to rising fuel prices, but the problem was
exacerbated by stagnating demand and low yields (a proxy for prices). Some
airlines went bankrupt in this phase. The fifth phase (the second half of the
1980s) saw a turnaround in profitability, as economic growth increased and the
real price of fuel fell (Figure 2.8). Doganis noted that as a legacy of the losses
they had been making, and in attempting to finance the purchase of aircraft
needed to cope with the strong growth in demand, airlines were burdened with
large amounts of debt (Doganis 1991, p. 20).
Another two phases are evident in the 1990s (Figure 2.8) The economic
recession of the early 1990s and the large numbers of aircraft accumulated by
airlines, squeezed profitability. The effect was exacerbated by general concerns
about the safety of aviation (for example, hijacking) arising from tensions in the
Middle East which culminated in the Gulf War in 1991. However, the industryINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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has recovered since 1993 and, at least until the Asian crisis, was achieving
much the same level of profitability as in the late 1980s.
To obtain a barometer of the profitability of the Australian international aviation
industry relative to all ICAO airlines, the profit performance of Qantas (both
before and after its 1993 amalgamation with Australian Airlines) was compared
with all ICAO airlines (Figure 2.8). The trend for Qantas appears to follow
closely that of all ICAO airlines, both prior to and after its amalgamation with
Australian Airlines. However, 1992 is a year worth noting, since the pre-merger
Qantas deviated from the trend by registering a profit in a year ICAO airlines
were recording losses.
Figure 2.8 Operating profit as a percentage of operating revenue,









1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Qantas pre-amalgamation All ICAO airlines Qantas post-amalgamation
a Data for ICAO airlines are for calender years, data for Qantas are for years ending June 30.
Note: The Commonwealth of Independent States has been omitted in the calculation of ICAO airline figures. The
1993 Qantas amalgamation figure includes ten months of domestic airline operations.
Sources: ICAO (1996b), Qantas (1994), and Qantas (1997).
The relatively poor profit performance of the total airline industry masks quite
varied individual airline performance. Net margins can be used as a measure of
profitability, where net margin is the ratio of operating profit to sales revenue.
Current data show a wide gap between the best and worst airlines (Table 2.8).2   THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
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Atlantic Southeast Airlines 14.1
Singapore Airlines 13.4
Midway Airlines 13.4
Mexicana de Aviacion 12.2
US Airways 12.0








Kiwi International Airlines -27.6
Southern Air Transport -24.4
Croatia Airlines -20.1
Asiana Airlines -17.6
Pakistan International Airlines -14.7
Air Zimbabwe -12.1
American International Airways -10.7
Mesa Airlines -9.5
Note: Rankings are based on World’s 148 largest airlines by revenue
a Net margin is the ratio of operating profit to sales revenue.
Source: Airline Business (1998).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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A 1997 survey of 148 airlines found that 101 had positive net margins and 37
had negative net margins (net margins were not available for ten). Qantas
achieved a ranking of 60 with a net margin of 3.2 per cent. This was lower than
the average net margin of 3.3 per cent obtained by the top 100. The Ansett
Group obtained a ranking of 109 with a net margin of -1.0  per  cent
(Airline Business 1998).37
3 REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL AIR
SERVICES
International air services are subject to a complex regulatory framework. The
overarching feature of this framework is the bilateral system of air services
arrangements (ASAs) between countries. The Chicago Convention in 1944
established the foundation for these bilateral arrangements, and they have
remained a stable feature of the global industry. The Air Navigation Act gives
effect to the Chicago Convention in Australia and is a prominent part of the
regulatory framework. One of the major objectives of this inquiry is to review
this Act and the regulatory framework under the Competition Principles
Agreement.
International air transport does not occur under the current bilateral regulatory
system unless it is explicitly permitted. Whilst providing a mechanism to
facilitate trade in air services, bilateral regulation also limits competition and the
growth and development of international air services by restricting certain
services.
This chapter examines the framework of international air services regulation
and describes the regulation of a number of important aspects of international
air services including scheduled and non-scheduled services, safety, the
application of competition law to air services, state assistance to carriers and the
role of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the
International Air Transport Association (IATA).
ASAs are negotiated bilaterally and generally comprise an Air Service
Agreement, a Memorandum of Understanding and/or an exchange of letters.
They are sometimes accompanied by other less formal and less transparent
understandings. ASAs negotiated on a bilateral basis have been a feature of
international air services since 1913.
3.1 History of bilateral air services regulation
Attempts have been made to achieve a multilateral agreement on international
air services. The first multilateral legal convention on international civil aviation
rights was signed in Paris in 1919 and came into effect in 1922. It established
important principles such as the right for complete and exclusive sovereignty
over a country’s air space and the right of innocent passage over a
predetermined and agreed route.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE
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These principles provided the foundation for the Chicago Convention in 1944.
Representatives from 52 countries met in Chicago to establish a multilateral
system covering air traffic rights, control of fares and freight tariffs, and control
of frequencies and capacity.
Box 3.1 Freedoms of the air
First freedom the right of an airline of one country to fly over the territory of
another country without landing
Second freedom the right of an airline of one country to land in another country for
non-traffic purposes such as refuelling or maintenance, while en
route to another country
Third freedom the right of an airline of one country to carry traffic (passengers,
(to) cargo or mail) from its country to another country
Fourth freedom the right of an airline of one country to carry traffic from another
(from) country to its own country
Fifth freedom the right of an airline of one country to carry traffic between two
(intermediate other countries providing the flight originates or terminates in its
and beyond) own country
Sixth freedom the right of an airline of one country to carry traffic between two
other countries via its own country. A sixth freedom is effectively a
combination of two sets of third and fourth freedoms
Seventh freedom the right of an airline of one country to operate flights between two
other countries without the flight originating or terminating in its
own country
Cabotage the right of an airline of one country to carry traffic between two
points within the territory of another country.
Source: DTRD (sub. 33, attach. 2).
The negotiations were not successful in achieving multilateral agreement on
tariffs, frequency and capacity. This failure mainly reflected widespread
concern that US airlines would dominate trade in air services because they had
advantages in technology and production capabilities after the second world
war. It also reflected the desire of the other main player at the conference, the
United Kingdom, to protect its aviation industry (which had been weakened in
the war).3   REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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The Chicago Convention established a basic system of air service rights
commonly referred to as freedoms of the air (Box 3.1). These freedoms provide
the backbone for negotiating capacity rights between countries under each ASA.
3.2 The bilateral framework
The bilateral system of ASAs starts from the principle of exclusive sovereignty
over a country’s own airspace and allows various freedoms established under
the Chicago Convention to be granted to the carriers of other countries. Thus,
the agreements covering trade of international air services differ from
agreements for trade in most other goods and services (Box 3.2).
Box 3.2 Different types of trade agreements
Trade agreements between countries range from bilateral to multilateral, from coverage of
a single product or service to all goods and services, from coverage of a single trade
measure to all trade measures. They may set general rules for behaviour or specify targets
or required outcomes. They may require parties to an agreement to extend any concessions
or benefits to all members unconditionally, or to pass on such concessions or benefits only
if they are reciprocated.
The following are examples of various types of trade agreements:
·  Bilateral, single product Australia’s international air services 
arrangements
·  Bilateral, all products Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic 
Relations Agreement
·  Regional, single product Convention for the Conservation of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna
·  Regional, all products APEC Bogor Declaration
·  Multilateral, single product Universal Postal Union
·  Multilateral, multiple productGeneral Agreement on Trade in Services
The Chicago Convention resulted in the multilateral exchange of the first two
freedoms through the International Air Services Transit Agreement of 1945
(IASTA). All other freedoms, including all rights for parties that were not
signatories to the IASTA, are negotiated on a bilateral basis.
As a signatory to the IASTA, Australia is required to grant first and second
freedom rights to the carriers of some 100 other signatory nations (BTCE 1994).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE
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However, it can only establish additional rights by negotiating ASAs with other
countries.
The existing bilateral system has some advantages over other approaches to the
negotiation of international air services through regional or multilateral fora.
Bilateral agreements can be tailored to the characteristics of certain markets.
Such negotiations also enable a country to exert pressure on restrictive countries
to liberalise their arrangements by withholding access to its own market. They
also permit pairs of countries to experiment with liberalisation of air services
and to demonstrate to other countries the benefits of more liberal arrangements.
The fundamental principle of the bilateral system is that of bilateral reciprocity
whereby countries exchange rights on the basis of ‘equality of opportunity’.
This essentially means that countries agree to exchange rights which will enable
their carriers to obtain access to foreign markets to the same extent as foreign
carriers are able to gain access to their markets.
ASAs generally contain provisions that restrict the services allowed by
international carriers between sets of countries. These provisions relate to
market access (including freedoms granted and route specification), capacity
and frequency, and a method for determining or approving tariffs. There has
been an increasing trend to remove some of these restrictions (Section 3.2).
Most ASAs also require airlines designated by each party to be ‘substantially
owned and effectively controlled’ by the country or the nationals of that
country. There is no internationally accepted definition of what constitutes
‘substantial ownership and effective control’ but most countries have legislation
that defines their own criteria. The criteria must be acceptable to both parties to
the bilateral agreement. In conjunction with this provision, ASAs permit
bilateral partners to refuse, revoke, suspend or impose conditions on the
authorisation of air services by carriers owned and controlled by other countries
not party to the bilateral agreement. They prevent these carriers from using and
benefiting from the rights established under those arrangements. They also
restrict the ability for carriers from one country to provide services on behalf of
another country.
The ownership and control provisions of ASAs effectively entrench the bilateral
system of negotiation by restricting the ability of airlines to merge across
national boundaries. The bilateral system in turn entrenches the ownership and
control provisions — a change in the requirements by one party has to be
acceptable generally to all bilateral partners. As DTRD noted:
... ownership and control is the true restriction in bilateralism. Capacity is relevant
but what keeps an ASA bilateral — and keeps out a potential competitor, who may
otherwise enter through acquisition is — ownership and control. ... The fear that3   REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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foreign carriers might obtain unreciprocated access to local markets is why
ownership and control is likely to remain an issue in air services arrangements
until bilateralism itself is replaced (sub. 60, p. 7).
ASAs also include a series of ‘doing business’ rules such as rights for airlines to
repatriate funds, be exempt from customs and excise duties, and gain access to
terminals and ground handling services. These provisions generally facilitate the
operation of international air services between countries by seeking to minimise
the potential for anticompetitive practices.
3.2.1 Australia’s ASAs
Australia currently has 51 ASAs with its bilateral partners. They typically
include provisions such as:
·  a guarantee of fair and equal opportunity for airlines designated under the
agreement;
·  agreement that designated carriers are substantially owned and effectively
controlled by nationals of the contracting parties;
·  agreed principles for regulating capacity and tariffs;
·  rights granted for the designated carriers of one party to conduct business
in the country of the other party;
·  mutual recognition of airworthiness procedures;
·  agreement to cooperate on aviation security;
·  exemption from import duty by both parties for aircraft fuel, spare parts
and supplies used by airlines of the other party;
·  descriptions of the routes over which agreed services can operate (usually
contained in an annex); and
·  an agreement that both parties will amend the air services arrangements to
conform with any matter covered by any multilateral agreement into which
both parties have entered (DTRD sub. 33).
Whilst Australia’s ASAs contain a number of provisions which facilitate the
operation of international services between Australia and other countries, they
also contain a number of restrictions. The key restrictions in the ASAs which
affect the efficiency of airlines are set out in Box 3.3. The main provisions of
Australia’s ASAs and the capacity available are detailed further in Appendix E.
The economic effects of the current bilateral arrangements are examined in
Chapter 6.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE
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Box 3.3 Regulatory constraints within Australia’s ASAs
Ownership and effective control. Designated carriers are generally required to be
‘substantially owned and effectively controlled’ by the party (the government) or nationals
of the party before being able to use rights negotiated under the agreement. Foreign
ownership and control limits on Australian airlines are set out in the Qantas Sale Act 1992
and the Air Navigation Act 1920.
Capacity constraints including frequency controls. Limits on the overall capacity to be
used by Australian and foreign designated carriers are contained in all ASAs except with
New Zealand and the United States. These limits are generally specified in terms of the
number of flights, units or seats that a country’s carriers may operate each week. Most
ASAs allow capacity to be used for passengers or freight, although some have dedicated
freight capacity. Some ASAs also contain restrictions on both the overall capacity and the
frequencies that carriers may operate.
Fifth and seventh freedom rights. Many of Australia’s ASAs contain fifth freedom rights
but they are generally limited in terms of quantity, and the third countries to which they
apply. There are no seventh freedoms in any of Australia’s ASAs.
City designation. Designated carriers can use capacity only to provide air services to
particular cities, or a choice of cities specified under the ASA. Australian carriers can use
capacity from any point in Australia to a list of specified points (or a choice of points) in
the bilateral partner’s country. Similarly, foreign carriers are normally granted rights to fly
only to specified points within Australia.
Cabotage. Cabotage refers to the right to carry traffic internally. Australia has granted
cabotage rights to foreign carriers under its ASAs with India and New Zealand only.
Stopover rights. These rights allow foreign airlines to carry their own international
passengers between two points within Australia. They are included in several ASAs.
Codesharing. Codesharing refers to the ability of an airline to sell seats on a flight
operated by another airline. Provisions for codesharing are included in half of Australia’s
ASAs. However, for an airline to codeshare, it must also have the underlying market
access and capacity rights under the relevant ASA.
Tariff regulation. All ASAs (with the exception of Australia’s ASA with New Zealand)
require aviation authorities to approve or disapprove of tariffs. Some ASAs require the
airlines to use IATA processes in formulating tariffs; others encourage the designated
airlines of the two parties to agree on tariff levels.
3.3 Regulation of non-scheduled services
Non-scheduled services are air services which are not listed in a published
timetable. Generally they are operated on an irregular or infrequent basis.3   REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Charter flights are one form of non-scheduled services. The terms ‘non-
scheduled’ and ‘charter’ are often used interchangeably.
In some parts of the world, non-scheduled services provide significant
competition to scheduled international services. Charters in Europe and across
the Atlantic account for a significant portion of the overall market for travel.
They have developed partly as a response to market circumstances, such as the
high seasonality of passenger traffic and freight, and partly as a response to
some regulatory constraints on scheduled services, including the high fares
supported by these constraints.
In Australia, non-scheduled services play an important role in meeting increased
demand for export freight capacity where scheduled services are unable to meet
exporters’ requirements, particularly during seasonal peaks. They have also
enabled carriers to develop new markets, particularly to places not served by
scheduled international services.
The regulation of non-scheduled services is generally outside the bilateral
system which tends to cover scheduled passenger and freight services only.
However, some arrangements such as the US ‘open skies’ agreements contain
provisions relating to non-scheduled services. A few regional agreements also
cover non-scheduled services. These include the 1956 Multilateral Agreement
on Commercial Rights of Non-scheduled Air Services in Europe and the 1971
Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights of Non-scheduled Air Services
Among the Association of South–East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (ICAO 1996a).
The authorisation of charter services remains at the discretion of individual
countries (ICAO 1996a). Thus, proposed charter services must generally satisfy
the charter requirements of both countries independently before they can
commence operations.
The national regulation of charter services varies among countries. Whilst many
countries, particularly tourist destinations, readily authorise incoming charter
flights, others have adopted a more restrictive approach (Doganis 1991).
In Australia, the Air Navigation Act establishes the legislative framework for
international charter services. The Department of Transport and Regional
Development (DTRD) is responsible for approving the operation of charter
services. In the past, Australia’s charter policy has been criticised for being
restrictive (IAC 1989). However, the Commonwealth Government liberalised its
charter guidelines in June 1996 to enable certain categories of charter flights to
obtain automatic approval (Chapter 4). A number of participants acknowledged
that these changes had alleviated many of the constraints on the operation of
charter services to and from Australia.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE
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3.4 The role of ICAO and IATA
The operations of two main international bodies, namely ICAO and IATA,
influence the regulation of international air services.
3.4.1 International Civil Aviation Organization
The 1944 Chicago Convention resulted in the establishment of ICAO.1 A
specialised agency of the United Nations, its main functions are to develop
international standards and to recommend practices for the safe and efficient
conduct of international air transport (BTCE 1994). These standards cover
issues related to safety, aeronautical communications, meteorology,
airworthiness, operations, environmental standards and security. It also has a
significant role in collecting and disseminating information on the operation of
international air services.
While the Chicago Convention established a role for ICAO in economic
regulation of international air transport, ICAO generally has not focused on this
area. Nevertheless, it has held worldwide air transport conferences which have
provided useful fora for considering economic regulatory issues (Chapter 4).
ICAO also has an administrative role in the ASA process. Copies of all ASAs,
enactments, terminations and other related documents are required to be
registered with ICAO. Currently, over 3000 bilateral agreements between 185
member states are registered (DTRD sub. 33).
3.4.2 International Air Transport Association
IATA is a trade association representing the interests of over 230 scheduled
airlines. IATA provides a forum for setting various technical, operational and
commercial standards. This allows carriers to coordinate scheduling of flights
and to interline.2 It also operates a clearing house for inter-airline debts arising
from interline traffic. Non-IATA member airlines are able to pay to use the
clearing house service.
Traditionally, air fares and cargo rates were negotiated and agreed at IATA
traffic conferences and subsequently approved by governments under ASAs.
IATA (sub. 8) indicated that the function of the IATA tariff conferences has
                                            
1 ICAO was formally established in 1947 following ratification of the Chicago Convention by
the required number of 26 states. It superseded the Provisional International Civil Aviation
Organization (Ryan 1984).
2 Interlining involves connecting passengers between two airlines on the same ticket.3   REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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been modified to focus on ‘reference fares’, mainly to facilitate interlining and
to determine how money from the sale of an interline ticket should be divided
between the airlines operating the service. As a result, the fares negotiated and
agreed at IATA tariff conferences usually do not reflect the final fares paid by
consumers.
Participation in fare coordination was a condition of IATA membership until the
late 1970s. Pressures contributing to the declining importance of IATA traffic
conferences as a means of negotiating fares included the move in 1978 by US
antitrust authorities to question the exemption granted to IATA traffic
conferences and other agreements from US antitrust laws. Subsequently, IATA
agreed to allow optional participation in tariff coordination.
Approximately 100 of IATA’s 230 members participate in tariff coordination
(IATA 1998a). Four Australian airlines (including Qantas and Ansett) are IATA
members and both Qantas and Ansett participate in IATA tariff conferences.
3.5 State assistance to airlines
A number of governments provide assistance to their national airlines through
the provision of state aid or subsidies. In some cases, the assistance provided by
governments has not been limited to direct funding, but has been provided
through other means such as loans made on non-commercial terms, discounts or
exemptions on charges for airport services and navigation and landing fees,
discounts on the price of, or preferential arrangements for the supply of fuel,
monopoly handling rights, duty free concessions at the airline’s base airport
granted without competitive bidding, debt forgiveness and fiscal privileges (ICC
1995). Of course, the bilateral system itself provides substantial assistance to
national airlines in their own markets — but simultaneously limits participation
in other markets.
State assistance to national carriers potentially distorts competition and reduces
the productive efficiency of airlines.3 It may enable less efficient airlines to
remain in the market.
Obtaining estimates of total direct subsidies and implicit subsidies to national
airlines is difficult for a number of reasons. First, different accounting methods
and reporting practices make it difficult to determine whether airlines have
received government subsidies. Second, airlines have an incentive not to report
government subsidies or to signal to their competitors that they are receiving
                                            
3 In some cases, subsidies may have broader social or community benefits, for example, where
they are used to support services to remote or other areas.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE
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assistance. ICAO (1996) data indicated that total direct subsidies to scheduled
airlines totalled US$100 million in 1995, but this appears to be a substantial
underestimate. In Europe, where more stringent requirements exist for
notification and authorisation of aid, various forms of government direct and
indirect aid to national airlines totalled more than US$7 billion in 1994 (ICC
1995). Third, airlines may receive assistance in non-monetary forms which may
be difficult to quantify.
Qantas highlighted some of the difficulties involved in quantifying the range of
assistance measures sometimes offered to airlines:
... it’s often very hard to prove or to quantify the degree of assistance and it can
take many forms, ... [from] billion dollar capital injections ... policies which very
much favour and encourage the development of the domestic airline ... to policies
on taxation and the financing of aircraft ... also rules which may govern ancillary
parts of the industry, such as whether there are monopolies at airports in handling
agencies and catering operations and so on (transcript, pp. 463–4).
The Comité des Sages (1994) argued that capital injections and state aid to EU
airlines had contributed to overcapacity and uneconomic pricing in the EU
market. It recommended that subsidies to EU carriers be disapproved if
incompatible with normal commercial practices. It urged the European
Commission (EC) to enforce strictly the provisions of the Treaty of Rome
relating to state aid and to set clear guidelines for evaluating any exceptional
application for state aid. The Comité recommended a number of conditions for
such approvals including:
·  direct operating aid be accepted only as aid of a social character or as a
public service obligation;
·  other aid be authorised only if it forms part of a comprehensive
restructuring program; and
·  a second round of restructuring aid be allowed only under exceptional
circumstances, unforeseeable and external to the company (the so called
‘one-time-last-time’ principle).
The EC largely adopted the Comité’s recommendations and has implemented
regulations which establish a process for the notification and authorisation of
state aid to EU carriers. To date, the EC has allowed assistance to a number of
loss-making EU airlines (Table 3.1).
Approval of these subsidies was given subject to a number of conditions. For
example, the airlines were required to restructure their operations and were
restricted from expanding capacity. The EC has scrutinised the restructuring
programs of several state-owned airlines, including Aer Lingus, Air Portugal,3   REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Air France and Olympic Airways and authorised aid subject to a number of
stringent conditions.





Sabena 1 800 August 1991
Iberia 1 200 May 1992
Aer Lingus 250 December 1993
Air Portugal 1 100 July 1994
Olympic 2 300 July 1994
Air France 3 700 July 1994
Iberia 690 January 1996
Source: OECD (1997, p. 79).
In the United States, an explicit objective of its international air transportation
policy is to ensure fair competition and a level playing field by eliminating
market place distortions such as government subsidies (DOT 1995). The United
States has adopted a principle of not subsidising its own airlines, except under
the Essential Air Services (EAS) program which provides subsidies to
commercially unsustainable regional routes. Subsidies paid under the EAS
program have been reduced from US$121.7 million in 1981 to US$34.8 million
in 1992 (Hanlon 1996). However, the United States provides other forms of
assistance through the ‘Fly America’ policy which requires US government
agencies to use air services provided by US airlines when available.4
In November 1994, ICAO proposed a regulatory arrangement relating to state
aid (ICAO 1994). Each member state would recognise the potential for state aid
to distort trade in international air services and support unfair competitive
practices and would agree to take transparent and effective measures to ensure
that any state aid did not adversely affect other competing carriers. However,
the proposal was not adopted by member states.
The provision of state assistance to other carriers which compete against
Australian carriers potentially undermines the effectiveness of liberalisation
under the bilateral system. Seeking commitments in ASAs from bilateral
partners to restrict significant assistance provided to their national carriers is
                                            
4 The US bankruptcy code also contains generous provisions which act as an indirect form of
state assistance for financially troubled carriers (Findlay, Hufbauer and Jaggi 1996).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE
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one way of reducing such distortions. Chapter 9 discusses further the
importance of restricting government assistance to national carriers as part of a
program of liberalising ASAs.
3.6 Application of competition policy to international air
services
Certain aspects of international air services provision raise a number of issues
relating to the application of competition policy. Restrictions in ASAs, alliances
and mergers between carriers, access to airport infrastructure including landing
and takeoff slots and ground handling services (Chapter 8) and access to
computer reservation systems may all potentially have deleterious effects on
competition.
Where airlines operate on a global basis, their actions may be influenced by
competition legislation in a number of different countries. However, there are a
large number of countries with no competition laws at all. The extent to which
there are significant differences in legislative requirements across those
countries may impose costs on airlines in terms of uncertainty and compliance.
It may also result in inconsistent conclusions being reached by regulatory
authorities about the effect of a particular action on competition.
The Director-General for Competition in the EC highlighted some of the major
concerns related to differences in competition laws worldwide:
Action in some countries against anticompetitive practices may be less rigorous
than in others. This may have foreclosure effects in some markets and result in
trade disputes undermining the positive results of efforts deployed in multilateral
fora to open up international trade. Furthermore, antitrust authorities may lack the
necessary instruments to deal with practices which affect competition on their
territory but are organised in third countries. Finally, remedies adopted by an
antitrust agency in order to ensure competition within its jurisdictions may seem
legitimate, but may sometimes adversely affect the interests of another country.
They may also directly conflict with remedies adopted in the same case by another
authority (Schaub 1998, p. 2).
A number of cases involving mergers and agreements in the airline industry
have highlighted the uncertainty and costs associated with obtaining regulatory
approval across a number of jurisdictions. First, in relation to the
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger, differences in approach between the EC
and the US Federal Trade Commission resulted in different decisions by the two
regulatory authorities. This case highlighted the limited ability to resolve
conflicts where there is a significant divergence in analysis and conclusions
between national competition authorities (Schaub 1998).3   REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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More recently, the proposed British Airways/American Airlines alliance has
also highlighted some of the difficulties associated with obtaining approval from
regulatory authorities in several countries. The airlines initially sought
regulatory approval for the alliance in July 1996. In July 1998, the EC approved
the alliance subject to a number of conditions, including the surrender of slots
by British Airways and American Airlines at Heathrow Airport (EC 1998).
However, the airlines are still awaiting approval from regulatory authorities in
the United States and the United Kingdom. In contrast, the Qantas/British
Airways alliance required authorisation from the Australian competition
authority but did not require authorisation from authorities in the United
Kingdom (OECD 1997).
ASAs generally include provisions aimed at promoting competition or reducing
the potential for anticompetitive practices in the airline industry. Australia’s
ASAs generally include a fair competition clause and/or a commercial
opportunities clause which seek to remove potential impediments to market
access and improve the effectiveness and/or profitability of international air
services. These provisions often refer to commercial and related activities such
as ground handling, currency conversion and remittance of earnings,
employment of non-national personnel, sale and marketing of international air
transport and computer reservation systems. However, ASAs do not generally
include provisions dealing specifically with the application of competition law.
Qantas argued that:
The absence internationally of anything like an agreed set of competition rules, or
policy principles, is a strong reason to maintain the existing arrangements under
which countries are free to pursue competitive outcomes on an agreed bilateral
basis (sub. 25, p. 53).
The OECD argued the case for international convergence of competition rules:
At the international level, the policy challenge is to ensure that differences in
competition laws and enforcement standards do not substantially distort
competition. In the longer term, it would be desirable that such differences
gradually diminish with the convergence of legislation (1997, p. 17).
At the 1994 World Wide Air Transport Conference, there was wide support for
a mechanism which would protect the aviation industry against anticompetitive
actions as part of the global approach to market liberalisation. ICAO members
at the Conference agreed to:
·  the development of a multilateral code of conduct under which unfair
capacity and pricing practices would be proscribed; and
·  a specially created dispute settlement mechanism (ICAO 1994).
However, there has been little progress in this regard.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE
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3.7 Regulation of safety
The Chicago Convention establishes a mechanism for standardising approaches
to safety and security in international aviation through ICAO. ICAO has been
primarily responsible for the development of international standards,
recommended practices and procedures covering technical fields of aviation for
worldwide application. It is the responsibility of individual countries to ensure
that the ICAO minimum standards are applied.
ASAs generally incorporate safety provisions which recognise the responsibility
of each country for ensuring that ICAO safety standards are met. The bilateral
partners also agree to recognise the certification and licensing of carriers
registered in each country.
Most of Australia’s ASAs provide for Australia and its bilateral partner to
request consultations if there are concerns about the safety standards of
aeronautical facilities, aircrew, aircraft and the operation of designated airlines.
If airlines are found not to comply with ICAO standards, Australia (or its
bilateral partner) can request corrective action to ensure conformity. Ultimately,
countries can revoke or suspend authorisation for designated carriers to use
entitlements under the ASA if they fail to comply with the laws and regulations
applied by aeronautical authorities in accordance with ICAO standards.
DTRD argued that these provisions are generally sufficient to ensure minimum
safety standards are met:
The ‘country of convenience’ problem endemic in shipping has been avoided to
date, as ownership and control requirements make it clear who the carrier is
responsible to for safety; and with a government-managed safety consultation
mechanism in the bilateral agreements. Ultimately, there is an ability to deny
access, should there be doubts about safety (sub. 33, p. 35).
Some countries, concerned about the level of safety observed by some carriers
have incorporated additional provisions within ASAs to enable them to assess
the extent to which ICAO standards are being met by foreign airlines. The
United States and EU member countries have sought to include provisions in
their ASAs which allow them to inspect foreign aircraft when they are within
their territory. The provisions generally enable them to board the aircraft to
check the validity of the aircraft and crew documents and to check the condition
of the aircraft. DTRD has indicated that such provisions are expected to be
inserted into Australia’s ASAs with a number of countries, including Germany,
Greece, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom.
In Australia, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) is responsible for
issuing Air Operators Certificates to Australian and foreign airlines operating
international air services to and from Australia as well as ensuring compliance3   REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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with safety regulations and standards. Since December 1996, CASA has been
inspecting foreign aircraft engaged in commercial passenger and freight services
to Australia as part of the international safety oversight program (CASA 1997).
The inspections are designed to ensure that aircraft and crew documentation is
in order and that there are no obvious deficiencies with the aircraft. CASA has
also proposed bilateral airworthiness arrangements with aeronautical authorities
in China and Malaysia.
Chapters 6 and 9 discuss in greater detail the relationship between deregulation
and liberalisation of international air services and airline safety.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE
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4 TRENDS IN LIBERALISATION OF AIR
SERVICES
Governments around the world have been liberalising their aviation policies
including their ASAs. Over the past decade the Commonwealth Government has
changed its aviation policy to enhance competition and efficiency in Australia’s
international air services. Substantial national benefits have resulted.
This chapter examines the international trends towards liberalisation and recent
changes to Australia’s aviation policy, both domestically and internationally,
which have influenced international services.
4.1 International trends towards liberalisation
Many governments in recent years have moved to deregulate domestic aviation
markets through privatisation and to eliminate government subsidies to airlines.
A number of countries have also sought to liberalise various aspects of their
bilateral arrangements — for example, the United States has pursued so called
‘open skies’ arrangements on a bilateral basis. Countries in the European Union,
South America, APEC and ASEAN have also pursued liberalisation on a
plurilateral and regional basis to various degrees. On a multilateral basis, the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) has some very limited
application to air transport.
4.1.1 Unilateral liberalisation
Unilateral liberalisation of domestic aviation markets has been pursued by many
countries. Domestic deregulation occurred in the United States in 1978 and
commenced in Europe in the late 1980s. More recently, other countries
including Australia have also sought to reduce restrictions on competition under
domestic legislation.
Privatisation of government-owned airlines has been a significant unilateral
initiative by many countries. The trend towards privatisation of airlines began in
the 1980s (Hanlon 1996), and evidence suggests that privatisation has led to
greater efficiency and competitiveness of airlines. Forsyth (1998) reports
improvements in productivity for British Airways, Air Canada and Qantas in
anticipation of privatisation and after it was implemented.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Following privatisation, many governments continued to support their airlines
by funding commercial losses. However, some governments have also sought to
reduce or eliminate government subsidies to airlines so as to reduce distortions
to competition. As noted earlier, the EC introduced strict rules in 1993 to cover
the provision of state aid to airlines.
The current Asian financial crisis has placed the governments of Malaysia,
Indonesia, the Republic of Korea and Thailand under considerable pressure to
undertake reform of their air services industries. The terms of the International
Monetary Fund adjustment packages introduced for some of these countries
require privatisation of a certain number of state-owned enterprises (which may
include airlines) and other reforms to reduce their reliance on government funds
(Ballantyne et al. 1998). The governments of the Republic of Korea and
Thailand have indicated that they will relax limits on foreign investment in their
airlines (Knibb 1998).
The crisis and subsequent International Monetary Fund packages may create
additional pressures on traditionally restrictive Asian economies to liberalise
their aviation markets. The Department of Industry, Science and Tourism
argued:
The current Asian crisis presents an important opportunity for Australia to
progress liberalisation regionally and bilaterally. ... This situation should therefore
provide useful negotiation leverage for liberalisation (ensuring better access to
third markets) and place Australia in a better position to benefit from economic
recovery in these markets in the medium term. The success of the negotiated
outcome with Thailand, in February 1998, underlines this point (sub. 31, p. 23).
DTRD (sub.  60) considered that the liberal terms of the recently negotiated
ASA with Thailand were more the result of years of negotiations rather than
pressure created from the economic crisis. However, Thai press reports suggest
that there has been a growing consensus on the need to change Thailand’s
aviation agreements with other major destinations, including Australia, the
United States and the United Kingdom, in order to cope with changed economic
circumstances (Khompeera 1998).
4.1.2 Bilateral liberalisation
There has been an increasing trend since the late 1970’s towards the
liberalisation of bilateral arrangements. Following deregulation of the US
domestic market in 1978, the United States negotiated more liberal ASAs with
many countries to promote competition and to reduce the extent of government
involvement. These arrangements sought to promote free determination of
capacity without government interference, reduce route restrictions, establish4   TRENDS IN LIBERALISATION OF AIR SERVICES LIBERALISATION
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multiple designation of airlines, remove the system of double governmental
approval of tariffs, facilitate the operation of charter flights, and promote fair
and competitive practices by airlines (Dresner and Tretheway 1992a).
Many other countries have since sought to negotiate similar provisions in their
bilateral arrangements. However, there are still many countries that remain
relatively restrictive in their approach to bilateral negotiation.
A number of countries have pursued liberalisation through so called ‘open
skies’ agreements. Qantas (sub. 67) argued that the term ‘open skies’ has no
universally accepted meaning, but the term has become so prevalent that it
symbolises the debate about the future direction of aviation policy. These open
skies policies have been implemented on a bilateral basis, within the general
structure of bilateral negotiations and agreements.
In the United States, these so called ‘open skies’ agreements have generally
incorporated unrestricted rights for both US and bilateral partner carriers to
operate between the two countries, including to intermediate and beyond points
(see below). However, they have not included cabotage rights, have not relaxed
the limits on foreign ownership of US carriers and have not provided the right
of establishment for foreign airlines within the United States. Nor have they
removed the advantages conferred on US carriers by virtue of the ‘Fly America’
policy.
New Zealand has also adopted a bilateral ‘open skies’ policy, agreeing on
liberal arrangements with Brunei, Chile, Singapore, Malaysia, the United Arab
Emirates and the United States. The New Zealand External Policy Advisory
Committee (sub. 76) stated that the New Zealand open skies model uses the US
model as a basis and incorporates additional elements of liberalisation which it
sees as desirable (for example, New Zealand is prepared to negotiate seventh
freedom passenger and cabotage opportunities. These rights are included in the
New Zealand–Brunei open skies agreement).
The New Zealand–Singapore agreement permits greater flexibility in foreign
ownership. It removes the requirement for majority national ownership of
carriers, although it still retains the requirement for national control (Air New
Zealand sub.  6). New Zealand also has a very liberal arrangement with
Australia under the Single Aviation Market which provides for unrestricted
capacity to and from and within each country (including cabotage). However,
restrictions on fifth freedom (beyond) rights for carriers remain.
Table 4.1 illustrates some of the major differences between a number of key
bilateral air services arrangements. Relations between Australia and New
Zealand are described in Section 4.2.4.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Seventh freedoms ªª ª ª
Cabotage ￿ª ª ª
US ‘open skies’ agreements and antitrust immunity
Since 1992, the United States has adopted an ‘open skies’ policy based on
liberal ASAs. Whilst still negotiated under the bilateral framework, the US
‘open skies’ agreements have generally incorporated:
·  open entry on all routes between the bilateral partners;
·  unrestricted rights to operate between any international gateways in the
United States and participating countries, including intermediate and
beyond points;
·  unrestricted capacity, frequency and aircraft on all routes; and
·  flexibility in setting fares within certain guidelines.
In addition, they provide for:
·  liberal charter and cargo arrangements;
·  the ability of carriers to convert earnings into hard currency and return
those earnings to their homelands without restriction;
·  open codesharing opportunities;
·  rights for carriers to perform their own ground handling in the partner
country;
·  the ability of carriers to enter freely into commercial transactions related
to their flight operations; and
·  a commitment for non-discriminatory operation of, and access to,
computer reservation systems (Subcommittee on Aviation 1997).4   TRENDS IN LIBERALISATION OF AIR SERVICES LIBERALISATION
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As noted above, the US ‘open skies’ agreements have not granted cabotage —
the right for foreign carriers to fly domestically within the United States. Nor
has the policy been accompanied by the right of foreign carriers to increase their
ownership of US airlines beyond a maximum of 25 per cent of airline voting
stock (Subcommittee on Aviation 1997).
In 1995, the US Department of Transportation (DOT) established its strategy for
pursuing these more liberal ‘open skies’ arrangements (DOT 1995). It extended
invitations to enter into open aviation agreements to a number of countries that
it believed shared its vision of liberalisation, offering important traffic flow
potential for its carriers. To date, the United States has signed a total of 30
‘open skies’ agreements with a range of countries in Europe, Central America
and South America and the Asia–Pacific region. Australia is not a signatory to a
US open skies agreement. Issues associated with this are discussed in Chapter 9.
US aviation policy appears to have recognised the importance of having
unrestricted market access as a competitive safeguard against the potentially
adverse competitive effects of airline alliances. Indeed, the negotiation of ‘open
skies’ agreements has often been linked to the granting of antitrust immunity for
alliances — for example, in January 1993, the DOT granted antitrust immunity
to Northwest and KLM to enable them to form an alliance. A major factor
influencing the decision to grant the airlines immunity was the existence of the
US–Netherlands ‘open skies’ accord which allowed airlines from both countries
unrestricted entry and capacity rights between and beyond both countries. Since
then, DOT has approved other alliances between its carriers and the carriers of
other countries which have signed ‘open skies’ agreements with the United
States.
DTRD expressed concerns about the US practice of granting antitrust immunity
for alliances in exchange for agreement to an open skies policy. It stated that
‘US open skies packages include an exemption from its antitrust laws’ (DTRD
sub. 33, p. 28). Havel (1997) argued that:
... although antitrust immunity for inter-carrier cooperation is not an element per
se of the model open skies relationship, this vestigial DOT [Department of
Transportation] authority has recently acquired prominence as a pivotal factor in
persuading Germany to subscribe to a liberalised air transport treaty.
Unfortunately, the use of the bait of immunity ... may have become a template for
US international aviation policy that will be difficult for US negotiators to decline
(p. 22).
This view would seem to find support in that recent open skies agreements
between the United States and a number of Central and South American
countries appear to have created an expectation of DOT’s automatic approval of
international alliances between carriers. The chief executive officer of theINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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TACA group of Central American airlines1 was reported recently as urging
South American countries not to sign any more open skies agreements with the
United States and putting pressure on Central American governments to rescind
their open skies bilaterals following a two year delay in obtaining regulatory
approval for the TACA/American Airlines alliance (Walker 1998). The Chilean
Government has also been reported as stating that its acceptance of an open
skies deal with the United States is conditional on the approval of an immunised
alliance between LanChile and American Airlines (Walker 1998).
The Commission’s understanding is that DOT’s processes for considering the
antitrust implications of international airline alliances examine among other
things, the scope for competition from other carriers in response to the alliance.
The official US position is that liberal or ‘open skies’ arrangements are a
prerequisite for considering antitrust immunity for alliances which would
otherwise be in danger of violating antitrust laws. An ‘open skies’ agreement
thus would not guarantee that airlines of the two countries subsequently will be
granted antitrust immunity.
The US Assistant Secretary for Aviation asserted this approach:
The presence of an open market and alliance agreements that are consistent with
our antitrust laws provide us with the opportunity to consider requests for antitrust
immunity. Nevertheless, they do not guarantee that we will grant it. We must also
determine that the Department’s immunity authority will be used for securing pro-
competitive and pro-consumer benefits (Hunnicutt 1998, p. 5).
The Commission is of the view that there needs to be a strict separation between
open skies agreements and antitrust immunity or similar immunity. A
commitment to open skies agreements between Australia and other countries
should not hinge on a promise of, or be in exchange for, antitrust or similar
immunity.
4.1.3 Plurilateral and regional liberalisation
Some agreements negotiated in recent years have sought to liberalise air
services on a regional basis or among a small set of countries. The propensity
for countries to negotiate regional arrangements for international air services is
partly a reaction to some of the restrictive elements of the bilateral system. The
most notable examples of regional or plurilateral agreements affecting air
                                            
1 The TACA group consists of six Central American airlines from Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. All of these countries signed open skies
agreements with the United States in 1997.4   TRENDS IN LIBERALISATION OF AIR SERVICES LIBERALISATION
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transport include the creation of a free market for intra-EU air services and
agreements within APEC and ASEAN.
European Union
In 1986, member countries in the EU2 agreed to create a single European market
for the exchange of goods, services (including air transport services), labour and
capital. The date for the commencement of the single European market was 1
January 1993. The European Commission (EC) has primary responsibility for
developing and implementing the regulations for the operation of the single
market, including provisions relating to air transport.
The regulation of intra-EU air services was previously characterised by
relatively restrictive bilateral arrangements between each of the member states.
The EC introduced three packages of reforms between 1987 and 1993 to
harmonise existing regulation of EU air services and to introduce greater
competition for international air services between EU airlines. The measures
included establishing common licensing standards, allowing airlines to set fares
freely without requiring government approval, and removing restrictions on
third, fourth and fifth freedom services.
Since 1 April 1997, EU airlines have faced no restrictions on cabotage (that is,
the right to operate domestic services within any EU country). The changes
essentially enabled airlines to be registered as ‘EU airlines’ and thereby to
operate services unconstrained within and between EU member countries.
The measures undertaken by the EU have so far been largely restricted to the
operation of air services between the member states. The air transport
regulations have been extended to all European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
states (except Switzerland) since 1994 as part of the European Economic Area.3
Arrangements between individual EU member states and other countries
continue to be governed largely by the bilateral framework. Despite EU airlines
now registering as EU carriers, the capacity negotiated under bilateral
arrangements between countries of the EU and countries outside the EU is not
available to all EU carriers.
                                            
2 Previously known as the European Community, the European Union currently comprises
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
3 The European Free Trade Association currently comprises Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway
and Switzerland. The European Economic Area comprises the EU and EFTA countries,
except Switzerland.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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The EC is seeking to exercise its authority to negotiate aviation agreements as a
single entity on behalf of all EU carriers. In March 1998, the EC announced
legal action against eight member states which have concluded aviation
agreements with the United States. The EC argued that these member states, by
unilaterally granting US carriers traffic rights to and from and within the EU
and obtaining exclusive rights for their own carriers to fly from their territory to
the United States, have distorted competition and cut across the single market
concept of the EU. On the other hand, the United States may have an advantage
in negotiating separately with each of the member states, rather than with the
EC representing the EU as a whole. Many of the EU member states may also
find it advantageous to continue to negotiate separately.
APEC
The leaders of APEC economies4 signed the Bogor Declaration in November
1994, in which they agreed to work towards the goal of free and open trade and
investment by 2010 for industrialised economy members and by 2020 for the
developing economy members (APEC 1994). In November 1995, member
economies agreed on the Osaka Action Agenda which outlined a range of
liberalisation, facilitation and economic and technical cooperation initiatives
designed to give effect to the Bogor Declaration (Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade (Japan) 1995).
Some APEC governments, such as New Zealand, are of the view that the Bogor
Declaration implies that air services within the APEC region must be liberalised
by 2010 (or 2020 for less developed countries). If this is accepted as a valid
interpretation of the Bogor Declaration, APEC governments will need to
remove all restrictions on trade in air services and on investment in airlines,
consistent with these timeframes. Whether such restrictions would need to be
lifted against APEC members only or against all countries is not clear.
The full implications of Bogor remain unclear for air services, and indeed
appear not to have been addressed in APEC fora. Nevertheless, under the
liberalisation and facilitation and economic and technical cooperation
components of the Osaka Action Agenda, members agreed on a number of
initiatives on transportation. These included resolutions with respect to air
transport. The Air Services Group of the APEC Transportation Working Group
has identified prospects for liberalising international air services in eight areas:
                                            
4 The APEC member economies party to the Bogor Declaration are Australia, Brunei,
Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand,
Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Thailand
and the United States. Peru, Russia and Vietnam were admitted as APEC member
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·  air carrier ownership and control;
·  tariffs;
·  ‘doing business matters’ related to commercial operations of airlines;
·  air freight;
·  multiple airline designation;
·  charter services;
·  airline cooperative arrangements; and
·  market access.
The APEC Transport Ministers in 1997 endorsed further consideration of the
scope to apply APEC commitments to these eight areas. The Transportation
Working Group reconvened the Air Services Group to develop these options
further (DFAT sub.  52). However, there has been little tangible progress in
developing air services liberalisation options in this forum.
Australia has strongly advocated to APEC members the separation of freight
and passenger capacity and the removal of constraints on freight. It has
proposed to develop a set of standard APEC air freight clauses for adoption in
bilateral or plurilateral agreements. Despite freight being one of the less
contentious issues, these suggestions have met with little response from some
APEC members (DTRD sub. 33).
Despite APEC being a forum under which the liberalisation of air services could
progress, the consensus required and the sensitivity of air services issues are
likely to make substantial progress through APEC difficult in the immediate
future (DFAT sub. 52).
ASEAN
ASEAN member countries5 agreed in 1992 to adopt the Framework Agreement
on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation. This included a commitment to
‘enhance further regional cooperation to provide safe, efficient and innovative
transportation and communications infrastructure network’ (ASEAN 1992).
Further to this commitment, in 1997 ASEAN agreed to an implementation
program for the ASEAN Plan of Action in Transport and Communications. The
program sought to introduce a regional competitive air services policy within
ASEAN, including the removal of restrictions on frequency, capacity and
aircraft type for point-to-point services between and within member countries. It
                                            
5 ASEAN currently comprises Brunei, Burma, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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was proposed that the liberalisation of air services within ASEAN would occur
on a sub-regional basis initially, with the ultimate objective of an ‘open skies’
policy within the ASEAN region (ASEAN 1997).
Some progress has been made on a sub-regional basis — for example, in the
South East Asian region, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have
liberalised air services within and between their less well developed provinces
to stimulate trade and development in the East Asian Growth Area (DTRD
sub. 33). However, DTRD (sub. 33) argued that this arrangement has not been a
major stimulus for the market in this region because it is not connected under
liberal arrangements with major traffic markets.
Nevertheless, given Australia’s proximity to South–East Asia the move towards
more liberal policies within the ASEAN region may have implications for
Australia, particularly for its prospects of achieving further liberalisation within
the region. There may also be some scope for entering into plurilateral
arrangements with a group of ASEAN countries.
4.1.4 Multilateral liberalisation
On a multilateral level, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
and ICAO have to date had some limited influence on international
liberalisation of air services.
The GATS was negotiated in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations which concluded in 1994. The round resulted in the establishment
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which encompasses among other
agreements, the GATS and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(GATT 1994). The GATS defines trade in services as the supply of a service:
·  from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member;
·  in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any other
Member;
·  by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the
territory of any other Member; and
·  by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons
of a Member in the territory of any other Member (Article I).4   TRENDS IN LIBERALISATION OF AIR SERVICES LIBERALISATION
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Under the GATS, each WTO Member agrees to treat the services and service
suppliers of any Member no less favourably than it does for like services and
service suppliers of any other country (the Most Favoured-Nation principle).6
All WTO members are required to accept the GATS and GATT (1994) as parts
of the ‘single undertaking’ outcome of the round. Nonetheless, Members have
discretion over the industry sectors to which many GATS provisions apply.
The GATS has some limited application to air transport services. The Annex on
Air Transport Services specifically excludes the application of the GATS to air
traffic rights, however granted, and services that directly relate to the exercise
of traffic rights. However, there are three services related to air transport to
which the GATS does apply. These are aircraft repair and maintenance services,
the selling and marketing of air transport services and computer reservation
services. The application of many GATS provisions to these services is
restricted to the extent that the services are listed or scheduled by members.
The Annex on Air Transport Services provides for periodic reviews (at least
every five years) of developments in the air transport sector and the operation of
the Annex. The first review is due in 2000, along with a review of the GATS
itself. This will provide an opportunity to consider the further application of the
GATS to air transport services.
Apart from the GATS, ICAO has provided a forum for discussing issues related
to international liberalisation of air services. In particular, the 1994 Worldwide
Air Transport Conference canvassed a number of important issues including:
·  the prospects for eliminating, replacing or modifying ownership and
control criteria for designated carriers;
·  the future regulatory process including the scope for multilateral
agreement on air services;
·  structural impediments to air services created by various forms of state
assistance and physical restrictions on access through, for example, slot
allocation;
·  the interrelationship between air services and the broader regulatory
environment, for example, competition and environmental laws, taxes on
air traffic, and trade agreements and arrangements; and
·  regulation of ‘doing business’ matters such as airport ground handling
arrangements, currency conversion and remittance of earnings, non-
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national personnel and the sale, marketing and distribution of air services
including CRSs.
The Conference highlighted the difficulty of achieving agreement among
member states on many of these issues. For example, in relation to the prospects
for multilateral agreement on air services, member states concluded that:
Given the diversity of views and policies of States and the disparities in their
economic and competitive situations, it was recognised that there was no prospect
in the near future for a global multilateral agreement on the exchange of traffic
rights. Support was however expressed for focusing work towards a multilateral
agreement on ‘soft rights’, including ‘doing business’ matters which would benefit
from uniform treatment while traffic rights would continue to be regulated by
bilateral agreements and regional arrangements (1994, pp. 53–4).
4.2 Recent changes to Australia’s aviation policy
Prior to 1989, Australia’s international aviation policy was based on:
·  strict separation of international and domestic aviation sectors;
·  designation of Qantas as Australia’s national carrier;
·  government ownership of airlines in both domestic and international
sectors; and
·  tight regulation of both domestic and international aviation.
The Commonwealth Government has since made several significant changes to
its air services policy which have influenced the structure, efficiency and
competitiveness of the Australian international air services market. The major
policy changes have included:
·  domestic deregulation, including the abolition of the ‘two airlines’ policy
and the privatisation of Australian airlines;
·  relaxation of restrictions on equity investment in Australian airlines and
the privatisation of Australia’s government-owned airlines;
·  multiple designation of Australian carriers and a re-focus of negotiations
away from the interests of Qantas, towards the needs of all stakeholders;
·  an agreement between Australia and New Zealand for a Single Aviation
Market, allowing airlines from both countries to fly unrestricted within
each country and across the Tasman;
·  liberalisation of Australia’s air freight and charter policy; and
·  privatisation of most Australian airports (except airports in the Sydney
region).4   TRENDS IN LIBERALISATION OF AIR SERVICES LIBERALISATION
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4.2.1 Domestic deregulation and privatisation
In October 1987, the Commonwealth Government announced that it would end
the ‘two airlines’ policy in Australia and facilitate the introduction of
competition for interstate services. Following this announcement, the
Government renegotiated the recently granted long term domestic terminal
leases held by Ansett and Australian Airlines at major domestic airports. It
aimed to provide potential new carriers with the opportunity to obtain access to
airport facilities after deregulation (DTC 1990). However, access to airport
facilities has remained a significant issue (Chapter 8).
The domestic ‘two airlines’ agreement favouring Ansett Airlines and the
government-owned Australian Airlines ceased on 30 October 1990. This
enabled Compass Airlines to commence services on major domestic trunk
routes. Following the entry of Compass, fares fell dramatically on many
domestic routes as a fierce pricing war developed (BTCE 1993). Compass
Airlines was unable to sustain heavy losses and became bankrupt in 1991.
Another new airline also named Compass Airlines entered the market in 1992,
but lasted only six months before going into voluntary liquidation.
Despite the failure of the two entrants, the deregulated market appears to have
delivered benefits. DIST noted that:
... average domestic air fares decreased by 21.8 per cent in real terms between the
September quarter 1990 and the March quarter 1996, following domestic
deregulation of these services in late 1990. Domestic traffic growth has averaged
12.6 per cent between 1990 and 1995 compared with average growth of just
4.7 per cent for a similar period prior to deregulation (sub. 31, pp. 13–14).
A number of studies have examined the effect of deregulation on the Australian
aviation market. For example, the BTCE (1991) concluded that the existence of
Compass Airlines was a significant factor determining the depth of available
discount fares in August 1991. In 1993, further research by the BTCE,
examining a sample of 100 domestic routes in November 1992, supported this
conclusion. It found that the depth of discount fares was partly determined by
the number of airlines operating on a route (BTCE 1993).
Savage, Smith and Street (1994) also found evidence that travellers using
discount fares received the greatest benefit from competition, although they
found no evidence of a negative relationship between competition and either
business fares or economy fares. Quiggin (1997) argued that domestic
deregulation had helped reduce the average price of air travel (although only by
about 1 per cent) and had generated improvements in service quality such as
increased flight frequency, expansion of frequent flyer schemes and airport club
lounges. He argued that the distributional effects of deregulation were unclear.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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In February 1992, the Commonwealth Government announced further
liberalisation of air services arrangements as part of its One Nation statement
(Keating 1992). This included removing restrictions on equity investments
between Australian domestic and international operators. This move facilitated
the merger of the two government-owned airlines, Qantas and Australian
Airlines, and effectively allowed Australian carriers to develop integrated
domestic and international networks.
The merger strengthened the competitive position of Qantas internationally and
enabled it to make more effective use of its aircraft and capacity and to develop
domestic feeder routes. With the addition of domestic traffic, Qantas moved
from 43rd to 21st in the world in terms of overall passenger boardings (Jaggi
and Morgan 1997).
The competitiveness of Qantas was further strengthened in March 1993 when
British Airways purchased a 25 per cent stake in the airline. This purchase was
subject to conditions to ensure that the majority ownership and control of
Qantas remained in Australia. The Commonwealth Government then sold the
remaining 75 per cent of Qantas in a public float in July 1995.
4.2.2 Changes to foreign ownership and control requirements
Limits on foreign investment in international carriers are generally required for
designated airlines to demonstrate compliance with bilateral requirements that
they be ‘substantially owned and effectively controlled’ by the country or its
nationals.
The Commonwealth Government’s decision to relax limits on foreign
investment in Australian international carriers preceded the privatisation of
Australian airlines. This allowed up to 49 per cent foreign investment in total,
with a single foreign carrier holding limited to 25 per cent and total foreign
carriers limited to 35 per cent.
The precise nature of the arrangements for ownership and control differs
between Qantas and other Australian international carriers. The arrangements
are established under separate pieces of legislation — the Qantas Sale Act and
Air Navigation Act (Table 4.2). Foreign investment requirements for Australian
domestic airlines are more liberal than those for Australian international
airlines.4   TRENDS IN LIBERALISATION OF AIR SERVICES LIBERALISATION
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Table 4.2 Foreign investment requirements for Australian carriers





held by all foreign
persons




100 per cent (unless





35 per cent 35 per cent 40 per cent
a
Equity held by a
single foreign
person/airline
25 per cent 25 per cent Generally up to 25 per
cent for foreign airlines
flying to Australia
a
a The Commonwealth Government is prepared to consider foreign equity proposals in excess of these guidelines
if the proposal is not contrary to the national interest.
Source: Qantas Sale Act and Air Navigation Act cited by DTRD (sub. 33, attach. 1).
There are also requirements for the control of Qantas and other Australian
international airlines (Table 4.3). The arrangements generally apply similar
requirements for the location of the airline’s head office, the location of most
operational facilities and the composition of the board. However, additional
requirements prohibit Qantas from taking any action to incorporate outside
Australia.
Issues related to the ownership and control requirements for Australian airlines,
along with the implications of different arrangements for Qantas and other
Australian domestic and international airlines, are discussed in Chapter 9.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Table 4.3 Control requirements for Qantas and other Australian
international carriers
Requirement Qantas Other Australian international
carriers
Head office The head office must always be
located in Australia.
The head office must be in
Australia.
Board At all times, at least two thirds of the
directors must be Australian citizens.
At least two thirds of the Board
members must be Australian
citizens.
The director presiding at a meeting
of the board of directors (however
described) must be an Australian
citizen.
The chairperson of the Board must




The majority must be located in
Australia.




Qantas is prohibited from taking any
action to incorporate outside
Australia.
Source: Qantas Sale Act and Air Navigation Act cited by DTRD (sub. 33, attach. 1).
4.2.3 Multiple designation and the IASC
Prior to 1992, Qantas was Australia’s only designated international carrier. This
restricted the ability of other existing and potential airlines to compete for
capacity as an Australian international carrier.
The Commonwealth Government’s February 1992 One Nation statement
announced the decision to secure multiple designation of Australian capacity in
all ASAs (Keating 1992). The implementation of a multiple designation policy
enabled other existing and prospective Australian carriers to provide
international air services.
Given the move to multiple designation and increased capacity, the negotiation
of entitlements focused more on the needs of all interests including those of
consumers, tour operators, industry and regions as well as those of other
Australian carriers. The Commonwealth Government also sought to negotiate
enhanced route and capacity entitlements ahead of demand to increase the
opportunities for existing and potential carriers to operate international air
services. It established the International Air Services Commission as a statutory
body responsible for allocating capacity negotiated under Australia’s ASAs
(Chapter 7).4   TRENDS IN LIBERALISATION OF AIR SERVICES LIBERALISATION
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4.2.4 Australia–New Zealand relations and the Single Aviation
Market
Australia and New Zealand agreed in 1992 to establish a Single Aviation
Market (SAM) as part of the Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic
Relations Trade Agreement. This was to include very liberal arrangements
including an exchange of cabotage rights.
In a supporting move Australia and New Zealand signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) in 1992 which amended the existing bilateral. The MOU
immediately lifted capacity restrictions for air traffic between Australia and
New Zealand, introduced multiple designation, and included the staged
introduction of greater beyond rights up to a limit of 12 Boeing 747s per week
by November 1994. It also committed the two governments to consult on the
subsequent full exchange of beyond rights.
Under the MOU, both countries also agreed to consult on issues concerning the
further implementation of the SAM including the exchange of cabotage rights,
the ownership and control of designated airlines, and the possibility of forming
a joint bloc for the purpose of negotiating international traffic rights. However,
in November 1994 Australia withdrew an offer of additional beyond rights to
New Zealand carriers and access to the domestic market (Findlay and Kissling
1997). This action soured relations between the aviation authorities of the two
countries and delayed the signing of the SAM until 1996.
Despite these initial setbacks, the SAM has become Australia’s most liberal
bilateral arrangement. It authorises airlines from both countries to fly
unrestricted within each other’s territory and across the Tasman. Ownership of
SAM airlines7 may be vested in either Australian or New Zealand nationals or
both. The agreement has relaxed foreign ownership of domestic and trans-
Tasman carriers indirectly and facilitated the subsequent foreign ownership of
Ansett’s domestic operations (Findlay and Kissling 1997). The SAM is the only
arrangement (except for an old arrangement with India) under which Australia
allows cabotage by foreign carriers. However, New Zealand carriers have not
used cabotage rights. Instead Air New Zealand has sought access to the
                                            
7 Airlines operating in the Single Aviation Market must meet the ownership and control
requirements of the agreement, or be approved by the ministers responsible for civil aviation
in the two countries. They must also meet operational requirements covering security,
insurance, noise and operational authorisations from both countries. The ownership and
control requirements include at least 50 per cent ownership and effective board control must
belong to the nationals from either country, at least two thirds of board members must be
nationals of either country, the chairperson of the board must be a national of either country,
and the head office and operational base must be in either country.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Australian domestic market through its equity investment in Ansett Australia
and an extensive alliance and codesharing agreement.
The SAM significantly liberalises air services between the two countries, but
does not completely override the ASA between Australia and New Zealand.
Beyond rights for both Australian and New Zealand carriers are still determined
by the ASA and subsequent understandings including the 1992 MOU. The SAM
arrangements include the commitment to make every effort to conclude a new
air services treaty which would reflect the terms and conditions of the SAM
arrangements, and replace the ASA. Additional discussion of the SAM is
contained in Appendix D.
The effect of new entrants
Liberalisation of air services across the Tasman included removing restrictions
on entry for New Zealand and Australian owned airlines. Three new entrants
emerged in 1994 and 1995: Kiwi Travel International Airlines; Air New
Zealand subsidiary Freedom Air International; and Ansett International.
However, by early 1997 only Freedom Air International operated services in its
own right (Box 4.1). Kiwi went into liquidation in September 1996 and Ansett
International entered a codesharing deal with Air New Zealand and does not
operate flights independently.
The entry of new competitors did for a time produce substantial consumer
benefits in terms of new services and lower fares. There appear to have been
some longer term benefits despite Kiwi’s failure.
The entry of Kiwi International and Freedom Air was associated with
significant traffic expansion at the lower price end of the market. Many first
time travellers were attracted by the availability of some highly discounted
fares, particularly for passengers travelling to Australia from New Zealand.
Total origin–destination traffic between Australia and New Zealand increased
from around 1.8 million in 1995 to around 2.2 million in 1996. This increase of
approximately 20 per cent compares to an average annual growth rate of less
than 4 per cent between 1993 to 1995 (Figure 4.1).8
After Kiwi’s withdrawal in September 1996, growth slowed markedly and
traffic levelled to around 185 000 passengers per month in 1997 and early 1998.
This may be explained partly by the fact that fares offered by the scheduled
carriers returned more or less to their pre-Kiwi levels, and Freedom also raised
                                            
8 The growth in traffic in 1995 largely reflects an increase in visitors to Australia, which grew
(24 per cent) at more than double the rate of Australian resident departures for New Zealand
(11 per cent).4   TRENDS IN LIBERALISATION OF AIR SERVICES LIBERALISATION
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its prices. For example, in response to Kiwi’s entry, Air New Zealand and
Qantas set their special fares for the Auckland–Sydney route at NZ$399. After
Kiwi’s departure these fares rose to NZ$529 in November 1997. Standard fares
on the same route responded similarly. These were NZ$749 in the high season
before dropping to NZ$499 during Kiwi’s presence in the market. After Kiwi
this fare rose to between NZ$729 and NZ$829 in November 1997 (Haugh and
Hazledine 1998).
Box 4.1 New entrants on the trans-Tasman route
Kiwi Travel International Airlines entered the trans-Tasman market in December 1994. It
initially operated as a travel agency and air charter firm offering direct non-stop services
from provincial New Zealand cities to major Australian cities. In August 1995, Kiwi
commenced a scheduled weekly service between Dunedin and Brisbane. It grew rapidly by
offering fares which were substantially lower than the prevailing Qantas and Air New
Zealand fares.
Kiwi’s market share (uplift–discharge traffic) tripled from approximately 1 per cent in
1995 to 3 per cent in 1996 (DTRD 1998). At its peak, during mid-1996, Kiwi operated 30
trans-Tasman services a week. In a second stage of development, Kiwi tried to take on the
majors directly by starting up services to Australia from Christchurch and Auckland.
Qantas and Air New Zealand responded by matching Kiwi’s NZ$399 fare. The intensity
of the competition from the incumbent airlines, and a series of problems — including legal
wrangles over its leased aircraft, technical difficulties and diminishing passenger loyalty
— drove Kiwi into liquidation in September 1996.
Freedom Air International commenced scheduled services in October 1995. A wholly
owned subsidiary of Air New Zealand, Freedom Air was created to provide direct
competition for Kiwi, using low fares and attractive accommodation deals. With the failure
of Kiwi, Freedom Air withdrew from the domestic market in New Zealand to concentrate
on trans-Tasman services. In June 1998, Freedom Air operated flights between provincial
New Zealand cities (Hamilton, Palmerston North and Dunedin) and Australia (Sydney,
Brisbane and Coolangatta).
Ansett International began a twice weekly service between Sydney and Auckland in 1995.
However, almost 75  per  cent of these seats were block purchased by Aerolineas
Argentinas (Thomas 1996, p.  10). In 1997 Ansett announced that it would no longer
operate trans-Tasman services in its own right, instead codesharing on services operated
by Air New Zealand.
Source: Findlay and Kissling (1997) and DTRD (1998).
The SAM arrangements paved the way for increased flight frequencies and a
wider choice of travel options between regional centres in New Zealand andINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Sydney, Brisbane and Coolangatta. The total number of scheduled flights across
the Tasman operated by Australian and New Zealand carriers increased from
11 404 in 1995 to 13 665 in 1996 (DTRD 1998). In January 1998, Air New
Zealand doubled its trans-Tasman flights from Wellington, and increased its
flights from Christchurch by 50 per cent and from Auckland by 15 per cent (Air
New Zealand 1998).





























































































































a Percentage change on corresponding month of the previous year.
Source: DTRD (unpublished).
Haugh and Hazledine concluded that for New Zealand, the overall impact on
consumer welfare of Kiwi’s entry was clearly positive.
There was an increase in total traffic and consumers were able to gain the
advantage of lower fares, greater product variety and for those living outside
Auckland, Wellington or Christchurch the opportunity to travel a much shorter
distance to the airport in New Zealand especially those living in the Waikato, Bay
of Plenty and Otago. Some of these gains, for example more variety, have not been
entirely lost despite Kiwi’s exit (1998, p. 8).
From an Australian perspective, increased inbound tourism benefited the
Australian tourism industry and Australian consumers of air services to New
Zealand as a result of a wider variety and availability of services and some
reduction in air fares.
Beyond rights
While the availability of beyond rights was increased following the 1992 MOU,
the cap of 12 Boeing 747 equivalents per week has remained since November4   TRENDS IN LIBERALISATION OF AIR SERVICES LIBERALISATION
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1994. This constraint is a sensitive issue in relations between the two countries.
Both Air New Zealand (sub. 6) and the New Zealand Government (sub. 34)
have criticised the retention of this limit and advocated further liberalisation.
The availability of beyond rights is particularly important for New Zealand
carriers. Without them, their ability to compete with sixth freedom traffic
carried by Australian carriers between third countries (particularly Asian
countries) and New Zealand is limited.
Figure 4.2 Use of beyond rights by New Zealand carriers (six





































Boeing 747 Equivalents Actual Frequencies
a Under the Civil Aviation Act, carriers are required to file tariffs and schedules every March and October for the
following period. This figure indicates the use of beyond rights by New Zealand carriers under the Australia-New
Zealand ASA for sixth monthly periods ending March or October.
Source: DTRD (unpublished).
It is not clear to what extent this cap has restricted the operations of Australian
and New Zealand carriers. Air New Zealand has tended to use more New
Zealand rights than Australian airlines have used Australian rights. Air New
Zealand has also used its capacity entitlement to operate smaller (than Boeing
747) aircraft, and thus operate more than 12 frequencies a week for much of the
time. Even so, at times Air New Zealand has been operating well below the
limit (Figure 4.2). This is not to say the limit may not at times have been
binding. This could have occurred where the quantum of remaining capacity
was not sufficient to allow Air New Zealand sufficient frequencies to
commence services to a new destination at a commercial level, for example, to
operate daily frequencies.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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4.2.5 Recent developments in charter and air freight policy
In June 1996, the Minister for Transport and Regional Development announced
changes to Australia’s air freight policy for both scheduled and non-scheduled
(charter) services (Sharp 1996a). These changes included:
·  a proposal to negotiate bilaterally significant increases in dedicated
capacity for air freight services in key export markets;
·  consideration of the removal of restrictions on third country freight
operators;
·  the introduction of more liberal international passenger and freight charter
guidelines; and
·  the development of a model APEC air freight agreement for greater
liberalisation of air freight operations.
The negotiation of dedicated freight capacity has created significant
opportunities for dedicated freight carriers to operate services on major trading
routes. Australia has concluded unrestricted freight agreements with Germany,
Luxembourg, Singapore and Taiwan. In addition, 98 weekly Boeing 747
equivalent units of dedicated freight have been negotiated outside those covered
by these unrestricted ASAs since March 1996 (DTRD sub. 60).
The international passenger and freight charter guidelines introduced by the
Commonwealth Government in June 1996 provide for automatic approval of
proposed charter programs of up to three months. They also provided for up to
12 months automatic approval for freight charter programs where the applicant
is not currently operating scheduled services to and from Australia and is able to
demonstrate the carriage of a high level of Australian exports (DTRD 1996).
The policy changes also strengthened consumer protection provisions, covering
financial losses from the failure of a charter operator to fulfil its obligations or
to complete a program of flights.
The Commonwealth Government has encouraged APEC member economies to
agree to remove restrictions on freight carriage within the APEC region. Whilst
it appears that little progress has been made in this regard, DTRD  (sub.  33)
indicated that it has achieved agreement at officials level to remove restrictions
on air freight progressively.
4.2.6 Privatisation of Australian airports
The Commonwealth Government announced in 1996 that it intended to tender
the leasehold sale of a number of government-owned airports, with the
exception of Sydney’s Kingsford Smith airport. The policy was aimed at4   TRENDS IN LIBERALISATION OF AIR SERVICES LIBERALISATION
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improving the efficiency of airport operations and facilitating future airport
developments on a commercial basis.
The first phase of the process involved the privatisation of the Melbourne, Perth
and Brisbane airports. The Government awarded 50 year leases on 1 July 1997
to the successful new operators, Australia Pacific Airports Corporation
(Melbourne), Brisbane Airport Corporation (Brisbane) and the Airstralia
Development Group (Perth), with an option of a further 49 years. Another 14
airports were leased in the second phase of the airport privatisation process.
Sydney’s Kingsford Smith Airport remains in government ownership, being
operated by the Sydney Airports Corporation.
The operation of airports by private sector interests is likely to increase pressure
for further liberalisation of international air services. The new operator of Perth
Airport, Westralia Airports Corporation, argued that:
Privatised airport operators, including Westralia Airports Corporation, are actively
investigating ways of increasing throughput and diversifying and expanding airport
activities. ... [However] existing air service agreements are constraining new
service opportunities to and from Perth International Airport. For consumers, these
constraints are affecting frequency of flights, opportunities for lower pricing
alternatives and alternative service options (sub. 15, pp. 1–2).
Issues related to the operation of airports and the importance of access to airport
infrastructure are discussed in Chapter 8.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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5 AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL AVIATION
POLICY
Australia’s international aviation policy has changed dramatically over the past
decade as detailed in Chapter 4. The policy emphasis has changed from
protecting the Australian airline industry to promoting the economy wide
benefits of international air services. The Commonwealth Government has
sought to encourage a more outward looking, robust and internationally
competitive aviation industry.
Australia’s approach to negotiating international air services entitlements has
changed in line with this broader policy agenda. This chapter examines the
Government’s current policy objectives, evaluates the success of recent policy
changes, and outlines the extent to which the Commonwealth Government’s
negotiating framework can be improved. It therefore addresses the legislative
review requirement under the Competition Principles Agreement to clarify the
objectives of the international aviation policy.
5.1 Policy objectives
Australia’s international air services policy for many years was conducted
largely according to the maxim that what was good for Qantas was good for the
country. In turn, Qantas’ pursuit of commercial objectives was conditioned by
what it perceived, or was encouraged to perceive, were national objectives.
The Minister for Transport and Communications acknowledged in 1989 that
emphasis had traditionally been placed on negotiating entitlements in favour of
Qantas:
Historically, the interests of Qantas were the predominant factor when the
Government was considering entering into new air service agreements with foreign
Governments or amending existing ones. ... the emphasis was on trading ‘like for
like’ benefits. ... Indeed access has sometimes been refused to a foreign carrier
where our own did not have an interest in flying to its country (Willis 1989, p. 1).
The Minister signalled a change in the Commonwealth Government’s policy
towards:
... a more hard-headed economic approach to air services, and fuller analysis of
where to capture the economic and other benefits for Australia. ... what is in it for
Australia as a whole will be the dominant consideration (Willis 1989, p. 3).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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These changes removed many of the operational constraints on Qantas and
allowed it to operate in a more commercial manner. The Department of
Transport and Regional Development (DTRD) commented that:
Qantas was freed from having any real or apparent obligation to maintain market
share on behalf of the national interest, and its Chairman has informed
shareholders publicly that it no longer feels such an obligation (sub. 33, p. 13).
Similarly, the Tourism Task Force highlighted the growing acceptance of the
commercial independence of Australian airlines:
While some participants in the tourism industry were highly critical of the Qantas
and Ansett decisions to cease services to South Korea, the TTF recognises that
Australian airlines are in business rather than in Government and cannot afford to
operate unprofitable routes (sub. 38, p. 2).
With major changes to airlines, airports and multiple designation,1 it is
appropriate to evaluate the success of the Commonwealth Government’s current
approach to negotiating air services arrangements (ASAs). In reviewing
legislation that restricts competition, the Competition Principles Agreement
requires that the objectives of legislation be clarified. In accordance with this
requirement, the Commission has identified that Australia’s negotiating
approach now aims to:
·  take an economy wide approach and consider a wider range of interests in
the development of negotiating stances;
·  end special treatment of the Australian airlines and provide the airlines
with greater commercial freedom;
·  encourage new services by Australian and foreign airlines, including
charter and freight services, to a wider range of Australian and foreign
destinations;
·  respond to market demand more quickly; and
·  aim for a balance of overall benefits from negotiations with other
countries, rather than strict bilateral reciprocity.
Success in achieving such objectives is difficult to measure. The growth in
Australian international air traffic over the last ten years is outlined in Chapter
2. The system is less constrained now than it was before this process began, and
there is general consensus that there have been significant gains as a result. But
it is difficult to determine whether greater gains may have been possible. Many
                                            
1 There are still some outstanding matters: Sydney Airport is still to be privatised; beyond
rights are still restricted under the Australia–New Zealand ASA; and the two countries have
not proceeded with implementing a joint multiple designation regime for Australasian
carriers in international markets, as envisaged in 1992 (Keating 1992).5   AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL AVIATION POLICY
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inquiry participants argued that greater progress could have been achieved, and
they are eager to ensure that it is accelerated in the future.
Some major policy objectives of the Commonwealth Government’s
international aviation policy are evaluated in the following sections.
5.2 Economy wide approach
Encompassing a wider range of interests in bilateral negotiations means giving
sufficient consideration to passengers and users of air freight, the tourism
industry, State and local governments and other regional interests, in addition to
the aviation industry itself. DTRD submitted that Australia’s approach to
negotiating ASAs has changed:
No longer were the interests of the then single Australian international airline,
Qantas, to be the prime factor in determining Australia’s negotiating strategies. A
wider range of interests were to be taken into account, in particular those of
Australia’s tourism and other export industries. Over time, this has led to
Australia’s considered negotiating position at each set of bilateral talks being
formed after taking into account a balance of interests (sub. 33, p. 11).
Although the stated objectives of Australia’s international aviation policy are
much broader than they were a decade ago, some participants argued that the
negotiation of Australia’s ASAs does not reflect this change fully and that
Australian international aviation policy still predominantly aims to ensure the
viability of the Australian airline industry. Aerolineas Argentinas commented
that:
... the interests of the transport bureaucrats and the Australian airlines continue to
take precedence over other equally important elements of the national interest. ...
[and are] holding back progress towards a truly competitive and market-oriented
situation in airline access to Australia (transcript, p. 366).
DIST suggested that:
... the relative balance given to Australian airline and tourism/trade interests in the
formulation of negotiating strategies is not yet considered optimum for maximising
net national benefit (sub. 31, p. 29).
DTRD (sub. 60) strongly disagreed and argued that these comments reflected
the views of aggrieved parties rather than any undue influence given to airline
interests.
It was apparent to the Commission that Australia’s aviation policy has changed
considerably to encompass interests other than those of the airlines. However,
there are strong perceptions among a number of participants that this process is
still not complete. Given the interest in these issues and the importance ofINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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adopting an aviation policy which is in the national interest, consideration of the
wider range of interests in bilateral negotiations may be strengthened by:
·  clarifying aviation policy objectives in a policy statement;
·  establishing more effective consultation mechanisms with interested
parties;
·  having greater transparency and public access to air services arrangements;
and
·  broadening departmental input into air services negotiations.
5.2.1 Need for a clear policy statement
There is no clear statement of Australia’s aviation policy objectives, including
the Government’s approach to regulating and negotiating international air
services entitlements.
The Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation argued that there is a distinction between
having an aviation policy and having regulation:
... regulation is no substitute for aviation policy. We have in this country a range
of in some ways almost perfect regulators; perfect in terms of their being clearly
legislated with very specific and sometimes wide-ranging policy goals, many of
which conflict, but none of which work directly towards the establishment of a
sound aviation policy per se (transcript, p. 196).
Throughout this inquiry, the Commission referred to a number of Ministerial
speeches, statements, pieces of legislation and associated second reading
speeches and explanatory memoranda, individual policy guidelines and
departmental reports to infer current policy objectives. Indeed, DTRD indicated
that it relied on a variety of such documents:
... we do have an aviation policy ... the Minister for Transport and Regional
Development has made policy statements in the past on every occasion when the
government has undertaken a major reform option. There’s a pile of books which
... actually outline these and the rationales for them. In more recent times John
Sharp, the former minister, made a keynote speech to the aviation industry — [at
the] aviation press club — indicating the nature of what he considered Australia’s
aviation policy and what it was directed towards (transcript, p. 311).
However, reliance on such a wide range of sources is not practical for most
people with an interest in the air transport industry. Access to some relevant
documents is not easy for those outside government circles. The policy
documents are difficult to piece together; many of these documents deal with
discrete areas only (such as the criteria guiding IASC determinations of capacity
or guidelines for the approval of charters) but provide little guidance on the
overall thrust of aviation and transport policy.5   AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL AVIATION POLICY
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Even with an examination of the full range of policy documents, the objectives
of the current international air services policy are not clear. It is often difficult
for an observer to determine which elements of an old policy are retained when
government policy changes. And as the South Australian Government pointed
out, this can make it difficult to assess the extent to which the policy is being
achieved and has consequences for other agencies and businesses:
... Australia’s aviation policy objectives are widely scattered throughout a range of
documents. ... successive Commonwealth aviation policy statements have, without
exception, included references to the benefit of spreading international  air access
to regional Australia, but without providing detailed policy as to how that will be
accomplished. This sort of policy vagueness has made it possible for various
Commonwealth agencies or business enterprises to implement policies of their own
which act at total odds with the objective of achieving better international access to
secondary ports (sub. 63, pp. 2–3).
Several other countries explain their approaches to international air services
through an overarching policy statement. The United States has published an
aviation policy statement which was developed by the US Department of
Transportation in consultation with the Department of State and other executive
agencies (DOT 1995). It sets forth objectives and guidelines for use by US
Government officials in carrying out US international air transport policy, and
establishes a strategy for achieving those objectives (Box 5.1).
Similarly, the International Air Transport Policy of New Zealand states that:
The overall and determining objective of New Zealand’s international air transport
policy is to maximise economic benefits to New Zealand, including trade and
tourism, consistent with foreign policy and strategic considerations. New Zealand
therefore seeks to conclude with other countries the most liberal and flexible air
services arrangements possible, as a means of securing enhanced quantity, quality
and breadth in our international civil aviation links (Williamson 1998, p. 4).
Box 5.1 US International Air Transportation Policy
The Statement of United States International Air Transportation Policy (DOT 1995)
indicates that the major US air transportation objectives are to:
·  increase the variety of price and service options available to consumers;
·  enhance access of US cities to the international transportation system;
·  provide carriers with unrestricted opportunities to develop types of service and
systems based on their own assessment of market demand;
·  recognise the importance of military and civil airlift resources for defence
mobilisation and deployment requirements of US defence and foreign policies;
·  ensure fair competition and a level playing field by eliminating marketplace
distortions such as government subsidies, restrictions on carriers’ ability to conductINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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their own operations and ground handling, and unequal access to infrastructure,
facilities and marketing channels; and
·  encourage the development of the most cost-effective and productive air transport
industry to be best equipped to compete in the global aviation market.
The Statement outlines three main strategies for achieving these objectives.
1.  Offer liberal agreements to a country or group of countries if it can be justified
economically or strategically. View economic value more broadly than in the past, in
terms of both direct and indirect access and future development potential. Adopt liberal
agreements with smaller countries where it puts competitive pressure on neighbouring
countries to follow.
2.  Work with countries that control access to their markets tightly to develop alternatives
which address their immediate concerns and also advance US international aviation
policy objectives. Examine alternative approaches including departure from established
methods of negotiation (such as negotiations with two or more trading partners);
development of service opportunities for foreign airlines to service the United States
more economically; and assist other governments and their constituencies to appreciate
the benefits of unrestricted air services. In the interim, consider transitional or sectoral
agreements.
3.  For countries not willing to advance liberalisation, maintain maximum leverage to
achieve procompetitive objectives. One option is to limit foreign airlines’ access to the
US market and restrict their commercial relations with US airlines. When airlines
request authority to serve restricted bilateral markets not provided for under an
international agreement, consider their request on a case-by-case basis in light of all US
policy objectives.
The Commission believes that a concise statement articulating the
Commonwealth Government’s international aviation policy would reduce
uncertainty, promote a greater understanding of the Government’s objectives
and enable evaluation of the extent to which those objectives are being
achieved. A policy statement on international air transport should:
·  state the Government’s policy objectives and strategies for international
air services and their relationship to other government policy;
·  wherever possible, establish objectives or performance indicators which
are measurable so as to facilitate evaluation;
·  indicate the role of government departments and agencies in meeting these
objectives; and
·  detail the Government’s procedures for consultation with interested
parties.5   AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL AVIATION POLICY
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Many participants supported the need for an aviation policy statement including
Westralia Airports (sub. 59), the Australian and International Pilots’
Association (sub. 61), the South Australian Government (sub. 63) and Australia
World Airways (sub.  69). Qantas argued that ‘policy consistency and its
articulation are important elements in the development of an efficient and
competitive airline industry’ (sub. 67, p. 10) .
Recommendation 5.1
The Commonwealth Government should publish, and keep up to date, a
statement of its aviation policy.
5.2.2 Consultation and transparency
Arrangements for consulting with interested parties outside the airline industry
also contribute to the doubts of various participants about DTRD’s
implementation of an economy wide approach. Two main issues have been
raised, namely to what extent do existing consultation mechanisms take into
account the broader interests in international air services and also, to what
extent is there sufficient feedback and communication from DTRD about the
outcome of Australia’s negotiations?
DTRD is primarily responsible for developing a proposed negotiating position
in advance of bilateral negotiations. It has indicated that its negotiating position
is developed after consultation with interested parties including:
·  Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and Department of
Industry, Science and Tourism (DIST);
·  Commonwealth and State tourism and transport organisations;
·  Australian international airlines;
·  airport operators;
·  freight interests;
·  customs and immigration authorities; and
·  aviation security, air service and safety authorities.
There are a number of consultation groups, such as the Tourism Aviation Group
(TAG) and the Aviation Working Group of the Standing Committee on
Transport (AWSCOT), which provide comments to DTRD in developing
Australia’s negotiating position.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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The TAG facilitates consultation with the tourism industry and other private
sector organisations and makes recommendations to DIST for submission to
DTRD. The Office of National Tourism of DIST chairs and administers the
group. TAG membership includes the Australian Tourism Commission, State
representatives, and peak industry representatives and, more recently, the
privatised airport operators.
A number of the newly privatised airport operators have expressed an interest in
becoming more directly involved in the consultation process, rather than having
their interests subsumed under the TAG process. DTRD is currently considering
a number of options which would enable airport operators to contribute to
various negotiations.
A number of participants argued that the TAG is too narrowly focused and does
not provide adequate representation of the range of interests related to air
services. The Western Australian Government said:
... we see it from the state’s point of view as not just a tourism issue but a freight
issue as well, and in the interest of people who now own substantial ground content
(transcript, p. 281).
It added:
Other interested parties, such as the privatised airports, the air freight industry and
the business community, which have a substantial interest in international air
services have no avenue of input into the bilateral process. ... While it may be
unwieldy to have all such groups directly involved in the negotiation process, ways
need to be found to enable the private airports, the air freight industry and the
business sector to have a greater input into the process (sub. 30, p. 4).
AWSCOT provides a forum for Commonwealth–State consideration of issues
related to aviation policy, including Australia’s international air services
negotiations. It comprises representatives from DTRD (although not directly
from the International Relations Branch which handles international air services
negotiations) and from State and Territory departments of transport.
State-based working groups have been established to examine issues in the
aviation sector. In Western Australia, the Strategic Aviation Committee
coordinates input from various interested parties in relation to aviation policy
and DTRD’s air services negotiations. This feeds into the Aviation Policy
Committee which is chaired by the Premier. The Western Australian Air Freight
Export Council also provides a forum for considering impediments to air freight
exports in Western Australia, including those arising from international air
services arrangements. These and similar arrangements in most other States
mean that State submissions to DTRD can reflect a consolidated position from
those with major interests.5   AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL AVIATION POLICY
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The Victorian Government commented that AWSCOT and TAG, in their
current forms, provide limited fora on aviation and do not facilitate two-way
information flows. It criticised the fact that formal DIST submissions to DTRD,
to which it contributed, were not available to TAG members:
For the vast majority of ASA negotiations, State representatives to TAG receive
notification and are invited to provide submissions for a ‘consolidated’ DIST
submission to DTRD and are usually provided with a DTRD summary review of
the market involved. DIST’s submissions are not available to TAG members.
DIST representatives accompany ASA negotiators, but detailed negotiated
outcomes are better explained by DTRD. Against this background, the Victorian
Government has chosen to send its ASA submissions directly to DTRD on a
confidential basis. It is understood that Queensland and South Australia do the
same (sub. 27, p. 6).
Westralia Airports Corporation recommended that:
... the government review the existing consultation process to ensure that it is
transparent and that the priorities of the states, airlines, airport operators,
exporters and other industry stakeholders are given appropriate balanced
consideration (transcript, p. 354).
Melbourne Airport argued that segmenting the consultation process by
operating a number of separate, and sometimes overlapping, consultation groups
is both counterproductive and inefficient:
... there must be a better consultative process than what there is currently with this
segmentation so that we can be able to organise one group that meets on a regular
basis, where you can be able to go off and voice your opinions and you can be able
to say where we go (transcript, p. 447).
These various groups in their current form do not appear to provide adequate
fora for considering the broad range of interests and issues relevant to
Australia’s negotiating stance on air services. A direct consultation process,
chaired by DTRD, which targets as many interest groups and issues as possible,
not just tourism, would help to ensure that an economy wide approach is taken
in negotiating ASAs. This would also minimise the duplication and overlap that
currently exists between the separate consultative groups.
A number of participants argued that they are consulted before some
negotiations, but do not always receive adequate feedback about the outcome of
negotiations. The Western Australian Government argued that:
We have the opportunity to provide submissions to the Federal Government ... but
we’ve received very little feedback of what actually takes place in the bilateral
process, and this is a situation that is unsatisfactory to us (transcript, p. 275).
It highlighted some issues on which it wished to receive feedback:INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Was the country they were talking to receptive to increasing capacity? ... if we put
information forward we [need to] know it’s taken to the negotiating table. If it’s
not taken to the negotiating table, why not? And then to at least come back and
say, ‘This is what happened’. So then, when we need to respond to the Premier and
other ministers, we’re in a position to do so (transcript, p. 283).
Further, Westralia Airports Corporation stated that:
Prompt and direct feedback on the outcomes of negotiation is also critical to ensure
that stakeholders’ interests are in fact being looked after (transcript, p. 354).
DTRD acknowledged that it has recently become aware of some concerns about
the feedback, and is addressing the situation (transcript, p. 340).
It is generally acknowledged that intergovernmental negotiations cannot be
conducted effectively in the full glare of publicity, but more information could
be made available to interested groups and the community more generally.
Greater openness would do much to overcome perceptions that DTRD has not
fully embraced an economy wide approach in negotiating ASAs, and to improve
the transparency of the negotiation process.
Improved direct consultation with interested parties will give them more
confidence that their views have been taken into account. The TAG may
provide an effective consultation and feedback mechanism for dealing with
tourism interests and issues, but there needs to be a mechanism which has
regard for issues other than tourism, including those of relevance to freight
users, airport operators and State governments. The provision of timely and
informative feedback on outcomes is also central to promoting the openness and
transparency of the process.
Recommendation 5.2
DTRD should develop a formal direct consultation process which
encompasses  all major interested parties to obtain their views on ASAs
being negotiated and ensure that it provides timely and informative
feedback on the outcomes of the ASA negotiation process.
5.2.3 Government handling of negotiations
Another means of better ensuring that the economy wide interests in negotiating
Australia’s ASAs are taken into account could be to switch the responsibility for
international aviation policy and negotiations from DTRD to DFAT, or for
central agencies to have greater involvement in approving the negotiating
framework.5   AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL AVIATION POLICY
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DTRD is primarily responsible for developing Australia’s negotiating strategy
and leading the negotiating team at Australia’s bilateral talks. This differs from
the practice with many other areas of Australian trade which are negotiated
primarily by DFAT. However, as DTRD (sub. 60) indicated, there are some
exceptions such as the Department of Primary Industries and Energy which
leads trade talks in relation to fisheries.
The sectoral approach to trade in international air services, separate from most
other traded goods and services, is generally justified by the technical
complexity of ASA negotiations and the need for specialist knowledge.
However, a sectoral approach may allow specific airline industry interests to
influence trade of air services unduly. It may also result in conflict between
trade facilitation and transport objectives (particularly any industry development
objectives).
DTRD argued that:
The sectoral nature of air services negotiations is a universal phenomenon. The
notion of broadening the field of trade negotiations to include air services, or to
trade for comparative advantage across sectors including aviation, has not been
embraced anywhere and would be difficult to effectively trade in the extremely
valuable third country markets (sub. 60, p. 9).
The focus of negotiations on air services alone restricts Australia’s ability to
consider tradeoffs between liberalisation of air services and other areas of
tradeable goods and services. Broadening the field of trade negotiations to
include air services could produce outcomes that are not possible within a
narrow industry-specific framework, and hence be more beneficial to the
community as a whole.
Increasingly, countries are considering their approach to air services in the
context of wider trade agreements. Europe’s liberalisation of trade in air
services was linked to liberalisation of trade in other goods and services.
Similarly, the Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade
Agreement for comprehensive liberalisation of trans-Tasman trade in goods and
services has prompted the Single Aviation Market arrangements. DTRD
acknowledged that:
... the direction of international economic reform in tradeable goods and services is
swinging heavily in favour of forums where the totality of trade benefits to a nation
from reform, rather than sectoral benefits, can be taken into account
(sub. 33, p. 34).
Worldwide moves towards comprehensive trade agreements mean that
Australia’s approach to air services will need to be examined in the context of
other traded goods and services. The application of the General Agreement onINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Trade in Services to air transport services is to be reviewed in the year 2000. To
the extent that the review makes significant progress, Australia will need to
focus on its approach to trade in air services within a general trade framework.
As noted earlier, one way of ensuring that aviation policy is formulated within a
broader trade agenda would be to transfer responsibility for the negotiation of
Australia’s ASAs to DFAT. However, at the moment, DFAT does not possess
the specialist expertise required to take the lead role in negotiating ASAs.
The DFAT representative on Australian negotiations is generally a staff member
from the relevant country desk or port, rather than a Canberra-based specialist
in international aviation. As a result, if responsibilities for international aviation
were to be transferred to DFAT, it would require administrative and staffing
changes.
Another approach may be to increase the involvement of central agencies such
as the Departments of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Treasury and Foreign
Affairs and Trade. This would promote a whole of government approach to air
services and ensure that a wide range of factors and interests are taken into
account when developing a negotiation strategy. This approach has been
adopted in New Zealand through the operation of the External Aviation Policy
Committee (Box 5.2).
Box 5.2 New Zealand External Aviation Policy Committee
New Zealand’s international aviation policy is developed and implemented by the External
Aviation Policy Committee. The External Aviation Policy Committee is chaired by the
Ministry of Transport and includes representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, the Ministry of Commerce, the Treasury and the Department of Prime Minister and
Cabinet. It is responsible for considering all proposals to enter into negotiations on air
services and seeking Government endorsement of these proposals. Input is also sought
from the New Zealand Tourism Board and New Zealand international airlines.
In recent years, the External Aviation Policy Committee has produced Strategic Action
Plans for implementing aviation policy, outlined the priorities for negotiation and specific
issues to be addressed in each bilateral relationship. This has involved seeking the input of
other industry groups such as Tradenz, the Manufacturers’ Federation, and the Inbound
Tour Operators’ Council of New Zealand. These plans are confidential.
Source: New Zealand External Aviation Policy Committee (sub. 34).
Such an approach encapsulates a number of important principles. First, it
enables consideration of proposals on air services negotiations from a whole of
government perspective. Second, it incorporates a strategic and documented5   AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL AVIATION POLICY
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approach to air services which could facilitate a thorough evaluation of the
negotiating approach and outcome. Melbourne Airport argued that it would like
to see some sort of performance indicators incorporated into the process in
order to:
... measure the performance of the various government organisations that are in the
negotiating framework [and to] see where they have succeeded or not succeeded.
At the moment all we do is we receive back information saying we were successful
or unsuccessful (transcript, p. 437).
Third, it provides the basis for more effective consultation and a transparent
process.
A more robust and transparent consultation process, as recommended above,
should overcome some of the perceptions about the extent to which economy
wide interests are effectively taken into account when negotiating Australia’s
ASAs. The Commission considers that the current arrangements could be
improved further through greater involvement of central agencies in approving
the final negotiating position. An interdepartmental committee chaired by
DTRD, with representatives from these central agencies and DIST would appear
to be most appropriate.
Recommendation 5.3
An interdepartmental committee, chaired by DTRD, should be established
to consider and endorse all proposals relating to Australia’s air services
negotiating position. The committee should include the Departments of
Prime Minister and Cabinet, Treasury, Foreign Affairs and Trade, and
Industry Science and Tourism.
5.2.4 Public access to air services arrangements
Public availability of the full details of Australia’s ASAs is currently restricted.
The Air Services Agreements are publicly available by virtue of their treaty
status, but certain governments have requested that Memoranda of
Understanding be treated as confidential. Such governments include those of
Austria, China, the Cook Islands, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau, Nauru and
Singapore.
DTRD indicated that confidentiality of certain parts of Australia’s ASAs is
usually granted at the request of Australia’s bilateral partners, rather than being
required by the Australian Government. DTRD explained that the main reason
for confidentiality requests is that countries do not wish other bilateral partnersINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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to know the nature of their arrangements with Australia. They are particularly
concerned that the public availability of commercially sensitive arrangements
may prejudice future negotiations with other bilateral partners.
DTRD usually provides access to interested parties to the full set of Australia’s
ASAs only after they have signed an undertaking to protect the information they
contain. DTRD also produces publicly available summaries of arrangements for
more general use, and provides copies of specific arrangements on request
where they are not explicitly confidential.
The availability issue differs in the United States. The Senate must ratify US
ASAs in their entirety, so all arrangements are made publicly available.
DTRD argued that:
... we don’t have any particular reason to have [the ASAs] confidential, but there
are some parties we negotiate with who have strong views about it. The United
States is probably in a position to tell those parties that they have a public policy.
We are much less in that position to tell those bilateral partners
(transcript, p. 397).
A number of participants argued that the confidential nature of the ASAs
reduces transparency and understanding of bilateral issues. The Victorian
Government argued:
Current DTRD policy is to restrict access to ASAs and relevant documents, thus
creating a situation where all parties are reliant on DTRD advice. Australia’s
carriers also hold copies of agreements. As a matter of principle, the Victorian
Government believes that states and territories should have right of access to ASAs
and relevant documentation. Streamlined access would also greatly improve
understanding of bilateral issues, improve the quality of, and quicken advice to
DTRD (sub. 27, p. 7).
Brisbane Airport Corporation also stated that there should be greater access to
ASAs:
Currently the agreements are only made public in an abridged format. Full details
of the agreements, including some background to the decision making, should be
made available to all concerned parties. As the agreements form the basis of the
most fundamental business of the airport, the airports should have greater access
to the decision making and the subsequent results (sub. 10, p. 5).
The Victorian Government (sub. 27) indicated that ASAs can be obtained from
various sources, thus making the current Commonwealth policy and
confidentiality restrictions a hindrance rather than a barrier.
DTRD argued that agreeing to confidentiality can sometimes enable Australia to
obtain a more liberal outcome, and it is not willing to sacrifice a liberal outcome
on the altar of making things more transparent (transcript, p. 398).5   AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL AVIATION POLICY
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The Commission is unable to assess the extent to which agreeing to
confidentiality has produced benefits for Australia as it is difficult to know what
outcome might have been possible if arrangements had been completely
transparent. Stiglitz (1998), drawing on his experience as a member and then
Chairman of the US Council of Economic Advisors in the US Clinton
administration, argued:
... hiding information may sometimes provide a tactical advantage in the political
bargaining game. But ... all too often, secrecy is neither justified by national
security interests, nor as a prerequisite for rational or thoughtful debate, nor even
as a tactical necessity in a broader strategy, but rather, secrecy serves as a cloak
behind which special interests can most effectively advance their interests, outside
public scrutiny (pp. 15–16).
The Commission firmly believes that there should be a strong presumption in
favour of disclosure and transparency of the arrangements. Confidentiality
should be limited strictly to those parts of the arrangements specifically required
by other governments and the reasons for granting confidentiality should be
scrutinised closely. All other arrangements should be made public and easily
accessible.
The Commission’s recommendations to strengthen public consultation
processes in relation to developing Australia’s negotiating position should
provide a mechanism for ensuring that the benefits and costs of a less
transparent system are properly assessed. Greater involvement in the negotiation
process by central agencies should also promote a more rigorous assessment of,
among other things, whether confidentiality should be granted to air services
arrangements with other countries.
Recommendation 5.4
Confidentiality of ASAs should be limited strictly to those parts of the
arrangements specifically required by other governments. The reasons for
granting confidentiality of ASAs should be scrutinised closely. All other
arrangements should be made public and easily accessible.
5.3 Responding to market demand
The responsiveness of the bilateral system to market demand relies on two
factors, namely the ability to anticipate growth in passenger demand and to
respond quickly to changes in the market. One of the major objectives of
Australia’s international aviation policy since 1992 has been a commitment byINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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the Government to expand market access opportunities by negotiating capacity
‘ahead of demand’.
5.3.1 Negotiating capacity ahead of demand
Bilateral negotiations between June 1992 and June 1996 doubled the passenger
capacity available to Australian carriers under ASAs. DTRD (sub. 33) indicated
that capacity for international passenger services to and from Australia since
March 1996 has increased by the equivalent of an additional 234 Boeing 747
scheduled passenger services per week (excluding the recent outcomes of
negotiations with Thailand and Argentina). The data exclude New Zealand and
the United States which do not impose capacity limits on Australia’s third and
fourth freedom traffic.
This has led to a substantial bank of capacity available for Australian and
foreign carriers compared with the amount of actual passenger traffic
(Figure  5.1). This capacity bank is an aggregate and does not indicate the
amount of capacity used by Australian and foreign carriers on specific routes.
Furthermore, it does not take account of load factors — planes are rarely
completely full. The lower line in Figure 5.1 indicates the number of passengers
actually flown (filled seats) as distinct from the actual capacity operated by
carriers (comprising both filled and unfilled seats). The actual capacity used by
carriers lies somewhere between the two lines in Figure 5.1.5   AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL AVIATION POLICY
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Figure 5.1 Traffic carried by Australian and foreign carriers
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Note: Negotiated seat entitlements do not include freight entitlements, except where there is a substitution
formula in the ASAs for converting freight capacity to passenger capacity. Passenger traffic is less than the use of
capacity which includes empty seats flown as well as those carrying passengers. New Zealand and the United
States are not included in the data as they do not have fixed capacity constraints.
Source: DTRD (sub. 33, attach. 4).
The extent to which capacity entitlements are used by carriers varies from
country to country is shown in Figure 5.2. Capacity remains constrained on a
number of routes. As at 30 June 1998, Australian carriers had no remaining
flight capacity to Italy2 and little capacity left to Hong Kong, India, the
Philippines and Taiwan. Further, there was no additional capacity remaining for
foreign carriers from Italy and little available for airlines from Malaysia, Hong
Kong and Singapore. Carriers from Austria and Dubai, although not in the top
22 countries by origin-destination traffic, also had no remaining capacity to
operate additional services to Australia (Appendix E).
                                            
2 Australia is currently holding negotiations with Italy.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Figure 5.2 Australian and foreign capacity use as a proportion of
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Notes: The information presented in this table is of a summary nature only. More detailed information about the
nature of capacity arrangements is included in Appendix E. The order that countries appear in the table is based
on the top 22 economies by origin–destination traffic for the year ending April 1998. The United States and New
Zealand are included to show their positions in the top 22 economies, even though they have no predetermined
capacity constraints. Where different capacity entitlements exist for different routes to and from an economy, the
aggregate capacity entitlements and capacities used have been applied. Where ASAs restrict frequency instead of
capacity, data reflect the proportion of frequencies used to those available. Data include capacity available and
used for scheduled passenger services but not capacity available for dedicated freight services. Where the capacity
used by carriers differs for inbound and outbound traffic, the greater number has been used. Codeshare capacity
(including third country codeshare capacity) has been included.
Source: Appendix E, Table E.1.
The data do not indicate the extent to which the flights operated by carriers with
existing capacity entitlements are full (with high load factors), but rather the5   AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL AVIATION POLICY
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scope for existing and prospective carriers to make additional flights. Qantas
(sub. 25) indicated that current load factors on many of the routes were not
excessive. As a result, there is scope for carriers to carry more passengers on
their existing flights.
Capacity utilisation rates as at 30 June 1998 may provide a misleading guide of
the longer term capacity constraints. Traffic between Australia and a number of
other countries was below normal volumes due to the Asian crisis. Hence, the
potential for Australia’s ASAs to constrain traffic with Asian countries may be
understated. Instead, traffic as at 1 February 1998 (just prior to the main impact
of the Asian crisis) may give a better indication of the long term trend in traffic
volumes relative to capacity.
For three countries, Japan, Indonesia and the Republic of Korea, there was a
significant decline in the percentage of capacity used between February and
June 1998, not because of increased capacity but because of reduced traffic.
Capacity utilisation rates as at 1 February 1998 for Australian carriers were
97 per cent for Japan and 82 per cent for Indonesia. By 30 June 1998, these
rates had dropped to 79  per  cent for Japan and 61  per  cent for Indonesia.
Similarly, the capacity utilisation rate for Korean carriers was 84 per cent as at
1 February 1998 and had dropped to 67 per cent by 30 June 1998.
Seasonal peaks in demand further exacerbate the problem of restricted capacity.
DIST indicated that:
Travel agents currently complain of a lack of seasonal seat availability on a range
of routes including in markets such as Italy, Germany and Hong Kong. ... In some
countries even where capacity may currently be adequate, the potential for rapid
increases in tourism demand will require further substantial increases in capacity
ahead of demand (sub. 31, p. 21).
DTRD (sub. 33) indicated that lack of capacity in particular markets can be
largely attributed to one of three factors: first, the conservative approach of
some of Australia’s bilateral partners; second, the existence of other constraints
such as restricted access to airport infrastructure and other environmental
problems; and third, the existence of relatively small markets for traffic, which
have little market growth or growth that is being met by sixth freedom carriers.
Restrictions on the capacity for the carriers of two countries would suggest that
competition between the two countries may be limited. However, on some
routes, fifth and sixth freedom carriers provide important competitive pressures
and have been able to capture significant market shares.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Table 5.1 Shares of passenger traffic held by Australian, bilateral











New Zealand 42.1 47.2 10.7
Japan 53.4 38.3 8.2
United Kingdom 34.6 15.4 50.1
United States 46.5 30.8 22.7
Indonesia 55.2 39.4 5.4
Singapore 38.7 33.7 27.7
Hong Kong 55.0 35.7 9.3
Malaysia 28.2 48.1 23.6
Taiwan 43.1 30.5 26.3
Korea, Republic of 31.9 49.9 18.2
Germany 39.9 0.0 60.1
China 45.6 31.5 22.9
Thailand 34.2 35.4 30.5
Canada 54.6 4.6 40.7
Italy 40.4 25.2 34.4
Fiji 17.2 77.9 4.9
Philippines 38.4 46.9 14.8
Papua New Guinea 42.6 52.7 4.8
South Africa 42.6 27.8 29.7
France 38.5 6.7 54.8
India 49.6 0.0 50.4
Netherlands 33.6 14.9 51.5
Notes: Origin–destination data were used. Passengers on codeshare tickets could not be distinguished from those
on flights operated by ticket seller. Market shares may not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding errors. Data
include passengers on scheduled and non-scheduled flights.
Source: Commission estimates based on DTRD (unpublished).
Third country carriers operating through their home country can sometimes
achieve significant market shares on some long haul routes, particularly where
an intermediate stop is necessary for refuelling and where it may be desirable
from a passenger or tourism perspective to break the journey. For example, in5   AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL AVIATION POLICY
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the year to April 1998, 50  per  cent of the traffic between Australia and the
United Kingdom was carried by third country carriers including Singapore
Airlines, Malaysia Airlines, Thai International and Cathay Pacific (Table 5.1).
Under Australia’s ASAs, Italy and Hong Kong are two of the most capacity
constrained markets (Figure 5.2). However, third country carriers operating
between Italy and Australia hold a 34  per  cent market share suggesting that
competition between Australia and Italy is greater than the capacity constraints
in the Australia–Italy ASA would suggest.
However, between Australia and Hong Kong, although there is not much spare
capacity, third country carriers have a much smaller market share (9 per cent).
This may be because intermediate stops are not necessary and passengers prefer
direct flights. Other ASAs identified as approaching capacity constraints which
do not appear to have large third country carrier market shares include Japan
(8 per cent) and the Philippines (15 per cent).
Even where there is significant competition from third country carriers, the
capacity constraints highlighted above still limit the ability of airlines to expand
their third and fourth freedom operations.
5.3.2 Responsiveness of the policy
A policy of negotiating capacity ahead of demand needs to be responsive to
changes in market conditions. DIST expressed concerns over the pace at which
some negotiations initiated by bilateral partners have proceeded:
While we acknowledge that this situation is sometimes unavoidable, we have some
concerns over the pace at which some negotiations proceed, particularly where
foreign carriers have been eager to commence or increase the level of their
services. This has, at times, hindered the provision of adequate capacity to meet
projected tourism demand (sub. 31, p. 17).
It cited the recent negotiations with Singapore as an example. During 1996,
Singapore Airlines had been operating to the limit of its capacity entitlements
and indicated an intention to increase services. Agreement to increase capacity
under the Australia–Singapore ASA took nine months from the date originally
proposed for talks. However, DTRD argued that:
The basic reason for the time taken was the effort being made to remove
restrictions, in an environment complicated by separate commercial negotiations
between some of the interested airlines. The Department could be brutally efficient
and achieve little; or address the complexities professionally (sub. 60, p. 11).
The renegotiation of capacity entitlements under Australian ASAs is costly and
administratively complex. The South Australian Government argued that despiteINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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the recent policy changes (including the policy of negotiating capacity ahead of
demand):
... the present bilaterally regulated system is unwieldy, expensive to administer and
unable to respond quickly to the rapidly changing industry environment (sub. 3,
p. 12).
The existence of capacity constraints reduces the ability for both Australian and
foreign designated carriers to respond to rising traffic demand or changes in
conditions in those markets (Box 5.3). It enables airlines with existing capacity
to exercise increased market power and prevents other airlines from responding
to increasing demand.
Box 5.3 Case study of dynamic market conditions in the
Philippines
Recent events in the Philippines demonstrate how market conditions can change so that
restrictions under ASAs which are not currently binding can quickly constrain the
operations of airlines. Philippine Airlines halted all flights to Australia in June 1998 due to
a financial crisis. At the time, there was sufficient unutilised capacity available to
Australian carriers to allow Qantas to respond by immediately almost doubling its
capacity to Manila. Qantas’ five weekly scheduled Boeing 767-300 services were
converted to a daily Boeing 747–SP service.
However, the doubling of capacity operated by Qantas resulted in most of the capacity
available to Australian carriers being used. ASAs with many other countries (such as Fiji)
would not have allowed a similar increase in capacity in response to changed market
circumstances (Figure 5.2).
Other restrictions in the Australia-Philippines ASA also limit the responses to changed
market conditions available to Qantas. The ASA includes few beyond points for Australia,
preventing Australian carriers flying through the Philippines to locations such as the
United States. In addition, the only points available to Australian carriers in the
Philippines are Manila, Cebu and Davao. To the extent that Qantas wished to fly to other
points it would be constrained. Other constraints on the flexibility of Australian carriers to
offer services to the Philippines include restrictions on dedicated freight capacity and own
stopover rights.
Source: Qantas (1998).
Restricted capacity also increases the likelihood of applications for capacity
being contested. As the procedures for assessing contested applications are
more onerous than those for uncontested applications, the lack of sufficient5   AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL AVIATION POLICY
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capacity to satisfy all potential applicants imposes costs to the government and
to airlines (Chapter 7).
Negotiating capacity ahead of actual demand is inherently an arbitrary
approach. It is based on presumptions about the determinants of demand which
may change at relatively short notice, or may not be justified. The entry of new
cut-price carriers (for example third country competitors or charter operators
who can drive fares down), or changes in social and economic conditions, for
example, can bring about large changes in the capacity demanded and quickly
use up available capacity. The risk is that the negotiation process takes so long
that existing limits become constraining on the carriers of one or both countries.
Further, the policy of negotiating capacity ahead of demand — as distinct from
negotiating unrestricted capacity limits — is a time consuming and costly
exercise. DTRD held bilateral consultations between January 1992 and
September 1997 on 122 occasions. Many involved the negotiation of additional
capacity rights and occurred over a number of days. DTRD held 19 bilateral
consultations with 15 countries in 1996–97 (DTRD 1997a).
The negotiation of Australia’s ASAs is strategically complex. It can involve
sequencing and balancing of arrangements and negotiations in different
countries. DTRD noted that the bilateral system has grown from involving:
... relatively simple exchanges of rights in relation to point to point services
between two countries, to a complex series of interconnected structures between all
countries active in international aviation (sub. 33, p. 2).
In some cases, what may be perceived to be a delay or reluctance in
negotiations may actually represent the strategic sequencing of negotiations to
achieve greater overall benefits for Australia across all ASAs. For example, it
may be beneficial to secure fifth freedom rights from country B before seeking
agreement to unrestricted fifth freedom rights with country A. By sequencing
negotiations in this way, a country can ensure that it secures rights which can be
used under a subsequently negotiated liberal policy.
Consequently, the negotiation of additional capacity generally has been slow
and incremental. The complex and time-consuming nature of negotiations has
contributed to emerging capacity constraints.
Whilst in some cases there are potential benefits available from sequencing
negotiations, these benefits need to be balanced carefully against the costs
associated with not quickly easing capacity constraints in important markets.
There are alternative mechanisms for ensuring that capacity remains ahead of
demand which do not involve complex and lengthy renegotiations. For example,
a number of Australia’s ASAs already provide for automatic increases ofINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
100
capacity at set dates. These may be a less costly and potentially more responsive
means of increasing capacity. In addition, the Australia–US agreement contains
a trigger mechanism to enable capacity to be increased automatically. However,
it contains a complex set of conditions and approval processes, which may
constrain the ability of carriers of either country to increase capacity unilaterally
and supply more than a specified amount of capacity on a route.
In the context of the current policy framework, the Commission endorses
DTRD’s current approach of negotiating capacity ahead of demand as a means
of seeking to minimise the constraints on Australian and foreign carriers.
Capacity should remain well ahead of demand, not just in aggregate, but on all
routes. In addition, there is a need to ensure that capacity is negotiated ahead of
potential demand, rather than actual demand, to maximise the ability of carriers
to respond to unanticipated changes in the market.
Chapter 9 discusses further the importance of removing remaining constraints
on capacity as a means of liberalising Australia’s ASAs.
5.4 Balance of benefits
The bilateral system is based on the principle of reciprocity. The Chicago
Convention states that ‘international air transport services may be established on
the basis of equality of opportunity’ (Preamble to the Chicago Convention,
quoted in DTRD, sub. 33, p. 1).
The principle of reciprocity enables Australia to withhold access to the
Australian market where bilateral partners are not prepared to grant similar
opportunities to Australian carriers. Before the reform process began,
Australia’s approach was one of strict reciprocity whereby access to Australian
cities for foreign carriers largely depended on Qantas being granted access to
similar sized cities overseas (Willis 1989). This imposed significant costs on
Australians by restricting access to international services where Australian
carriers were not granted similar opportunities. A number of old ASAs are a
legacy of this past approach. However, DTRD argued that:
Australia has not taken such a simplistic policy approach for many years. A wide
variety of recent and not so recent bilateral outcomes demonstrate this (eg
Thailand, Germany, New Zealand, Malaysia, the UK etc). ... Australia, and almost
all of its bilateral partners, look to exchange packages of rights rather than ‘one for
one’ trading ... (sub. 60, p. 7).
More recent agreements have attempted to achieve a better ‘balance of
benefits’. Qantas supported this general approach:5   AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL AVIATION POLICY
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We believe that we’re better off as a country to keep pushing to get those
conditions which will give a more vigorous aviation industry, both in terms of the
opportunity for Australian companies to participate in that but also in terms of the
reciprocal opportunities that it opens up as well. ... The reality is that you do need
to use leverage in order to open up these opportunities (transcript, p. 128).
Australia has willingly granted increased market access to foreign carriers in
some cases in exchange for rights which would promote competition amongst
Australian carriers. DTRD indicated that the process of negotiating multiple
designation involved making quite substantial concessions to persuade foreign
governments to facilitate a second Australian carrier’s entry in those markets
(transcript, p. 322).
However, DTRD indicated that the degree of Australia’s negotiating coin or
leverage is limited in some cases:
... the bilateral structure can be very conservative and inflexible in the hands of
countries which are not supportive of competition or for other reasons prefer to
manage market entry closely. ... Australia, a small and remote origin/destination
market does not have the leverage (from aviation or non-aviation sources) in
international markets to overcome the conservative stance by some of its major
partners (sub. 33, p. 17).
Qantas also acknowledged the difficulty of extracting greater benefits under
Australia’s ASAs:
... Australia’s leverage in the pursuit of these interests is often less than other
countries as a result of Australia’s geographic positioning and market size. By
linking access to the Australian market with access to foreign markets, it enables
Australia to maximise the leverage it does have in the pursuit of national interests.
By dealing with this on a case by case basis, Australia is able to make judgments
about the various trade-offs required (sub. 25, p. 42).
Nevertheless, participants to this inquiry stated that Australian negotiators tend
to drive a hard bargain. Australia has safeguarded access to the Australian
market as leverage to gain preferential access for Australian carriers to foreign
markets, particularly access to city designation and fifth freedom rights. Thus,
the current restrictions are seen as important negotiating coin for future
negotiations.
DFAT argued that earlier ASAs negotiated on the principle of bilateral
reciprocity did not provide for a balance of opportunities:
Rather, they regulate and restrict the performance of participants in a fragmentary
collection of bilateral markets. It has been argued that such arrangements provide a
reciprocity in outcome, not opportunity, frustrate gains from comparative
advantage and are costly to administer (sub. 52, p. 8).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Some participants argued that restrictions under some of Australia’s ASAs have
been retained despite the considerable benefits that may be achieved otherwise.
For example, DIST argued that:
While Australia attempts to secure such rights for our own carriers, through
granting greater market access for foreign carriers to Australia, it continues to
question and constrain the ability of foreign carriers to carry such traffic to
Australia via third countries (sub. 31, p. 18).
It also cited Australia’s past reluctance to grant beyond rights to Aerolineas
Argentinas as an example of how potential economic benefits from the
additional tourism have been foregone.
A number of States and regional trade and tourism bodies expressed concerns
that regional parts of Australia and smaller gateways often suffer as a result of
Australia’s hard bargaining approach. The Western Australian Government
illustrated how Australia’s reluctance to grant capacity to foreign carriers
restricts benefits to the State:
Qantas which doesn’t operate services between Perth and Kuala Lumpur, is
understood to oppose any additional capacity being granted to Malaysia. Thus a
growing market into Malaysia for tourists and freight is being frustrated and
likewise Malaysians are restricted to current capacity, which has a negative impact
on the State’s economy (sub. 30, p. 2).
Restrictions in Australia’s ASAs allow Australia to use its leverage to gain
preferential access to foreign markets for Australian carriers, but they may also
constrain the wider benefits from granting foreign carriers greater access to the
Australian market. These benefits are often not obvious, and to the extent they
are overlooked there is a cost to Australian consumer, business, regional and
State interests.103
6 ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON AIRLINES, USERS
AND THE ECONOMY
The economic regulations in the bilateral framework of international air services
have had profound effects on airlines and their users. While liberalisation over
the last decade has lessened these effects significantly, Australia’s ASAs still
affect where airlines fly, the number and frequency of flights they operate, what
aircraft they use, their ownership and access to equity, and how much they can
charge. They influence the nature of competition among airlines through
controls on market entry, and the quantity and variety of rights allocated to
particular airlines.
The regulatory system influences airlines’ costs, sometimes facilitating the
operation of efficient air services, but mostly increasing the costs of operation
by restricting airlines’ ability to operate efficient networks. Higher costs and
restricted competition mean that prices are higher than they otherwise might be.
The regulatory system also has implications for airlines’ revenue and
profitability.
The effects of the regulatory system are felt by:
·  passengers, whose total costs of travel vary with the level of airfares and
the range and quality of services offered;
·  the Australian tourism industry, whose output varies with the number of
overseas visitors travelling to Australia and the extent to which Australians
substitute international for domestic tourism;
·  users of air freight, whose competitiveness varies with the level of air
freight charges and the range and quality of services offered; and
·  the economy as a whole.
Each of these groups and sectors can be affected differently, creating a mix of
costs and benefits across different sectors of the economy. To the extent that
current arrangements result in higher air fares, the output of Australian tourism
operators decreases as foreign tourists are discouraged from visiting Australia,
and increases as Australian travellers are induced to substitute domestic for
foreign travel. The overall effect of the regulations on Australian economic
welfare is determined by the balance of gains and losses across all sectors of the
economy, as it is for all barriers to international trade.
The key features and restrictions in the air services arrangements (ASAs) which
affect the efficiency of airlines are described in Chapter 3. These regulatoryINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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features can have effects individually, but more often they work in combination
to constrain airlines’ operations and limit competition. A shortage of capacity,
for example, may allow designated airlines to charge high prices, but when it is
combined with the effects of other constraints such as city designation, the net
result could be to limit the variety of services provided and raise the cost of
providing those services.
Several of the specific constraints have similar effects on airline behaviour:
market entry on a particular route could be constrained by insufficient capacity,
restrictions on codesharing, or by not having the appropriate fifth or seventh
freedoms.
This chapter examines the economic effects of regulations on the airlines and
users, rather than technical regulations governing the conduct, safety and
security of international aviation. It does however give consideration to the
possible safety implications of economic liberalisation.
6.1 Effects on airline costs
Australia’s ASAs affect airlines’ costs in many ways. They limit access to
equity, and affect how airlines configure their networks. There are also
significant compliance costs. In this section, the restrictions are discussed
according to which types of costs incurred by airlines — factor costs, operating
costs and administrative costs — they affect.
6.1.1 Factor costs
The constraints have implications for employing labour, and there are serious
effects on the cost and availability of capital.
Labour
The regulatory structure may affect the cost of labour. If regulations or industry
policy provide protection to an industry, the value of protection may be
dissipated in poor productivity, and higher-than-normal returns to labour and
capital. To the extent that Australia’s aviation regulations have limited
competition over the years, and to the extent that this protection was not a quid
pro quo for implementing the Commonwealth Government’s non-economic
objectives, airlines have enjoyed a privileged position.
Entry limitations and capacity constraints have the potential to allow airlines to
earn above normal returns, which may be appropriated by shareholders or paid6   ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON AIRLINES, USERS AND THE ECONOMY
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out in higher than normal costs (including wages, salaries and working
conditions).
ASAs also have some impact on the employment of labour by restricting
cabotage rights. By preserving the rights to fly domestic services for Australian
owned and controlled airlines, ASAs indirectly maintain an employment base
for Australians on Australia’s airline services.
The implications for employment of deregulating air services were of concern to
a number of participants. The Australian Services Union stated that it:
... is clearly concerned that deregulation will place pressure on labour costs and
conditions of employment were it to be pursued as Australian airline workers will
in effect be increasingly compared to workers’ wages and conditions applying in
other economies which are often much lower than those which apply in Australia
(sub. 20, p. 3).
It also noted that:
A study of JAL reported that the establishment of Japan Air Charter has provided
30 per cent lower labour costs as 90 per cent of the crew are Thai paid about one
tenth the wages of JAL flight attendants (sub. 20, p. 6).
Qantas emphasised the links between the competitiveness of aviation and the
prices of labour and capital:
Given the valuable contribution that aviation and tourism make to national welfare,
it is essential that the aviation market is globally competitive and functions in the
most efficient way. This means that the inputs that the industry depends on, such
as labour and capital, must also be available on an internationally competitive
basis (sub. 25, p. iii).
To the extent that foreign airlines would take up cabotage rights if they were
granted, some domestic employment by Australian airlines could be lost. But if
foreign airlines offered extensive domestic services, they would find it
necessary to employ additional Australian staff. Further, Australia’s
international airlines already have some ability to substitute overseas workers
for Australian workers. They operate both domestic and international flights and
need to draw on labour in most of the countries they serve. These may include
local staff required for marketing, sales, aircraft maintenance, cabin crew and
pilots.
Capital costs
The relatively capital-intensive nature of the airline industry, combined with the
fact that airlines are generally regarded as being inherently risky investments,
means that access to large, well-functioning capital markets is an important
issue for all airlines. Concerns about the cost-raising effects of the ownershipINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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and control requirements for national designation lie behind the proposal by the
ICAO Secretariat to liberalise designation rules (ICAO 1994).
The effects of these restrictions may vary from country to country, but are likely
to be greater for countries with small domestic capital markets. Air New
Zealand argued that:
The restrictions are more onerous in less populous countries such as New Zealand
(and, to a degree, Australia) where there is a relatively small equity market and, in
consequence, there are limits to the local capital available for investment in
airlines. The effect can restrict the growth of such airlines and depress their market
capitalisation, as indicated by the difference in the market value between Air New
Zealand’s A and B shares. The former, which are limited to New Zealand
nationals, have consistently traded at a lower value than B shares, which may be
held by either New Zealand or foreign nationals (sub. 6, pp. 9–10).
This issue was even deemed to be important for US airlines. The US National
Commission to Ensure a Strong and Competitive Airline Industry (1993)
envisaged the long-term development of more liberal cross border airlines
investment. However, as a short-term measure it advocated ‘... expanded access
to international capital markets by allowing larger investments from foreign
investors under the current bilateral system’ (p.  21). It also proposed that
foreign investors be able to hold up to 49 per cent of the voting equity in US
airlines, up from the then (and still current) limit of 25 per cent.
The cost and availability of capital is an important issue in Australian aviation.
Australia’s economy, although substantially larger than New Zealand’s, may be
too small to provide sufficient equity capital for Australian airlines. The
Australian Government interprets the ownership and effective control
constraints in many ASAs as restricting foreign ownership of Australian
international airlines to 49 per cent. Foreign ownership and control rules have
been interpreted differently for Qantas and other Australian airlines (Chapter 4),
but a common feature is that foreign airlines are restricted to owning no more
than 25 per cent individually, or 35 per cent in aggregate. These restrictions
may raise the cost and availability of equity capital, and distort choices between
equity and debt capital given that access to debt is not constrained by aviation
regulation.
Currently, both Ansett International and Qantas have the maximum foreign
equity allowable, suggesting that there may be unsatisfied foreign demand for
investment in these companies. Some financial market observers have estimated
that the Qantas share price is 10 per cent lower than it would be in the absence
of foreign investment restrictions. Any increase in the cost of equity capital
flows through to the choice of debt versus equity and thereby distorts capital
structures. Airlines should have flexibility in financing their operations and6   ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON AIRLINES, USERS AND THE ECONOMY
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developing their corporate structures. The existence of a cap on foreign
ownership limits this flexibility.
6.1.2 Input costs
The nature of international aviation means that airlines need to purchase inputs
in many locations. Aircraft must refuel in other countries and take on
provisions. Further, repairs may be necessary in foreign locations requiring
parts and equipment to be brought in. Airlines also need access to overseas
terminals and baggage and freight handling services. One initial reason for
regulating the international aviation industry was to guard against countries
using their sovereign rights to discriminate against visiting airlines by charging
higher rates of taxes or user charges. Consequently all ASAs contain some
‘doing business’ rules such as:
·  exemption from customs duties and other charges on aircraft stores, spare
parts and fuel and lubricating oils;
·  the non-discriminatory application of fees for using aviation facilities and
services such as terminals, and baggage handling; and
·  the rights to establish offices, repatriate funds and maintain staff in the
territory of the other party.
These provisions ensure the uniform treatment of airlines in all countries, and
have been an enduring feature of the regulatory system.
6.1.3 Operating costs
The regulatory system affects where, how and when airlines can fly. Thus it
affects airlines’ ability to operate efficient networks and their revenue
(Section 6.2). To the extent that airlines cannot use the least cost combinations
of aircraft types to carry passengers and freight, the costs of operating existing
networks are higher than they otherwise might be (technical inefficiency).
Further, they may be prevented from flying the optimum sized and configured
network (allocative inefficiency). Thus, costs may be reduced as airlines are
able to operate the right aircraft at the right frequencies on an existing route.
Airlines, by changing the design of a network and increasing its size, may also
be able to decrease costs through economies of scale and scope.
Many features of ASAs restrict the development of efficient networks. These
include capacity constraints (third and fourth freedoms), lack of fifth and
seventh freedoms, break of gauge restrictions (which limit the ability toINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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substitute one type of aircraft for another to operate a fifth freedom), and the
ownership and effective control constraint on foreign investment in airlines.
Ownership and control
The major effect of ownership and control restrictions is to prevent the merger
and acquisition of international airlines across national boundaries.
Consequently, airlines are constrained in achieving the efficiency benefits of
operating a larger and potentially better integrated business. Air New Zealand
argued that:
As airlines strive for greater efficiencies, they consider the benefits of
consolidation. However, the normal commercial process of acquisition and/or
merger is not available due to restrictions contained in bilateral agreements that are
designed to ensure that ownership and control of airlines remain with nationals of
the countries where they are based (sub. 6, p. 5).
Growth through merger or acquisition enables airlines to achieve economies of
scale and scope by consolidating airline functions. The merger of two airlines,
for example, may allow them to consolidate their ground handling,
maintenance, information technology and various managerial functions.
Restrictions on foreign investment in airlines and their ability to merge have
prompted airlines to seek other ways of achieving the same benefits. The
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission argued that:
With takeovers, buyouts and mergers effectively prevented by the substantial
ownership and control clause, airlines have resorted to alliances to try and achieve
objectives similar to that which a takeover would achieve (sub. 49, p. 7).
The use of alliances and codesharing has grown in recent years as a means of
minimising airline costs, extending market reach and increasing airline
profitability. Indeed, Qantas argued that mergers were not necessary to capture
these benefits:
... if we [were] looking to buy equity into another airline, then generally speaking
we would prefer to form a commercial agreement with them to get all the benefits
without the capital outlay that’s involved (transcript, p. 126).
However, an alliance may not be able to achieve the same level of operational
integration or the same cost savings possible within a single firm. Air New
Zealand claimed that ‘alliances have become a substitute for acquisitions or
mergers that deliver some, but not all, of the benefits’ (sub. 6, p. 5).
One reason is that alliances can involve significant costs, particularly the costs
of negotiating and managing the alliance, maintaining separate management for
the alliance partners, and monitoring the performance and benefits of the
alliance partner. Where alliances are complex and wide ranging, these6   ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON AIRLINES, USERS AND THE ECONOMY
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negotiations can be time consuming and costly (IC 1997). Some past alliances
have failed or been short lived, highlighting the difficulties of reaching
agreement or realising the benefits of alliance arrangements.
Ansett illustrates the distortion to company structures and the increase in costs
imposed by the current ownership and control provisions for national
designation. Ansett Holdings is half owned by News Corporation and Air New
Zealand. Although it is a SAM airline, it does not meet the requirements to be
called Australian-owned and could not be designated as an Australian carrier for
international operations. Ansett International was set up as a separate majority
Australian-owned company to comply with the ownership and control rules for
international designation.
Ansett (both domestic and international arms) and Air New Zealand are
attempting to achieve with an alliance at least some of the commercial goals that
in a free market could be achieved by merger but which are currently prohibited
to them. Chapter 9 discusses further options which would facilitate closer links
between Australian and New Zealand carriers.
Fifth and seventh freedoms
Most of Australia’s ASAs include provisions for fifth freedom rights, but these
are limited in quantity and available for only a small number of routes. The
Department of Transport and Regional Development (DTRD) (sub. 33) argued
that Australia’s scope to offer beyond rights to foreign carriers is limited by its
geographic location which offers little other than trans-Tasman services or
intermediate points for long-haul services over South-East Asia.
Restrictions on fifth and seventh freedom rights prevent airlines from
developing efficient networks based on overseas hubs. Australian airlines can
hub out of Australian ports (principally Sydney), but they have only limited
ability to develop their own hubs in other countries.
By emphasising third and fourth freedoms, the system has encouraged point-to-
point services and hindered the development of efficient networks (including
hub and spoke operations). Some countries such as Singapore and Thailand
have been able to use sixth freedom rights to hub through their airports, but still
have only limited rights to hub out of most other countries.
Air New Zealand argued that fifth freedom rights are vital to support airline
operations, particularly on long-haul routes and ‘thin’ routes where traffic is
light and markets are developing. It also argued that fifth freedom rights allow
carriers to operate routes with greater frequency than can be sustained by third
and fourth freedom traffic alone. Thus, airlines would be able to operateINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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services with lower overall costs, and by increasing the size of their network
they would be able to capture important marketing advantages.
Seventh freedom rights are similar to fifth freedom rights in that they allow
carriers to operate services between two foreign countries. However, they do
not require the carrier to originate or terminate the service in its home country.
The absence of this requirement enables airlines to minimise the network costs
of operating services between foreign countries by not linking them with other
third and fourth freedom services. It also enables carriers to make the most
effective use of their hubs.
Australia’s ASAs do not provide for carriers to exercise seventh freedom rights.
FedEx (transcript, p. 78) argued that the lack of seventh freedom rights under
Australia’s ASA with the United States means that a flight into Australia must
originate and terminate in the United States regardless of whether there is
sufficient demand for that particular segment. Thus, it may restrict the ability of
carriers such as FedEx to operate a frequent and commercially viable service at
minimum cost.
Qantas (sub. 25) argued that as the momentum builds to break down airline
nationality boundaries, seventh freedom rights will become increasingly
important for Australian carriers to compete for routes in Asia, and to seek the
lowest cost structures for their international operations.
Codesharing
Codesharing is an important tool for airlines to minimise the costs of operating
services. By selling seats on a flight operated by another carrier, codesharing
enables an airline to make direct cost savings by rationalising services or
establishing market presence on a route without actually operating on it. Thus,
both airlines may be able to save on fuel, labour and other variable costs, as
well as making more effective use of aircraft and other overheads.
Qantas argued that codesharing has been an important strategy for reducing its
operational costs on certain routes:
... Qantas avoids capital acquisition and ongoing operating costs by codesharing
on American Airlines’ services to six cities in the United States from Los Angeles
(sub. 25, p. 11).
Codesharing may also affect other administrative costs such as the cost of
operating computer reservation systems. Computer reservation systems have
become an important competitive tool for airlines, but they involve high
investment costs and continuing additional costs.6   ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON AIRLINES, USERS AND THE ECONOMY
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Australia has progressively negotiated codeshare provisions into its ASAs,
though these provisions do not yet exist in all of Australia’s arrangements.
DTRD argued that the exceptions are ASAs which are ‘... older, or less active or
are held with States that are not currently interested in codeshare arrangements’
(sub. 60, p. 13).
Cabotage
Restricting access by foreign carriers to the Australian domestic market gives
the Australian carriers a solid base from which to extend into international
aviation. The same applies to most other countries, with the exception of city
economies such as Singapore and Hong Kong. Integrating domestic and
international services allows airlines to achieve:
·  operational synergies and efficiencies by being able to switch capacity and
aircraft between the domestic and international sectors; and
·  network advantages such as economies of scope and traffic density as well
as the marketing advantages of operating a combined domestic and
international network.
Capacity and frequency
Given the fixed costs of developing and maintaining a route, a shortage of
allowed capacity may increase the average cost of providing services. The
marketing and sales promotion costs of a route are largely independent of the
number of flights operating on the route. Extra capacity enables some
economies of scale by spreading these costs over more passengers. Economies
of scope may also be achieved by spreading indirect administrative costs over
more services.
Ansett International (sub.  19) indicated that capacity restrictions on certain
routes have precluded it from obtaining sufficient capacity to operate daily
frequencies on most of its international services. Given that higher frequencies
may help an airline to draw on the latent demand for air services, a lack of
capacity which results in sub-optimal frequencies may reduce the commercial
viability of some routes. The South Australian Government stated that
‘commercial sustainability on a single route may require a much higher level of
frequency than that required in the context of a wider network’ (sub. 3, p. 17).
The key point is that there is a trade-off for airlines: they can operate fewer
services per week and achieve some economies by using bigger aircraft, or they
can increase revenue by operating more services using smaller, but more
expensive (on a per unit basis) aircraft. These sorts of decisions should be
entirely commercial and unhampered by regulation.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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6.1.4 Compliance costs
Like any regulatory system, the bilateral system of regulation involves some
compliance costs and obliges international airlines to devote considerable
resources to tracking negotiations, liaising with DTRD and the IASC, and
participating as technical advisers on delegations. ASAs which require periodic
renegotiation impose higher compliance costs on the industry, and are more
costly to regulate, than more liberal arrangements where prior agreement allows
for further increases in capacity and other rights, or where there are no
restrictions at all.
Ownership and control restrictions also impose costs on airlines in monitoring
their compliance with foreign ownership constraints. The cost for Qantas
includes monitoring its share register. Qantas indicated that it traces ownership
through various structures, but it has not specifically costed the exercise
(transcript, p. 123).
Complying with safety standards also involves costs. But a good safety record
may be an important marketing advantage, thus warranting expenditure in
excess of what may be required to meet regulatory standards. Qantas claimed
that:
... [it] has an established reputation for on-board and on-ground safety. To
maintain this, Qantas spends around $40 million per annum in meeting technical
and operational specifications in excess of the minimums laid down by regulatory
authorities (sub. 25, p. 14).
6.2 Effects on airline revenues
Some regulatory restrictions act to decrease the potential revenue from
operating certain services. Even if a carrier is technically efficient, regulatory
restrictions may restrict its ability to pick up freight and passengers at different
points in the network. Restrictions on fifth freedoms, cabotage and stopover
rights may all constrain the ability of airlines to optimise passenger and freight
loads over different stages in their networks.
6.2.1 Fifth freedoms
If airlines are able to land in certain places to discharge passengers and cargo,
but are unable to take on further passengers or cargo for a subsequent stage of a
round trip, they will be discouraged from operating the second stage. Thus the
lack of fifth freedom rights for foreign carriers can limit the viability of6   ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON AIRLINES, USERS AND THE ECONOMY
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international passenger services to and from Australia. The New Zealand
External Aviation Policy Committee argued that:
... in negotiating with third countries, the lack of access to trans-Tasman traffic for
those third-country airlines is often cited as a constraint impacting on the viability
of any service they may wish to operate to New Zealand in conjunction with
services to Australia (sub. 34, p. 5).
Aerolineas Argentinas (sub.  9) claimed that the lack of fifth freedom traffic
rights between Auckland and Sydney (until recently) had prevented it from
making the most of the revenue opportunities on the route between Buenos
Aires, Auckland and Sydney, affecting the viability of the service. It claimed
that:
The lack of these rights prevented Aerolineas Argentinas from realising full
revenue opportunities on the route necessary to offset operating costs which on
long, thin routes are high. Aerolineas Argentinas nevertheless persisted
(transcript, p. 365).
By affecting the overall yields of some routes, restrictions on fifth freedoms
limit inbound tourism. The Department of Industry, Science and Tourism
(DIST) (sub. 31) argued that limits on the beyond rights of some foreign carriers
have constrained potential inbound tourism growth to Australia from the
Republic of Korea, South America and New Zealand.
6.2.2 Stopover rights and city designation
Restrictions on own-stopover rights (for example, Korean Air carrying
passengers on to Sydney which it had brought to Brisbane some days earlier),
limit the scope for foreign carriers to obtain revenue from operating services to
two or more points in Australia. Clearly the same applies to Australian carriers
operating between points within other countries.
Airlines, in the absence of own-stopover rights, can choose to serve either the
two or more designated cities with the one flight (but with reduced loads
between those cities) or (presuming that capacity and frequency conditions are
not constraining) each city with individual flights. Whatever the choice, their
passengers who wished to visit both cities would need to use domestic services.
This may not greatly inconvenience such passengers, but would reduce the
viability of operating services to Australia. Own-stopover rights allow airlines
to increase the revenue gained from operating the domestic stage of a loop and
thus to improve yields.
If own-stopover rights are absent or insufficient to meet their needs, foreign
airlines are constrained in offering travel packages that involve multipleINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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domestic stops. Thus, foreign carriers are restricted in developing secondary
gateways and generating (and responding to) market growth opportunities.
6.2.3 Cabotage
Restricting cabotage rights for the carriage of passengers and freight to domestic
airlines reduces competition on domestic routes. These restrictions help keep
fares and freight rates higher than they otherwise might be, boosting domestic
airline revenue at the expense of domestic consumers. Allowing foreign carriers
some cabotage rights could improve competition in the domestic market. A
relatively limited form of cabotage would allow a foreign airline stopping at two
or more points within Australia to carry domestic passengers and freight
(consecutive cabotage or eighth freedom). A more fundamental form of
cabotage would allow dedicated domestic flights by foreign carriers (stand
alone cabotage or ninth freedom).
Granting consecutive cabotage rights to international airlines may allow them to
increase revenue on trips into and out of Australia. For example, the ability to
carry passengers or freight on the route from Perth to Australia’s east coast and
vice versa, might improve South African Airways’ overall yield on flights to
and from South Africa, and could lead to reduced fares and/or increased
frequency. The Northern Territory Government stated that cabotage rights for
foreign carriers between Darwin and other cities would improve airline returns.
It said:
The benefits of cabotage rights would be the ability for carriers using Darwin as a
setdown point en-route to other Australian cities to earn revenue on the sectors
beyond Darwin and therefore increase the carrier’s revenue raising capacity and
hence its commitment to Darwin (sub. 40, p. 4).
A number of participants including Ansett, Qantas and the Australian and
International Pilots Association (AIPA) opposed granting cabotage rights to
foreign carriers. Ansett argued that foreign airlines could price their services on
domestic legs at little more than the marginal cost of the flight, significantly less
than average costs. It was argued that this would make it difficult to make a
satisfactory return on investment in both the airline itself and its infrastructure.
Ansett claimed that:
It is most likely that foreign carriers would engage in ‘cherry picking’ ie. carry
domestic traffic on the most profitable routes. Incumbent airlines would need to
counter any loss of profitability on routes affected by cabotage and this could
mean a reduction in the number of services provided on these routes, or the
reduction or withdrawal of services from less profitable routes, with consequential
loss of amenity to passengers, including those making connections to other parts of
the domestic network. (sub. 19, p. 30).6   ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON AIRLINES, USERS AND THE ECONOMY
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The degree to which additional competition on the more profitable domestic
routes would compromise the airlines’ abilities to continue to operate other less
profitable services is questionable. Like the new entrant, Qantas and Ansett
would price as much above marginal cost as they could. Anything above
marginal cost would allow them to make a contribution to the joint and common
costs of operating their network. Additional competition may reduce this
contribution.
Granting foreign carriers the opportunity to operate domestic sectors is unlikely
to result in Australia’s domestic carriers losing a large amount of market share
in the passenger market. The inconvenience of travelling with an international
carrier for domestic travel could limit the market appeal of this type of service.
For example, Australian domestic travellers are allowed to travel on domestic
legs of international flights operated by Australian airlines, but must: ‘... carry
appropriate identification, pass through normal customs control procedures and
are subject to examination if required’ (sub. 55, p. 1). These problems could be
avoided by having full customs and immigration clearance at the first port of
call (as in the United States), but this would inconvenience international airlines
and their passengers.
Other disadvantages of consecutive cabotage include the poor frequency of
service, delays associated with international flights, and poor connections
between domestic and international flights. For these reasons it is expected that
only price sensitive leisure travellers would be attracted to this option, rather
than time sensitive business travellers. While the domestic airlines would lose
some business to the new services, their profitability may not be greatly
affected, as the bulk of airlines’ profits come from business and other price
insensitive passengers.
Entry may occur on the longer haul Australian sectors, where aircraft used on
international flights are more suited. For example, Westralia Airports
Corporation estimated that if current restrictions were lifted, traffic to Perth
could increase by 5 to 10 per cent (transcript, p. 169).
Cabotage reform would need to be accompanied by a review of the way tax
exemptions on fuel are granted to international carriers.1 This is an important
feature of all ASAs, but to treat domestic and international carriers on the same
basis may require that some distinction be made between the domestic and
international components of a flight in assessing liability for the excise tax on
fuel.
                                            
1 DTRD has mentioned that granting cabotage rights may jeopardise tax exemptions for
international carriage (sub. 60, p. 14).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Section 6.5 addresses the implications of granting cabotage rights to foreign
carriers for the carriage of freight.
6.3 Competition among airlines
The regulatory structure inhibits competition in many ways. It can prevent or
deter entry, constrain capacity, and limit the potential for airlines to win market
share. Most ASAs also contain price regulation in one form or another. Some
routes are contested by third and fourth freedom carriers only, others are also
subject to competition from fifth and sixth freedom traffic. The degree of
competition varies widely across the routes in and out of Australia. To the
extent that competition would occur in the absence of regulation, restrictions
decrease economic efficiency by raising the price of air travel, reducing the
range of services offered, and discouraging innovation and cost minimisation.
A problem in assessing regulatory impacts is the structure of aviation markets.
Economies of scope and traffic density favour large airlines operating many
services. On the demand side, a single carrier operating a long thin route with
multiple frequencies will attract better business than multiple carriers who each
operate one service per week. Thus markets tend to be concentrated with a small
numbers of carriers operating on most routes. This applies even within the US
domestic market, where many routes are highly concentrated despite the
existence of a ‘competitive fringe’ of airlines capable of entry (Forsyth 1998).
Despite a trend to privatisation of airlines, and evidence of private airlines being
more efficient than publicly owned airlines (Oum and Yu 1997), some airlines
still have substantial public ownership or require substantial subsidies. It cannot
be presumed that these airlines respond to normal commercial incentives.
Instead of focusing on shareholder value, they may be managed for national
prestige, employment enhancement, technology transfer, or defence reasons, all
of which might require government subsidies. The continued use of substantial
government subsidies is an obstacle to achieving economically efficient air
services, and has important implications for competition in a less regulated
international environment.
6.3.1 Market entry and competition
The bilateral system of regulation contains numerous barriers to entry. These
are important because entry to a market, or the threat of entry, can be an
important competitive discipline on the behaviour of firms. However, like most
markets, aviation markets are not perfectly contestable. Entry is never entirely
costless, some entry costs are not recoverable, and incumbents have the ability6   ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON AIRLINES, USERS AND THE ECONOMY
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to respond quickly to entry of a new competitor. Nevertheless, entry can occur
where regulation permits.
The regulatory system constrains the potential for entry in many ways. Capacity
constraints, absence of fifth or seventh freedoms to compete on a route,
investment constraints, and restrictions on codesharing can all be important
barriers to entry.
Capacity
Constraints on capacity on certain routes may enable airlines with existing
capacity to maintain higher load factors and higher prices than otherwise. This
occurs where other airlines designated under the agreement are prevented from
expanding their existing services or from entering the route. Incumbent carriers
will have an incentive to use capacity — even when load factors and yields are
relatively low — if that will prevent the loss of that capacity to another
designated carrier. Some countries appear to use capacity constraints to protect
their carriers (Chapter 5).
The effect of capacity constraints on competition is illustrated by the
Japan-Australia ASA. Australia’s third and fourth freedom capacity to Japan
was almost all in use in February 1998 (Chapter 5; Appendix E). Aircraft may
not have been flying full, so some seats would have been available.
Nevertheless, the capacity constraint meant that at the time, Australian airlines
(using almost 97 per cent of Australia’s entitlement) could not substantially
increase the number of flights operated to Japan. The designated Japanese
carriers on the other hand were much less constrained, and were using only
some 77.5 per cent of their entitlement.
Japanese carriers have been shown to be relatively uncompetitive by world
standards, and Qantas appears to be relatively efficient by comparison
(Chapter 2). It is not known whether the Australian airlines would have chosen
to increase services in the absence of the capacity constraint: they may have
been satisfied to operate the then current levels of service. However, as long as
the ASA constrains capacity, Australian airlines cannot choose to operate
additional services, and hence cannot take market share from the Japanese
carriers beyond what they can supply with their existing capacity. More recent
evidence shows that capacity utilisation on this route has decreased quite
significantly since February 1998 (Chapter 5) in response to a downturn in the
Australia–Japan market, but the point remains — capacity restrictions have the
potential to stifle market driven competition.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Competition from third country carriers
Third country carriers provide an important source of competition on some
routes where they have the appropriate rights under their ASAs with Australia
and other countries. Depending on the route, Australian carriers may compete
not only with our bilateral partner’s carriers, but also fifth freedom and sixth
freedom carriers.
DTRD acknowledged that:
For Australia, the competitive benefits of these third country carriers are very
important and are taken into account in determining net national benefit, as
Australia assesses proposals for capacity increases and trade-offs with other rights
which may be offered (sub. 33, p. 9).
Given the historical development of Australia’s aviation industry, sixth freedom
carriers are an important source of competitive pressure on routes through to
Europe, as noted in Chapter 5. This competition comes from carriers operating
from countries that are conveniently placed to operate as hubs between
Australia and Europe. Singapore Airlines, for example, is able to use third and
fourth freedom rights under the UK–Singapore and Singapore–Australia ASAs
to operate flights from London to Australia in direct competition with
Australian and UK carriers using third and fourth freedom rights under the
Australia–UK ASAs.
Fifth freedom carriers are important sources of actual or potential competition
to Australian carriers on many routes. Under its fifth freedom rights under the
Australia–New Zealand ASA, Air New Zealand operates services from
Australia to several Asian destinations and the United States. Similarly, the
exchanges of fifth freedom rights between Australia, Thailand and Hong Kong
enable carriers of all three economies to compete on the Australia–Thailand,
Australia–Hong Kong, and Hong Kong-Thailand routes.
Some participants were critical of Australia’s apparent reluctance to grant
further fifth freedoms to other countries. DIST claimed that third and fourth
freedoms have been ‘regarded as a ‘national right’ by some countries under the
current system of bilateral agreements’ (sub. 31, p. 18), not to be eroded by fifth
freedoms. It also argued that Australia’s failure to agree to additional beyond
rights for New Zealand carriers has denied Australia the benefits of additional
competition.
The Commission recognises the importance of fifth freedoms in generating
competition on routes into and out of Australia, and that fifth freedoms for
Australian carriers to operate between two other countries are important for
developing efficient networks.6   ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON AIRLINES, USERS AND THE ECONOMY
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It has already been noted that Australia does not have seventh freedom rights in
any of its ASAs. If they were available, seventh freedom rights may also lead to
the entry of third country carriers, and thus provide additional competition for
Australian and other carriers.
Restrictions on foreign investment
The ownership and effective control restrictions prevent foreigners from
establishing new airlines in countries for the purposes of providing international
air services. These restrictions could hinder the entry of new airlines wishing to
operate international air services into and out of Australia, and limit the
opportunities for Australian aviation interests to establish new airlines in other
countries. British Airways noted that the maintenance of a restriction on foreign
investment, despite the deregulation which had occurred in the United
Kingdom, delayed the development of competition in the UK domestic market.
British Airways stated that:
The big change that EU liberalisation brought to the market was the opportunity
for companies owned by citizens of countries other than the United Kingdom to
commence services. Thus Irish owned Ryanair and Greek-owned EasyJet were
able to enter the market and have done so. We see a similar pattern elsewhere with,
for example, British Airways’ subsidiary Deutsche BA providing competition in
Germany and British-owned Virgin Express competing internationally out of
Belgium (sub. 36, p. 2).
While these developments may increase the level of competition within the EU,
airlines which have broad EU ownership and control may not be eligible to
exercise rights under ASAs negotiated with non EU countries.
Codesharing
Codesharing has the potential to promote competition among carriers on ‘thin’
routes where it may not be commercially sustainable for multiple carriers to
operate services. Codesharing may be an attractive option to the operating
carrier in these circumstances when the additional traffic generated by the
non-operating carrier lowers operating costs and makes it feasible to operate
more services.
The impact of codesharing on competition will depend on the extent to which
the carriers operating on a codeshare basis compete with each other on the same
route, or use codesharing to connect their services. Where carriers are already
operating on the same route, and have relatively high market shares,
codesharing is likely to reduce competition.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission commented on the
potential anticompetitive effects of codesharing:
In the case of an operating carrier selling seats to a non-operating carrier, such
arrangements may lead to a reduction in price competition as the operating carrier
knows the price that it sells seats to the non-operating carrier. This places the
operating carrier in a privileged competitive position and may enable it to establish
air fares at a level higher than in a competitive market. Similarly, the non-
operating carrier has a disincentive to compete too vigorously as it may run the
risk of having the code share operation terminated (sub. 49, p. 8).
The operating carrier may be in a dominant position for pricing seats, but the
two carriers may still compete in marketing and selling tickets, and in providing
connecting services. Codesharing may also provide a means for carriers to start
up services and test new routes. Thus, it can be an important precursor to the
development of more vigorous competition when carriers operate services in
their own right. Codesharing may also enable carriers to operate with greater
frequencies and to connect with other carriers’ services through a hub.
Many participants emphasised the importance of having the flexibility to
operate on a codeshare basis. DTRD commented that:
Codesharing offers new and incumbent carriers the opportunity to enter a market
or increase traffic and revenue and obtain economies of scale and density by
expanding their networks without incurring the major sunk costs associated with
operating additional aircraft (sub. 33, p. 25).
Qantas also stated that ‘without the ability to compete on this basis — airlines
both foreign and Australian — will be at a distinct commercial disadvantage’
(sub. 25, p. 16).
The inclusion of codesharing rights under most of Australia’s ASAs allows
airlines flexibility in terms of how they will contest markets. Thus, they have
the potential to generate greater competition and to minimise the costs of
operating on certain routes and the overall network. The omission of these
rights from the remainder of Australia’s ASAs restricts the scope for both
Australian and foreign carriers to enter new markets and to minimise costs,
though as noted earlier (Section 6.1.3) the restriction may not in fact be
significant.
Computer reservation systems
The development and use of computer reservation systems became an important
competition issue in the late 1980s. An airline, by developing its own system
which travel agents and other airlines could then use, gained a competitive
advantage by ensuring that its flights were listed more prominently on computer
displays used in booking tickets. This issue became such a concern that it is6   ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON AIRLINES, USERS AND THE ECONOMY
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now specifically addressed in ASAs, and is covered under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services.
6.3.2 Market concentration
The bilateral nature of regulation means that the designated airlines of the
partner countries often dominate the air services between the two countries. In
many cases this means that a small number of airlines supply most of the direct
services. Bilateral arrangements, by generally constraining the potential for
entry and the ability of designated carriers of one country to take market share
from carriers of the other country, help preserve high numbers of airlines at the
global level, but relatively high market concentration on a country pair basis.
Calculation of Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices (HHI) offers some perspective on
the degree of concentration in particular markets and thus the potential for
competitive behaviour. These indices are calculated by summing the squared
market shares (expressed as a decimal) of each airline operating between a
country or market pair (Table 6.1).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Table 6.1 Market concentration by country or region, 12 months
to end April 1998























Note: A high HHI figure indicates more market concentration. A pure monopoly would have an HHI of 1.0; a
duopoly with each firm having equal market share would have an HHI of 0.5; and atomistic competition would
have an HHI approaching zero. Market shares are based on origin and destination traffic.
Source: Commission estimates based on DTRD (1998).
These results indicate that most airline markets are not highly competitive, with
many HHIs indicating a high degree of concentration. The HHI for the
Australia-New Zealand route, for example is 0.47, a reflection of the dominance
of Qantas and Air New Zealand, which had market shares of approximately 41
per cent and 42 per cent respectively in the twelve months to end April 1998.
Other markets such as the United Kingdom show relatively lower market6   ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON AIRLINES, USERS AND THE ECONOMY
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concentration, which is partly the result of competition from sixth freedom
carriers.
6.4 Effects on passenger airfares and services
6.4.1 Price competition
Competition between airlines has been shown to result in lower prices, and an
increased range and quality of services. Given the considerable differences
among groups of customers, and the abilities of airlines to differentiate their
prices, the effects of competition are likely to be different from one group to the
next. Competition for price-sensitive travellers, such as people travelling for
leisure reasons, is likely to lead to lower prices, whereas competition for
price-insensitive travellers such as business people could focus on non-price
aspects such as frequency of service, in-flight services, and the use of airport
lounges. Empirical research supports this behaviour.
The Commission undertook some modelling of the effects of Australia’s
international aviation arrangements on the market for air travel to and from
Australia (Appendix F). Specifically, the Commission modelled the competitive
effects of entry of a new Australian carrier, such as Ansett International, on
prices, Australian and foreign economic welfare, and net tourism. The results
suggest that increased competition tends to reduce prices, and that increases in
consumer welfare more than offset losses in the profits earned by airlines on
affected routes. For example, where airlines are assumed to have some
discretion in setting prices, a price fall of almost 8  per  cent occurs in the
Indonesian market, and a fall of almost 7 per cent occurs in Hong Kong as a
consequence of Ansett’s entry (Table 6.2).
The Commission’s results are broadly consistent with those of Savage, Smith
and Street (1994), and Dresner and Tretheway (1992b).
Savage, Smith and Street (1994) estimated the effect of competition on air fares
in Australian international aviation markets. Their econometric model used
three proxies for competition: the number of airlines competing on a route;
market concentration (using a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index); and a qualitative
measure of regulation. The regulation variable was included to account for the
degree of ‘liberality’ in the ASA governing air services rights on each route.
They found strong evidence that discount fares declined where three or more
airlines were competing on a route, and there was some evidence of business
class fares increasing as the number of airlines increases. They also found
strong evidence that liberal regulation decreases the best discount fare andINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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increases the business class fare. They suggested that discount fares are 16 per
cent lower on liberal routes than on non liberal routes.
Table 6.2 Estimated effects of Ansett’s entry on changes in price
and quantity by market, 1997
Between Australia and: Quantity Prices
%%
China 2.6 -4.4
Hong Kong 5.3 -6.8
Indonesia 3.4 -7.7
Japan 3.0 -4.3




Savage, Smith and Street explained these results by suggesting that:
As competition cuts into profits, airlines move to segregate business and non
business traffic, because business traffic is generally less price sensitive than non
business traffic. ... Airlines then compete for these high yielding business
passengers on the basis of service quality, such as more frequent departures, the
provision of airport lounges, or better in-flight systems (1994, p. 16).
These results are generally consistent with those of Dresner and Tretheway
(1992b) who estimated the effects of market structure on the price of airfares in
the US international aviation market. Dresner and Tretheway investigated the
effect of liberal bilateral agreements on the price of discount and full fare
tickets. Their study revealed that the United States procompetitive air transport
policy:
... had a significant effect, reducing discount fares by an average of 35 per cent,
other things being equal. This may have resulted in a welfare gain of roughly $325
million in 1981 alone. In contrast, the policy has had no statistically discernible
effect on the ‘full fare’ which business and other non-discretionary travellers use
(1992b, p. 183).
The regulation of charter services may also have important effects on
competition and airfares in the lower end of the market. Facilitation of charter
services can provide opportunities for the development of low cost leisure and
major event markets. The Australian Tourist Commission (ATC) claims that
recent charter initiatives have significantly contributed to the expansion of the
lower-cost end of the market for travel between Australia and the United6   ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON AIRLINES, USERS AND THE ECONOMY
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Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand. The ATC noted that charter operators
Britannia and Air Tours have developed the lower cost market on the
Australia-UK route by offering lower fares than the scheduled carriers. It also
claimed that the entry of charter operator Canada 3000 has provided Canadian
travellers with direct access to Australia at more competitive prices than those
offered by scheduled airlines (sub. 29).
The influence which charter services may have on the airfares of scheduled
services depends on the degree to which the two services are substitutes for
each other, the level of competition on the route concerned, and the actual or
perceived ability of charter operators to take market share from scheduled
operators. On most routes to and from Australia, charters have only a very small
proportion of the market, and other things being the same may not be regarded
as a substantial threat to scheduled airlines. In the 12 month period to
November 1997, the charter operator Britannia operated the largest charter
service to Australia, but accounted for only just over 2 per cent of the origin and
destination traffic between Australia and the United Kingdom. The presence of
a number of sixth freedom carriers on that route appears to have been a more
substantial influence on competition. However, in some more concentrated
markets such as Canada and New Zealand, charter operators may have an
important effect. For example, Kiwi Travel International Airlines — which
initially started as a charter operator before offering scheduled services — was
able to capture only a small part of the Australia New Zealand market.
However, it had a substantial effect on airfares at the discount end of the market
(Section 4.2.4).
These results indicate generally that deregulation has been an important
precursor to lower airfares in the discount end of the market. To the extent that
the current set of ASAs constrain competition, further price reductions may be
possible. This would be likely to benefit leisure travellers more than business
travellers.
Impacts on tourism
Regulations that lead to higher inbound international airfares reduce the number
of inbound foreign tourists, and Australia’s export of tourism services. Higher
airfares also reduce tourists’ expenditure on accommodation, shopping,
restaurant meals, guided tours and internal transport. However, higher outbound
international airfares induce more Australians to travel domestically instead of
overseas, benefiting local tourism operators. Thus they encourage import
substitution — that is, the supply of domestic rather imported tourism.
The importance of airfares to tourism was highlighted by several participants in
this inquiry. DIST (sub. 31) indicated that much of the recent growth on theINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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trans-Tasman route resulted from significant discounting associated with the
entry of Kiwi International (which has since liquidated) and its Air New
Zealand subsidiary competitor Freedom Air in 1995. Despite being
characterised as a mature market, visitor arrivals to Australia from New Zealand
increased by around 25  per  cent over the twelve month period when both
airlines operated on the route (Chapter 4).
Regulations that lead to higher airfares are a tax on exports of tourism services.
Higher airfares sustainable under constrained ASAs impose net costs on
Australian tourism operators as well as on Australian tourists. Higher airfares
impede the development of inbound foreign tourism, and the tourism choices of
Australians, more than offsetting any benefits to tourism operators from more
Australians travelling at home instead of overseas.
These issues are discussed further in Section 6.7.1
6.4.2 Non-price effects
Regulations that restrict the number of airlines serving particular routes, and the
extent to which they can compete with each other, may limit the range of
service levels — safety, ticket conditions, check-in and on-board facilities —
from which passengers can choose. Capacity restrictions may constrain the
introduction and expansion of direct flights, the timing and choice of services,
and the ease and speed of connections, for example. The costs of less direct
services are incurred by passengers, and potential passengers (in the form of
increased travel time, lower availability of on-demand seats and less
convenience), and by Australian tourism operators (in the form of lower levels
of inbound tourism).
Frequency
Frequency of service is one of the most important non-price determinants of
demand. Lower levels of flight frequency reduce the opportunity of passengers
to satisfy their itineraries and seat requirements, and reduce the potential for
airlines to draw on the latent demand for air services. More convenient flight
scheduling has been found to be important to business travellers (Morrison and
Winston 1989).
Restrictions that affect the availability of services can be an important issue in
the competition for discretionary travel by potential tourists. The Australian
Tourist Commission stated that:
... where capacity is tight, and load factors are high, there are potential impacts on
all aspects of the travel distribution system. If wholesalers and travel agents
(retailers) experience difficulty in obtaining seats to Australia, they are likely to6   ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON AIRLINES, USERS AND THE ECONOMY
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‘cross sell’ the potential Australian traveller to other more easily obtainable
destinations ... eg Hawaii or the USA (sub. 29, pp. 8–9).
Product range
Even where capacity is available to book seats on flights into Australia,
difficulties in packaging international with domestic services may discourage
tourism. The quality of service which foreign airlines can offer within Australia
is limited by restrictions on own-stopover rights, and restrictions on domestic
codesharing. The availability of these rights improves the ability of overseas
airlines to market a more comprehensive range of Australian tourism
destinations, and generate additional inbound tourism. Codesharing can provide
attractive, relatively seamless service to foreign tourists, but is not possible if
foreign airlines do not have traffic and market access rights to cover secondary
gateways.
Limitations on network development based on fifth and seventh freedoms
restrict the quantity and variety of services which airlines can offer. This
influences the degree to which Australia can be marketed as a tourism
destination. The New Zealand External Aviation Policy Committee
demonstrated that a large proportion of visitors to New Zealand — particularly
those from long-haul markets in North America, North Asia and Europe —
combine a visit to New Zealand with one to Australia.
The 1996 International Visitors Survey conducted by the New Zealand Tourism
Board indicated that 58.5 per cent of all third-country visitors to New Zealand
visited Australia in the same trip ... Australia and New Zealand are perceived, in
many of our major markets, to be a ‘single’ destination (sub. 34, p. 4).
Limitations on the quantity of fifth freedoms available to third country carriers
to offer air services between Australia and New Zealand therefore may be
constraining the potential for tourism to Australia and New Zealand.
Safety
Some participants in this inquiry were concerned about the possible effects on
airline safety of liberalising the bilateral regulatory regime. Maintaining the
current regime, some argue, is important for underpinning the profitability of
airlines and their expenditure on safety (crew training, maintenance, investment
in new aircraft, etc.). For example, the AIPA highlighted a possible link
between deregulation, airline profits and investment in safety:
... the bilateral approach in the form of ASAs has had the benefit of enabling
Australia to monitor and ensure safety certification of foreign carriers flying to,
within and beyond Australia. ... regulation, whilst raising costs and restricting the
potential for competition, has upheld the quality of service in terms of airlineINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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safety. In particular, where regulation has supported higher profitability in Qantas
and Ansett and profitability is correlated with airline safety and performance ...,
regulation has been responsible for higher airline safety (sub. 61, p. 10).
The AIPA was also concerned that consumers may have insufficient
information on accident and incident rates to make informed decisions about
airline safety investments. If such an asymmetry of information exists, it may
encourage the carriers to invest less on safety than consumers would demand if
fully informed (sub. 61).
Some empirical research on this subject where US carriers are concerned,
suggests that there may be some links between profit and safety investment for
small to medium sized carriers, but not for large carriers (Rose 1990,
Rose 1992). Rose suggests that this may:
... reflect a greater degree of freedom for these carriers in choosing their safety
investment levels. Information asymmetries or liquidity constraints may be less
important for the largest firms in the industry, or the FAA may more tightly
constrain these carriers through safety inspection and enforcement (1990, p. 959).
Rose qualifies her results by acknowledging that further research is required to
test causality of the relationship between profits and safety (1990, p. 959). It is
by no means clear in her work whether profits drive safety or vice versa.
Airlines have an incentive to invest in safety if consumers have sufficient
information to distinguish between ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ airlines. In that case
rather than profits driving safety, it is possible that establishing a good record
may lead to higher patronage and earnings.
It is difficult to draw any conclusions from Rose’s work about the possible
effects on safety of airlines servicing the Australian market, either under the
current regime, or some alternative more liberal regime. The circumstances in
the US domestic market are somewhat different from the international scene.
Domestic deregulation in the US led to a number of new start up airlines
entering the market, and the relatively few accidents of these carriers have
helped skew the results. Liberalising the bilateral system of regulation may
make it easier for start up carriers to enter Australia’s international aviation
markets, but its most probable effect will be to encourage more competition
from large already established carriers from third countries. The fear expressed
by AIPA is that competition could drive these and Australian airlines to lower
their safety standards.
The small number of air accidents make it very difficult to establish any robust
statistical relationships between accidents and potential causes. While
‘incidents’ are more common, the data on incidents are unsatisfactory, again
making it difficult or impossible to establish robust statistical relationships. The
Australian Services Union argued that:6   ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON AIRLINES, USERS AND THE ECONOMY
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... the Australian airlines industry is a very capable one and has a reputation of
impeccable safety when compared perhaps to other areas. What we are concerned
[about] is that if there are to be changes within the industry that safety isn’t
forfeited for what would be perceived to be short-term gain (transcript, p. 433).
But even if there were a link between liberalising the economic regulations
governing international aviation and safety, maintenance of adequate safety
standards would be best addressed directly through the development and
enforcement of adequate safety regulations. As noted in Chapter 3, some
countries are building on the ICAO basis for regulating safety multilaterally by
adopting additional safety procedures in their ASAs. The Commission endorses
the need for compulsory universal safety standards which airlines can choose to
exceed if they wish. The keys to effective regulation of safety are a rigorous
form of national designation (which does not necessarily require ownership by
nationals), strict enforcement by the designating country, and effective
monitoring by other countries.
6.5 Effects on users of air freight
The majority of freight services are provided as a by-product of passenger
services. Hence the regulation of passenger services through ASAs can have
implications for the supply and configuration of air freight services to and from
Australia. As most of Australia’s ASAs have been negotiated with passengers in
mind, they do not always cater for the requirements of cargo operators.
Increasingly though, specific freight conditions are being incorporated into
ASAs.
The nature of air freight makes for a very different market from passenger
services, hence regulations which might be limiting in one market may be
unimportant in the other. One example of this is freight users who are not
particularly sensitive about the time taken to deliver their freight and hence may
be indifferent to the route taken. While such users would clearly want their
freight delivered in a reasonable time, and presumably more quickly than via
surface freight, they may accept less direct routes in exchange for lower rates.
This gives them a wider range of choices over airlines and routes than
passengers who are interested in relatively direct routes which conserve time.
Competition is therefore quite vigorous, even within regulated markets.
Australia’s inbound and outbound freight markets differ quite substantially. The
inbound market is dominated by high value, non perishable goods. The
outbound market is more mixed. In revenue terms, the largest single commodity
exported is non monetary gold, followed more or less equally by computers and
office equipment, and perishable primary products. By weight the great majorityINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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of the outbound market is in perishable primary products many of which are
quite low in unit value. Demand for air freight of these products is highly price
sensitive.
6.5.1 Capacity constraints
In this and other inquiries (HRSC 1996) it was evident that freight capacity per
se is rarely a limiting factor. On many routes there is substantial excess capacity
available on passenger services, and many ASAs also contain dedicated
freighter capacity, much of which is unused. The Government has been
pursuing a progressively more liberal policy on air freight to reduce constraints
on capacity, frequency and access points (Chapter 4). Consequently, dedicated
freight airlines such as Cargolux, DHL and FedEx have been increasing their
operations in Australia.
The liberal amount of capacity led the House of Representatives Standing
Committee (HRSC) to conclude in its 1996 report Jet Fresh: Paddock to Plate,
that there was adequate capacity overall. Examining the air freight regulatory
environment, the HRSC found that capacity:
... does not present significant impediments to the export of perishable and time
sensitive products. In general, available air freight capacity (on passenger flights,
supplemented by dedicated freight services plus ad hoc charters during peak
periods) is adequate to meet the current needs of exporters of perishable
products (p. 29).
However, it also noted that:
... this should not be interpreted as meaning ... that the level of service offered by
airlines (and forwarders) meets the level of service sought by exporters, such as
providing direct routes into target markets, guaranteed delivery times, and access
to space on preferred flights (p. 33).
The key point is that a surplus of freight capacity overall does not tell the full
story. There are important spatial and temporal dimensions to the demand for
air freight, and the scope for competition from third country carriers is
constrained. With schedules and routes determined largely by airline passenger
priorities, Australian exporters can be constrained in their ability to meet
particular market requirements for such things as overnight delivery. For
example, DFAT (sub.  52) argued that the scarcity of passenger flights from
Australia to South America impeded the development of trade in high-value,
time-critical goods and manufactures with that region.
The need for timely freight deliveries may create demand for dedicated services
even where there is surplus freight capacity in scheduled passenger services. For
example,6   ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON AIRLINES, USERS AND THE ECONOMY
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... DHL has committed a significant resource into the development of an overnight
trans-Tasman service. In considering that service, the potential existed to utilise the
capacity of some 60 passenger flights per week. However, the timing of these
flights did not satisfy our client’s needs. Accordingly, and despite the relative
capacity that existed, DHL commenced its current dedicated 727 freighter service
(sub. 17, p. 4).
6.5.2 Competition from third country carriers
The quantity and variety of fifth freedom rights from Australia have been
influenced more by the requirements of passenger services than freight services.
This may disadvantage freight operations because their traffic patterns are
unlikely to mirror passenger routes. The consequences of low value outbound
freight and restrictions on fifth freedoms mean that some freighters traverse
quite lengthy stages, such as Sydney to Singapore, with an empty hold, or
without using the freight capacity of passenger services most effectively. If one
leg of a journey cannot be profitably operated, there will be upwards pressure
on the prices of other legs.
Australian international airlines operate very few dedicated freighters, hence
Australian users are more highly dependent on foreign carriers than is the case
in the corresponding passenger market. This means that freedoms which allow
overseas carriers to pick up freight in Australia are particularly important. Some
participants emphasised the need for more fifth freedom rights for passenger
and dedicated freight services. Tassal Limited (sub.  16) stated that some
overseas dedicated freight carriers operating the loop Los Angeles–Sydney–
Hong Kong–Taipei–Los Angeles have no cargo carrying rights ex-Australia.
FedEx was critical of various restrictions in Australia’s ASAs, such as the
conditions attached to the use of fifth freedoms and the absence of seventh
freedoms out of Australia, which it claimed limited its flexibility to operate
freight services into and out of Australia (sub. 18).
However, even where rights exist, the commercial incentive may be insufficient
to warrant supplying a dedicated freighter service. The Jet Fresh report argued
that the apparent lack of motivation of some foreign dedicated freight carriers
which do have such rights to carry freight ex-Australia may be overcome if
Australian exporters could provide regular high yielding loads on these routes
(HRSC 1996).
6.5.3 Cabotage and interconnection issues
Australia’s ASAs restrict the rights of overseas carriers to carry freight within
the Australian domestic market, as they do the carriage of passengers.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Competition within the domestic market is therefore restricted to the rivalry
between Ansett and Qantas, some relatively small specialist operators, and the
alternatives of surface or sea transport. DTRD indicated that administrative
arrangements allow temporary exemptions from freight cabotage restrictions.
Domestic cabotage by international carriers is permitted, for example, when
carriers are unable to operate because equipment has failed, or because
specialist equipment necessary to transport freight is not available in Australia
(transcript, p. 323).
The Northern Territory Government (sub.  40) advocated the relaxation of
restrictions on freight and passenger cabotage to allow carriage of air freight on
some domestic sectors of international flights. It suggested that the granting of
cabotage rights would enable foreign airlines to use available freight capacity
between Darwin and other Australian destinations better.
Some participants suggested that granting rights for freight cabotage services
could jeopardise the viability of some domestic freight services, or that it would
decrease the returns airlines achieve on their domestic passenger services. The
AIPA argued that if international carriers flew a domestic leg on route to an
international destination they might make the round trip currently operated by
some domestic freight operators unprofitable (sub. 61, pp. 4–5). This could lead
to the domestic operator leaving the market altogether, and a poorer standard of
service from the international operator who would be disinterested in operating
the return trip. Similarly, Qantas argued that its Perth–east coast freight run,
which is operated with a leased freighter, would be in jeopardy if freight
cabotage services were allowed (sub. 67).
These arguments are similar to those put forward by some participants for the
retention of cabotage restrictions on passenger services. It is inevitable that
some changes would result from the entry of foreign carriers into the Australian
domestic market for passengers or freight, but the dynamics of the market place
make it difficult to tell in advance what the results might be. In addition, the
possible loss of exemptions on excise taxes on fuel and other charges, which are
currently extended to foreign carriers for the operation of international flights,
may lessen the appeal of exercising cabotage rights (Section 6.2.3). To the
extent that granting consecutive cabotage rights to foreign carriers for freight
injects any competitive pressure on routes, it would be unlikely to lead to
substantial losses in the market shares of dedicated domestic operators.
Some participants also raised some important logistical issues concerning the
availability of air freight. The South Australian Government (sub.  3)
emphasised that domestic flights from Adelaide to other gateways provide a less
appropriate alternative to direct flights for freight than for passengers. This is
because domestic flights operating between Adelaide and the primary freight6   ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON AIRLINES, USERS AND THE ECONOMY
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gateways of Sydney and Melbourne are all operated with narrow-bodied
aircraft, such as Boeing 737s and Airbus 320s, which are unable to carry freight
containers suitable for larger, wide bodied aircraft.
Indirect routes and the associated transhipping requirements (such as
repackaging) can affect adversely the quality of perishable products before they
leave Australia. The South Australian Government stated that:
Transhipment via other gateways imposes costs of the deterioration in market
value of some products caused by additional transport time required to reach the
markets. Transport SA, in consultation with industry, undertook case studies in
1995 of representative products exported from South Australia. The studies
estimated that the cost per day of additional transport time is in the order of 25 per
cent of FOB value for melons, 30 per cent for cherries, 15–30 per cent for fresh
meat and 15 per cent for fresh chilled tuna (sub. 3, p. 8).
Airlines concentrate the majority of passenger flights through eastern seaboard
gateways because these gateways have the strongest passenger demand and are
the major destinations for inbound freight. Airlines have little incentive to divert
what are essentially passenger flights to collect freight at smaller Australian
gateways, especially for low-value cargo which attracts low freight rates.
Nevertheless, even if wide-bodied aircraft flew through Adelaide, it would not
necessarily avoid repackaging because different wide-bodied aircraft, such as
the Boeing 767 and the Boeing 747, have different freight container sizes.
6.5.4 Conclusions
Little can be done about the basic imbalance in the value and volume of
inbound and outbound air cargo, but the Commission considers that the
financial penalties of the regulatory system could be reduced through further
liberalisation.
In particular, granting freight cabotage rights to foreign freighters and passenger
services would provide opportunities for them to carry domestic Australian air
cargo on domestic stages of their journey — for example, from Sydney to Perth
en route to Singapore. This could improve yields on those flights, and stimulate
competition in the domestic market. Such services would have to compete not
only with domestic air cargo services but also with surface transport.
Nevertheless, the greater regular availability of freight capacity on wide-bodied
aircraft could provide a useful additional type of service. However, care would
need to be taken that international operators were not given an unfair advantage
over domestic operators through exemptions on taxes and charges granted to
international flights under all ASAs.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Regulations governing international freight services have been eased
considerably in many of Australia’s ASAs, but some restrictions remain. These
increase the costs and inconvenience of doing business in Australia. Removing
the remaining restrictions on the entry of third country carriers would provide
some competitive pressures on freight rates for international and domestic
routes. More fifth and seventh freedoms for Australian airlines would be of
benefit too. In fact anything that reduces airline costs and improves networking
possibilities will benefit users of air freight.
Options for liberalising air freight regulation are canvassed in Chapter 9.
6.6 Regional effects
Air services are not an end in themselves, rather they are a way of getting
people and goods to locations for business or leisure activities. Many
international airlines supply services to Australia’s main international airports,
and these are complemented by domestic services to a wide range of secondary
airports. Connections with international services are therefore not always direct,
and in some cases may require connections on regional or domestic airlines.
Many participants emphasised the critical role which air services can play in
state and regional development, and tourism in Australia. For example, the
South Australian Government argued that:
... [Direct international flights] provide benefits related to increased passenger
spend[ing] at Adelaide Airport, export facilitation, investment attraction, niche
tourism development and enhanced credibility of the State as an international
destination and place to do business (sub. 3, p. 3).
Tourism is highly significant for some regional economies. The Cairns Port
Authority noted that:
International inbound tourism has pumped $4 billion into the economy of Tropical
North Queensland over the past five years — and tourism is now the largest
industry sector in the region (sub. 51, p. 1).
Constraints imposed by ASAs on overall capacity and market access affect
foreign airline services to smaller cities and regional airports. Many of these
cities are served currently by Australian airlines, either through direct
international flights or through connections on their domestic services. Ansett
noted that:
... ASAs do not constrain Australian carriers from serving Australian regions ...
Normally ... [Australian] ... carriers, in exercising commercial judgments, prefer to
serve main centres, and rely on domestic networks to supply the feed to and from
regions (sub. 19, p. 35).6   ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON AIRLINES, USERS AND THE ECONOMY
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However, the constraints on foreign airlines limit their potential to offer new
services and to compete with the Australian carriers directly in servicing some
cities. Restrictions on city designation can limit access to secondary airports in
two ways. First, some ASAs exclude access to secondary airports either
specifically or because all allowed points in an agreement are fully used.
Second, combined with overall capacity restrictions, limits on foreign carrier
access points impose opportunity costs on flying to points other than primary
international gateways.
The South Australian Government argued that:
... as long as the capacity available to a foreign carrier is less than the amount of
total capacity it wishes to operate to Australia, then the effect of that will be to
concentrate the airline’s services on the highest yielding airports. Scarcity of
capacity will act to discourage airlines either from implementing new services to
secondary airports, or expanding existing services to them (sub. 3, p. 10).
Participants suggested several approaches to improving access to secondary
gateways, with potential flow-on benefits for regional Australia.
The South Australian Government (sub. 3) suggested removing or reducing
limits on capacity generally as a way of lowering the opportunity cost of using
secondary gateways. Alternatively, where overall capacity limits are binding,
the governments of Queensland, Northern Territory and Western Australia
argued that access to secondary gateways should be more substantially
liberalised than at primary international gateways. These governments felt that
this approach would encourage regional development by increasing
opportunities for foreign airlines to use secondary gateways, in turn increasing
inbound tourism (particularly in the regions).
Some participants wanted to remove any restrictions on access to airports in
northern Australia — that is, that airlines be given unlimited capacity to serve
specified airports in the northern zone — as a step towards more broadly based
reform, and a boost to tourism. The Northern Territory Government suggested a
northern Australian ‘open skies’ policy which would include better access to
airports in these regions as a first step to more liberal arrangements:
The ‘Northern Australia’ proposal for Air Service Agreement negotiations
encourages regional development by increasing opportunities to utilise selected
northern secondary gateways to increase inbound tourism to Australia. The
concept may be used by the Commonwealth as an early initiative, on a selective
basis, to increase the liberalisation process. Over time there will be increasing
global and regional pressures for open route and open capacity arrangements
(sub. 40, p. 4).
The Queensland and Western Australia Governments submitted similar
proposals. The Queensland proposal also suggested that some cabotage rights beINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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offered to foreign airlines to carry passengers from the designated northern
airports to other major airports outside the Northern Australian zone. However,
this approach would run into problems if an airline sought the right to use a port
in the ‘northern zone’, then fly on to a second port which is designated and
allocated capacity under an ASA. More generally, lifting restrictions on
capacity and gateway specification would be preferable.
The cities currently designated in ASAs are the product of negotiations within
the bilateral framework and reflect the broad exchange of opportunities between
Australia and its bilateral partners. DIST argued that:
Regional centres have ... suffered from the general tendency in the past for each of
our agreements to provide access to a limited number of specific ports in Australia.
The availability of points is frequently used as a negotiating chip. In this sense, the
benefits regional Australia would receive from a more liberal and flexible regime
are often seen as a secondary consideration (sub. 31, p. 15).
As Australia has relatively few beyond points it can offer to airlines of other
countries, Australia’s multiple points of market access are of some value in
bilateral negotiations. Access to Sydney was an important issue for many
participants, and is highly valued by the airlines of many countries. Similarly,
Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth are major and expanding gateways (Table C5,
Appendix C), and may have considerable value at the negotiating table.
However, the value of many other locations as negotiating coin is questionable.
Denying other countries the rights to serve locations such as Adelaide, Darwin
and Broome may be counterproductive. If capacity is scarce, and airlines have
to choose between serving Sydney or Darwin, for example, they will choose
Sydney.
The proposals put by the Northern Territory, Western Australia, South Australia
and Queensland have some parallels in a recent policy initiative announced by
the Hon. Glenda Jackson MP, Minister for Aviation for the United Kingdom.
The UK Government has announced its intentions to offer its bilateral partners
open access to all UK airports — with the exception of Heathrow and Gatwick
— on the condition that UK airlines are also able to operate on the same routes.
The change in our policy will allow both UK airlines and the airlines of the country
concerned to operate to and from that country on such routes without restrictions
on capacity or frequency, and without the need for international aviation
negotiations to establish such services. This will enable UK and foreign airlines to
plan the development of services with confidence that future growth will not be
limited by bilateral restrictions. (Jackson 1998)
An important feature of the UK initiative is that it is within the bilateral
framework: UK airlines obtain unlimited access to the bilateral partner’s
departure points, in exchange for unlimited access by the bilateral partner’s6   ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON AIRLINES, USERS AND THE ECONOMY
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airlines to UK airports other than Gatwick and Heathrow. This places pressure
on the bilateral partners either to liberalise access points and capacity
completely, or take a parallel course and distinguish between primary and
secondary gateways. Whichever option is chosen, reciprocity is route specific.
These options are considered in Chapter 9.
6.7 Economy wide effects
It is difficult to trace the net effects on economic welfare of the complex
restrictions on trade and competition in the bilateral arrangements for
international air services. The economic effects not only concern those directly
involved in international aviation, but also other economic activities that are
directly and indirectly affected. Further, with an industry that is international in
nature, the analysis needs to consider the effects on other countries as well as
Australia.
6.7.1 Effects on the Australian economy
The previous sections have shown that constraints in Australia’s ASAs have led
to higher airline costs and prices, and restricted competition and the quantity
and range of services provided to passengers. The effects have impeded the
Australian tourism industry (particularly in regions served by secondary
gateways), and have implications for the many small businesses dependent on
tourism.
The air freight market appears to be less affected by restrictive provisions in
ASAs. The main impediment to better service provision seems to be the
imbalance in the value and quantity of Australia’s air freighted imports and
exports, rather than constraints in the ASAs.
The Commission has received relatively little explicit information about the
effects of the current ASA constraints on airline costs. However, some
information is available about the cost savings achieved by Australia’s airlines
as a result of past reforms. The industry’s efficiency was considerably hindered
by the regulatory system imposed for many years, particularly the segmentation
of domestic and international services, the ‘two airline’ policy, and government
ownership which often emphasised non-commercial objectives. Significant
efficiency gains have been achieved since the removal of these impediments.
Qantas stated that:
Between the financial years 1993-94 and 1996-97, Qantas’ annual revenue
collection rose from $6.6 billion to $7.8 billion, an increase of 18.2 per cent. At theINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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same time, costs rose by 15.9 per cent from $6.3 billion to $7.3 billion. The
Qantas Group’s passenger growth in the four year period has been 36 per cent
including a 13.0 per cent rise in passenger traffic carried on international
scheduled services. Revenue Passenger Kilometres (RPKs) have increased by 26.3
per cent, while capacity growth measured in Available Seat Kilometres (ASKs)
has been less at 25.3 per cent (sub. 25, p. 10).
Nevertheless, the constraints on capital raising, traffic and access rights and
network development have considerable cost-raising effects for airlines serving
the Australian market. These translate into higher fares and reduced levels of
service for Australian consumers, without significant benefits to others.
The constraints on competition tend to support higher profitability for the
airlines as well as higher prices. Other things being equal, receipt of higher
profits by Australian owned airlines as a result of foreigners paying higher
prices improves Australian economic welfare, just as increased foreign airline
profitability as a result of Australian passengers paying higher prices reduces it.
Both Qantas and Ansett have argued that Australia is better off to the extent that
foreign passengers pay more. Ansett stated that:
As with other export industries, it is in Australia’s interests to have high prices; to
this end, liberalisation may be against its interest. There are some qualifications to
this; for example, there are Australian travellers even on routes dominated by
visitors, and Australian airlines do not gain all of the traffic on these routes.
However, in general, there is an argument that Australia’s interests are best served
by a less liberal environment and higher fares and profits (sub. 19, p. 53).
Differences between markets have raised some interest in the idea of pricing air
services above competitive levels on some routes. This is a variation of the
optimal tariff (trade tax) theory that suggests that if foreign demand for the
goods or services of a country is sufficiently price inelastic, national welfare
can be increased by taxing exports. In the aviation case, if foreign demand is
sufficiently inelastic, and traffic is dominated by inbound passengers, charging
high prices might be in Australia’s national interest. This could be achieved by
restricting competition so that incumbent airlines are able to maintain high
prices in which case the rents are retained by the airlines or their employees, or
though taxes on airfares, in which case the rents are retained by the
Government. Different taxes (or permissible price raising by the airlines) would
apply to different markets.
This idea has a number of serious practical difficulties. First, like any optimal
tariff or export tax argument, such an approach would invite retaliation from
other countries and could trigger serious disputes about trade in other goods and
services. Second, the data do not exist to determine elasticities of demand for
different markets with anything like the certainty required (Chapter 2).
Elasticity estimates do not clearly distinguish between the effects of changing6   ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON AIRLINES, USERS AND THE ECONOMY
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fares on one route only with others held constant, and the effects of changing all
fares. Nor do they distinguish between short term elasticities and the almost
invariably higher long term elasticities. Further, demand may be inelastic for
some markets, but this could disguise relatively price sensitive behaviour by
some groups of travellers (for example, tourists) and price insensitive behaviour
by others (for example, business). Third, setting higher fares on some routes
will inevitably capture some domestic expenditure by Australian passengers.
Fourth, setting different taxes on different routes (rather than higher prices) may
contravene the Chicago Convention’s non discriminatory approach to setting of
airport and other charges (ICAO 1997, Article 15)
This argument also takes a narrow view of the national interest. If tourists have
to pay higher prices for airfares, then they have less to spend on other goods and
services while in Australia. Qantas suggested that this is not a cost to the extent
that it reduces the profits of foreign-owned hotels, but the same argument
applies to foreign ownership of Australian carriers. The Commission notes that
the proportion of foreign ownership of tourist accommodation in Australia is
about the same as foreign ownership of Australia’s international airlines
(JLW 1998).
DIST argued that:
Australia’s approach to air service negotiations does not appear to take sufficient
account of the potentially substantial benefits that would flow to Australia from
the introduction of more frequent, more competitively priced services. A true net
national benefits approach to the negotiations would recognise these wider net
benefits of liberalisation (sub. 21, p. 21).
The Commission’s modelling of the effects of the entry of Ansett International
(Appendix F) on a number of Asian routes indicates that on most routes
affected, lower airfares arising from greater competition increase consumer
welfare but reduce airline profits. The model measures economic welfare effects
by changes in consumer surplus and airline profits for both domestic and
foreign markets. It found that reduced prices and improved services as a result
of Ansett International’s entry increase consumer surplus across all international
routes considered and increase net economic welfare in Australia and all
affected overseas markets (Table 6.3).
The Commission’s modelling builds on preliminary work by Street, Smith and
Savage (1994) which examined the welfare trade-offs between Australia and the
global community, and among Australian air travel consumers, airlines and
tourism operators from liberalising ASAs. Results from the Street, Smith and
Savage study suggest that the overall welfare effects of liberalising ASAs are
ambiguous.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
140
Citing these results, Qantas (sub. 25) and the Centre of International Economics
argued that the overall effect of increasing competition on Australian consumers
is clearly positive, but the effects on other important groups (such as Australian
airlines and the tourism industry) are unclear. However, the Commission notes
that the Street, Smith and Savage model is based on a hypothetical market with
assumed price and quantity responses by airlines. Results from the
Commission’s own model, which uses actual market characteristics and
endogenises airline behaviour, suggest that increased competition leads to net
welfare gains. In addition, the Commission’s modelling tests for sensitivity to
the price elasticity of demand. This test was undertaken to address concerns
about the accuracy of elasticity estimates for individual markets, and industry
statements that demand was generally price elastic. Increasing the price
elasticity did not change the general tenor of the results, that increased
competition enhances economic welfare.6   ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON AIRLINES, USERS AND THE ECONOMY
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Table 6.3 Estimates of Australian and foreign economic welfare
changes for Ansett International’s entry, 1995 and 1997
1995 1997
Australian consumer welfare by route $m $m
Australia and:
China 5.5 7.6







Total consumer surplus 70.0 89.9
Australian airline profits (gross) -41.6 -57.5
Australian economic welfare 28.4 32.4
Foreign consumer welfare by route
Australia and:
China 3.5 5.4







Total consumer surplus 88.3 153.5
Foreign airline profits (gross) -75.9 -121.8
Foreign economic welfare 12.4 31.7
a Ansett had minimal market share for services to the Republic of Korea in 1995 and was excluded from the
model for that year.
Source: Commission estimates.
6.7.2 Effects on the world economy
It is accepted by international trade economists that trade barriers generally
reduce efficiency in the global allocation of resources and lead to lower livingINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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standards around the world. Liberalisation of trade in goods and services has
been a major factor in world economic growth over the past half century. The
question is whether the barriers to trade in international air services have had a
negative effect on the global economy.
The Commission has not found anything unique about production and trade in
air services that would indicate that restrictions on trade in international air
services do not have harmful effects on countries generally. This chapter has
outlined the substantial costs to airlines and their customers of constraints on
activity and competition within the bilateral system. The gains that have
occurred with liberalisation and deregulation in both international and domestic
aviation markets are well documented.
The restrictions in the system appear to lead to a serious misallocation of
resources within individual economies. Some countries, by preventing
international trade in air services on the basis of national comparative
advantage, are supporting international airlines when there would be better uses
for their national resources. Conversely, those countries that have a comparative
advantage in providing international air services cannot reach their potential
because capacity, network development, national designation and ownership
and control are restricted.
The system also reduces the efficiency with which resources are used in the
aviation industry. Costs are higher and productivity is lower than in the absence
of many of the regulatory constraints on airline operations.
The requirement for local ownership and effective control for national
designation has had a particularly distorting effect on the capital market. The
need to raise equity capital domestically imposes an opportunity cost on other
industries’ access to capital, particularly in countries with limited capital
markets. In such economies, the high capital requirements of modern
international airlines can increase the cost of capital for other industries, as well
the airline industry. Removing this constraint would free capital for use in an
economy’s most productive areas. It would also give airlines the flexibility in
choosing between equity and debt financing that other industries take for
granted.
The constraints on airline operations and competition have also tended to reduce
the technical efficiency of the international airline industry. Constraints on
capacity, frequency of flights, networks and even aircraft choice and use, mean
that costs are higher than if the airlines could make their own production
decisions, as can producers in almost any other industry. The Commission has
been unable to identify any area of compensating cost saving from these
constraints.6   ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON AIRLINES, USERS AND THE ECONOMY
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The restrictions appear to have had a mixed effect on airline profits. The
restrictions on competition tend to improve yields and profits, other things being
equal. The Commission’s modelling of the effects of Ansett International’s
entry to seven Asian routes shows that the resulting lower prices contribute to a
significant decline in profits for the carriers in all  of the foreign economies
concerned — a fall of almost $122 million in 1997. There is little doubt that the
anticompetitive constraints that have evolved in the bilateral system can bolster
profitability of the airlines, which explains why the airline industry supports the
assistance it receives from the system, despite the costs.
This potential profitability is not always realised in higher than average earnings
for airlines. Worldwide profitability of international airlines has been low on
average relative to other industries, although some airlines have been highly
profitable and others have sustained substantial losses over many years. Some
airlines have dissipated their potential monopoly profits through inefficiency or
the pursuit of non-commercial objectives. To the extent that these
anticompetitive constraints have allowed airlines to adopt this behaviour, they
further contribute to inefficiency in the world airline industry.
Overall, by increasing costs and reducing competition, the system tends to
produce prices that are higher than necessary and restrict the quantities of
services produced and consumed. It reduces the incentive for airlines to develop
new and innovative products, constraining the growth of international tourism.
The Commission’s modelling of the effects of entry of even a relatively small
airline to international routes shows how consumers can benefit from the lower
prices and better quality of service that results from greater competition. The
entry of Ansett International increased consumer surplus in the seven Asian
economies served by nearly $154 million in 1997, more than compensating for
the decline in profits of the airlines (Table 6.3).
This partial equilibrium modelling does not include any effects on other
industries. It is reasonable to expect that the modelled consumer benefits would
be mirrored by benefits to the tourism industry and to other industries whose
staff travel on business or use freight services. However, the reduced
profitability of the airlines could be expected to have short term adverse effects
on airline shareholders’ incomes, consumption and wealth. It could also be
expected to stimulate efforts by the airlines to improve efficiency, given that
competition provides a most effective discipline on company behaviour.
Liberalisation of trade in international air services is likely to bring substantial
benefits to consumers, the tourism and other industries that rely on international
aviation. It is also likely to benefit efficient airlines. Those countries with
efficient airline industries would reallocate more resources to the airlineINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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industry and away from those industries that are relatively less efficient.
Conversely, those countries with relatively inefficient airlines, would move
resources out of airlines and into activities to which they were better suited,
leading to economic gain in the long term.145
7 CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND THE IASC
The capacity available for Australian airlines under the bilateral system is
allocated by the International Air Services Commission (IASC). The
Productivity Commission is required to assess whether the IASC allocation
process (including the provision designed to assist new entrants) provides net
benefits to Australia.
This chapter examines the policy of multiple designation and the net benefit of
the IASC allocation process. It discusses alternative approaches to allocation
and the current policies for capacity allocation. It also examines the relationship
between the IASC and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
(ACCC).
7.1 Multiple designation in Australia
During the late 1970s many countries began to include the multiple designation
of airlines in their air service arrangements (ASAs). This allowed a country to
grant the right to carry international traffic to more than one carrier on a
particular route. Previously, most agreements had a single designated carrier for
each country (Dresner and Tretheway 1992a).
Multiple designation was introduced in Australia in 1992, before which Qantas
was the country’s only international airline. Multiple designation is now
contained in all Australian ASAs except for those with Greece and India which
have dual designation, and those with Burma, the Cook Islands, Italy, Mauritius,
Nauru, Switzerland and Zimbabwe which have single designation. Only two of
these single designation routes (Italy and Zimbabwe) are served by an
Australian carrier.
Multiple designation has partly removed artificial constraints on the emergence
of new international airlines in many countries, thus promoting greater
competition in international air services and facilitating overall efficiency
improvements. The Department of Transport and Regional Development
(DTRD) noted that:
... multiple designation has allowed the entry by new Australian (and foreign)
carriers in a significant number of key growth markets ... The threat of entry is a
valid means of ensuring that consumers are not exploited on any route, and as such
our aim is to have shelf capacity and multiple designation available on all routes
(sub. 33, p. 22).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Multiple designation under the bilateral system has required governments to
introduce a method for allocating capacity to carriers on particular routes. The
IASC was established on 1 July 1992 to provide an independent body for
allocating third and fourth freedom capacity including codesharing (Box 7.1), to
existing and prospective Australian carriers. Given the growth in international
airline alliances since the late 1980s, applications to the IASC for capacity are
increasingly based on codesharing. During 1997, for example, codesharing was
approved by the IASC on 11 routes. In most of these cases, the application was
unopposed and capacity was available.
Box 7.1 Codesharing
Many ASAs now contain provisions for the operation of joint services, particularly
codesharing arrangements. Codesharing occurs when an airline uses seats on another
airlines’ aircraft, but employs its own airline designator code (for example, ‘QF’ for
Qantas) and capacity rights.
There are two main forms of codesharing: the sale of seats by the operating carrier to the
non-operating carrier; and the swapping of seats between carriers without any further
payment. Codesharing may create public benefits, particularly on low traffic routes, but it
also may have anticompetitive effects on some routes by reducing incentives to compete
vigorously and by reducing consumer choice of airlines.
Source: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (sub. 49).
The IASC allocates capacity to Australian carriers only, for both scheduled
passenger and freight services, and for all services available under Australia’s
ASAs. Until recently this only included third and fourth freedom rights. In July
1998 the IASC Act was amended to expand the IASC’s jurisdiction to all rights
available under Australia’s ASAs, including fifth freedom services. It is not
involved in the approval of charter operations.
An independent statutory body, the IASC consists of a part-time chairperson
and two part-time commissioners. DTRD provides secretariat support staff.
The IASC allocation of capacity must have regard to the public benefit
objectives set out in the International Air Services Commission Act 1992
(Box 7.2), which also sets out the public processes to be followed by the IASC
in making allocations. Policy statements by the Minister for Transport and
Regional Development (Section  7.5) provide the criteria to be used for
allocating capacity.7   CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND THE IASC
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Box 7.2 Objectives of the IASC
... to enhance international air services by fostering:
a)  greater economic efficiency in the airline industry, and increased competition between
Australian carriers;
b) increased responsiveness by airlines to the needs of consumers, including an increased
range of choices and benefits;
c)  Australian tourism and trade; and
d)  the maintenance of Australian carriers capable of competing effectively with airlines of
foreign countries.
Source: International Air Services Commission Act 1992.
The IASC must follow a public process under the Act in making determinations
regarding the allocation of capacity. The IASC must advertise new capacity (as
it becomes available) and publicly invite applications and submissions. It may
hold public hearings in making a determination, and must publish
determinations.
The Act allows the Minister to make policy statements on how the IASC should
perform its functions. These policy statements may set out the criteria for
assessing the benefit to the public of capacity allocations, including criteria that
apply in particular circumstances.
When an application is contested other criteria are used to adjudicate between
applicants. Where there was previously one carrier on a route, start-up
provisions apply which favour a new entrant to that route. The IASC also
reviews allocated capacity on the use-it-or-lose-it principle, and undertakes a
renewal process when determinations expire after their five year term.
The most recent version of the policy statement was released on 23 April 1997,
superseding earlier statements released on 27 March 1995, 7 December 1992
and 1 July 1992. These revised policy statements introduced several changes,
adapting the policy statement to the changing policy environment, and
clarifying some aspects of the statement.
The IASC made nearly 200 determinations and decisions between July 1992
and August 1998 (of which 85 related to Australian airlines other than Qantas).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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7.2 Has multiple designation and the IASC provided a net
benefit?
The Commission has been asked to assess whether the IASC allocation process
provides net benefits to Australia, particularly referring to the value of
provisions designed to favour new entrants (Section 7.8).
The introduction of multiple designation has been an important component of
the liberalisation of international air services which has occurred since the
mid 1980s. Multiple designation provides the potential for greater competition
on routes to and from Australia. The ACCC stated:
Multiple designation facilitates entry to the market and may lead to increased
competition as more airlines operate services. By comparison, a single designation
agreement has at most two airlines (one Australian, one foreign) operating in the
market and creates the potential for duopolistic pricing and scheduling (sub. 49, p.
5).
Realising the potential gains requires an allocation process that effectively
allows new entrants while minimising costs for both governments and carriers.
The Commonwealth Government’s approach has been to use an administrative
system that bases allocation on a public interest test, with certain provisions for
favouring new entrants.
A number of new carriers have attempted to enter the market since the
introduction of multiple designation. From 1 July 1992 to 31 August 1998,
14 applicants (besides Qantas) applied for capacity and received at least a draft
IASC determination (that is, a preliminary decision regarding an application for
capacity):
·  three carriers were allocated capacity and commenced operations on those
routes (Ansett, National Jet Systems, and Asian Express);
·  four carriers were allocated capacity (conditionally in some cases), but
have yet to commence operations (Flight West, Transair, Qwestair and
Australia World Airways). Flight West, Transair, Qwestair were initially
unable to commence operations as approval was not given by the Papua
New Guinea Government. That approval has now been given and all three
should have commenced operations by October 1998;
·  two carriers were allocated capacity but did not start operations, or have
subsequently ceased operations (Australia Air and National Airlines); and
·  five carriers were found to be not reasonably capable of implementing
their proposals so were not allocated capacity (sub. 42).
Thus, despite the activity of several potential start-up airlines, only two
passenger operators and one freight operator have entered the market. Ansett7   CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND THE IASC
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International has operated between Australia and Denpasar (Bali), Hong Kong,
Kuala Lumpur, Osaka, Taipei, Jakarta, Seoul and Shanghai (although services
have now been withdrawn from Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, and Seoul). National
Jet Systems has operated regional international flights to Singapore and
Indonesia, while Asian Express has freight services to New Zealand.
The entry of new airlines has increased competition on a number of routes
(Chapter 6). The importance of new capacity in improving competition has been
backed by participants. The ACCC stated:
While multiple designation is highly desirable from a competition viewpoint, it
needs to be accompanied by sufficient capacity entitlements if it is to yield
competition benefits. To have multiple designation without sufficient capacity for
each carrier to develop commercially sustainable services would be likely to result
in fewer carriers operating than if capacity is unlimited (sub. 49, p. 5).
However, Ansett has noted:
The IASC has not been able to promote competition to any great extent but this is
because of the nature of its task, one of allocating limited capacity, rather than
because of its allocation approach (sub. 19, pp. 48–49).
While few new airlines have entered the market, the Commission’s analysis
suggests that entry brings significant economic benefits. The threat of the entry
of new airlines on routes may also provide an additional avenue for competition
induced benefits. The IASC process has been valuable in introducing this
competition, but the importance of the expansion of capacity should not be
ignored.
While the introduction of multiple designation and the allocation of capacity by
the IASC have benefited Australia, improvements to the allocation system could
increase benefits and reduce the costs.
7.3 Alternative allocation approaches
An administrative system (based on a public interest test approach) has been
used in Australia to allocate capacity. Would an alternative approach produce
greater net benefits? The Commission considered three approaches: rule based,
public interest based, and market based.
7.3.1 Rule based allocation approach
This approach involves the use of a pre-determined formula for the allocation of
capacity. Capacity could be allocated on a geographic basis, or shared betweenINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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carriers based on some specific rule, for example. Provisions could also be
made for automatic entry rights under certain conditions.
The Republic of Korea uses a rule based allocation method. Korean Air and
Asiana are the only two designated airlines. Capacity on new routes is allocated
between the two carriers equally. The system differs for established routes.
After Korean Air reaches a specific capacity level, Asiana gains access up to a
certain proportion of Korean Air’s capacity, then capacity is allocated equally
(sub. 42).
Canada has used a geographic allocation system with Canadian Airlines flying
routes to the west and Air Canada routes to the east. This system was liberalised
following a review in 1994. However, the geographic separation largely
remains. The two major carriers can only compete on routes which exceed
300 000 passengers per year (sub. 42).
Such approaches are simple to understand and apply, and they have low
administration costs. Costs for carriers are low because they are not required to
apply for capacity that is received automatically. Further, carriers can be certain
about the allocation of future capacity.
However, there are some problems with this approach. First, a rule based
approach cannot easily deal with changing market structures which may require
changing allocations or the transfer of capacity between carriers. It may also
prevent airlines from operating the optimal amount of capacity on a particular
route.
Second, such an approach can encourage strategic behaviour. If increased traffic
activates rules allowing entry by an additional carrier, for example, then an
incumbent airline may not respond to demand for increased services on a route,
or foster demand by trade promotion or lowering prices.
Finally, rules providing for geographic allocation to single airlines do not
provide multiple designation on routes and have few if any competitive benefits.
7.3.2 Public interest test approach
This approach involves an adjudicative process using some form of public
interest test, usually based on defined policies and criteria. This method is used
in a number of countries as well as Australia, including the United States
(Department of Transportation), and the United Kingdom (Civil Aviation
Authority).7   CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND THE IASC
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Such an approach can provide a number of benefits. It can be independent,
transparent and flexible. It can also be used to pursue particular policy
objectives, such as new entry on routes.
However, a public interest test approach imposes costs on both the government,
in operating the process, and on carriers, in supplying information used in the
adjudication process. It also may create delays in allocating capacity.
Further, an inevitable conflict occurs for such an approach between setting
concrete rules and criteria, and exercising subjective judgment:
First, the regulator’s desire to find objective standards to select the winner from the
final group often conflicts with his belief that he must exercise his subjective
judgment, for no set of standards can consistently select winners who are best in
terms of the regulatory program’s objectives.
The second difficulty is the conflict between the need for decisions that comply
with certain legal principles of fairness and the effort to implement the statute’s
purposes. For example, the need to treat like cases alike — a basic principle of
fairness in law — pushes the agency towards developing uniform rules and
standards. Yet when deciding individual cases, agencies make exceptions or blur
standards to better attain the statute’s purpose (Breyer 1982, p. 74).
A public interest test may provide capacity to carriers where it is most likely to
provide benefits to the country, but this is certainly not assured. A poorly
designed or administered system can lead to a less than optimal allocation of
capacity.
7.3.3 Market approach
A market approach would see capacity auctioned or otherwise sold to the
highest bidder. Such a competitive market allocation system could provide the
most efficient allocation of capacity, by allocating capacity to carriers that value
it most.
A market approach could be based on the auctioning of all capacity entitlements
or just new capacity entitlements. Both existing and new capacity could be
transferable. As far as the Commission knows, such a system is not used in any
country.
A market-based allocation system would allow airlines to make their own
commercial judgments about the routes on which they wish to operate. It also
avoids many of the costs of an adjudicative process.
Selling rights in a competitive market could also provide carriers with more
flexibility through the operation of a secondary market, in which carriers would
trade capacity directly among themselves. This could allow carriers to adjustINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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quickly to market conditions. Such a system could be transparent, both in the
initial auction process and for subsequent sales. It could also provide clear
signals of where capacity increases are required.
However, while a market-based system has benefits, where there are capacity
constraints, it has drawbacks too. If capacity is constrained, monopoly rents can
be extracted from particular routes. A market-based approach would allow
governments to gain a portion of these rents when capacity is sold.
This could lead to incentives for governments to restrict capacity on some
routes. Current government policy is to increase capacity and thus to reduce the
scope for monopoly rent to be earned.
There is also the potential for restrictions on capacity to create further obstacles
to liberalisation of international air services in the future. In the taxi market, for
example, the high value of taxi licences due to an artificial restriction on the
number of licences has proved to be an impediment to further reform. This
vested interest problem could be ameliorated by limiting the time period for
which the route allocations are made, although they would have to be long
enough to encourage investment in route development.
If firms pay for privileges issued by government, then legal property right issues
may arise. The payment for capacity may give airlines additional legal claims
over those capacity rights. Thus, changes in capacity which arise from factors
outside of the control of aviation authorities (for example, political changes)
may lead to claims for compensation.
These problems have occurred to various degrees in several Australian
agricultural product markets, such as the egg and dairy markets where output
restrictions have created strong vested interests opposed to reform, and fisheries
where licensing has created property rights problems. However, these problems
have generally not outweighed the benefits of a market-based allocation system.
However, with capacity constraints resulting from the bilateral system, multiple
designation is unlikely to involve more than two Australian carriers on a route.
This could cause additional problems with a market-based approach. Ansett
argued:
The main problem with auctions in this context is that there are not sufficient likely
bidders to make auctions efficient. For most routes there will only be one or two
effective bidders. In small group auctions, where economies of scale are present,
auctions can be used pre-emptively by a dominant incumbent to prevent the
emergence of competitors (sub. 19, p. 49).
Thus an auction process (compared to a purely administrative system) could
increase barriers to entry for new carriers and reduce competition. If an7   CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND THE IASC
153
incumbent airline could earn monopoly profits by retaining all the Australian
capacity on a route, then it may be able to make a higher bid for new capacity
than that of a new entrant, (who could only base its bid on the profits available
from a more competitive market). The costs associated with operating a auction
system would not make it significantly cheaper to operate than an administrative
system.
7.3.4 The Commission’s preferred approach
The best way to achieve efficiency and to improve the economic welfare of
Australians from air services would be to remove all capacity constraints, as
indicated in previous chapters. A method of allocating capacity that is
constrained by government actions is a choice among inferior options.
Given the objective of increasing competition in the international air services
market, a rule-based allocation approach is inappropriate because it does not
allow the flexibility required to stimulate competition (and may even hinder it).
An auction could provide efficiency gains in a competitive market, but
competition is seriously limited in the bilateral regulatory system. Thus an
auction system would have limited influence on the efficiency with which
resources are used in the airline industry or in the economy. Further, given the
constraints of the bilateral system and the small Australian market, an auction
system could hamper competition.
If capacity remains constrained, the Commission concludes that the public
benefit test approach is most appropriate and the IASC allocation system should
continue (however issues regarding the operation of the IASC would need to be
addressed). If capacity constraints are removed, the IASC allocation process
would no longer be required.
Recommendation 7.1
Contested capacity should continue to be allocated by the IASC using a
public benefit test.
7.4 The International Air Services Commission Act
The Commission considered some aspects of the objectives and operation of the
International Air Services Commission Act which affect the IASC.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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7.4.1 Objectives of the IASC
A principle of good regulation is that it should have clearly defined and
enunciated objectives which do not overlap or conflict. The stated objectives of
the IASC are generally clear, but there is some conflict and confusion (Box
7.2).
As noted in Section 7.3.2, an administrative allocation process must deal with
the inherent conflict between developing a list of concrete rules and setting
overarching principles and exercising subjective judgment. The Commission
believes that the range of objectives currently specified in the IASC Act may
introduce conflict and increase the complexity of the IASC’s task.
The main objective of the IASC, as set out in the Act is to ‘enhance
international air services’. The fostering of efficiency and competition (point ‘a’
of the objectives) is likely to enhance international air services as is the
responsiveness to consumer needs (point ‘b’). But enhanced international air
services are likely to foster tourism and trade, rather than the other way round
(as stated in point ‘c’). And, to the extent that positive, distinct action is taken to
comply with point ‘d’, ‘the maintenance of Australian carriers capable of
competing effectively with airlines of foreign countries’, it can conflict with
point ‘a’, ‘greater economic efficiency in the airline industry, and increased
competition between Australian carriers’.
It is of benefit to Australia to ensure that international air services to and from
Australia are as efficient and competitive as possible. This will ensure that the
best possible services are provided at the lowest possible cost to both
Australians and foreign travellers. This benefits not only those Australians who
travel overseas but also the many industries relying on air services, such as
tourism and airport services.
Despite the need for interpretation, the task of the IASC would be simplified if
the objective of the IASC was reduced to a simple, clear statement of its task.
However, when objectives or guidelines are simplified there is the potential for
them to be misinterpreted. DTRD noted this, stating that simplifying the
objectives of the IASC:
... is unlikely to simplify the task of the IASC. Ansett provides a good illustrative
example. Ansett could be claimed to be a less ‘efficient’ carrier than Qantas,
incurring losses and without the benefits of economies of scale or scope. However
... it is demonstrably an agent of competition. The conflict created can be
addressed in guidelines or policy statements. In the Department’s view, this matter
is not prone to simple change (sub. 60, p. 15).
Nevertheless, with a simple overarching objective of promoting greater
competition and economic efficiency, the IASC should be able to resolve this7   CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND THE IASC
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issue. While initially the new entrant may be less efficient, the introduction of
competition on the route should lead to greater long term efficiency gains for
the community, as the airlines battle to reduce cost and improve services to
attract consumers.
Recommendation 7.2
The objectives of the International Air Services Commission Act  1992
should be amended to:
‘enhance the welfare of Australians by promoting economic efficiency
through competition in the provision of international air services’.
7.4.2 General approach of the IASC
The Act provides for the IASC process to be conducted in a public and
transparent manner. The IASC explained that:
There is a high degree of transparency in the IASC process. The new capacity
arising from bilateral negotiations is advertised publicly and applications invited.
All applications are made available for public inspection, together with any
objections or comments that may be made by interested parties. Material such as
business plans may be submitted by applicants on a confidential basis, provided
that such material is referred to in the public register version of the application. In
certain circumstances, draft determinations or decisions are issued to give
interested parties a further opportunity to comment before moving to finals. Full
assessments of the applications and the IASC’s reasons are included in all
determinations and decisions (sub. 42, p. 6).
Generally, participants have expressed satisfaction with the perceived
independence of the IASC and its processes. Ansett, for example, stated:
... the framework for the negotiation of bilateral rights by the Department of
Transport and Regional Development (DTRD) and the allocation of those rights
by the IASC has worked well. The negotiation process should continue to be
separate from the allocation process and the allocation of rights should remain with
a small independent statutory authority supported by its own secretariat.
... [the IASC] has acted in an independent, balanced and reasonable manner. Its
processes are open and have given ample opportunity for both the applicant and
other interested parties to comment on applications (sub. 19, pp. 5, 45).
Similarly, the Department of Industry, Science and Tourism (DIST) expressed
satisfaction with the processes undertaken by IASC in allocating capacity, and
noted the importance of ensuring that capacity allocations are made by an
independent agency (sub. 31).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Australia World Airways commended the administration of the IASC in
handling applications, noting that its applications for capacity were handled in a
fair manner and that the IASC was open to consultation at all stages of the
process (sub. 22; transcript, p. 4).
7.5 Policy statement of the Minister for Transport and Regional
Development
The IASC allocates capacity on a route-by-route basis, with routes being
country to country rather than point specific (although bilateral agreements may
specify cities, and thus constrain airlines). The criteria for allocating capacity
are set out in the policy statement of the Minister for Transport and Regional
Development. Several criteria may be used for each allocation, depending on
the particular circumstances. In addition to the general criteria that are used in
most circumstances, various other criteria apply for specific circumstances (for
example where a route is contested, where there is only one incumbent airline,
and during renewals of determinations).
The policy statement itself is a complex document with various permutations of
possible criteria. A representative of Melbourne Airport, for example, argued
that:
... it took me three readings before I could work out exactly what it was all about. I
am neither an unintelligent person nor unfamiliar with the subject matter that they
were discussing ... if somebody was coming into this with a sales and marketing
background from an airline to set up new services they would find it extremely
difficult. I thought it was unduly complicated in the description and also the
number of processes that have to be worked through (transcript, p. 58).
The changes proposed by the Commission (see below) would help simplify the
policy statement, but the document should also be reviewed for clarity and ease
of use.
7.6 General capacity allocation criteria
The IASC determines capacity where the allocation is of benefit to the public.
Particularly, the allocation is not to be considered of benefit to the public unless
the carrier is reasonably capable of obtaining the necessary approvals to operate
on the route and of implementing its proposals. These general criteria and their
conditions are shown in Box 7.3.
These general criteria have become the minimum standard — as the IASC has
stated, ‘... [it] will allocate capacity to any Australian carrier that can7   CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND THE IASC
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demonstrate that it is reasonably capable of obtaining the necessary approvals
and of implementing its service proposals’ (sub. 42, pp. 4–5).
These criteria are used in all cases except for routes in the ‘start-up phase’ (for
which somewhat similar criteria apply as well as additional start-up criteria —
Box 7.4) or for the renewal of a determination where different criteria apply
(Box 7.7).
With regard to being reasonably capable of obtaining the necessary approvals to
operate on the route, the IASC has stated that it ‘seeks advice from the
Department on these criteria, which relates to such matters as the carrier’s
ability to be designated as an Australian airline and to obtain an International
Airline Licence and an Air Operator’s Certificate’ (sub. 42, p. 7).
The second test is whether the carrier is reasonably capable of implementing its
proposals. This involves two main components:
·  an examination of the carrier’s business plan, to determine whether the
carrier can be expected to break even within five years; and
·  a requirement that the carrier have sufficient funding to cover initial set-up
costs, and the operational cost of running the proposed service for six
months without any offsetting revenue (Carlson 1997).
Combined, these tests require an airline to have the capability to operate before
receiving approval to commence operations.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Box 7.3 Policy statement — general criteria for assessing
benefit to the public
4.1 Subject to 6 below, the general criteria against which the benefit to the public is to
be assessed by the Commission in considering the circumstances in relation to an
allocation of capacity or the renewal or review of a determination allocating capacity to an
Australian carrier are as set out below:
Use of Australian carrier entitlements
(a) Subject to (b), the use of the entitlements of Australian carriers under a bilateral
arrangement is of benefit to the public.
Carrier capabilities
(b) It is not of benefit to the public for the Commission to allocate capacity to Australian
carriers unless such carriers:
(i) are reasonably capable of obtaining the necessary approvals to operate on the
route; and
(ii) are reasonably capable of implementing their proposals.
...
Capacity not limited
6.1 In circumstances where capacity is not limited under a bilateral arrangement, only
the criteria in 4 above are applicable.
One applicant or sufficient available capacity
6.2 In circumstances where:
(a) there is only one applicant (or where more than one application is made but all
applications except one are withdrawn) for allocation of capacity on a route; or
(b) there is more than one applicant but, subject to 7.4 below, the amount of available
capacity is equal to or exceeds the total amount of capacity applied for.
only the criteria in 4 above are applicable. However, if submissions are received about, or
opposing, the allocation of capacity to a particular carrier, the Commission may also apply
additional criteria in 5 [see Box 7.4] above.
Source: Sharp (1997).7   CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND THE IASC
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7.6.1 Rationale for the tests
Since the introduction of the IASC Act, a number of rationales have been
suggested for these tests. The main arguments for these tests are to:
·  attempt to ensure airlines do not collapse after commencing services as
there would be:
— a direct cost to consumers who would be stranded overseas if an
airline collapsed1; and
— a cost to the reputation of Australian tourism and other Australian
airlines if an airline collapsed; and
·  attempt to ensure an airlines take up capacity that is allocated, as there is a
need to ensure capacity is not left idle and an obligation to bilateral partner
governments.
Protecting consumers from airline collapse
In a research paper prepared for the IASC, Carlson argued:
... it is possible that a new entrant may be unable to sustain its services [and] may
need to withdraw from the route at a later date. Depending on the nature of this
withdrawal, the cost to the community of the airline’s withdrawal may outweigh
any initial benefits from allocating the capacity. These costs may include damage
to the Australian tourism industry, additional costs to stranded passengers and the
perception that Australian carriers provide poor quality services, reducing the
competitiveness of other Australian carriers. Consequently, it may be possible that
the community is better served by the IASC not making an allocation to the new
entrant (1997, p. 5).
The main costs to consumers from the collapse of an international airline are the
direct cost of pre-purchased tickets and the cost of being stranded overseas (if
passengers are without travel insurance). However, these costs should be
compared with the additional benefits to consumers of reduced fares and new
routes as a result of competition from new entrants. Carlson (1997) suggests
that a new entrant would not have to remain in the market for long before the
benefits to consumers outweighed the direct costs of airline failure.
General consumer protection is provided though the Trade Practices Act 1974.
Industry specific protection is not provided for consumers in the markets for
most other products in Australia. Such consumer protection provisions, for
example, do not apply to domestic airlines or surface transport. Neither the
policy statement nor the attached explanatory statement provide a solid rationale
                                            
1 This is quite separate from passenger safety issues (Chapter 6).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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for additional consumer protection regulations for the international airline
industry. DTRD argued:
It is standard for new carriers to claim ‘government approval’ or ‘government
approval pending’ in advertisements ... If we licence someone, we must satisfy
ourselves that they are capable of doing what they hold out to less well-informed
parties they will do (and from whom they take large amounts of money in
advance). The general protection laws do not take this issue into account (sub. 60,
p. 16).
In many areas where deceptive advertising has been a problem, the ACCC
(which enforces the Trade Practices Act) has been able to focus resources on
that area. For example, since deregulation of the telecommunications market,
the ACCC has actively focused on deceptive advertising in that area, developing
with industry participants the ‘Faircall’ guidelines to good practice in
advertising. It may be appropriate for the ACCC to focus on international
airlines if it considers that there are major problems. Alternatively, DTRD
could, as part of the licensing agreement, require that ‘government approval’ not
be used in advertising.
If the government wishes to provide specific consumer protection for customers
of new Australian international airlines, a better system might be that used for
charter operations — a bond to cover the cost of returning passengers to their
home country. Alternatively, customers could be encouraged to insure against
such events, using commonly available travel insurance.
Protecting the reputation of the industry
The second argument for viability testing is that there is a cost to the reputation
of Australian tourism and other Australian airlines if an airline collapses. No
evidence has been submitted during this inquiry to support this argument.
Attempting to ensure airlines take up capacity
It has been argued by a number of participants that scarce capacity should be
used, and that the tests are justified in order to ensure that that this aim is
achieved. The South Australian Government argued:
If contested capacity is awarded to an airline according to public benefit criteria,
then the public should have a reasonable expectation that the airline is capable of
operating it. It should not be left to events to prove otherwise so that the public is
denied the benefit of another airline operating the capacity in the interim (sub. 63,
p. 6).
This is a valid concern in the adjudication of contested operations. When
assessing different applications for capacity, the IASC should take into account
the ability of an airline to service the capacity for which it applied. However in7   CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND THE IASC
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uncontested applications the same rationale does not apply. If an applicant is
refused capacity because it does not pass the tests then the capacity will not be
utilised. Where the choice is between the capacity not being utilised and being
allocated to a carrier, even a new untried carrier, it would seem appropriate to
allocate the capacity.
In addition, it is possible that a carrier could apply for capacity to ‘lock out’
competitors, with no intention of starting service. Thus the most appropriate
response is to rely on existing safeguard procedures, such as the use-it-or-lose-it
principle, rather than applying restrictive tests in the allocation process.
The obligation to bilateral partners
It has been argued that as the government must designate Australia’s
international airlines, it has a duty to ensure that they be of a suitable standard
and that they are likely to operate allocated capacity. DTRD stated that the
government must designate Australian international carriers and must indicate
these carriers to foreign governments (sub. 60, p. 16). Qantas stated:
Qantas is also mindful of the need to avoid the ‘locking up’ of capacity by
awarding it to carriers which ultimately fail to accumulate the capital and other
resources needed to commence operations or to obtain operational approvals.
Experience shows that the award of capacity to airlines which have not met
minimum standards can be damaging to Australia's international aviation
reputation (sub. 67, p. 28).
The Commission accepts that there is the possibility of some small cost due to
airlines not starting, but judges that this is outweighed by the benefits provided
by allowing more new entrants to the international aviation market.
7.6.2 Costs of the tests
The IASC accepts that in all but exceptional circumstances, established airlines
are able to meet the two tests and requires no additional information from those
airlines (sub. 62, p. 2). However, in the case of start up airlines, the resources
required to pass the tests may be significant.
Australia World Airways estimated that the cost incurred in meeting IASC
requirements was in the range of $350  000 to $400  000 (transcript,  p.  6),
although a significant portion of this may have been required anyway for
business and finance raising purposes. DTRD and the IASC argued that the
IASC processes involved little if any additional cost. DTRD stated:
... the provision of business plans to the IASC, as part of the viability test, should
not be an unreasonable or costly requirement. They are usually prepared by
carriers in any event as a part of prudent business practice (sub. 60, p. 16).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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However, this raises the question: if the viability test requires no additional
effort on behalf of the airline, what is the purpose of undertaking the tests? If
any business is required to prepare the same documents to pass the ‘tests’ of the
financial market in raising capital, and if the purpose of the IASC is to assess
financial credibility, then there would appear to be little reason for the IASC to
run similar tests based on the same documents.
Based on evidence presented to the Commission, the IASC testing process does
impose costs on new entrants. Australia World Airways stated that:
These applications are extraordinarily detailed. I mean ... it was something of the
unabridged edition of Ulysses by the time that we’d finished with this and of
course the processes of building up an application and a submission of those
dimensions becomes extremely costly (transcript, p. 448).
Australia World Airways considered that the IASC process delayed them at
least two years (transcript, p. 450). Requiring applicants to show that they are
likely to pass licensing procedures, before they actually apply for those
licences, also imposes costs.
Australia World Airways, estimated that the cost of satisfying the Civil Aviation
Safety Authority that it could meet its licensing criteria was approximately
$400 000, even before it had obtained any aircraft, or received approval from
the IASC to operate on any route (transcript, p. 8). While these costs would
have to be incurred eventually, the use of these tests by the IASC means that the
expenditure is incurred earlier than necessary as Australia World Airways
stated:
... as far as CASA [Civil Aviation Safety Authority] is concerned we went through
the processes necessary to demonstrate to the [IASC] that we were reasonably
capable of being able to commence commercial operations and being licensed. As
part of that, although we didn’t apply formally for the necessary licences through,
for instance, CASA, we of course had to demonstrate that we had the capability to
apply for those licences and once applied carry through and be granted the licences
(transcript, pp. 7–8).
Small, fledgling airlines have found it more difficult to demonstrate that they
have the required funding (sub. 42). The IASC indicated that a number of
proposals by new airlines were rejected:
... because the applicants were not able to show that they were reasonably capable
of implementing their proposals. This was generally because their business plans
were deficient, the revenue projections were over-optimistic or, most commonly,
they lacked the necessary funding. Nevertheless, some of these start-up carriers
could be a source of potential competition, particularly on thin or niche routes
where start-up costs are lower and smaller aircraft can be used for passengers or
freight (sub. 42, p. 16).7   CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND THE IASC
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The effect of these costs is to deter new entry by start-up airlines. For example,
Tropic Isle Air reported that:
An examination of the draft determination by the IASC demonstrates that the
Commission was not convinced that Tropic Isle Air was reasonably capable of
raising the necessary capital to commence operations. It is our view that it is not
the place of the IASC to make this determination and it was used as a justification
for denying capacity.
Tropic Isle Air had an undertaking from one of Japan’s largest tour operators that
they would enter into an agreement to provide the company’s working capital and
start-up funds to enable the airline to commence business. The agreement
acknowledged that these funds would only become available after capacity was
allocated. The IASC were unable to accept that the funds would be made available
if capacity was granted (sub. 58, p. 2).
Conclusion
A number of rationales have been put forward for the application of these tests
during the processing of applications for capacity allocation. These existing
provisions are confusing and can impose costs on airlines, particularly small,
start-up airlines. In international air services, where there are only two domestic
airlines, start-up airlines can provide some additional competition. The threat of
new entrants is one of the major competitive forces which provide pressure for
firms constantly to watch costs and improve services.
These tests, which apply on all applications for route capacity, also overlap with
other regulatory procedures, such as the application to the Civil Aviation Safety
Authority for an Air Operator’s Certificate and to DTRD for a International
Airline Licence.
It is important that an administrative allocation system be designed and
implemented to provide the greatest net benefit over costs. The benefits from
these tests as they apply to route allocation appear uncertain, while the costs
may be significant. For example, these tests are a poor method of providing
consumer protection, yet they screen out many start-up airlines, which may
have provided additional competition and benefit to consumers on a number of
routes.
The Commission accepts that the Commonwealth Government has some
obligation to satisfy itself as to the bona fides of a new airline applying for
Australian flag carrier status, for example, to apply a ‘fit and proper person’ test
for operators of new international airlines. This should be done by DTRD as
part of the process for approving international airline licences, independent of
the allocation of the route rights to airlines. Testing the bona fides of airlines in
regard to applications for capacity confuses targets and instruments and imposesINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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unnecessary costs. The IASC’s role should be to allocate capacity to airlines,
focusing on the relative merits of applicants in contested cases, while DTRD
undertakes limited bona fides tests.
Recommendation 7.3
The IASC should not be involved in assessing the viability of airlines, or
anticipating approvals by other government agencies.
Were this recommendation to be accepted, the allocation of uncontested
capacity would be a simple administrative procedure which would not require
the involvement of a specialist agency. Instead, uncontested allocation could be
undertaken by DTRD — which maintains the register of available capacity and
is involved in other aspects of airline regulation. Where an application is
contested, it would be referred to the IASC for adjudication.
Recommendation 7.4
When international capacity becomes available, or is applied for, it should
be advertised by DTRD.
Where an application for capacity is uncontested (that is, only one
applicant), or capacity is not constrained, the allocation of that capacity
should be approved automatically by DTRD.
It should be the responsibility of the airline to meet all other regulatory and
financial requirements before the commencement date.
Where an application is contested, the IASC should determine the
allocation of capacity.
7.6.3 Objections
The Act requires the IASC to take submissions whenever new capacity is
advertised or a carrier applies for new capacity. Submissions may be made by
many parties, including airlines operating on competing routes. Although the
Minister’s policy statement indicates that the use of the capacity is of benefit to
the public, a submission opposing an allocation (even on uncontested routes)
may be sufficient reason for the IASC to apply a full range of additional criteria
(Section 7.7).7   CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND THE IASC
165
The collection of submissions is an important aspect of a transparent, public
review process for contested applications. However, uncontested applications
merely involve airlines introducing new services, or supplementing or
expanding their range of products. If there is spare capacity, there is a strong
presumption that it would be in the public interest that the capacity be used and
there would appear to be no justification for denying that use.
When the Commission proposed disallowing submissions in the draft report,
some participants argued for retaining them. For example, the Australian and
International Pilots’ Association argued:
Bilateral rights are the property of the Commonwealth of Australia, not the airlines
allocated the capacity. Interested parties with a legitimate position should be
provided with a forum to present their positions. This proposal, if accepted, will
remove the IASC forum, which currently provides a workable public benefit test
on all bilateral allocations (sub. 61, p. 7).
Any public process, such as that undertaken by the IASC, should allow public
submissions. However, if the government were to accept the recommendation
that all non-contested capacity be allocated automatically, there would be no
role for objections to uncontested route allocations, as there would be no scope
for the IASC to reject the application. For contested allocations, however, the
public consultation process is important, and submissions should be sought.
Recommendation 7.5
Submissions should not be called for unless a contested allocation is
referred to the IASC.
7.7 Allocation on contested routes
If an application for constrained capacity is contested, or if a submission
opposing the application is tendered, the IASC may use the additional criteria
provided in the Minister’s policy statement (Box 7.4). They consist of factors
that the IASC should consider when allocating capacity under the public interest
test.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Box 7.4 Policy statement — additional criteria for assessing
benefit to the public
5.1 The following additional criteria are applicable in assessing the benefit to the public
in all circumstances other than as provided in relation to particular circumstances
described in 6 below:
Tourism Benefits
(a) The extent to which proposals will promote tourism to and within Australia. The
Commission should have regard to:
– the level of promotion, market development and investment proposed by each of
the applicants; and
– route service possibilities to and from points beyond the Australian gateway(s)
or beyond the foreign gateway(s).
Consumer Benefits
(b) The extent to which proposals will maximise benefits to Australian consumers. The
Commission should have regard to:
– the degree of choice (including, for example, choice of airport(s), seat
availability, range of product);
– efficiencies achieved as reflected in lower tariffs and improved standard of
services;
– the stimulation of innovation on the part of incumbent carriers; and
– route service possibilities to and from points beyond the Australian gateway(s)
or beyond the foreign gateway(s).
Trade Benefits
(c) The extent to which proposals will promote international trade. The Commission
should have regard to:
– the availability of frequent, low cost, reliable freight services for Australian
exporters and importers.
Competition Benefits
(d) The extent to which proposals will contribute to the development of a competitive
environment for the provision of international air services. The Commission should
have regard to:
– the need to develop strong Australian carriers capable of competing effectively
with one another and the airlines of foreign countries;7   CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND THE IASC
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– the number of Australian carriers using capacity on a particular route and the
existing distribution of capacity;
– the extent to which applicants are proposing to provide capacity on aircraft they
will operate themselves as, in the long term, operation of capacity on own
aircraft is likely to result in more competitive outcomes;
– the provisions of any commercial agreement between an applicant and another
airline affecting services on the route but only to the extent of determining
comparative competition benefit between competing proposals; and
– any determinations made by the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission or the Australian Competition Tribunal in relation to a carrier
operating or proposing to operate on all or part of the route; and
– any decisions on notifications made by the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission in relation to a carrier operating or proposing to operate
on all or part of the route.
Industry Structure
(e) The extent to which proposals will impact positively on the Australian aviation
industry.
Other Criteria
(f) Such other criteria as the Commission considers relevant.
5.2 The Commission is not obliged to apply all the criteria set out in 5.1 if it is satisfied
that the important criteria in the circumstances have been met.
Source: Sharp (1997).
The allocation of capacity on contested routes is the central purpose of the
IASC and these additional criteria play a pivotal role in ensuring that the
allocation of capacity provides the maximum benefit to the public. The
additional criteria have been used in around one quarter of all determinations
made, with even higher proportions on some more highly constrained routes
such as Japan–Australia (Table 7.1).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Table 7.1 Determinations using additional criteria, June 1992 to
February 1998







Austria – 2 Netherlands 2 10
Canada – 2 New Caledonia – 3
Chile – 2 New Zealand 1 6
China 4 10 Noumea 1 ?
Dubai – 2 Papua New Guinea – 6
Fiji – 1 Philippines 2 5
France 1 1 Singapore 3 19
French Polynesia – 2 Solomon Islands 1 2
Germany 1 2 South Africa 1 4
Greece 1 5 Sri Lanka – 4
Hong Kong 4 10 Taiwan 1 4
India – 3 Thailand 2 2
Indonesia 4 19 United Kingdom 1 4
Italy – 2 United States – 1
Japan 7 12 Vanuatu 1 3
Korea, Republic of 2 19 Vietnam 2 3
Malaysia – 8 Zimbabwe – 2
Source: IASC (unpublished).
With any allocation process under a public interest standard, there is a conflict
between providing a complete and inflexible set of criteria (which creates a
costly and bureaucratic process) and allowing administrative discretion by
providing no or limited criteria (which reduces transparency and the probable
consistency of the process) (Breyer 1982). As DTRD stated:
What therefore happens is that either by having a simple objective and then
subsequent elaboration as a result of the experience of particular cases, a body of
interpretation evolves, or alternatively you have a policy statement which probably
has the same problems attached to it. It becomes complex and attempts to respond
to particular cases (transcript, p. 413)7   CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND THE IASC
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It is important to achieve a correct balance between prescriptive criteria and
flexibility. The current criteria contain many factors which need to be
considered in allocation decisions. As the IASC stated, it is required:
... to examine the extent to which each proposal, if implemented, would: promote
tourism to and within Australia; benefit consumers through lower fares, increased
consumer choice or improved standard of service; promote international trade
through the availability of low cost and reliable freight services; contribute to the
development of a competitive environment in which strong Australian carriers are
able to compete effectively with one another and the airlines of foreign countries;
and impact positively on the Australian aviation industry (sub. 42, p. 8).
The IASC is not obliged to use all the criteria above and may use others that it
considers relevant.
As with the objectives of the IASC Act, there appears to be some confusion
with the criteria as they list competition benefits along with a number of other
benefits which are likely to arise from competition (for example, tourism
benefits).
A number of relevant factors should be considered when determining the
competitive benefits of particular applications, for example:
·  the introduction of new carriers to the route;
·  the ability of a carrier to provide an efficient service, such as by providing
a daily frequency;
·  the competitive effects of codesharing arrangements; and
·  the ability to commence services and the timing of commencement.
While the Commission is wary of over simplifying the allocation criteria, there
is a presumption that increased competition will provide benefits, and indeed,
the Competition Principles Agreement stipulates that this should be the primary
criterion used in allocating capacity. Thus the criteria should be simplified such
that competition benefits are the major factors in determining the allocation of
capacity on contested routes.
Recommendation 7.6
The criteria used by the IASC to allocate contested capacity should be
simplified to focus on benefits from competition.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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7.8 Start-up provisions
If a capacity allocation is contested, special start-up provisions may apply in
certain circumstances (Box 7.5). These provide a weighting towards a new
entrant on a route, where the primary consideration is the introduction of
competition on that route (Sharp 1997). Separate criteria are applied during the
start-up phase allocating the new entrant a commercially sustainable level of
capacity when other conditions are met. Freight allocation is treated differently,
with a separate start-up phase.
The start-up phase lasts until a new entrant on a route has been allocated a
commercially sustainable level of capacity on that route. When the start-up
phase ends, all further capacity is allocated using the normal criteria for
contested routes. These start-up criteria add to the complexity of the policy
statement.
While the IASC should encourage competition on all routes to and from
Australia, the start-up provisions currently do this in an arbitrary way. In some
cases the assistance given to the start-up carrier on a route may be unwarranted.
It should be noted that the start-up provisions relate to new entrants on a route,
not new airlines.
The main objective of multiple designation and the IASC process has been to
introduce greater competition into international air services by encouraging
additional Australian carriers onto routes. The start-up provisions have been a
key component of the policies implemented to achieve this objective. Ansett
stated that:
This approach works well to achieve viable competitors on a route. There are scale
economies and set up costs. Airlines without viable services (possibly daily
services on busy routes) are at a competitive disadvantage vis a vis their
competitors, and it takes several years for a new airline on a route to become
known and build up market contacts. By recognising this, and by enabling an
initial new entrant to achieve viability as soon as possible, competition in the
longer term is increased. Granted the advantages the incumbent has, new firms will
be discouraged from entering on less restrictive and less profitable routes (sub. 19,
p. 49).
However, this may come at some cost — for example, the incumbent carrier
may not obtain the capacity it may have received otherwise. It was noted that:
... Qantas, which on many routes is the incumbent carrier, would not be successful
in competing for available capacity against a start up carrier even if it could
demonstrate a greater level of benefit from its service proposals in the absence of
the start up rules (sub. 25, p. 60).7   CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND THE IASC
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The main effect of the start-up provisions appears to have been the development
of Ansett International as a second international carrier.
Box 7.5 Policy statement — start-up phase criteria
2.1 In this Policy Statement, unless the contrary intention appears:
‘new entrant’ means, in relation to a route, an Australian carrier which has not previously
been allocated a commercially sustainable level of capacity in relation to that route.
‘start-up phase’ means, in relation to any route, the period from 1 July 1992, or from such
later date as a particular bilateral arrangement becomes subject to the Act in order that
available capacity under that arrangement may be allocated by the Commission, until the
date on which a determination has been made under section 7 or 8 of the Act allocating a
commercially sustainable level of capacity on the route to a new entrant (see section 7 for
further details).
‘commercially sustainable level of capacity’ means the minimum capacity necessary to
allow a level of scheduled international services necessary to permit the development of
efficient, commercially sustainable operations on a route.
7.1 Subject to 6.1 above [see Box 7.2], during the start-up phase in relation to any
route on which an Australian carrier is already operating scheduled international services,
the pre-eminent consideration is to introduce competition on the route through allocating to
an initial new entrant a level of capacity appropriate to the development of efficient,
commercially sustainable operations. The Commission should allocate such capacity to an
initial new entrant, providing it is satisfied that:
(a) the level of capacity available and in prospect is sufficient to support a level of
services necessary to permit the development of efficient, commercially sustainable
operations by both a new entrant and an incumbent Australian carrier; and
(b) the proposed new carrier's tariff and service proposals would enhance competition on
the route; and
(c) approval would not result in a decrease in inbound tourism to Australia, Australian
consumer benefits or trade; and
(d) the proposed new carrier is reasonably capable of obtaining the necessary approvals
and commencing operations as proposed.
7.2 Where a bilateral arrangement provides for dedicated freight capacity in addition to
other capacity (whether that other capacity is for passenger services alone or in
combination with, or convertible to, freight services however described) the start-up phase
criteria will be applied separately in relation to:INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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(a) capacity involving the operation of passenger services (even if freight is also carried on
those services); and
(b) capacity for the operation of dedicated freight services only (irrespective of whether
this would involve the use of dedicated freight capacity or the use of dedicated freight
capacity in combination with other capacity under a bilateral arrangement);
and the application of the start-up phase criteria in the case of either (a) or (b) above will
not end the start-up phase in the case of the other.
7.3 An Australian carrier seeking an allocation of capacity, or which may be permitted
to use capacity allocated to an incumbent Australian carrier, will not be taken to be a new
entrant if it is a subsidiary or a holding company of an incumbent Australian carrier
operating on the route or if there is some other substantial connection between the two
carriers in relation to ownership and control.
7.4 Where there are applications for capacity on a route during the start-up phase by
two or more prospective new entrants, the criteria set out in 4 and 5 above [Box 7.3 and
7.5] are to be applied in selecting one of those applicants as the initial new entrant to be
allocated the level of capacity referred to in 7.1.
7.5 Where the available capacity on the route exceeds the level of capacity referred to
in 7.1, the criteria in 4 and, subject to 6.2, in 5 above are to be applied in considering the
allocation of the balance of the capacity.
7.6 Where the Commission invites applications for capacity on a route during the start-
up phase and none of the applications received are from prospective new entrants, the
criteria in 4 and, subject to 6.2, in 5 above are to be applied in considering an allocation.
7.7 In considering determinations during the start-up phase, the Commission shall have
particular regard to the possible use of interim determinations to facilitate the introduction
of competition on the route without any unnecessary delay in the use of the capacity.
Source: Sharp (1997).
These provisions may have been justified as a transitional adjustment
arrangement. The significant changes in 1992 — with Qantas entering the
domestic market and Ansett International obtaining access to the international
market — may have warranted some transitional support. Given Ansett’s
domestic network, it was always the most likely new entrant to the international
market:
It would seem to Ansett improbable that other Australian airlines who will not
have the benefit of extensive domestic networks to provide feeder traffic to and
from international services could compete effectively internationally other than on
a regional ‘niche’ basis or on a limited charter basis (sub. 19, p. 46).7   CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND THE IASC
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The IASC (sub. 42) argued that the start-up provisions will become less
important over time because a new entrant is not able to challenge existing
capacity allocations. Only the initial new entrant on a route is entitled to take
advantage of the start-up provisions and the start-up provisions cannot be
reactivated if a carrier withdraws.
Submissions were received that argued against the start-up provisions. Qantas
stated:
... the new entrant policy is a market distortion which should be avoided.
Moreover, the circumstances which were evident when the new entrant policy was
established in 1992 no longer exist and, whatever the arguments for and against
the policy at that time, there is no case now for its retention (sub. 25, p. 61).
This viewpoint was opposed by the South Australian Government:
The SA Government does not have a strong view about whether the start-up
provisions of the IASC’s policy statement should be retained or not. However,
there seems to be little evidence that they constitute the market distortion that
Qantas claims in its submission, or that, if properly applied, they might result in
Qantas or other incumbent carriers failing to win capacity contested by a start-up
carrier ‘even if it could demonstrate a greater level of benefit from its service
proposals’. The requirement for the IASC to award capacity to the start-up carrier
only if the ‘approval would not result in a decrease in inbound tourism to
Australia, Australian consumer benefits or trade’ should be sufficient safeguard
against that (sub. 63, p. 6)
The Commission considers that it is no longer appropriate that the start-up
provisions apply. The introduction of competition should be the central concern
of the policy statement. The more appropriate avenue for introducing
competition is through the additional criteria which apply on all contested
applications, as outlined above.
Recommendation 7.7
The start-up provisions should be removed from the Minister’s policy
statement.
7.9 The use-it-or-lose-it principle
The policy statement includes a use-it-or-lose-it principle, whereby capacity
must be used fully by the period specified in the original determination. If
capacity is not used fully, the Act grants the IASC the power to review
determinations, and it may vary, suspend or revoke the allocation (Box 7.6).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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The policy statement states: “the use of the entitlements of Australian carriers
under a bilateral arrangement is of benefit to the public” (Sharp 1997) and the
main purpose of the use-it-or-lose-it principle is to maximise public benefit by
allowing carriers sufficient time to commence operations, and ensuring that
capacity is used fully once operations have commenced.
Box 7.6 Policy statement — use-it-or-lose-it principle
9.1 For the purposes of specifying a period within which capacity allocated to an
Australian carrier must be fully used, the Commission should specify as short a period as
is reasonable having regard to the steps required to commence operations. Except in
exceptional circumstances, the Commission should not specify a period exceeding 3 years.
Source: Sharp (1997).
Concerns about the practical operation of the use-it-or-lose-it principle include
the potential for airlines to hoard entitlements. The ACCC noted that:
The existence of capacity limits creates the possibility that airlines will seek to
‘hoard’ capacity entitlements to prevent other airlines from using that capacity,
either preventing competitors from entering the market or preventing existing
operators from expanding. While a capacity allocation received from the
International Air Services Commission (IASC) includes a condition that the
capacity must be fully utilised from a specified date, this is not always enforced by
the IASC (eg Fiji route). Similarly, the carrier with the allocation may never
actually commence operations with that capacity or seek continuous deferral of the
date by which it must use the capacity (eg Ansett to Malaysia, Qantas to South
Africa, Australia World Airways to Greece). Such behaviour, if successful, may
lessen competition by restricting competitors expanding their operations or new
entrants establishing services. If there is ample capacity available then this
incentive to ‘hoard’ entitlements is eliminated (sub. 49, p. 6).
The IASC also noted that there may be problems with the application of this
principle:
The strict application of this use-it-or-lose-it principle can create difficulties for
carriers operating on routes where there is a pronounced seasonal variation in
passenger or freight traffic (for example, on the Australia–Fiji route). The strict
application of this principle would require that in the seasonal trough capacity be
handed back, with a fresh application needed to regain the capacity in time for the
seasonal peak. This aspect of the regulatory system can create uncertainty for the
carrier and involve higher administrative costs and burdens for the carrier and the
IASC (sub. 42, p. 23).
Thus, generally the use of allocated capacity on a constrained route should be
enforced using the use-it-or-lose-it principle to ensure that all current and
potential carriers have the ability to apply for capacity not in use, but a7   CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND THE IASC
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reasonable length of time should be considered to allow for seasonal variations.
Also, carriers need sufficient flexibility to deal with special circumstances —
for example times of cyclical downturns — without incurring additional
administrative costs. Qantas argued for a flexible approach:
Perhaps more relevant in current industry circumstances, has been the need for the
Commission to consider case by case whether capacity which carriers have been
using but is now in suspension against the possibility that the market will pick up
should be handed back or kept by carriers in reserve. In these circumstances,
Qantas has generally sought some flexibility under the use-it-or-lose-it formula on
the understanding that if another carrier had a use for the capacity it would be
returned. This suggests to Qantas that, overall, this is an area where flexibility
rather than a more prescriptive approach is needed (sub. 67, p. 23).
The Commission believes it would be difficult to specify administrative rules
for applying the use-it-or-lose-it principle in such circumstances. Thus it
considers that the IASC should continue to enforce the use-it-or-lose-it principle
rigorously on all routes, making allowances, based on its considered judgment,
where there are justifiable reasons for not using capacity temporarily. This
should also include rigorously enforcing time limits on starting services on a
route.
7.10 Renewal of determinations
IASC determinations generally hold for five years and are then reviewed. The
renewal criteria differ depending on whether the route is in start-up phase
(Section 7.8).
If the route is still in start-up phase and a new entrant applies for some of the
capacity held by the incumbent at the time of the renewal, start-up phase criteria
apply to that part of the capacity necessary to the development of efficient,
commercially sustainable operations (Box 7.7).
Box 7.7 Policy statement — renewal of determinations criteria
8.1 Subject to 6.1 [Box 7.3] above, the criteria for assessing the benefit to the public
for the purposes of renewal of determinations, other than interim determinations, are as set
out below, reflecting a presumption in favour of the carrier seeking renewal which may be
rebutted only by application of the criteria in the circumstances described:
(a) During the start-up phase on the route:INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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– the start-up phase allocation criteria set out in 7 above apply in relation to that
part of the capacity which is reasonably necessary for a level of scheduled
international services necessary to permit the development of efficient,
commercially sustainable operations; and
– the criteria set out in 8.2 below apply to the balance of the capacity.
(b) After the start-up phase on the route, the criteria set out in 8.2 below apply.
8.2 After the start-up phase on the route, the criteria for assessing benefit to the public
are:
(a) whether the carrier seeking renewal has failed to service the route effectively; and
(b) whether use of the capacity in whole or in part by another Australian carrier which has
applied for that capacity would better serve the public having regard to the criteria set
out in 4 and 5 above;
and the Commission should allocate the capacity to the carrier seeking renewal unless both
of those criteria are met, in which case all or part of the capacity can be reallocated.
Source: Sharp (1997).
If the start-up phase has ended, or if capacity is still available after an allocation
to the new entrant under the start-up phase criteria, the IASC allocates capacity
to the carrier seeking renewal except where:
·  the carrier has not serviced the route ‘effectively’; and
·  an airline which would better serve the public has applied for capacity.
The two main aims of the renewal process appear to be to ensure capacity is
used and allow new entrants some ability to obtain capacity held by
incumbents.
Incumbents in all non-start-up phase reviews so far have had their
determinations renewed. If an incumbent carrier was suspected of not using its
capacity, the IASC would have instituted a review under the use-it-or-lose-it
principle (Section 7.9). Capacity should have been revoked where not being
used (sub. 42).
The renewal process is not costless. It imposes a cost on both the IASC and
carriers. Qantas argued that ‘the requirement to seek the renewal of allocations
every 5 years should be reviewed. The process is time consuming and costly for
the Commission and the airlines involved’ (sub. 25, p. 60).
A cost is also imposed on the IASC in undertaking the reviews. This is
exacerbated by the bunching of renewals at five-year intervals. When the IASC
was established, the Minister issued determinations on capacity being used by7   CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND THE IASC
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existing carriers. All these determinations expired on 30 June 1997, creating a
considerable workload in the preceding 12 months (sub. 42). Qantas argued that
extending determinations from five to ten years would reduce costs, while
maintaining accountability (sub. 25).
Professor Brian Johns, a former IASC Commissioner, proposed options
designed to overcome this problem:
·  consolidating determinations;
·  extending some determinations by one year;
·  providing for indefinite terms, but allowing new entrants to challenge
incumbents if substantially greater public benefits would result; and
·  offering a choice of fixed or indefinite terms, whereby the incumbents
may choose either a renewal of up to 6 years, or an indefinite term, during
which new entrants can apply for the capacity if they can demonstrate
substantially greater public benefits (sub. 42).
The most appropriate approach may be to make capacity allocations in
perpetuity. It has been argued that the renewal process helps ensure that
capacity is used fully. However, it duplicates the operation of the use-it-or-lose-
it principle, which should be capable of ensuring capacity is used. The South
Australian Government stated:
The SA Government cautiously supports the Commission’s view that allocation of
capacity should be made in perpetuity and the principle that new entrants’ access
to capacity should be by ‘expanding available capacity, rather than the
redistribution of constrained capacity.’ This presupposes that the IASC must
enforce its use-it-or-lose-it powers to ensure that an incumbent carrier cannot
block access to a route while failing to operate it itself, and that available capacity
can be negotiated to meet demand (sub. 63, p. 7).
Ansett does not support allocating capacity in perpetuity:
The arrangements put in place in 1992 were developed in such a way as to achieve
a balance between the interests of the incumbent carrier and potential new entrants
... If determinations are to be made in perpetuity, as recommended by the
Commission, this already reduces the opportunities for the start-up provisions to
be applied (sub. 66, p. 6).
There may be a cost on certain routes where capacity is not expanded and the
granting of capacity in perpetuity may entrench a monopoly carrier. However,
given the world-wide trend towards liberalisation of air services, the current
policy of expanding capacity ahead of demand, and allocation criteria that
encourage competition, the Commission considers this unlikely. It is more
appropriate to give new entrants access to capacity by expanding available
capacity, rather than the redistribution of constrained capacity.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Recommendation 7.8
Capacity allocations should be made in perpetuity and the IASC should be
rigorous in enforcing the use-it-or-lose-it provisions.
7.11 Relationship with the ACCC
A number of participants noted the apparent duplication of effort between the
IASC and the ACCC in their assessment of applications for codesharing (and
scope for inconsistent decisions). This overlap occurs because both the IASC
and the ACCC may assess the competitive effects of a codesharing proposal.
The ACCC is an independent statutory authority which administers the Trade
Practices Act, and seeks to prevent or limit anticompetitive conduct (sub. 49).
Codesharing, as a joint service arrangement, may have anticompetitive effects,
so it comes within the jurisdiction of the ACCC.
Many of Australia’s ASAs explicitly allow for codesharing arrangements. If a
carrier wishes to operate on a route on a codeshare basis, it must have capacity
allocated under the appropriate ASA.
On contested or opposed applications for capacity, broad public interest criteria
of the IASC include a range of competition factors. Further, in considering any
applications involving codesharing, the IASC considers the impact of the
application on competition. This occurs regardless of whether there are
competing claims for the capacity, based on the objective of the International
Air Services Commission Act to ‘consider the extent to which any proposal
would contribute to the development of a competitive environment for the
provision of international air services’ (sub. 42, p. 35).
The ACCC noted that there are fundamental differences between the roles of
the IASC and the ACCC in assessing competition issues:
The IASC must be proactive in its consideration of competition issues whereas the
ACCC may be reactive in its role ... An Australian airline requires an allocation
from the IASC before it can commence operations. In obtaining an allocation, the
airline must submit its business proposal and have it assessed by the IASC.
This is contrasted with the ACCC, where an airline can implement its business
proposal without prior approval from the ACCC. Of course, the airline runs the
risk of action subsequently being taken by the ACCC if there are competition
concerns. Thus the ACCC is reactive. Should the airline apply for authorisation
under the Trade Practices Act then the ACCC is proactive in considering the
proposal prior to its implementation. However, the option remains for airlines to
bypass the ACCC whereas they cannot bypass the IASC.7   CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND THE IASC
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The Commission’s experience to date suggests that airlines are well aware of their
obligations under the Act and normally seek authorisation for possible
anticompetitive behaviour before implementing it (eg Qantas/British Airways Joint
Service Agreement) (sub. 49, p. 10).
Several participants expressed concern about the overlap between the ACCC
and IASC. Qantas argued that responsibility for examining the competition
aspect of codeshare arrangements must be clarified. Qantas found that the
current system has led to both the IASC and the ACCC examining its
codesharing arrangements from a competition perspective (transcript, p. 122).
British Airways highlighted the additional cost imposed by such duplication:
It appears to BA that under these circumstances it was wasteful and unnecessary
for the IASC to examine the agreement which had been specifically allowed for in
the changes to the bilateral negotiated by the Australian government and which had
the acquiescence, and was under the future oversight, of the Australian competition
authority (sub. 36, p. 6).
Similarly, Ansett argued that the overlap of responsibilities creates duplication,
and adds to the complexity, time and cost of codeshare applications:
... if you’re going to have a regulatory regime, [the] regulators should have clear
functions and charters. It doesn’t seem sensible to have to go through a series of
different regulators on one issue. It’s not an efficient way to organise government
regulation (transcript, p. 194).
Further, it has been argued that the IASC does not have the jurisdiction to
consider certain competition issues. DIST argued that:
According to the explanatory notes [to the policy statement] ‘the IASC is to assess
a commercial agreement between an applicant and another airline affecting
services on a route only to the extent of determining comparative competitive
benefit between competing proposals’. It appears that the role of the IASC may
only be to rank proposals on the basis of their competitive benefits, rather than
adjudicate on their competitive merits. The explanatory notes go on to state that
the ‘wider responsibility relating to possible anti-competitive effects of commercial
arrangements is the responsibility of the ACCC’ (sub. 31, p. 32).
The Minister for Transport and Regional Development issued a revised policy
statement for the IASC on 23 April 1997, stating in a letter to the Chairman of
the IASC:
I wish to avoid the situation where airlines are subject to two approval processes in
respect of the possible anticompetitive effects of a commercial agreement. In
addition, I wish to see the aviation industry subjected, in a consistent manner, to
the same general competition laws applicable to other industries. Accordingly, the
amendments to the Policy Statement avoid duplication of work, and make the
respective roles of the IASC and the ACCC more transparent to applicants
(sub. 25, p. 57).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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However, there may be still some conflict with aspects of the International Air
Services Commission Act which guides the actions of the IASC. The IASC
argued that:
One of the [IASC’s] primary obligations under the Act is to consider the extent to
which any  proposal would contribute to the development of a competitive
environment for the provision of international air services (sub. 42, p. 35).
The Act, the policy statement and the Explanatory Memorandum to the policy
statement appear to having conflicting notions of the role of the IASC in
assessing competition matters.
To deal with the overlap of responsibility, the IASC and the ACCC entered into
a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to ‘provide a framework for
cooperation in undertaking their respective responsibilities when these
responsibilities overlap’ (ACCC and IASC 1997). The agreement recognises the
overlapping responsibility of the agencies and commits the agencies to consult
on matters that come before them that may involve the other agency, to take
account of prior decisions of the other agency, and to seek comment from one
another on matters before them of relevance to the other agency. However the
fundamental problem of the overlap in responsibility remains.
This overlap imposes costs on governments and airlines. Governments incur
undue administrative costs through conducting unnecessary processes. Airlines
must participate in additional processes, deal with the additional uncertainty of
facing two agencies that may reject their application, and risk additional delays
as a result of these processes (Box 7.8).
Some participants argued that the IASC’s consideration of codesharing should
be limited to contested applications. Ansett argued that:
At present it appears that effort is in fact being duplicated and that both the ACCC
and the IASC are considering the possible broader anti-competitive effects of
commercial agreements. It is Ansett’s strong view that the ACCC should be solely
responsible for this task and that the IASC’s role should be confined to considering
the codesharing criteria in cases of competing applications or where there are
submissions opposing the codeshare arrangements (sub. 19, p. 50).
Box 7.8 Qantas–British Airways codeshare application
The ACCC, on 12 May 1997, authorised a joint service agreement between Qantas and
British Airways which covered a broad range of commercial arrangements, but not
codesharing.
Qantas applied to the IASC on 11 September 1997 for capacity to codeshare with British
Airways on the Singapore, Thailand and United Kingdom routes. Despite no other carrier7   CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND THE IASC
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applying for the capacity, the IASC used the full additional criteria, because submissions
opposing the application had been lodged. The ACCC has not made a decision regarding
the impact of the codeshare on the authorisation.
The IASC made a draft determination on 17 October 1997 rejecting the application on the
basis that it would not be of benefit to the public. Qantas, British Airways, State
governments, tourism organisations and other bodies made further submissions. Then on 4
December the IASC approved the codesharing on the Singapore and UK routes, but
rejected it on the Thailand route because it was not satisfied the relevant ASA allowed
codesharing.
During the review, 64 separate documents were lodged on the public register, totalling
over 220 pages. Qantas provided information on capacity, service frequency, seat
availability, discount seats, information on foreign exchange effects, and revenue sharing
arrangements, among other details. Qantas was required to reschedule the introduction of
the services, as a result of delays in receiving approval.
The ACCC made no further decisions regarding the Qantas–British Airways agreement,
allowing the authorisation to stand.
Source: IASC (1997a, 1997b, and 1997c).
Qantas argued that tightening of the MOU is required:
... Qantas would prefer to see the MOU make it clear that the ACCC is the
primary body responsible for assessing the competition policy effects of service
proposals and that the IASC has a responsibility to assess comparative
competition benefits (rather than effects) only when it is relevant to decisions on
competing applications.
Qantas suggests that it should be the responsibility of the Ministers responsible for
the ACCC and IASC to authorise the MOU and that the opportunity might be
provided for public comment before it is authorised as part of the transparency of
process which lies behind many of the Commission’s recommendations (sub. 67, p.
24).
The Commission considers that the specific roles of the ACCC and the IASC
should be clarified, removing overlap in those roles, and that the IASC’s
consideration of codeshare applications should be limited to contested
applications. Recommendation 7.4, to limit the IASC to the consideration of
contested applications only, should go a long way to solving the current overlap.
7.12 Conclusion
The Commission found that the policy of multiple designation has brought
significant benefits to Australia. The IASC allocation process is an appropriateINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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method of allocating capacity given the constraints imposed by the bilateral
system. Despite making recommendations aimed at reducing the administrative
burden of this process, the Commission found that the IASC process is
fundamentally sound.
In summary, the Commission recommends that the objectives of the
International Air Services Commission Act 1992 be amended, and that the IASC
not assess the viability of airlines, or anticipate the approval processes of other
government agencies. In addition, the IASC should be limited to cases where
capacity is contested, and the start-up provisions removed.
However, the Commission is aware that the IASC allocation process is a sub-
optimal solution. While steps could be taken to streamline the process, greater
gains could arise from rapidly expanding capacity to ensure its availability and
avoid the need to adjudicate contested applications.
The Commonwealth, in the long term, should aim to create a framework for
international air services that allows consumers to choose freely without
governmental allocation of the rights to produce, as they can in most other
markets for goods and services.183
8 ACCESS TO AIRPORTS
Access to airport infrastructure is essential for the effective use of the
entitlements under air services arrangements (ASAs). Restricted access to
landing and take-off slots and other airport facilities (such as passenger
terminals) may constrain the use of capacity available under existing ASAs. It
may also limit the ability of governments to secure additional capacity for
carriers. Further, congestion can impose significant costs on airlines and
passengers.
8.1 Australian and overseas international airports
Australia’s international airport network is of significant economic importance
to the Australian community. Sydney is by far the busiest airport in Australia in
terms of both passenger and freight traffic, processing three times the passenger
traffic and double the freight traffic of the next largest airport, Melbourne.
Passenger traffic through Brisbane airport in 1997 almost equalled that of
Melbourne. Passenger and freight traffic in all mainland airports has increased
over the past three years except in Adelaide and Port Hedland (Appendix C).
The value of airport infrastructure is difficult to estimate but the sale prices of
four major Australian airports provide some indication. The sale of long-term
leases at Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth and Adelaide airports — which accounted
for 44 per cent of passenger and 42 per cent of freight movements in 1996 —
realised $3.34 billion (DTRD unpublished). A brief history of airport reform is
presented in Box 8.1.
The Federal Airports Corporation (FAC) invested $1.6 billion in infrastructure
at its Australian airports from its commencement in 1988. Airport infrastructure
projects typically involve long lead times and consist of ‘lumpy’ investments in
significant renewal or expansion programs. Most investment in terminals and
other infrastructure is needed to accommodate periods of peak demand. At
non-peak periods much of the expensive infrastructure is under used.
Individual airlines have also invested in airport infrastructure. Ansett estimated
the amount invested by Australian carriers at Sydney Airport in preparation for
the Sydney 2000 Olympics at around $500 million (transcript, p. 173).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES    
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Box 8.1 Australian airport reform
1988 Federal Airports Corporation (FAC) commences operations.
Full cost recovery is implemented for aviation facilities and services provided 
by the Commonwealth.
A ‘single till’ approach is introduced for applying uniform charges to all 22 
FAC airports.
A weight based General Aviation Infrastructure Tariff is introduced for 
unlimited use of general aviation airports.
1991 Peak period charges are introduced at Sydney Airport.
1997 Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth Airports are privatised.
1998 The second phase of the airport privatisation program is implemented 
covering Adelaide, Alice Springs, Canberra, Coolangatta, Darwin, Hobart, 
Launceston and Townsville.
The slot management system is introduced at Sydney Airport.
Sydney Airport is corporatised and FAC abolished.
Sources: FAC (1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997); IC (1992).
Overseas, recent new airport construction has occurred primarily in East Asia,
with new airport facilities at Bangkok, Hong Kong, Kansai, Kuala Lumpur,
Macau and Seoul. Airport construction in Europe and North America has been
limited; new airports have been built in Denver and Munich, and additional
airports are being developed in Athens and Oslo.
Data on traffic for Sydney and major airports in other countries are contained in
Table 8.1. In 1994, Sydney’s total passengers (including domestic passengers,
comprising 75 per cent of all passengers) were about a third of those passing
through Heathrow or Los Angeles Airports. By 1996–97, the total passengers
passing through Sydney had increased from 17.5 million in 1994 to 21.9 million
and international passengers had increased from 5.5 million in 1994 to 7.3
million (sub. 13, pp. 1, 8).8  ACCESS TO AIRPORTS
185
















’000 ’000 ’000 ’000 tonnes
Heathrow 411 51 368 44 262 954
Los Angeles 682 51 050 12 679 603
Sydney na 17 483 5 493 385
Tokyo
(Narita)
124 21 704 20 681 1 547
Vienna 143 7 521 7 159 81
Washington
(Dulles)
268 11 561 2 689 75
na Not available
a An aircraft movement is either a landing or take-off.
b Sydney freight data relate to domestic and international freight.
Source: ICAO (1996b).
8.2 Existing operational constraints on airport access
Increasing congestion in the air, on runways and in terminals has developed
where airport infrastructure has not kept pace with the growth in demand for air
services. Kapur (1995) predicts that 33 major airports in North America, 13 in
Europe and five in Asia will reach maximum capacity within the next 15 years
and cites IATA estimates that the cost of aircraft delays1 around the world is
US$15 billion to US$20 billion per year (Kapur 1995). The Prices Surveillance
Authority (1993) estimated that congestion at Sydney Airport cost passengers at
least $40 million per year. Congestion costs for airlines in the United States in
1986 were estimated at US$2 billion (Hong and Harker 1992).
Participants in the Inquiry identified operational constraints at Sydney Airport,
particularly the availability of landing and take-off slots at peak periods. Sydney
Airport is understood to present more significant operational constraints than
other major Australian airports. Qantas argued that an airport that is constrained
in the preferred peak periods would have difficulty accommodating any
substantial additional traffic created by further liberalisation. It identified the
following operational constraints at Sydney Airport:
                                            
1 The costs include those associated with aircraft in holding patterns, passengers’ travel time,
and communities located under flight paths.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES    
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·  the introduction of a legislated aircraft movement cap;
·  reductions in international flights permitted during the shoulder hours,
leading up to and just after the 11 pm to 6 am curfew; and
·  introduction of a Long Term Operating Plan which distributes traffic
across Sydney (sub. 25, p. C12).
These measures have been introduced to control and reduce the impact of noise
on Sydney. Sydney Airport acknowledged that these environmental restrictions
limit capacity to below the technical capacity of the runways (sub. 13, p. 5).
Qantas noted that overall capacity limitation at Sydney Airport was a significant
operational constraint:
We would say that when we look at driving Qantas forward, just speaking in
relation to our business, that one of the biggest constraints on our business is
Sydney’s Kingsford-Smith Airport ... but if one wants to talk about inefficiencies
and constraints and so on which are attempted to be solved by artificially
restricting the demand, then that is probably the biggest issue of all (transcript,
p. 451).
DIST emphasised that tourism growth depends on the provision of airport
infrastructure keeping pace with demand and that Sydney is the preferred port
of entry for the majority of international tourists. It noted that aircraft capacity
at Sydney Airport is constrained by land availability, heavy use during peak
periods and environmental concerns. It argued that:
As air services increase, access to Sydney will be largely determined by the
availability of slots, as it already is at many other congested airports such as
Narita in Japan. In anticipation of these constraints, Australia has been
encouraging some airlines to serve other ports or imposing constraints on how
Sydney is served eg. to be served only once in one direction ... The growing
scarcity of slots ... reinforces the need for non-specification of gateways [that is,
cities] and negotiation of sufficient capacity to allow carriers to serve a range of
other ports if they are unable to obtain suitable slots at Sydney (sub. 31, p. 36).
Sydney Airport emphasised the need to increase international terminal gate
capacity to handle the estimated 350 000 traffic movements at the airport by
2006 (compared with 275 000 in 1996–97) (transcript, p. 219). The number of
international Boeing 747 terminal gates at Sydney will be increased to 34 before
April 2000 from 24 in November 1997 (Sydney Airport unpublished).2
The focus of participants’ comments related to Sydney Airport, but there were
concerns about potential environmental constraints on access at other Australian
airports. Ansett (sub. 19, p. 39) noted that community environmental concerns
                                            
2  However, three smaller gates (one Boeing 767 and two Boeing 737) will be removed
(Qantas, sub. 25, p. C14).8  ACCESS TO AIRPORTS
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are not limited to Sydney and have been raised at other airports, especially
Adelaide and Perth.
Over time, congestion will become an increasingly important aspect of
international air services. Although many airports are expanding their capacity,
there are also environmental and geographic constraints which will place some
limits on available capacity. In these circumstances it is important to ensure that
congested capacity is managed in the most efficient manner as well as to plan
and build facilities to accommodate future growth.
8.3 Pricing at airports
Most international airports face increasing demand for their services. However,
it is not possible to make incremental increases in capacity. Airport capacity is
increased in large one-off amounts via ‘lumpy’ investments in new facilities,
such as a new runway or terminal.
A pricing regime for airports should suit an environment of growing demand
with periodic ‘lumpy’ investment. The central feature of such a pricing regime
is that charges for the use of facilities should reflect their opportunity cost (the
return forgone by using resources in their current form rather than in the most
valuable alternative use). The available capacity would then be used by those
who value it most highly.
The opportunity cost of an airline’s use of facilities varies with the level of
demand relative to the airport’s capacity. When demand is low relative to
capacity, the opportunity cost of an aircraft landing is low. However, as demand
rises relative to capacity, the opportunity cost of an aircraft landing increases.
For example, a light aircraft landing during the peak period may deprive a
Boeing 747 of a landing slot, producing a high opportunity cost.
Thus an efficient pricing regime occurs when charges for the use of the airport
reflect the changing opportunity cost as demand rises relative to the airport’s
capacity. Such charges would begin low and increase over time as the airport
becomes more congested and demand for limited resources increases. The
opportunity cost of an aircraft’s use of facilities is lower in non-congested
airports. In this case it is the long run marginal cost of maintaining the airport’s
facilities.
At congested airports, efficient landing and take-off charges would reflect the
cost of an aircraft movement to all other aircraft wishing to use the airport and
to passengers. Reflecting congestion costs in charges to airport users would
allow the airport owner to earn a surplus (after covering the physical costs ofINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES    
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providing the infrastructure) which could be used to fund additional ‘lumpy’
investment to alleviate congestion.
Prior to privatisation, the FAC used a uniform network charging system across
all airports. Thus charges at any individual airport were not directly related to
the costs of providing services at that airport (Box 8.2).
Box 8.2 Australia’s pre-privatisation pricing policy
The FAC’s pricing regime was determined by the need to recover the costs of aviation
facilities fully. Prices had little relationship to the marginal cost of providing the services
to airport users. They were set with the objective of recovering costs across all airports,
without considering the individual circumstances of particular airports. The FAC achieved
cost recovery of approximately 75 per cent (across all its airports) on its estimate of
aeronautical costs. This under-recovery was offset by the profitability of the Corporation’s
non-aeronautical activities.
Source: IC (1992).
Following privatisation, network pricing has ceased, increasing the scope for
efficient charging. Landing fees at most airports, for example, are now based on
an aircraft’s maximum take-off weight. Weight based fees are more efficient to
the extent that they account more accurately for some airport costs, such as
costs associated with runway damage caused by aircraft of different weight.
8.3.1 Efficient pricing during peak periods
Some airports may be congested at peak periods only. The opportunity cost of
aircraft movements is relatively low in non-peak times but may be significant in
peak periods when demand outstrips the airport’s capacity.
Peak load pricing — charging a higher price in peak periods to reflect the
additional costs of congestion to other airport users — is an efficient system of
pricing in such circumstances. Such pricing may take the form of a peak
surcharge in addition to the non-peak period charge.
Peak load pricing should provide an efficient solution to rationing capacity —
that is, capacity is allocated to airlines that place the highest value on using the
airport at peak periods. Airlines that place a lower value on airport use at peak
periods can move to off-peak periods, terminate less valued services, consider
alternative airports, or use larger planes at peak times.
The pricing differential between peak and non-peak periods depends not only
on the peak surcharge but also on non-peak charges. A small difference in peak8  ACCESS TO AIRPORTS
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and non-peak charges together with excess demand at peak hours, does not
necessarily mean that the peak surcharge is too low. It may imply that non-peak
charges are too high — it is the differential that matters.
Peak load pricing can easily accommodate a ‘regional ring fence’ (which
preserves a proportion of slots for regional airlines), as it is possible to charge a
different peak load charge for regional airlines.
Sydney Airport introduced peak period landing and take-off charges in 1991.
The peak surcharge was $250 per landing and take-off and the shoulder
surcharge (for the period leading up to, and just after the peak period) was $200
per landing or $100 per take-off (sub. 13, attach. E). These charges applied to
all fixed wing aircraft, irrespective of size.
One of the objectives of the charges was to discourage airport use by general
aviation at peak times. Sydney Airport considered the charge to be successful:
... in that there was some spreading of the peak into the shoulder hours and the
period before and after the shoulders plus the virtual elimination of General
Aviation movements in the peak (sub. 13, p. 8).
The peak period surcharge has had a significant impact on general landing
charges for smaller aircraft at Sydney Airport (Table 8.2). The surcharge was a
fixed fee per landing or take-off, whereas general landing charges varied
according to the maximum take-off weight of the aircraft. Thus, the surcharge
represented a greater impost for smaller aircraft. For example, the peak
surcharge represented a 210 per cent increase in landing fees (compared to
non-peak fees) for a Fokker F27–500, and an over 900 per cent increase in
landing fees for a Cessna 210. By contrast, the increase was approximately 70
per cent for a Boeing 737–400 and only 11 per cent for a Boeing 747–400.
Despite some success, demand for peak period slots remained high. Unsatisfied
demand at peak times suggests that the price differential between peak and off
peak may have been insufficient to spread demand to levels that Sydney Airport
could accommodate — the differential could be raised by lowering the general
landing charge or increasing the peak period surcharge.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES    
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Table 8.2 Landing charges, including peak period surcharge, for
selected aircraft at Sydney Airport
a










B747–400 (397 seats) 2 271 250 11
B737–400 (137 seats) 359 250 70
Fokker F27–500 (52 seats) 119 250 210
Saab 340A (34 seats) 73 250 342
Cessna 210 (5 seats) 28 250 909
a Peak period surcharges have applied since 1991. From 1 October 1998, these charges will be withdrawn.
b General landing charges: $5.72 per tonne maximum take-off weight with a minimum charge per
landing of $28.
c Surcharge applies per take-off or landing. The peak periods are between 8–9 am and 6–7 pm.
Sources: BTCE (1997); Sydney Airport (sub. 13, attach. E).
8.3.2 Proposed changes in airport charges at Sydney Airport
Charges for aeronautical services at Sydney Airport were restructured on
30 June 1998 and will be implemented on 1 October 1998 (Table 8.3). The
restructuring involves a reduction in the basic landing charge for use of runways
and taxiways, an increase in the minimum landing charge, and an increase in the
international terminal charge. The FAC claimed that the increase in the
minimum landing charge will more appropriately reflect the Corporation’s cost
of provision of basic runway and taxiway facilities and services. The changes
will be phased in over four years for regional airlines.
The international terminal charge will more than double to meet the cost of the
capital expenditure program, estimated to be $700 million (ACCC 1998c). Peak
landing or take-off charges will be withdrawn. With the commencement on
29  March 1998 of the new slot management scheme (Section 8.4), the
Corporation concluded that:
Having considered the industry’s views, the Corporation believes that while the
slot management regime may still be in its early operational state, that alone is not
sufficient to justify retention of peak charges in tandem with slot management
where the latter basically manages airport access during peak demand periods
(FAC 1998, p. 6).8  ACCESS TO AIRPORTS
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Table 8.3 Charges at Sydney Airport
Charge As at 5 March 1998 From 1 October 1998
$$






Additional peak landing or take-off charge 250 na
Shoulder landing or take-off charge 200 na
Minimum landing charge 28 100






a Maximum take-off weight
na Not applicable.
Source: FAC proposed Determination 13.
The restructured charges will change the cost of landing a Boeing 747–400 and
using the international terminal from $3254 ($3504 in peak periods) to $4303.
A comparison of landing charges for Boeing 747 aircraft (but not including
terminal charges) at selected international airports including Frankfurt,
Singapore, Tokyo and Osaka, indicates that Sydney’s charges are relatively low.
Data availability has precluded a full comparison of charges.
While the restructured charges at Sydney Airport will more closely align prices
with the cost of providing landing and international terminal facilities, they are
not attuned to allocating scarce capacity efficiently and providing incentives for
increased investment when overall capacity limits are approached. The decision
to abandon peak pricing rather than improve it could seriously compromise the
gains from the restructuring of charges.
A peak period surcharge provides important incentives to ensure appropriate
investment in airport infrastructure. In addition to allocating airport
infrastructure more efficiently, peak load pricing also provides a mechanism for
providing revenue for expanding airport infrastructure.
If peak load pricing is unable to provide the correct price signals to airport
operators, there is the risk that airports may over-invest in airport facilities
which are underutilised at off-peak times, even though some peak load could be
spread to the off peak. As Westralia Airports Corporation argued, demand
during peaks often drives airport capacity expansion plans:
Perth International Airport, like other busy Australian airports, experiences peak
periods during the day primarily due to global connection schedules between
interim connection hubs in Asia and destinations in Europe and North America. In
Perth, peak hour requirements alone drive terminal expansion plans. WestraliaINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES    
192
Airports Corporation believes that peak load pricing should be implemented where
appropriate (sub. 59, p. 4).
Qantas did not favour peak period pricing of airport facilities. It noted that
providing more airport facilities in response to increased demand for these
facilities was more important than managing the congestion which is created by
a shortage of facilities (transcript, p. 466).
The Commission is of the view that an efficient pricing structure would address
both overall capacity and the allocation of that capacity.
8.3.3 Constraints on pricing
A range of factors may inhibit the adoption of an efficient pricing regime for
airport services. The nature of international airline scheduling periods implies
that there are ‘windows of scheduling opportunities’ available to airlines, so that
peak load pricing could lead to very high landing and take-off charges at some
times (Krolke 1997). Further, political factors in many countries constrain the
use of peak load pricing to the extent necessary to reduce demand to a level
consistent with capacity. In addition the ‘natural monopoly’ characteristics of
airports invite government constraints on the pricing discretion of airport
owners.
Airport operators may have some scope to use monopoly power in their pricing.
The Commonwealth Government has sought to ensure that the sale of airports
does not facilitate the abuse of market power by private airport operators, by
establishing a transitional regulatory regime which operates for five years after
an airport is sold. The potential for such abuse is most likely to arise in charging
for aeronautical services such as landing aircraft. Aeronautical charges have
been capped at privatised airports. The price caps for the privatised airports
allow airports to raise average aeronautical charges by Consumer Price Index
minus X. The improvement in productivity (the X) that the government
considers can be achieved in aeronautical services varies across airports —
4 per cent for Melbourne, 4.5  per  cent for Brisbane and 5.5  per  cent at Perth
(Fahey and Sharp 1997). In addition, service quality will be monitored.
Aeronautical charges at Sydney Airport are subject to prices surveillance by the
ACCC. The airport will not be subject to a CPI minus X price cap
(Costello 1998).
However, a price cap can compound an inefficient aeronautical charging
structure — in the form of under-pricing — that existed prior to the
implementation of the price cap. While prices surveillance and monitoring are
intended to ensure that private airports do not abuse their market power, it is
important to recognise that:8  ACCESS TO AIRPORTS
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·  surveillance and monitoring can be demanding forms of regulation;
·  information problems and the range of strategies that can be employed by
airport operators mean that surveillance and monitoring are not precise;
·  surveillance and monitoring invariably involve trade-offs between quality-
enhancing investments and costs, where quality-enhancing investments
increase costs that cannot necessarily be recouped through higher
(permitted) prices; and
·  price-capped airports may be constrained in their ability to use pricing
strategies to solve congestion problems in the manner discussed above.
The first tranche of privatised airports will complete their five-year transitional
period by July 2002. The Government has stipulated that the prices oversight
arrangements will be reviewed prior to the conclusion of the transitional period.
8.4 Slot management
A slot is the right to schedule an aircraft arrival or departure, on a specified day
within a specified time frame. The number of slots available at an airport in a
given period is constrained by runway capacity. Congestion arises when
demand for access to slots in order to take-off or land exceeds capacity. Slots
can be allocated by administrative or market based techniques (or a combination
of both).
Over 100 airports throughout the world have established airport scheduling
committees to allocate landing and take-off slots. Airport authorities inform the
committee of the maximum number of landing and take-off slots available for
allocation among the airlines. Most scheduling committees operate under rules
set by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) (Box 8.3).
Because of capacity constraints, not all airlines receive all the slots they need at
the times required to make up their schedules. A system of swapping or
non-monetary trading of slots has evolved. Trading is organised
administratively at IATA scheduling conferences, when airlines are able to see
the planned schedules of other airlines and their slots. The conferences provide
the opportunity for airlines to obtain the required slots to make up their planned
schedules. They are held every six months, but trading in slots can also occur on
an informal basis between conferences.
Box 8.3 Scheduling rules
Most airport scheduling committees operate under the IATA general rules for scheduling
slots. These rules include:INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES    
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·  ‘grandfathering’ — an airline with a particular slot in the last period retains it in
this period;
·  use-it-or-lose-it — if an airline uses its particular slot for less time than that
specified, the slot will be made available to other airlines in the next period;
·  any slots which become available from increased capacity or by carriers
relinquishing slots are distributed equally between new entrants and existing
operators;
·  priority for regular services — given competing demand an available slot will be
allocated to the service that plans to use it most frequently; and
·  directed discretion — there are guidelines for precedence if demands remain unmet.
Rescheduling to accommodate larger aircraft has precedence over extending an
existing schedule to provide a year round service.
Source: Jones and Viehoff (1993).
Slots are usually exchanged for those with similar operating characteristics —
for example similar aircraft sizes. However, with the approval of the relevant
airport scheduling committees, it may be possible to change the characteristics
of a particular slot.
Sydney Airport introduced a formal slot management system in 1998. The
Commonwealth Minister for Transport has appointed a company responsible for
slot management (currently Airport Coordination Australia) and the process for
allocating slots is specified under the Sydney Airport Demand Management
Act 1997. The slot allocation scheme operates in conjunction with a movement
limitation scheme (a cap of 80 movements per hour during the operating period
outside the curfew, seven days a week) and is based on the IATA rules.
8.4.1 Concerns with current slot management processes
The current administrative system of allocating slots entrenches the position of
incumbent airlines at airports. DTRD noted that:
The inability of the committee based slot allocation process to provide adequate
provision for new entrants is a fundamental weakness of the system. However,
there has been no mechanism adopted internationally which satisfactorily or
equitably addresses this issue. The US has sparingly used forced sacrifice to free
up slots for international services ... Forced sacrifice would create a range of
administrative and legal problems (1997d, p. 4).
‘Grandfathering’ provisions ensure that the peak time slots held by incumbents
are generally not made available to new entrants. The issue of slot availability8  ACCESS TO AIRPORTS
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particularly concerns new entrant airlines. An executive from Virgin Atlantic
argued that:
The costs for the travelling public of maintaining grandfather rights are huge.
These costs represent a direct subsidy from consumers to those dominant airlines
fortunate enough to have acquired slot holdings in the past as gifts from their
government-owners. That should be unacceptable in a free market
(Humphreys, 1997, p. 3).
While increasing flexibility for incumbent airlines, slot trading under IATA
rules allows only limited entry by new airlines. There are some provisions for
new airlines, any slots which become available from increased capacity or
relinquished slots being distributed between incumbents and new operators.
However, as the number of slots becoming available in part depends upon
carriers relinquishing slots, few peak period slots are allocated to new entrants.
The IATA use-it-or-lose-it rule (which requires that a slot be used 85 per cent of
the time in the previous season) may increase the number of slots available for
allocation, but the likelihood of incumbent operators not utilising peak period
slots is small. For example, up to 80 per cent of slots (including grandfathering)
at congested airports in Europe have been reassigned to previous users at every
scheduling conference (BTCE 1994).
Grandfathering entrenches the dominant airline at an airport. This issue was
raised by the European Union Competition Directorate which ruled that British
Airways and American Airlines be allowed to merge their operations only if
they give up to competitors 267 take-off and landing slots at Heathrow and
Gatwick Airports. Slots are to be allocated to the airlines competing with British
Airways and American Airlines by the committee responsible for slot allocation
at the airports. This allocation is aimed at ensuring the development of
competition in the relevant markets (EC 1998).
The grandfathering process, which in effect grants slots in perpetuity, created
some expectation that British Airways may have a right to compensation for
slots lost. It has been suggested in some quarters that the two airlines should be
entitled to receive compensation from the government to recoup the value of
their slots (The Economist 1998).
8.4.2 Formal and informal slot markets
New entrants have acquired desirable slots in some airports by obtaining an
undesirable slot time in an allocation and exchanging it with an incumbent
airline, together with an under-the-table payment. Jones and Viehoff (1993)
noted that there was some anecdotal evidence of money changing hands when
slots were traded. Some participants also described such trading to theINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES    
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Commission. FedEx is reported to be negotiating for the sale of slots at Narita
Airport to other US airlines following the 1998 US–Japan ASA
(transcript, p. 83). European airlines have objected to the market being closed to
non-US airlines.
It is possible that ‘under-the-table’ selling could develop at constrained airports
in Australia where formal selling is not permitted — allowing explicit selling
instead would permit the development of a more efficient market. Indeed, if
capacity is not expanded and if peak load pricing is not used to spread demand,
it can be argued that the question is not whether a market in slots will develop
but whether the market will be above or under the table.
The International Chamber of Commerce argued that:
Since it is likely that when an airport is very congested, secondary trading will take
place, such trading should be at market prices and the process should be
transparent to the public (1994, p. 21).
The creation of a formal secondary slot market could result in more flexible slot
allocation procedures. A secondary cash market for slots (replacing the current
informal trading arrangements) would permit a market value to be placed on a
slot — that is, the price of the slot would reflect demand for the slot. An airline
could purchase a slot if its valuation of that slot exceeded the market price. Slots
would be acquired by those who valued them most. Several inquiry participants
supported the introduction of such a system. FedEx argued that a market-based
approach to slot trading would ensure an efficient allocation of slots
(transcript, p. 83).
Developing a slot market
A factor in the development of a market for slots is the nature of the property
right being offered. The airlines do not formally ‘own’ their slots although
‘grandfathering’ rules provide some degree of certainty as to the slots they will
hold in the future.
Legally, there is uncertainty concerning the ownership of landing and take-off
slots. For example, in the United States slots are ‘an operating privilege’ under
the control of the Federal Aviation Authority which may withdraw slots to
allocate them to essential air services or international flights. They are also
regarded as an asset to the extent that banks have accepted them as mortgage
security (Starkie 1994).
DTRD argued that the Commonwealth Government may be liable for
compensation if slots which were purchased could not be used because of
operating constraints at airports (transcript, p. 416).8  ACCESS TO AIRPORTS
197
Several participants commented about the uncertainty surrounding the
ownership of landing and take-off slots. Ansett argued that slots should belong
to countries not airlines (transcript,   p. 192). FedEx noted that slots, while a
sovereign right to be allocated by government bodies, have been regarded as
proprietary rights and leased and sold (transcript,    p.  83). Furthermore, the
privatisation of airports means that slots could belong to the airports (at least for
the duration of their leases) rather than to governments.
The nature of the rights conferred by owning a slot is unclear. It is impossible to
guarantee that an aircraft will be able to land at a precise time, even if it has a
slot. A range of factors such as weather conditions and other traffic can disturb
schedules, though contracts could be designed to accommodate such events.
While this uncertainty may make it difficult to specify property rights, the
prices offered for slots would reflect the uncertainty. This uncertainty has not
prevented the development of informal markets and under-the-table payments,
as noted above. Indeed it can be argued that one advantage of developing a
formal slot market is that there would need to be a clear specification of the
property rights of a slot, of the obligations of each party to the contract, and
hence of the distribution of risks between them.
Some smaller airlines have expressed concern that large incumbent airlines
would dominate slot markets. Ansett indicated that a market for slots would
pose significant problems because it would be outbid by large, established and
profitable airlines (transcript, p. 191). Such outbidding could reflect efficient
bidding and pricing, or it could reflect the exercise of monopoly power which
would disadvantage consumers.
Other problems arise with slot auctioning generally. Airlines require a parcel of
slots to land and take-off at a network of airports as part of their scheduled
service. However, the auctions would typically sell slots airport-by-airport and
not as parcels of slots at different airports. This may make schedule planning
and slot selection complex because airlines may not be able to value a slot until
they know what other slots they have secured at other airports. But this problem
would not be so important if existing slots are ‘grandfathered’.
As a starting point for a slot market at Sydney Airport, the airport scheduling
committee (or some other body established for the purpose) could auction new
slots or those made available through airport expansion, technological
improvements, regulatory changes, airlines discontinuing services, or the freeing
up of slots through the use-it-or-lose-it rules. This approach has the advantage
of allowing new entrants to bid.
The scope for new entrants to obtain slots would be widened further if the
auction extended to all (or some proportion of) slots currently held byINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES    
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incumbent airlines. This approach would require the relaxation of the
‘grandfather’ rights currently enjoyed by incumbent airlines.
Another approach may be to ‘churn’ slots, selling a small proportion of
currently ‘grandfathered’ slots through a general auction (or a tender process)
each year. The number of slots offered through auction would increase over
time. But the problem of determining which slots should be churned — and the
sequence, if all slots are to be churned over time — hampers the adoption of
this approach.
Independent of the primary market for slots, a secondary market could operate.
This involves the trading of slots once they have been transferred to airlines.
Despite the perceived advantages, formal markets for slots do not operate in
Australia or in most overseas countries. Since 1986, a recognised formal market
has operated at four US airports — O’Hare (Chicago), J. F. Kennedy (New
York), La Guardia (New York) and Ronald Reagan National (Washington DC)
— but is limited to slots for domestic flights. Under the new Canada–US ASA,
Canadian airlines may also participate in these markets. Slots are traded through
a clearing house although financial terms are generally not made public. The
number of outright slot sales in the United States seems to be relatively small.
Incumbent airlines tend to hold on to their slots although they are increasingly
leasing slots to other airlines (Starkie 1994). Thus incumbents may maintain
their dominance of the market while allowing some limited new entry.
The European Commission is currently drafting rules in relation to the
management of slots which may include provisions for some form of auctioning
or secondary market. The details are still being developed.
Regional airline slots
Many airports around the world restrict the trading of slots held by regional
airlines. Sydney Airport is required by the Government to hold up to 30 per cent
of the airport’s peak capacity for regional airline operators — this is known as
the ‘regional ring fence’. Slots held by regional airlines at Sydney Airport
cannot be traded for other categories of operation — that is, they cannot be
swapped with a non-regional domestic or international service. The New South
Wales Government stated:
Access to Sydney Airport for regional airlines is a major concern for regional
development interests in New South Wales. It is critically important for regional
development that regional business people, in particular, have ready, low cost
access to Sydney, and this means access in peak hours (sub. 81, p. 2).8  ACCESS TO AIRPORTS
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A move to a market in slots would not be incompatible with a ‘regional ring
fence’. Two types of slots could be traded, regional and non-regional, each with
its own market and prices.
However, the ‘regional ring fence’ limits the scope for additional entry of
domestic and international flights in peak periods. Sydney Airport argued that:
If market forces could operate to allow the economic use of the runway system
these slots would be swapped or traded for international or domestic flights. The
regional slot provision or ‘regional ring fence’ limits growth of international
services in the peak ... (sub. 13, p. 6).
8.5 Promoting competition in airport services
The terms of access to airport infrastructure are vital to the efficiency and
competitiveness of air services, both domestic and international. These services
are often provided on a monopolistic basis (OECD 1997). Monopoly provision
of airport services may not only increase the costs of user airlines, but where the
monopoly provider is an airline, it may provide a hidden subsidy to that airline.
A number of participants raised the problem of competitive access to airport
infrastructure. Qantas argued that:
In the international airline markets, a number of major non-regulatory barriers to
entry exist. Primary among these is a scarcity of airport capacity, either in terms of
take-off/landing slots, or access to other facilities. Other issues concern monopoly
provision of ground handling services (with the monopoly often held by a foreign
competitor), lack of enforcement (or applicability, or existence) of competition law
at the foreign end of routes from Australia, and monopoly provision of distribution
services in foreign countries ... (sub. 25, p. 35).
Ansett took the view that:
Access to airport infrastructure for international air services depends on the
physical capacity of an airport’s system ... regulatory arrangements on the use of
these facilities...the charging regime applicable to the use of these facilities and the
availability of commercial arrangements such as competitive ground handling.
Overall, these arrangements, in Australia (even at capacity constrained Sydney)
enable the operation of market forces. However, this is not the case in all foreign
markets served by Australian carriers (sub. 19, p. 38).
Article 15 of the Chicago Convention, which relates to airport and similar
charges, requires that airports in contracting states be open under uniform
conditions to the aircraft of all other contracting states. It also requires that
charges that are imposed for the use of such airports should not be higher than
those paid by the national carrier. Most of Australia’s ASAs include an article
relating to airport services and facility charges that reflects these requirements.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES    
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8.5.1 Ground handling and other ‘soft rights’
Ground handling is an important aspect of international air services operations
that affects market access. Some policy guidance on ground handling is
provided in Annex 9 of the Chicago Convention, but there is limited treatment
of ground handling in bilateral air service agreements. Annex 9 recommends
that operators be offered the choice of providing their own services for ground
handling operations, or having such operations performed by another operator,
or by the airport operator, or by an agent approved by the airport authority.
The ICAO Secretariat took the view that uniform regulatory treatment of ground
handling is necessary in order to provide all carriers with the same opportunities
to utilise market access rights effectively. The Secretariat presented a proposal
for ground handling arrangements at the 1994 Air Transport Conference, under
which parties would authorise foreign carriers to:
·  perform their own ground handling services;
·  handle another or other air carrier(s);
·  join with others in forming a service providing entity; and /or
·  select among competing service providers (at each designated carrier’s
choice).
Under this proposal, carriers would have been able to choose freely among
these alternatives, constrained only by the relevant safety provisions or the scale
of airport operations being too small to sustain competitive providers.
However, the Conference took no action as most States were satisfied that the
existing ground handling arrangements at their international airport(s) could
meet their specific needs. Many delegates expressed the view that, while foreign
carriers could provide air services to and from their territory, they should not be
permitted to carry out ground handling services. Some States indicated that they
intended to continue the present practice of having the national carrier or in
some cases the airport operator, provide ground handling. There was some
support for using a code of conduct based on reciprocity to resolve unfair
competitive situations arising from the provision of ground services by a
monopoly (ICAO 1994, p. 41).
Qantas argued that under the current bilateral system, Australia was able to
influence the conditions of competition in foreign markets and that:
This is particularly true in breaking down non-tariff barriers in areas such as
access to infrastructure, monopolistic ground handling provisions, and in other so-
called ‘soft rights’ (sub. 25, p. 43).8  ACCESS TO AIRPORTS
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Australian ASAs vary in their treatment of ‘soft rights’ such as ground handling.
Most ASAs are silent on the matter. Some, such as those with the United States
and United Kingdom, allow airlines to perform their own ground handling,
while some specifically restrict this option. For example, the Australia–Hong
Kong ASA stipulates that airlines designated by Australia are not able to
provide their own ground handling services in Hong Kong, but it does not apply
the reciprocal condition that the designated airlines of Hong Kong cannot
perform their own ground handling in Australia.
Despite Qantas’ optimism about the potential of ASAs to achieve competitive
outcomes for airport services such as ground handling, the record to date is not
encouraging. Australia should work with other countries to encourage greater
competition in ground handling services and to that end should seek provision
for competition in ground handling and other airport services in its ASAs.
8.5.2 Promoting competitive services at Australian airports
Access to the services of essential facilities can be an important precursor to
encouraging competition in related markets, and the economically efficient use
of resources. If, for example, ground services are provided by only one firm,
and that firm also operates aircraft, the benefits of competition in air transport
services might be offset by the terms and conditions on which ground services
are supplied. Even where the terms and conditions are non-discriminatory, the
benefits of competition might be captured through high profits accruing to the
monopoly provider of ground services.
The benefits of greater competition among airport service providers include
lower cost and higher quality services to airlines and their passengers, and
improved international competitiveness of Australian airports. This will enhance
Australia as a tourist destination and a place for airlines to do business (for
example, as a place to undertake aircraft maintenance).
Many countries have no provision for mandatory access to the services of
essential facilities at airports. In contrast, in Australia there are two ways in
which airport services may be declared for the purpose of providing access for
third parties. A general industry regime is set out in Part IIIA of the Trade
Practices Act 19743, and an industry specific regime is set out in Section 192 of
                                            
3  Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act provides a general access regime under which third
parties can seek access to the services of essential facilities. These parties must apply to the
National Competition Council (NCC) for a service to be declared, and the NCC must make
recommendations to the relevant Minister. The Minister may subsequently declare the
service or not declare the service. One reason for not declaring a service would be if an
effective regime was already in place or the owner had given an undertaking, acceptable toINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES    
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the Airports Act 1996. In addition to access regulation, provision exists in the
Prices Surveillance Act 1983 for price monitoring and surveillance.
While the intent of these regulatory regimes is to encourage competition and
economic efficiency, it was apparent to the Commission that considerable
confusion exists among airport users and service providers over their
application and consistency. This has been heightened by the possibility that
both airport access regimes may apply to the same airport. Currently the
Airports Act regime applies to the three major privatised airports — Melbourne,
Perth and Brisbane — but there is provision for the Minister for Transport and
Regional Development to extend its coverage to other airports including
Sydney. The Part IIIA regime for declaration applies potentially to all airports
and airport services, as it does for industry generally.
The first, and to date only, access declaration concerning airport services in
Australia was made under the Part IIIA provisions (Australian Cargo Terminal
Operators (NCC 1997)). The declaration covered certain services at Melbourne
and Sydney airports. The Melbourne declaration expired at the end of June
1998, at which time it was intended that airport services would be declared
under the Airports Act. The Sydney declaration still stands.
Where the two regimes differ is in the routes they take to declaring the services
of essential facilities. They are the same from that point on. These two paths
however have created considerable concern over the potential coverage of
airport services. This has been aggravated by the use of different selection
criteria4, and different regulators.
Not only are the criteria for declaration under the two Acts slightly different,
but the processes and personnel are as well. The Trade Practices Act declaration
                                                                                                                                 
the ACCC, to provide access on stated conditions. If it is declared, the third party and the
owner of the essential facility must enter into negotiations. This is backed by avenues for
arbitration and appeal.
4  The ACCC may decide if a service is declared on the basis of whether or not it is necessary
for the purposes of operating and/or maintaining civil aviation services at the airport, and is
provided by means of significant facilities at the airport, being facilities that cannot be
economically duplicated (Airports Act, sub section 192(5)). Part IIIA uses more exhaustive
criteria, and potentially applies to a narrower set of services. The important exception to this
is that Part IIIA will apply if it is ‘uneconomical ... to develop another facility’, which is a
potentially weaker test than the Airports Act test of economic duplication. However, in other
respects the Airports Act uses other much weaker tests. For example, it contains no
requirement that access promote competition in related markets, and while the facility must
be uneconomic to duplicate, it need not be nationally significant. In addition, recent
amendments to the Airports Act (subsections 192(4A) to 192(4D)) appear to give the ACCC
even more discretion in deciding which airport services should be covered by Section 192(2).8  ACCESS TO AIRPORTS
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process is triggered when a business applies to the National Competition
Council (NCC) seeking a declaration recommendation for a service. The NCC
is required to assess declaration applications and make a recommendation to the
Treasurer who must then publish reasons for any subsequent decision.
The Airports Act, on the other hand, requires first that the Minister for
Transport and Regional Development determine which airports are to be
subjected to the declaration process, and second that the ACCC decide which
services should be declared. The ACCC is not required to publish the reasons
for its decision. The NCC is not involved.
The Airports Act also stipulates that the three main privatised airports would all
be ‘declared’ airports if adequate undertakings were not in place 12 months
after their sale. Undertakings were either not given or not accepted, so the
Minister for Transport and Regional Development ‘declared’ all three airports
in July 1998. However, there has been no specific indication subsequently from
the ACCC of which services might be declared. By effectively declaring an
airport and its services without defining those services, the Airports Act process
makes a presumption in favour of declaration.
The use of different criteria and processes raises the prospect that non-essential
facilities will be declared, increases uncertainty about expected returns and
deters investment in airport facilities. This could be detrimental to competition
and economic efficiency in the airport sector.
Furthermore, mandatory access may not always be the right regulatory
instrument to apply to airport services. There are good reasons for being
concerned about the supply of airport services by organisations operating
essential facilities which are vertically integrated into other upstream or
downstream markets. But where airport operators act as landlords they have no
incentive to turn away customers. Airport operators would have an incentive to
encourage more, rather than fewer, service providers to locate on the airport, to
increase their rental income and provide better services to their airline
customers. In such circumstances the concern is not about whether the airport
operators will provide access — it is in their commercial interest to do so. If
market power is of concern, the Prices Surveillance Act could be a more
appropriate regulatory instrument.
Overall, the Airports Act access provisions are not consistent with the principles
in the Trade Practices Act, and are potentially highly interventionist.
Furthermore, they overlap to some extent with the prices surveillance regime
which imposes regulatory controls on charges for ‘aeronautical services’, but
not on charges for other services. While access regimes may be necessary, the
burden imposed by such regimes requires that their application be kept to aINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES    
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minimum. The Commission considers that the Airports Act declaration
provisions should be reviewed.
8.6 Conclusions
Improving the efficiency and competitiveness of airports is central to realising
the full benefits of liberalising international air services. Greater demand for
airport services will increase congestion at major Australian airports. Making
the best use of the available infrastructure, and providing appropriate signals for
new investment are vital to maintaining an efficient and healthy aviation
industry in Australia.
Ensuring competitive access to, and efficient pricing of, airport infrastructure is
required. Consideration needs to be given to the benefits and costs of peak load
pricing and developing a market for airport slots as means of managing demand
for airport services where congestion occurs. The Government has already
foreshadowed a review of price regulation to be completed by 30 June 2002.
The Commission considers that this review should be widened to take into
account the issues concerning airport access and pricing raised in this inquiry.
As these considerations go well beyond the ambit of the ACCC, the proposed
inquiry should be conducted by an independent body, follow transparent
processes and be open to public participation. Such an inquiry could also be
undertaken in conjunction with the legislative review of the Airports Act. A
specific date has not been set for this review but given the importance of the
issues involved it should occur sooner rather than later. A review in 2001 would
be appropriate.
Recommendation 8.1
The Commonwealth Government should commission an inquiry into airport
capacity, access and pricing in 2001. Such an inquiry should, at a
minimum, examine:
·  constraints that airports are imposing on Australia’s air services;
·  peak load pricing;
·  regulation of aeronautical charges;
·  the potential for the introduction of a market for slots; and
·  legislated access provisions.8  ACCESS TO AIRPORTS
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9 CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS FURTHER
LIBERALISATION
The constraints on competition and trade in the bilateral regulation of
international air services have significant, largely adverse, effects on airlines,
users and the economy. The introduction of greater competition has led to
substantial economic welfare gains, not just in Australia, but also overseas. On
balance, liberalisation of trade and investment in international air services is
likely to bring substantial benefits to consumers, tourism and other industries
reliant on international aviation as well as efficient airlines.
The Government has asked the Commission in this inquiry to develop and
assess options for greater liberalisation both within and outside the bilateral
system. This chapter sets outs the major options considered and
recommendations proposed by the Commission for further liberalisation of
Australia’s ASAs. Recommendations relating to departmental processes, the
IASC and airports are contained in Chapters 5, 7 and 8, respectively.
9.1 The liberalisation agenda
Looking increasingly antiquated, the bilateral system is coming under intense
pressure. These pressures include:
·  strong growth in air services globally and in Australia;
·  deregulation of many domestic air services;
·  growing consumer and business demands for better, seamless air services;
·  the use of codesharing, charters and alliances to overcome constraints
inherent in the bilateral structure;
·  US driven bilateral ‘open skies’ policy;
·  low profits of most airlines and growing reluctance of governments to
continue subsidising their airlines;
·  privatisation of airports and airlines;
·  global capital markets and the pressure they apply to both publicly and
privately owned airlines to perform; and
·  emergence of a number of regional or plurilateral agreements, particularly
developments in the European Union.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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In addition, world trade in most other goods and services is increasingly being
liberalised in a multilateral framework. This is producing demonstrable gains to
economic welfare, and making it difficult to justify a different system for
international air services. The APEC commitment to achieve free and open
trade and investment for industrialised economies by 2010, and for developing
economies by 2020, may also have important implications for regulating
international air services. Removing restrictions on trade and investment
conflicts with existing ownership and effective control restrictions which lie at
the heart of the bilateral system of national designation.
Despite these pressures, the bilateral system has proven to be quite resilient.
While this report has focused mainly on economic issues, the bilateral system
also incorporates technical regulation relating to international aviation
procedures, safety and security. The bilateral system can accommodate more
liberal economic regulatory arrangements. Liberalisation of such constraints
does not imply relaxation of technical and safety regulation of international air
services.
Although Australia has been liberalising its ASAs, the process inherently takes
time and is piecemeal. Pressure will continue to mount from the global push for
more liberal aviation agreements. Spurred by the United States, bilateral,
reciprocal, ‘open skies’ agreements are spreading. If Australia does not move
rapidly, the rest of the world could liberalise around it. Australia would be
disadvantaged if air transport services between other countries become more
efficient relative to air transport to and from Australia. And Australian carriers
would be disadvantaged in their pursuit of new and larger international markets
if other markets liberalised ahead of ours.
Further liberalisation of Australia’s international air services sector could
include unilateral, bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral approaches.1
Before considering options, it is important to clarify the objectives of
international air services regulation. The main economic objective for Australia
is to develop the full potential of trade in international air services to enhance
Australian economic welfare by:
                                            
1 There would appear to be no particular problems in establishing a plurilateral or multilateral
agreement which is consistent with the Chicago Convention. Market access is governed by
several Articles in the Chicago Convention the most important being Article 6, which
requires: “... special permission or other authorization” of a contracting state in order for a
scheduled international air service to operate into that State. But ICAO has noted that: “...
the Article does not specify the process by which that permission or its terms may be given:
permission could be exchanged bilaterally or multilaterally or even granted unilaterally”
(ICAO 1994, p. 2).9  CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS FURTHER LIBERALISATION
209
·  enabling access to an efficient, internationally competitive airline industry;
·  promoting the interests of Australian consumers and other users of
international air services; and
·  improving the efficiency with which resources are used in other parts of
the aviation industry, such as airports and government administration.
In addition, there may be equity and regional objectives that can be achieved
through greater access to international air services at lower prices.
9.2 International production and trade in air services
The main differences between regulation of international trade in air services
and trade in most other goods and services (Chapter 3) include:
·  bilateral aviation-specific (rather than multilateral multi-product)
agreements govern most aviation relations;
·  trade is prohibited unless various ‘freedoms of the air’ are invoked under
specified conditions in bilateral ASAs; and
·  most aspects of trade in air services do not come under the rules of the
World Trade Organization (WTO); far from treating bilateral treaties as
exceptions to the general WTO rule of non-discrimination, bilateral
arrangements are the essence of the rules of international aviation.
As a result, there are significant differences between production and trade in
international air services compared with production and trade in most other
goods and services. It is necessary to recognise these differences when
examining options for further liberalisation.
9.2.1 Nature of production and trade in international air services
Each city origin and destination pair for air services can be considered a
separate ‘product’ with limited substitution possibilities with other city pairs.
These products are geographically differentiated and not homogeneous. Further,
the characteristics of production in the airline industry (Chapter 6) mean that
few routes are likely to be served by a large number of airlines, even in the
absence of formal restrictions contained in the bilateral system. Small group
oligopolies, duopolies or even monopolies are likely to predominate
(particularly on Australia’s long thin routes) and the costs of entry can be
significant.
One country alone cannot produce international air services. An international
flight requires inputs from both the origin and destination countries in the formINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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of infrastructure and rights to exercise various freedoms of the air (such as
rights to embark and disembark passengers and freight, and to take-off and
land). This means that at least two countries must agree to produce an
international air service. Governments exercising control over their own
airspace are able to specify conditions under which production may occur. This
is in contrast with goods and most other services markets whereby a country is
generally free to produce whatever it likes on a unilateral basis.
For most countries, the production of particular goods and services is small
relative to worldwide output. Producers assume they will be able to export
freely if they can produce at or below the world price. However, whether it is
possible to export what they produce will depend on the trade policies of other
countries.
Freedom to produce and trade does not apply in international aviation. Given
the bilateral nature of production of any particular international flight, each
origin and destination country has power to veto production. Without
agreement, one country’s airline cannot produce international services even for
the country’s own citizens, regardless of its relative efficiency.
International air services do not necessarily involve an export or import. If the
airline and its passengers are all residents of the same country, in economic
terms, the flight can be considered to be an internal domestic activity rather than
an international trade. That is, the flight is more like a temporary extension of
the nation’s boundary. An export of the service only occurs if an airline carries
passengers or freight from another country, while an import only occurs if a
resident of one country uses another country’s airline. The international trade
context is not apparent from the flight itself.
Thus, Australia exports air services when foreigners fly Qantas or Ansett. But
Australians flying Australian airlines internationally are not involved in
international trade at all. Any particular Qantas or Ansett flight to or from
Australia is likely to produce both non-traded and export services, while the
carriage of Australian passengers on a Singapore Airlines flight on the same
route is an import of air services by Australians.
The bilateral relationships which have evolved for international air services,
mean that each bilateral partner has considerable bargaining power. Each
country can determine the size of the total supply to the bilateral market, not
just its own level of output. Such market power is equivalent to the ‘terms of
trade’ effect in international goods trade. Australia rarely possesses enough
influence in world trade to enjoy bargaining power of such magnitude (wool
and abalone are notable exceptions).9  CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS FURTHER LIBERALISATION
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Several participants in the inquiry emphasised the significance of Australia’s
bargaining power. Qantas argued that:
... the net effect on Australian welfare from the bilateral system is likely to be
positive... [because it] allows Australia to maximise its leverage in the pursuit of
national objectives on a case by case basis (sub. 25, pp. 62, 64).
This view was shared by Ansett International:
... the current approach to negotiation of aviation rights ... [goes] close to
maximising the benefits to Australia under the current bilateral system (sub. 19, p.
54).
However, the international air services bilateral framework also supports many
regulatory constraints on the efficient production of, and trade in, international
air services that are essentially protective and anticompetitive. These constraints
arise from the bargaining power of the bilateral partners, rather than the nature
of production of international air services itself.
There are other services which also cannot be produced without cooperation
between at least two countries, such as international telecommunications and
postal services. Multilateral free trade agreements have been concluded for both
of these services, with significant benefits. Thus, the nature of the product does
not imply that international agreements need be bilateral, nor that they should
be of a highly constraining nature.
9.2.2 Assistance to airlines through the bilateral system
The bargaining power inherent in the bilateral system has allowed individual
countries to pursue aviation policies that protect their carriers from international
competition. The result is that airlines of varying levels of efficiency are able to
compete on the same routes, sustained by anticompetitive constraints in the
ASAs and/or subsidies.
These assistance arrangements can be contrasted with assistance measures used
in international trade in goods. For example, under the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS), the non-discriminatory most favoured nation (MFN)
principle means that tariffs applied by WTO members are relatively transparent
and generally apply uniformly to imports from all other WTO members. In
contrast, the assistance provided through the bilateral system is extremely
complex and opaque. It varies between every pair of countries, and in some
cases the details are confidential.
The Commission would have liked to measure the assistance provided to
Australian airlines by Australia’s ASAs during this inquiry. However, the lackINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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of reliable data and the complexities of the system meant that this was not
practical.
From a global perspective, many of the constraints in ASAs do provide
assistance to airlines. These devices have been quite effective — relatively few
international airlines have gone out of business in the past fifty years. The most
efficient airlines do not tend to drive out less efficient operators.
Without barriers to trade in international air services, airlines would need to
compete on the basis of their efficiency relative to other carriers competing in
the same markets — just as producers compete in other product markets.
Consumers and other users of air services would benefit if more efficient
carriers entered the market and enhanced competition. Australian airlines would
also benefit from free trade in international air services if they were efficient
enough to expand into markets for which access has been restricted.
Australian airlines appear to be quite efficient by most world benchmarks
(Chapters 2 and 6). Over the last few years, Australian airlines have been
overhauling their operations to enhance efficiency and overcome the high cost
legacy of past regulation and government ownership. There is scope for further
efficiency improvements, especially if artificial regulatory constraints on their
operations are relaxed.
9.3 Ownership and control in the designation of airlines
Of all the bilateral system’s constraints on efficiency and competition, probably
the most fundamental and thereby, intractable problem, is the requirement that
national flag carriers be locally owned and controlled.
9.3.1 The problem
Restrictions on ownership and control in national designation of airlines lie at
the heart of the constraints on competition in the bilateral system. They provide
a foundation for both the current system wherein nearly every country has its
own international airline, and an array of protective measures that support it.
Such restrictions on corporate structure and investment increase the costs to
airlines (Chapter 6). Airlines are now finding ways of overcoming some of these
restrictions, for example by forming alliances or establishing contorted
ownership arrangements.
The justification for these restrictions is that each country should exercise its
entitlements under the bilateral system through its own flag carrier(s). However,9  CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS FURTHER LIBERALISATION
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this reduces the ability for economies to specialise in the production of those
goods and services in which they are relatively efficient and have a comparative
advantage.2 Local ownership and control is not a necessary condition for the
bilateral system to function. It is national designation, rather than ownership and
control, that is necessary.
Some form of designation will always be required to ensure that governments
can effectively regulate safety and other technical aspects of aviation. Currently,
designation is also required in order to assign rights to airlines because they are
not negotiated on a non-discriminatory basis and countries have different sets of
rights.
Ownership and control provisions have been subject to much debate in recent
years. At the 1994 World Wide Air Transport Conference, the ICAO Secretariat
proposed that the rules for designation be liberalised (Chapter 4). ICAO
members indicated broad support for applying the ownership and effective
control test at a regional level, for example, as Norway, Sweden and Denmark
have designated Scandinavian Airline Systems. They also expressed in principle
support for airlines being able to broaden their potential sources of investment
by increasing limits on foreign investment in national carriers. However, they
did not widely support the option of basing designation on ‘headquarters,
central administration or principal place of business’(ICAO 1994).
The lack of agreement among ICAO members resulted in no change to
designation arrangements. In part, this highlights the difficulties of achieving
change in multilateral fora such as ICAO. Many ICAO members were not
convinced of the benefits of a more competitive framework for international
aviation that reduced protection for their own national airlines. One of the major
concerns was that relaxation of ownership rules might lead to unacceptable
market access by third country carriers. This argument goes to the centre of the
ownership debate — it is about protecting national airlines from competition
and preventing the development of more efficient airlines that could, in a more
liberalised market, be designated by a number of countries. Fear of the
anticompetitive effects of the growth of ‘mega-carriers’, principally US carriers,
was also apparent.
                                            
2 Restrictions on foreign ownership would also appear to be inconsistent with the APEC
commitment to free and open trade and investment among developed country members by
2010 (and among developing members by 2020).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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9.3.2 Ownership and airline safety
The 1994 World Wide Air Transport Conference also highlighted concerns that
liberalisation of the ownership criteria could compromise airline safety,
particularly through flags of convenience (ICAO 1994).
These concerns largely reflect confusion between the concepts of ownership
and designation. Ownership is not a necessary condition for designation,
accountability or technical and safety regulation. However, designation is
important for technical and safety regulatory purposes because countries are
accountable for maintaining the safety standards of their designated carriers.
These non-economic regulatory functions of designation would remain even if
international air services were available on a non-discriminatory MFN basis.
Some system of accountability between airlines and government regulators
would continue to be required.
When there are clear lines of accountability between airlines and the countries
designating them, it should not matter where they are owned, any more than in
other industries. For example, national governments take responsibility for
regulating the safety of pharmaceuticals through recognition of other countries’
certification processes as well as through their own — they do not need to own
all pharmaceutical production and testing facilities in order to regulate safety.
Indeed, in some situations, it might even be easier to enforce safety standards on
airlines when the owners are foreigners. If a country is lax about enforcing
universal, compulsory safety standards, ownership requirements for designation
will not ensure that an airline is safe.
The Commission endorses the need for compulsory universal safety standards
which individual countries or airlines can choose to exceed if they wish.
However, national ownership is not required for the regulation of safety, as long
as a rigorous form of designation is applied and safety regulations are
effectively enforced by the designating country. The best way to prevent poor
safety standards and the development of flags of convenience is to develop
more rigorous safety accreditation procedures, and not to rely simply on mutual
recognition of all ICAO members’ standards.
9.3.3 Options for reform of designation
Although reform of ownership and control requirements for designation are
critical for liberalisation of the bilateral system, options are limited because the
provisions are actively monitored and enforced by various countries. Because
designated airlines must be recognised by bilateral partners, it is risky for any
individual country to change the criteria for designation of its airlines9  CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS FURTHER LIBERALISATION
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unilaterally. The United States showed that it was prepared to exercise its
‘muscle’ when it denied Aerolineas Argentinas status as an Argentinian carrier
once it was no longer majority Argentinian-owned. This particular dispute was
resolved at the price of concessions to the United States. It highlights the risks
to countries from unilaterally changing designation criteria.
Multilateral and bilateral options
The current ownership and control requirements are inhibiting the development
of a prosperous and sustainable international airline industry. Global capital
markets are requiring higher performance standards from airlines and nations.
There are simply too many poorly performing international airlines that are
burdening national economies. Conversely, efficient airlines are denied the
opportunity to develop to their full potential. If a country could designate an
airline domiciled elsewhere, then it could improve its air services and free up
scarce capital and technical resources for other, more productive uses.
Australia, with its relatively efficient airline industry, is likely to benefit from
international measures to relax the ownership and control requirements for
national designation. Australian airlines could become designated carriers for
other countries in the region whose economies are not well suited to capital
intensive, high technology industries like the modern international airline
industry. Australian airlines would also benefit from wider opportunities to
obtain capital on world markets.
The Commission considers that designation should be based on a less restrictive
test that does not require ownership, and possibly even effective control, by
nationals. Options for reform include basing designation on place of
incorporation, principal place of business or other evidence of commitment to
providing air services for the country. Ownership could be removed as a
criterion for designation; regulation of foreign investment could be aligned with
that for other industries.
Some governments already use other criteria for designation, reflecting
individual circumstances. Some of Australia’s ASAs apply different designation
criteria. For example, Australia’s ASA with Hong Kong requires that each
party’s designated airlines be incorporated and have their principal place of
business in their home economy. This is a common feature of Hong Kong’s
ASAs, aimed at overcoming the nationality problem associated with Hong
Kong’s political status.
New Zealand has relaxed the foreign ownership requirement in its more recent
bilateral agreements, opting for the less restrictive ‘effective control’
requirement. Air New Zealand noted that:INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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For the time being, airlines that complied only with these liberalised criteria would
be unable to exercise traffic rights under bilateral agreements containing traditional
ownership requirements. However, the intention of New Zealand and the bilateral
partners with which it has negotiated these arrangements is to establish precedents
that might increasingly be followed (sub. 6, p. 9).
As the Asian financial crisis has focused attention on the need for capital to be
used more efficiently in the airline industry, it may be opportune to try again to
achieve multilateral agreement to liberalisation of the ownership and control
requirements for national designation.
The Australian Government could join with other like-minded governments in a
push for reconsideration by the members of ICAO of the 1994 proposals for
liberalisation of the ownership and control criteria for national designation.
However, multilateral action is unlikely to be swift. It might be useful also to
pursue this initiative within APEC whose members account for a substantial
proportion of world aviation or as part of a plurilateral option (see below). In
the meantime, Australia should negotiate with its bilateral partners to
incorporate in its own ASAs a more liberal means of designating airlines which
does not rely on ownership restrictions.
Recommendation 9.1
The Australian Government should join with other like-minded
governments to have the ICAO Secretariat’s 1994 proposals to liberalise
ownership and control requirements for national designation reconsidered
for adoption on a plurilateral or multilateral basis.
In the meantime, Australia’s own ASAs should be negotiated to incorporate
a more liberal means of designating airlines which does not rely on
ownership restrictions.
Regional options
Another option to liberalise ownership and control criteria for national
designation would be for Australia to invite neighbouring countries to develop a
regional approach. Each country would still negotiate its own ASAs, but the
airlines could be owned by citizens of any country in the group. While this
would require changes to existing bilateral agreements, it should be possible to
gain ICAO recognition of such a regional arrangement.
An Australia–New Zealand regional agreement might be the place to start. The
trans-Tasman Single Aviation Market already has liberalised the ownership
provisions for designation to develop the concept of a SAM airline. A SAM9  CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS FURTHER LIBERALISATION
217
airline must be majority-owned by citizens of either Australia or New Zealand.
This concept could be extended to allow such Australasian carriers to fly under
both Australia’s and New Zealand’s ASAs with third countries. Another option
could be to develop a common aviation market between the two countries. The
differences in approach which now exist between Australia and New Zealand
could be an obstacle to greater integration (Chapter 4). However, if the
recommendations outlined in this report are adopted, the policies of the two
countries should become more closely aligned.
Alternatively, or in addition, the Australian Government could invite other
governments in the region to participate in a regional arrangement. Australia
already enjoys close aviation relationships with Papua New Guinea and the
island nations of the South Pacific. Freeing up the ownership and control
requirements for national designation could allow some rationalisation of
airlines, releasing scarce capital resources within the South Pacific Forum
countries. Airlines would be able to specialise more, with some becoming
regional feeder airlines for the longer range international carriers. This would
enable better use of aircraft; airline efficiency and standards of service could
improve. Australian airlines could gain greater access to markets and better
networking opportunities.
These are very much second-best options relative to liberal multilateral reform.
However, if liberalisation could be achieved quickly within the group, it could
be beneficial for members and their airlines. As well as gaining access to a
greater capital market, some airlines could simplify their corporate structures.
Recommendation 9.2
The Australian Government should invite neighbouring countries to
develop, and seek ICAO recognition for, a regional arrangement which
would enable relaxation of ownership and control criteria. Countries to be




Australia’s has undertaken most of its trade liberalisation on a unilateral basis.
There are a number of good reasons for this:
·  the trade barriers themselves were imposed unilaterally by Australia;
·  the barriers may have benefited some producers, but the costs to
consumers, users and the rest of the economy were quite high;
·  bilateral deals on a reciprocal basis are precluded generally in areas of
trade covered by the WTO, apart from customs unions and free trade
areas; and
·  Australia is a small country in international trade in most goods, so its
bargaining power has been relatively weak in most multilateral trade
negotiations.
These factors have meant that Australia was unlikely to be able to negotiate
better arrangements by waiting for multilateral negotiations to conclude, but
would continue to bear the self-imposed costs for the duration of the
negotiations. In these circumstances, it has been clearly in Australia’s interests
to liberalise unilaterally. Would it be equally advantageous for Australia to
pursue unilateral liberalisation of international air services while the bilateral
system remained?
9.4.1 The unilateral ‘open skies’ option
One option would be to grant unilaterally to other countries unlimited rights to
supply international air services into and out of Australia, without requiring any
extra rights for Australia in return.
This option would mean that Australia would cease to negotiate updated or new
bilateral agreements and would rely on the rights currently available for
Australian carriers. Without expecting any reciprocal action by other countries,
Australia would open its skies to foreign carriers, unilaterally removing all
constraints on traffic and access rights.
Box 9.1 Participants’ comments on unilateral ‘open skies’
‘Unilateral deregulation of international air services agreements would not see additional
carriers enter routes and lower fares or substantial new services added. On the contrary, it
would remove the one tool at Australia’s disposal for promoting competition in non-price
components in many foreign destinations where effective competition policy is deficient. It
would also remove the best tool at Australia’s disposal for gaining greater access to the
international network’ (Qantas, sub. 25, p. i).9  CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS FURTHER LIBERALISATION
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‘Unilateral deregulation is unlikely to deliver benefits to Australian consumers but could
result in losses for Australian provided airline services, jobs and profits. Unilateral
deregulation simply passes Australia’s leverage to its bilateral partners. The net result is
an overall loss of welfare’ (Qantas, sub. 25, p. ix).
‘... if Australia unilaterally opened its skies without regard to what other countries were
doing ... [we would see that] as a very significant detriment to Australian airlines. We
believe that there would be no leverage at all for countries to which we don’t have access
at the moment or sufficient access to change and therefore all the growth would be
available to foreign carriers and none to Australian carriers’
(Ansett, transcript, pp. 188-9).
‘Occasionally some commentators advocate a policy of opening Australia’s skies on a
unilateral basis, ie. without regard to the policies of our bilateral partners. Ansett considers
such a policy would be quite detrimental to Australia’s interests. It would not enable us, in
negotiating a bilateral agreement, to take into account on a case by case basis, the balance
of benefits to Australia as set out in the sub-section above. It is a totally inflexible policy
that does not enable Australia to respond appropriately to changing circumstances. It could
mean for example, that Australian carriers would gain no capacity increases in currently
restricted markets with all future growth available only to foreign airlines. Further, it
would provide Australia with no leverage to enter new and emerging markets such as
South America and Eastern Europe on fair and just terms’ (Ansett, sub. 19, p. 62).
‘The unilateral granting of rights to foreign airlines without securing comparable rights
would seriously disadvantage Australian carriers, undermining their ability to compete.
Given the commitment and priority accorded by home-based airlines to their home market
... the result would be seriously detrimental to the national interest’ (Air New Zealand,
sub. 6, p. 11).
For the purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that no other country
reciprocates. The only international rights that would not become frozen in time
would be those with the United States (where capacity adjustment is built into
the ASA) and New Zealand (where the Single Aviation Market applies).
However, fifth freedom traffic is constrained with New Zealand, so it is likely
that Australia’s fifth freedom traffic ex-New Zealand would continue to be
limited to the equivalent of 12 Boeing 747 flights per week, while New Zealand
carriers would not be limited in exercising fifth freedom rights ex-Australia.
Would such an arrangement improve efficiency in resource allocation in
Australia and provide Australia with more efficient international air services?
Would consumers and other users have a greater range and quality of services at
lower prices?INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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9.4.2 Effects on airlines
In the absence of the bilateral structure, if all countries adopted unilateral ‘open
skies’ approaches, the structure of the global airline industry would change
radically. Efficient carriers would displace inefficient carriers. In such an
environment, Australian airlines would expand or contract depending on their
relative efficiency against competing carriers. Users of air services would
benefit from more competitive fares.
Unilateral ‘open skies’ within the bilateral structure would not produce the same
outcomes. By allowing a bilateral partner to have unconstrained access, the
airlines of that country stand to gain an increasing share of traffic to, from and
possibly within Australia. However, Australian carriers would not necessarily
be able to expand their services elsewhere. This would mean that the rights for
Australia’s airlines could be frozen in time, for as long as the bilateral system
remained entrenched.
For as long as the bilateral system is accepted and entrenched in the rest of the
world, Australian airlines are likely to be severely disadvantaged by a policy of
unilateral ‘open skies’. They would be unlikely to share in market growth with
increased capacity and frequency (except in the United States and New
Zealand). Further, they would not be able to expand their networks to include
new destinations.
9.4.3 Consumer effects
Australian users of air services would benefit from a policy of unilateral ‘open
skies’ if it led to a greater quantity and range of services and lower prices, or if
foreign carriers were more efficient than Australian airlines and generated
effective competition.
However, there is no guarantee that these changes would occur while the
bilateral framework continues elsewhere. Without opportunities for growth,
Australian airlines would lose market share over time. Australian airlines would
be denied the market growth which they would otherwise have been able to
contest. Consumers who prefer to use Australian airlines, but are no longer able
to do so, would also bear the costs of having to use less efficient or less
preferred carriers. As a result, both Australian producers and consumers would
incur costs. It would also be difficult for Australia to negotiate any new fifth
freedom rights.
The quantity and range of flights from Australia to foreign destinations would
only increase if the relevant governments permitted this to occur. With the
bilateral framework still in place, Australias’s bilateral partners would continue9  CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS FURTHER LIBERALISATION
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to control capacity and frequency on Australian routes. They would be able to
control entry and curtail competition not only by their own carriers, but third
countries’ carriers as well.
It is possible that, if Australian airlines were no longer an effective competitive
force, airlines from bilateral partner countries would reduce the level of service
and increase prices. Australia could retaliate by retreating from its unilateral
liberalisation, but would be unlikely to regain the conditions it relinquished.
The damage to the Australian airlines could be substantial, for little benefit of
consumers. Alternatively, Australia might be tempted to retaliate in other areas
of trade against an individual country. The scope for such action is limited.
Most of Australia’s trade in goods and services is covered by non-
discriminatory MFN principles under the WTO.
As long as air services are regulated in a bilateral framework, the degree to
which Australia would benefit from a policy of unilateral ‘open skies’ would
depend entirely on how its partners behaved in the new environment. Under
some circumstances Australia could be worse off than it is now, and
opportunities for gain in the future could be forgone.
9.5 Bilateral liberalisation
Australia has been pursuing a policy of gradual liberalisation on a bilateral
basis. Substantial further liberalisation can be achieved.
9.5.1 Strategic sequencing
In any process of bilateral liberalisation, a change in Australia’s arrangements
with one country can have consequences for its arrangements with other
countries. As a result, it is necessary to consider the sequencing of negotiations
strategically.
Sequencing negotiations is particularly important as a means of securing fifth
freedom rights under ASAs. It may be beneficial to secure fifth freedom rights
from country B before seeking agreement to unrestricted fifth freedom rights
with country A. By sequencing negotiations in this way, a country can ensure
that it secures rights which can be used under a subsequently negotiated liberal
policy.
For example, a more liberal agreement between Australia and the United States
which increased fifth freedom rights through Japan would allow US carriers
opportunities to increase their capacity between Japan and Australia. This
would be a consequence of the relatively liberal US–Japan ASA which alreadyINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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provides for unrestricted fifth freedom rights. However, Australia’s ASA with
Japan does not include beyond rights for Australian carriers to operate between
Japan and the United States. Thus, while US carriers would be able to carry
passengers between Japan and Australia, Australian carriers would not have the
same rights between Japan and the United States.
Even without fifth freedom rights for Australian carriers, greater competition on
routes between Japan and Australia as a result of US carriers exercising their
fifth freedom rights would produce benefits for Australia. However, greater
access to fifth freedom rights for Australian carriers would enable them to
compete head to head with other carriers operating between Japan and the
United States. This additional benefit could only be achieved if Australia’s ASA
with Japan was liberalised as well as the ASA with the United States.
Another example of strategic relationships which are of great importance to
Australia are the ASAs with European countries, particularly the United
Kingdom, where fifth freedom rights have been constrained. Liberalisation of
these bilateral relationships would allow Australian carriers more scope to
compete against sixth freedom traffic operating between Australia and Europe
through intermediate points such as Singapore.
While strategic sequencing is advantageous, Australia should not wait
indefinitely for fifth freedom rights if it significantly delays the benefits of
competition that may be derived from liberalisation without them.
9.5.2 Reciprocal ‘open skies’ agreements
One option for the liberalisation of Australia’s air services is to accelerate the
process of liberalisation by negotiating bilateral ‘open skies’ agreements on a
reciprocal basis.
The term ‘open skies’ does not have a precise meaning, but is commonly used
to refer to the US template for the liberalisation of ASAs (Chapter 4). The
United States has now signed 30 bilateral ‘open skies’ agreements which
generally incorporate the removal of restrictions on third, fourth and fifth
freedom traffic, airfare regulation and the number of designated carriers.
Seventh freedom rights are negotiable, but cabotage rights are not, and the limits
on foreign ownership of US carriers are still highly restricted.
The US ‘open skies’ policy is often criticised for not being a very ‘open’ and
liberal policy by virtue of it retaining restrictions on cabotage and ownership
and control. The New Zealand ‘open skies’ policy provides a more liberal
approach to foreign ownership than the United States as well as allowing for the
negotiation of cabotage rights.9  CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS FURTHER LIBERALISATION
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A number of participants, including the Western Australian (sub.  30) and
Queensland (sub. 39) State Governments, and FedEx (sub. 18), supported the
concept of an ‘open skies’ policy for Australia where it was negotiated between
countries on a reciprocal basis. The Western Australian Government stated that:
Western Australia favours an ‘open skies’ policy being negotiated on a country by
country basis, on the proviso that the other country also agrees to open skies for
Australian carriers. ... An open skies policy will give the States and the privatised
airport operators much greater potential to deal direct with the airlines. ... An open
skies policy will permit additional capacity to be put onto a route as demand
dictates and will let market forces prevail and determine the frequencies of services
that an airline will provide (sub. 30, p. 3).
DIST also supported an ‘open skies’ approach under the current bilateral
system:
In our judgment, given that the current bilateral system of air services agreements
is likely to be with us for some time, Australia should place primary emphasis on
liberalisation within this sphere. The submission recommends an increase in the
pace of liberalisation of Australia’s air services and in particular the adoption of
an explicit policy goal of bilateral ‘open skies’. We believe these are pragmatic and
realistic objectives (transcript, p. 87).
FedEx commented on the momentum generated by ‘open skies’ policies:
The true power of global hubs is that once a critical mass of countries are
connected to them, other countries are obliged to join or risk falling behind their
competitors. Gradual bilateral liberalisation provides a strong ‘river’, the pressure
of which will eventually break the ‘dam’ of restraints on ‘open skies’ (sub. 18,
p. 25).
However, DTRD considered that an ‘open skies’ approach could hamper
Australia’s efforts to obtain liberal fifth freedom rights under other ASAs:
It is possible that, across the majority of Australian ASAs, open skies could well
be a barrier to increasing fifth freedom rights. Any third country that does not have
an open skies agreement with an Australian ‘open skies’ partner is hardly likely to
give Australian carriers superior (fifth freedom) access to that market than is
available to its own carriers (sub. 60, p. 23).
Some participants, such as Qantas, were cautious about the potential benefits
for Australia of an ‘open skies’ policy and advocated a case by case approach to
open skies:
Inevitably, under a process of progressive bilateral liberalisation, the point will be
reached on occasions when the next practical step will be to agree to open markets
in all respects — capacity, routings, service options etc. ... However, for this to
occur, it is important that this not be part of an ideologically driven or ‘designer
label’ policy but the result of a case by case examination to ensure that Australia isINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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confident of the benefits to be obtained and has positioned itself in such a way that
full use can be made of the opportunities on offer (sub. 67, p. 3).
The aim of a reciprocal ‘open skies’ policy would be to remove restrictions in
ASAs on competition and trade between the airlines of each of Australia’s
bilateral partners, consistent with technical and safety regulation. Australia
would only agree to remove all of the current restrictions on the ability for
foreign carriers to fly to Australia if the bilateral partner also agreed to the
removal of constraints on Australian carriers.
The Commission considers that the negotiation of reciprocal ‘open skies’
agreements in air services on a bilateral basis would produce significant benefits
for Australia. It would enable airlines to respond quickly to market growth and
to new market opportunities. Consumers would benefit from greater capacity,
expanded network opportunities, and increased competition as carriers take up
opportunities to serve new markets. It would also minimise administrative and
compliance costs for governments and airlines associated with negotiating
incremental changes to ASAs.
Negotiations for reciprocal ‘open skies’ agreements in air services should start
with everything on the table. All rights, including seventh freedom rights and
cabotage, should be available for the negotiators to exchange. A policy of
reciprocal ‘open skies’ would incorporate the removal of restrictions on:
·  ownership as a basis for airline designation (as discussed in Section 9.3);
·  capacity for third, fourth and fifth freedom rights (including multiple
designation of carriers);
·  codesharing on each other’s airlines;
·  routes including points of access to the Australian market, intermediate
and beyond points; and
·  prices.
In addition, a reciprocal ‘open skies’ agreement would incorporate restrictions
on government subsidies to airlines where necessary. It could also potentially
involve the exchange of seventh freedom rights and cabotage on a reciprocal
basis or as a trade-off for other benefits.
Unlimited third and fourth freedom rights
Unrestricted third and fourth freedom rights are important as a means of
encouraging competition between designated carriers in each country. Together
with multiple designation, it also represents an important means of allowing
entry by new carriers.9  CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS FURTHER LIBERALISATION
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Unlimited third and fourth freedom rights allow designated carriers to compete
for market share on a more vigorous basis. By negotiating capacity in more or
less equal proportions between bilateral partners, the current agreements can
restrict the ability of carriers in one country to take market share away from
carriers in the other country. The result is that high cost carriers can be
protected from lower cost bilateral partner’s carriers. However, there is a limit
to the protection that can be offered by restricting capacity because of the
availability of a number of alternative routes for travel between countries, even
though they may be indirect.
Binding constraints on third and fourth freedom capacity between two countries
can have the paradoxical effect of weakening the competitive position of the
two countries’ carriers in the marketplace in favour of third country carriers.
This may occur where capacity limits under ASAs fail to keep pace with market
growth. As a result, partner countries’ airlines may be unable to expand their
services in response to market growth opportunities, and it may be taken up by
fifth or sixth freedom carriers instead. Constraints under the Australia–Italy
ASA have been associated with third country carriers achieving a relatively high
share of the Australia–Italy travel markets (Table  5.1). Removal of capacity
constraints could enhance the competitive position of the bilateral partners
against third countries.
Fifth and seventh freedoms
Fifth freedom rights are a crucial part of the reciprocal ‘open skies’ package.
They allow carriers to develop new travel products, build efficient networks,
and enhance competition from third country carriers.
Expansion of Australia’s fifth freedom rights has been a major goal in DTRD’s
negotiations of bilateral agreements in recent years. Nevertheless, they are still
restricted in terms of destinations and capacity. In many cases, intermediate
fifth freedom rights are not matched by rights at the destination in a third
country. Where fifth freedoms do exist, quantitative limits often apply.
Operational constraints such as break of gauge restrictions may also limit an
airline’s ability to switch from a smaller plane to a larger one to carry additional
passengers beyond the intermediate point.
Seventh freedom rights allow airlines to provide ‘stand alone’ flights between
two countries without the flight originating or terminating in the airline’s home
country. Both fifth and seventh freedom rights are difficult to achieve within the
bilateral framework because they require agreement from third countries. As a
result, strategic sequencing of negotiations often plays a significant role in
achieving these rights. Seventh freedoms are relatively rare, althoughINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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recognition of their importance for hubbing and building efficient airline
networks is now leading to their inclusion in some agreements.
Route and city designation and other operational constraints
DTRD has been negotiating the progressive removal of city designation from
bilateral agreements. However, route and city designation restrictions are still
common (Appendix E). Australia’s reciprocal ‘open skies’ template should seek
to remove city designation or route restrictions — they would be inconsistent
with removal of capacity and fifth freedom constraints.
Removal of such constraints would allow airlines to develop more innovative
travel products and respond quickly to changes in market circumstances. For
example, if there were no route restrictions in the Australia–US ASA,
Australian airlines might have been able to offer flights from Australia to the
United States via Manila if they saw an opportunity following the recent
cessation of Philippine Airlines’ international services (Box 5.3).
In addition to the removal of restrictions on routes and city designation, a
reciprocal ‘open skies’ template should contain no restrictions on the types of
aircraft which can be used, or on ‘changes of gauge’. Such restrictions prevent
the efficient development of networks and impose unnecessary costs on airlines.
Price regulation
Most ASAs contain a mechanism for the aviation authorities of each country to
regulate or approve airfares. Of Australia’s 51 ASAs, 34 have relatively
intrusive double approval mechanisms (whereby tariffs must be filed with, and
approved by, aviation authorities in both countries), 15 have a double
disapproval mechanism (that is, no specific approval is required, but the
aviation authorities of both countries reserve the right to disapprove tariffs) and
Australia’s ASA with the United States has a country of origin rule (that is,
approval by the aviation authority of the country of origin of the flight is
required). Only in Australia’s ASA with New Zealand is there no price
regulation at all.
DTRD stated that:
Australia’s policy position is that tariff setting should be for the airlines’
commercial judgment and not government regulation, up until the point where the
competition authorities detect anticompetitive intent where it becomes a matter for
the ACCC (sub. 33, p. 16).
The Commission agrees. The reciprocal ‘open skies’ template should remove
the need for regulatory approval of fares.9  CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS FURTHER LIBERALISATION
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Cabotage
Traditionally, cabotage has been closely guarded by countries as a means of
protecting their air space and safeguarding their national boundaries. Cabotage
is not a part of the US ‘open skies’ model, although New Zealand has been
prepared to put it on the table for its ‘open skies’ negotiations with other
countries and recently has granted such rights to Brunei. Should Australia
include it as part of its reciprocal ‘open skies’ offerings, and what difference
would it make?
Allowing foreign carriers some cabotage rights could increase competition and
stimulate improvements in efficiency in the Australian domestic aviation
industry (Chapter 6). ‘Consecutive’ passenger cabotage (domestic carriage on a
domestic leg of a foreign airline’s international flight) could provide marginally
costed seats to passengers on long haul routes (for example, Perth–Sydney) who
were prepared to pass through immigration control and fly on relatively
infrequent services often at inconvenient times. Consumers would gain from
any reductions in fares on these relatively expensive routes. Freight users would
also benefit from a greater availability and choice of flights.
However, it is unlikely that such services would lead to substantial efficiency
gains in Australian resource allocation, as the Australian airline industry is
relatively efficient and internationally competitive. Foreign airlines are unlikely
to attract higher yielding business and full economy passengers from the
domestic airlines on such flights. In such circumstances, the costs of granting
consecutive cabotage rights would not be substantial, and there could be some
small consumer welfare gains. But would foreign airlines be attracted to low
yielding passengers at little more than marginal cost? And what would their
governments be prepared to give Australia in return for such cabotage rights?
‘Stand-alone’ cabotage, whereby a foreign airline would be able to establish a
domestic network within Australia, has greater potential to increase competition
in the Australian domestic market. This could lead not only to benefits to
consumers and users of domestic air services as a result of lower air fares but
also to efficiency gains for the entire airline industry.
These considerations lead the Commission to the view that cabotage should not
be specifically excluded from Australia’s reciprocal ‘open skies’ negotiating
package, but should be considered on a case by case basis.
9.5.3 Implementation of a reciprocal ‘open skies’ policy
Since reciprocal ‘open skies’ agreements can be implemented only with the
agreement of other countries, the policy could begin with an explicit declarationINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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of intent. This would state Australia’s willingness to put all rights on the
negotiating table, subject to constraints on subsidies where these are significant.
The aim would be to achieve reciprocal ‘open skies’ agreements on a bilateral
basis with other countries which provide for unrestricted market opportunities
between the territories of the two partner countries.
Reciprocal ‘open skies’ agreements would ideally follow a ‘negative listing’
approach. This would allow carriers from each country to conduct air services
without restriction except for items which were specifically listed as not being
allowed. Any restrictions under the agreement would be negotiated exceptions.
The negative listing approach differs from the current approach to negotiating
air services which starts from the position of absolute restriction. The rights for
carriers to operate are then specifically negotiated and listed in the agreement
(Chapter 3). A negative listing approach is applied in many other areas of trade.
The negative listing approach has a number of advantages. First, it enables any
new form of trade to be automatically included as part of the trading
arrangements. For example, the widespread introduction of codesharing by a
airlines around the world meant that in most cases Australia had to negotiate for
codesharing to be included specifically in its ASAs. Second, it is generally
easier to negotiate for the removal of the remaining restrictions than to negotiate
for the addition of certain activities or traffic rights. Third, it is consistent with
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) trading framework and
would therefore facilitate a transition to a broader plurilateral or multilateral
trading system for air services.
Some countries would be more prepared to enter into a reciprocal ‘open skies’
agreement than others. DTRD emphasised that:
We must also consider the position of our major partners, in examining whether
there are good prospects for entering into such agreements. Aside from the UK, US
and New Zealand, the overwhelming majority of our bilateral partners are not
prepared to sign ‘open skies’ agreements with Australia, and particularly not on a
basis that would provide any greater advantages to us than we currently enjoy
(sub. 33, p. 29).
It is unclear why many bilateral partners would be reluctant to enter reciprocal
‘open skies’ arrangements with Australia. It has been argued that Australia’s
geographical position and its relatively small population make it unattractive for
other countries. However, this report has shown that in aviation terms, Australia
is actually quite a large country. In addition, New Zealand has been able to sign
‘open skies’ agreements with the United States, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei,
Chile and the United Arab Emirates from a position arguably less favourable
than Australia’s.9  CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS FURTHER LIBERALISATION
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There are a number of countries with which Australia could seek to negotiate
reciprocal ‘open skies’ agreements and have some prospects of success. The
countries that have already signed ‘open skies’ agreements with New Zealand or
the United States provide a starting point.
Strategic sequencing of negotiations would still need to be considered.
However, the need to make consequential amendments to ASAs continuously
would slowly disappear as a network of reciprocal ‘open skies’ agreements was
achieved. Initially, Australia could focus on those countries that have the most
incentive to sign such agreements, and where the national benefits to Australia,
broadly defined, are the highest.
The Commission recommends that Australia should immediately announce a
bilateral reciprocal ‘open skies’ international aviation policy.
Recommendation 9.3
The Commission recommends that Australia should seek to negotiate
reciprocal ‘open skies’ agreements on a bilateral basis which would remove
restrictions on:
·  capacity and frequency to, from, between and beyond Australia and
the bilateral aviation partner;
·  codesharing on each other’s airlines;
·  routes, including points of access to the Australian and the bilateral
partner’s markets, intermediate and beyond points;
·  multiple designation of airlines by Australia and the bilateral partner;
·  ownership as a basis for airline designation; and
·  prices.
Such reciprocal agreements should also contain restrictions on government
subsidies where these are significant. Australia should also be prepared to
negotiate, on a case by case basis, removal of restrictions on cabotage and
the development of ‘stand alone’ services between the bilateral partners and
third countries (so called seventh freedom services).
Not all countries may be prepared to negotiate bilateral ‘open skies’ agreements
with Australia. For those countries, Australia should seek to negotiate as liberal
a position as possible.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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9.6 Regional reform options
A number of participants argued that the focus on Sydney as Australia’s premier
gateway, and limitations on the number of points and cities that could be served
in Australia’s ASAs, were denying international air services to the rest of the
country. Even when a city, such as Darwin or Adelaide, is designated in an
ASA, the high opportunity costs of operating to secondary gateways caused by
capacity constraints make it difficult to attract international air services. Where
airlines are forced to make a choice between Sydney and an alternative
destination, they will choose Sydney. Participants claimed that this policy
stunted growth of both international trade and tourism. Easing these restrictions
could create greater opportunities for international air services to regional
Australia.
9.6.1 The Glenda Jackson offer
The UK Minister for Aviation (Hon. Glenda Jackson, MP) has recently offered
unlimited capacity to secondary gateways in the United Kingdom (all airports
except Heathrow and Gatwick) to all bilateral partners, provided that they offer
similar rights in return (Chapter 6). The Australian Government should take up
this offer.
Australia could make similar offers to other countries. In light of Sydney’s
predominance as a gateway, Australia could offer unlimited capacity to all cities
other than Sydney, outside ASA restrictions, as long as reciprocal rights
(including codeshares) were also made available to Australian airlines.
These extra rights would be reciprocal and route specific, for example Adelaide
to Stanstead, Melbourne to Milan or Darwin to Kuching. Such arrangements
could be complementary to the regional air services liberalisation arrangements
now operating among Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines and
could provide niche opportunities for Australia’s international carriers. The
Commission considers that there would be considerable advantages from such
an arrangement. It would provide extra capacity to reduce the opportunity costs
of operating to regional areas and could stimulate growth in tourism and trade,
as well as provide new markets for Australian airlines.
9.6.2 Unilateral options
There is also scope for unilateral (unreciprocated) liberalisation of restrictions
on operations to regional centres. One option is to remove restrictions on the
number of points which can be served as well as designation of the specific9  CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS FURTHER LIBERALISATION
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cities, but within capacity negotiated in ASAs. This would allow airlines greater
freedom in developing their Australian routes.
Whether such unilateral action should include all cities other than Sydney
would depend on the negotiating coin Australia could derive from limiting
access to other cities, particularly Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth. Both
Melbourne and Perth airport operators suggested that they were very much
secondary gateways compared with Sydney, and that no city designation
restrictions should apply (sub. 65 and transcript, pp. 422 and 438).
In contemplating unilateral liberalisation, the benefits to be derived would
clearly need to outweigh the costs. The costs of allowing unlimited access to
Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth in terms of lost negotiating coin, could be
greater than for less populous cities such as Adelaide, Darwin, Hobart and
Townsville. The Commission therefore considers that liberalisation of access to
Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth, like Sydney, should continue on a negotiated
bilateral, rather than unilateral, basis. However, the proposal outlined above, for
unlimited  reciprocal access to cities other than Sydney, would provide
significant opportunities to increase capacity and access to these three cities.
Removing restrictions on serving secondary gateways will not guarantee the
start-up of services but, in conjunction with domestic codesharing and less
restricted own-stopover rights, it could facilitate the development of new and
more innovative air services to many regions of Australia. This initiative would
provide net benefits to regional economies, the tourism industry and the
economy as a whole, with little cost to Australian airlines in terms of lost
opportunities abroad.
The full benefits of improved access to secondary gateways may depend on the
removal of any restrictions on domestic codesharing from Australia’s ASAs.
Domestic codesharing would enable overseas airlines to offer their customers
relatively seamless service to any point in Australia served by Australian
airlines if they were able to negotiate a commercial deal with Australian
domestic airlines. This would improve their ability to market Australia as a
tourist destination and generate additional traffic. Domestic codesharing should
be a matter for the commercial judgment of airlines, and not be subject to
government regulation in ASAs.
Facilitation of charter services represents another approach to promoting
regional development by serving cities in which scheduled carriers lack interest.
While more use could be made of charter services, no change of policy appears
to be required to allow this to happen. DTRD claimed that:
In relation to passenger charter policy, successive Governments have adopted a
liberal approach to encouraging these operators, especially when they have soughtINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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to serve secondary (ie outside major capital city) gateways in Australia (sub. 33, p.
16).
Finally, the availability of own-stopover rights for foreign carriers operating
services between ports in Australia could facilitate joint tourism packaging
between States and increased traffic on international flights at secondary
gateways (South Australian Government, sub.  3). The Victorian Government
argued that own-stopover rights allow:
... [foreign] airlines to market multiple Australian points and reduce costs to
inbound tour operators, thus improving Australia’s competitiveness as an
international destination (sub. 27, p. 9).
The greater availability of own-stopover rights would also improve the financial
viability of operating multi-stop services by foreign airlines.
However, DTRD argued that some states would be sensitive about removal of
city designation. It cited examples where carriers are required to serve a
particular route such as to Darwin or Adelaide which they may not serve
otherwise. As a result, it argued that some States would be disadvantaged by
removing all restrictions on city designation (transcript, p. 385)
In addition, DTRD argued that:
In a couple of those cases the foreign carriers that serve that particular destination
operate to very substantial hubs in South-East Asia. Additional carriers in that
market may destabilise the commitment that those hub carriers have made to that
destination, so you will give a range of views, I suspect, on whether too much
liberalisation in some of those regional markets may in fact come at a cost
(transcript, p. 385).
The Commission has concluded that regional Australia is likely to benefit more
from a liberalised approach to providing access to secondary gateways than
from the preservation or development of restrictive arrangements, particularly if
additional capacity is introduced.
Recommendation 9.4
As a step towards the further liberalisation of international air services, the
Commission recommends reforms to ASAs to benefit regional Australia,
encompassing both bilateral and unilateral elements:
Bilaterally, Australia should offer unlimited capacity to fly to all airports
other than Sydney, provided that Australian carriers are offered the same
routes on a reciprocal basis by their bilateral partners. The Australian
Government should take up the British offer of similar opportunities.
Unilaterally, Australia should offer, within negotiated capacity:9  CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS FURTHER LIBERALISATION
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·  removal of restrictions on the number of points to be served and
designation of all cities in Australia other than Sydney, Melbourne,
Brisbane and Perth;
·  unrestricted rights for foreign airlines to codeshare to all points in
Australia on Australian domestic airlines; and
·  unrestricted rights for foreign airlines to carry their own-stopover
traffic.
9.7 Plurilateral open club
As reciprocal ‘open skies’ agreements become increasingly common on a
bilateral basis, the possibility arises for the development of a common
agreement among a number of countries which would extend the scope from a
bilateral to a plurilateral context. This could involve the creation of an open
club of countries which would provide the benefits of the common liberal ‘open
skies’ agreement to all who joined.
9.7.1 Characteristics of the club
The current regulatory framework has demonstrated its ability to accommodate
a degree of liberalisation. However, it still inherently limits the potential for
competition and further development of the international aviation industry.
A more promising option for reform may be to develop an aviation open club of
countries based on a common agreement which would allow all carriers within
the group to have similar sets of rights. For example, Australia might start a
club with countries X and Y which gives the carriers of all three countries
unlimited rights to operate into and out of any international airports of all three
countries. Consideration might also be given to granting cabotage rights within
the club. A key feature of the club is that it would be open to other countries to
join on the same conditions.
Compared with a more general multilateral approach (where the potential for
reform could be limited to what the least restrictive country would be prepared
to negotiate), the open club offers a better chance for initiating worthwhile
reform. This is because it could evolve from a small group of like-minded
countries which are prepared to liberalise their aviation sectors. A common
agreement would also have a distinct advantage over the complex set of bilateral
agreements it would replace.
Havel concurred:INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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A global multilateral instrument is currently unattainable. The bilateral system,
centred in national sovereignty, is ideally suited to those states that continue to
assert the wellbeing of their national carriers as the highest priority in aviation
policy. Any attempt to corral these states in to a wider multilateral framework
would have GATT-like consequences: agreement may result, but it would be
pitched to the ‘lowest common denominator’ ... embracing areas of general consent
that could prove even less liberal than current bilateral practice (1997, pp. 405–6)
The benefits to members would grow in proportion to the size of the network.
At the same time, the opportunity costs of not being a member of the club
would also increase. Non-members run the risk of becoming isolated by air
traffic which responds to more liberal conditions available within the club.
Countries that may be reluctant to negotiate ‘open skies’ agreements on a
bilateral basis may find they have little choice but to join the club.
The open club idea draws on the principles of open regionalism but with an
important difference. Under the WTO, signatories are required to treat the
products and services of other countries on a non-discriminatory MFN basis —
that is, in general they cannot treat the products of one foreign country
differently from those of another, except in a free trade area or a customs union.
Open regionalism describes the action of a group of countries reducing
impediments to trade among themselves, but not creating any new artificial
distinctions or discrimination between members and non-members (Elek 1996).
For example, APEC commitments to trade reform amount to a coordinated
program of unilateral actions by members to reduce trade barriers without
discriminating against non-members.
An aviation open club would operate differently. International air transport has
been specifically exempted from the GATS. Most countries apparently wish to
retain the bilateral system, and that system fundamentally contravenes the non-
discriminatory MFN principle. An aviation open club cannot help but
discriminate against non-members because it would grow out of the bilateral
system. The difference is that club members would offer one set of rights to all
other club members, and other sets of rights (bilaterally) to non members. But
non-members would be free to join. As membership grew, discrimination
between nations would decline. Transparency would be important to ensure that
non-members could understand the conditions of membership, and be
forewarned about changes to club rules.
The difficulties of establishing such a club should not be underestimated. Not
all countries may wish to join a club, or allow certain other countries to do so.
Countries with entrenched political or other differences may not wish to
cooperate in such a way. Airlines in member countries may have an incentive to
resist extending the boundaries of the club if it would mean entry of other more
competitive airlines. However, accession would be important because the9  CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS FURTHER LIBERALISATION
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overall benefits, including benefits to users, would grow as the size of the
aviation network grows.
To enhance the chances of the open club becoming a vehicle for widespread
reform, the club should:
·  not intentionally disadvantage outsiders any more than the bilateral
agreements it replaces;
·  have transparent rules;
·  allow new members to join on the same terms and conditions; and
·  contain provisions relating to competition policy, particularly relating to
restrictions on significant government subsidies.
A result comparable to an open club could be achieved by negotiating similar
bilateral agreements between a series of partners. But each agreement would
then need to contain similar provisions; this would be difficult to achieve
through a series of bilateral negotiations.
The United States has ‘open skies’ agreements with 30 countries. To offer the
airlines of each of these 30 countries the same possibilities for network
development as enjoyed by the US carriers, there would have to be 465 bilateral
‘open skies’ agreements. The same network possibilities would exist for all the
airlines with a single plurilateral ‘open skies’ agreement covering the 31
countries. Progress would probably be best served by a small number of
countries developing a plurilateral open club agreement and inviting other
countries to join, rather than trying to develop it through an extensive network
of bilateral agreements.
One challenge that confronts Australia and other nations is the possibility that
other countries may develop aviation agreements that are not open to outsiders.
The challenge is to ensure that regional or plurilateral agreements are used as a
stepping stone to global liberalisation and not as an exclusive device to favour
members. Openness is a key factor in this.
Recommendation 9.5
Australia should invite like-minded countries to discuss the formation of an
open club of nations committed to liberalising international aviation
through a common plurilateral ‘open skies’ agreement.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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9.7.2 Implementation
There are different approaches to targeting the right start-up group for a
plurilateral agreement. Some of the same considerations suggested for targeting
‘open skies’ bilateral agreements apply. But in this case a more strategic
approach may be necessary because the early members will be influential in
shaping the agreement.
While the principles of the club are that everyone would be eligible, Australia
could be proactive in approaching countries with which it might have the best
chance of negotiating the most liberal core conditions. Thus, membership by the
United States may limit the potential to negotiate cabotage rights or more liberal
ownership rules among members. On the other hand, just as in the bilateral
‘open skies’ option, many of the US’s ‘open skies’ partners would be an
obvious starting point.
It is possible, of course, that just as some US ‘open skies’ partners may be
hesitant to enter into similar agreements with each other, they may not wish to
join a plurilateral open club if the other is a member. Most US ‘spoke’ countries
would probably gain economically from ‘open skies’ agreements with each
other, but there may be cultural or political barriers to doing so. Indeed, there
could be resistance from the United States, which benefits from being at the
centre of a hub and spoke system, and whose benefits could be eroded by a
broader plurilateral or multilateral system.
APEC might be considered an appropriate group for developing an open club
for a number of reasons. Many APEC members are important aviation trading
economies. It has been a fast growing region and already contains several
economies with relatively liberal arrangements (principally because of the US
‘open skies’ policy).
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) suggested that there is
limited scope for liberalisation through APEC, considering that:
... the APEC forum provides an opportunity for a cooperative and constructive
approach to liberalisation of aviation services, an approach which distinguishes
itself from the adversarial national interest approach usually adopted in bilateral
air services negotiations. However, the sensitive nature of this issue and the
consensus-based approach to APEC decision making will continue to dictate the
pace and direction of reform in APEC (sub. 52, p. 3).
However, the club need not include all 21 APEC members:
... as long as the initiatives taken by some are positive examples which are
designed to maintain the cohesion of APEC and to provide practical means, as well
as incentives, to widen the coverage to include all of the region (Elek, Hooper,
Findlay and Warren sub. 54, p. 12).9  CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS FURTHER LIBERALISATION
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A 21 minus X approach is consistent with APEC. But if 21 minus X is a very
small number, the rationale for confining membership of the initial group to
APEC members would have to be questioned. Australia has been pushing for
liberalisation of air freight within APEC, with little support to date. New
Zealand and its APEC ‘open skies’ partners might be a more liberally minded
group to start with.
The incentive for some countries to join would relate to the benefits and costs
from better access to existing members. An open club would enhance the
development of efficient networks by giving all members what are effectively
matching sets of fifth and seventh freedoms. But some countries which already
have important international hubs may perceive an ‘open skies’ policy as
detrimental to their airlines unless it opens further opportunities for extending
the airlines’ networks. In this more competitive framework, some carriers would
be in a better position than others, and some rationalisation may be inevitable.
The benefits of obtaining access to the network could help countries that may
not have much to trade in a bilateral framework.
To illustrate the possible benefits and costs of an open club, the Commission
developed a model, described in Appendix F. Three scenarios were developed,
but data limitations have severely constrained their application and precluded
satisfactory country disaggregation.
Under the first, the airlines of the countries in the open club are freed from
restrictions on their operations and allowed to achieve the benchmark
productivity of the most efficient carrier (for example, Ansett is able to achieve
Cathay Pacific’s productivity). Under this scenario, airline profits, consumer
welfare and economic welfare all increase for club members as a whole. Costs
and prices fall within the club, but those countries and airlines outside the club
are disadvantaged. Those consumers from non-club countries who fly on club
airlines benefit from lower prices, but the non-club airlines lose market share
and their profits fall.
In the second scenario, airlines of club members become free to fly wherever
they like within the club, and to enter new markets previously denied them
under the bilateral system (for example, China Air could enter the Tokyo–
Sydney market). This allows club airlines to configure their networks in new
ways. The model generates new hubs, better aircraft utilisation and increased
frequency of service within the club. Lower costs translate into lower fares as a
result of increased competition among the club airlines. This leads to a drop in
airline profits but an increase in consumer and total economic welfare for club
members as a whole.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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In the third scenario, the two effects are considered together. The net increase in
economic welfare is even greater because of more efficient and flexible
networks, increased competitive pressure and increased consumer benefits.
However, the non-club economies suffer net reductions in economic welfare.
These model results illustrate the economic forces which could be unleashed in
an open club of countries with a common ‘open skies’ agreement. The bigger
the club, the bigger the benefits and the greater the disadvantages faced by non-
members.
Australia may be able to cement its place in the plurilateral club by taking the
initiative to establish it. The Cairns Group illustrates the possibilities for an
Australian initiative in international negotiations.
9.8 Multilateral liberalisation
Regulating international air services in a liberal multilateral framework offers
potential benefits over what might be achieved through other approaches. A
liberal multilateral agreement which covers all or most countries would allow
air services to develop in response to market pressures. Efficient carriers would
replace inefficient carriers and the removal of regulatory barriers to entry would
enhance competition. A multilateral system would be easier to administer and
comply with than the current bilateral system.
DIST summed up the benefits of moving to a multilateral structure:
A multilateral approach would seem to be the preferred option, since in
recognising that there is little difference between aviation services and other traded
goods, it could potentially bring trade in these services in line with the general
trend in the trade in services (such as is occurring under the jurisdiction of the
WTO). It would also provide a mechanism for pulling more conservative nations
along the deregulation path (sub. 31, p. 26).
Qantas also recognised the benefits of moving to a truly multilateral framework:
Multilateral deregulation could provide benefits to Australia especially in
achieving improved access overseas for Australian airlines. This would increase
the competitiveness of Australian airlines because of the disadvantages they face
relative to geographically better located foreign airlines (sub. 25, p. 49).
The Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry described what a
multilateral agreement could include:
Key elements of any [multilateral] negotiations should include: ensuring liberal
market access, with no restrictions (bar genuine safety considerations) on capacity
or frequency of services; charges, prices and fares should be set by the market,
subject only to bona fide competition policy issues; both passenger and freight9  CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS FURTHER LIBERALISATION
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movements; and, transparent and welcoming accession arrangements for countries
which wish to join during or after the negotiation processes (sub. 26, p. 5).
Attempts have been made to bring air services into a multilateral framework
through ICAO and the WTO. A first but unsuccessful attempt was made at the
Chicago Convention in 1944. Although ICAO has responsibility for developing
economic regulation, most countries have remained wedded to the bilateral
framework. ICAO has focussed on developing standards for safety and security.
Responding to the Uruguay Round of multilateral, multisectoral trade
negotiations and the possibility that air services might be included in the GATS,
the ICAO Secretariat proposed various reforms to economic regulation of
international air transport. The ICAO assembly considered them in 1994, but
did not agree to them.
The Uruguay Round also made little headway on air services. Air services are
within the ambit of the GATS in principle, but an Annex explicitly excludes
most of them. Only aircraft repair and maintenance, the marketing of air
services, and computer reservation systems are covered. This Annex can only be
amended or removed by a two thirds majority (currently 88) of WTO members.
It provides for periodic reviews at least every five years, with the first review to
take place by 2000. Thus, there is scope to remove the exemption, but DFAT
advised that:
... there have been no discussions by Members of the forthcoming review nor any
indication of likely negotiating positions (sub. 52, p. 4).
If air services were to be covered by the general provisions of the GATS,
Australia’s ASAs with WTO members could become redundant. However,
WTO members would need to maintain bilateral agreements with countries that
are not members of the WTO.
Extending non-discriminatory, MFN treatment to air services would prohibit
countries from discriminating among WTO members except in the context of a
trade agreement such as a free trade area or a customs union. This absence of
discrimination means that under the GATS, the nationality of airlines, and the
national designation of airlines as under the present bilateral system, would be
less relevant. A country would still be able to restrict access to its airspace and
to its domestic traffic, but it could not do so in a manner that discriminated
among foreign airlines, except in the context of agreements for economic
integration. Nor could the controllers of airspace, or the operators of airports,
discriminate among foreign airlines on the basis of nationality.
However, given existing attitudes to air traffic rights, it would not be easy to
obtain the two thirds majority to repeal or amend the Annex, especially given
that some otherwise liberally minded WTO members such as the United StatesINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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and the EU supported the exemption in the first place (sub.  33). Indeed, as
noted above, there are advantages to US carriers from preserving and extending
the hub and spoke set of ‘open skies’ bilateral agreements around the US hub,
rather than fostering a multilateral ‘open skies’ agreement.
Many participants were wary of the time that any multilateral approach would
take and the possibility that reforms would be watered down by the more
conservative parties. FedEx stated that:
Any attempt to substitute a multilateral approach will result in multilateral
agreements which are acceptable to the most restrictive countries. They will
contain the ‘lowest common denominator’ of rights and this will slow the progress
of full liberalisation (sub. 18, p. 25).
DIST noted that change has been difficult to achieve despite Australia’s efforts
to promote a liberal agenda:
While there are a number of alternative international organisations that could be
used to achieve this goal, including the WTO, APEC and the various international
transport based organisations, we understand Australia already takes a relatively
liberal approach in these fora. It appears progress is being held back by the
attitude of countries that wish to continue protecting their aviation industry.
Although the potential gains from a multilateral approach to aviation regulation
justify continuing effort in this area, given the limited gains to date, there is also a
need to review the options available under the alternative bilateral mechanism
(sub. 31, p. 26).
Given the entrenched position of bilateral negotiations as the basis for
exchanging rights, and the difficulties of negotiating a true multilateral
agreement, bilateral and plurilateral options may offer the best prospects for
achieving gains in the short to medium term.
Nevertheless, Australia should support the eventual inclusion of international air
services in the GATS, while simultaneously pursuing other initiatives. A useful
starting point would be to include other so-called ‘soft rights’ such as ground
handling. The ways this might be achieved should be discussed during the
forthcoming review of the GATS which is required to start by 2000.
Recommendation 9.6
The Australian Government should promote discussion within the WTO
membership to determine a process for including all air services in the
GATS.9  CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS FURTHER LIBERALISATION
241
9.9 The Commission’s preferred approach
The global aviation industry has reached a critical point in its development. The
inefficiencies imposed on the world aviation industry by the current bilateral
system are now apparent. The complacency shown by many governments about
the costs of the system, as recently as the ICAO World Wide Air Transport
Conference of 1994, is giving way as they privatise and/or cease to subsidise
their airlines. Alliances are multiplying, partly to overcome regulatory barriers,
and the benefits of more efficient, internationally competitive air services are
being demonstrated. Bilateral ‘open skies’ agreements are spreading.
This situation opens up opportunities for Australia, but it also points to the
danger that Australia could be left behind if it does not act quickly. Australia
could be disadvantaged if other countries’ air services become more efficient
relative to Australia.
Options for further liberalisation of Australia’s international air services
framework have been outlined in this chapter, in addition to the
recommendations made throughout this report to improve other aspects of
international aviation. Options for marginal improvements to the status quo
were discussed, but such changes will not go far enough to allow Australia’s
airlines to achieve their full potential, nor will they bring the full benefits to
user industries such as tourism or to the economy as a whole.
The Commission also examined the case for the most radical option, a policy of
unilateral ‘open skies’. It has concluded that when the rest of the world is still
committed to the bilateral system, such a policy, far from being welfare
enhancing, could make Australia worse off, particularly in the context of
growing markets.
The Commission has also outlined a number of options for liberalising
international air services which could make Australia better off. They consist of
separate but consistent measures which should be pursued on a number of fronts
concurrently.
This is an ambitious program, and would clearly require an increase in
resources for DTRD and an upgrading of DFAT’s knowledge of air services, as
they would be expected to play a significant role in plurilateral and multilateral
negotiations.
It will also require greater community understanding and input. This will
require implementation of the recommendations in Chapter 5 for greater
transparency, improved consultation processes and a clear statement of
government policy.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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The Commission’s preferred options
The Commission recommends a package of reforms aimed at improving the
gains from Australia’s international air services framework, involving:
·  liberalisation of ownership and control requirements for national
designation of airlines (Recommendation 9.1);
·  developing and seeking ICAO recognition for a regional arrangement
involving Australia, New Zealand and possibly other nations of the
South Pacific, which would enable relaxation of ownership and
control criteria (Recommendation 9.2);
·  a policy of reciprocal bilateral ‘open skies’ agreements
(Recommendation 9.3);
·  enhanced international air services to regional Australia through the
regional package (Recommendation 9.4);
·  inviting like-minded countries to discuss the formation of an open
club of nations committed to liberalising international aviation
through a common plurilateral ‘open skies’ agreement
(Recommendation 9.5); and
·  promoting discussion among WTO members to determine a process
for including international air services in the GATS
(Recommendation 9.6).
9.10 Competition principles legislative review findings
One of the aims of this inquiry was to review the Commonwealth’s policy on
International Air Service Agreements and the IASC allocation process in
accordance with the Government’s Legislative Review Schedule under the
Competition Principles Agreement.
The guiding principle for such reviews is that legislation should not restrict
competition unless it can be demonstrated that:
a)  the benefits of the restriction to the community as a whole outweigh the
costs; and
b)  the objectives of the legislation can only be achieved by restricting
competition.9  CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS FURTHER LIBERALISATION
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In relation to the Commonwealth’s policy on ASAs, the Commission has found
that many aspects of Australia’s ASAs are anticompetitive, but that there is only
limited scope for unilateral action that would enhance economic welfare. The
Commission’s recommended course of action is outlined in the package above
and involves action at both bilateral and multilateral levels, as well as improved
consultation and transparency by DTRD.
In relation to the IASC’s allocation process, the Commission has found that a
market-based allocation system would not lead to more competitive outcomes
than the present bureaucratic process using the IASC. It has also found that the
IASC’s guidelines and processes are procompetitive, but that there is scope for
simplification, improving their efficiency, certainty and timeliness and reducing
administration and compliance costs. Recommendations in respect of the IASC
are in Chapter 7.245
A CONDUCT OF THE INQUIRY
A1 Introduction
This appendix outlines the inquiry process and the organisations and individuals
that have participated in the inquiry to date.
The Commission is to report to the Commonwealth Government by 12
September 1998 on the arrangements for negotiating entitlements under
Australia’s air services arrangements (ASAs) and for allocating capacity
entitlements to Australian carriers.
As in all of its inquiries, the Commission’s aim is to improve the overall
performance of the Australian economy. It will have regard to the established
economic, social, environmental and regional development objectives of
governments. The full terms of reference are on page XIX.
Following receipt of the terms of reference, the Commission placed a notice in
the national press inviting public participation in the inquiry and released an
issues paper to assist participants in preparing their submissions. The
Commission received 55 submissions prior to the release of the draft report and
an additional 26 following the draft report. Those who made submissions are
listed in Section A2.
The Commission also held informal discussions with companies, government
agencies and other organisations involved in international air services in
Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth, Adelaide, Canberra and overseas. This
visit program was important in obtaining a wide understanding of the issues
confronting the industry and the views of participants. Organisations visited by
the Commission are listed in Section A3.
The Commission held public hearings in Melbourne and Sydney in March.
Following the release of the draft report public hearings were held in Melbourne
in July. Public hearing participants are listed in Section A4. Submissions and
transcripts of these hearings are publicly available.
A technical seminar and a workshop were held on 17 July and 31 July 1998
respectively to discuss the modelling presented in Appendix F. In addition, the
Commission also established an Independent Review Panel to comment on the
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Air New Zealand 6
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Asia/Pacific Cabin Safety Working Group 11
Australia World Airways 22, 69
Australian and International Pilots’ Association 24, 61
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 26
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 49
Australian Customs Service 2
Australian Family Party 75
Australian Services Union 20, 70
Australian Tourist Commission 29, 64, 74
Avalon Airport Australia 14
Board of Airline Representatives of Australia 21
Brisbane Airport Corporation 10, 77
British Airways 36
Broome International Airport 35
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Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 52, 78
Department of Industry, Science and Tourism 31, 44
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Participant (continued) Submission no.
May, Philip T. 57
Melbourne Airport 23, 65
National Jet Systems Group 7
New South Wales Government 81
New Zealand External Aviation Policy Committee 34, 76
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Northern Territory of Australia 40
Qantas Airways Limited 25, 47, 67, 68
Queensland Government 39, 48
South Australian Government 3, 46, 63
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Department of Transport (Western Australia)
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B COMPETITION PRINCIPLES AGREEMENT
The Commission’s review of Australia’s international air services arrangements
(ASAs) and the International Air Services Commission Act 1992 represents part
of the Commonwealth Government’s commitment under the Competition
Principles Agreement to review legislation.
The agreement forms part of the national competition policy which all
Commonwealth, State and Territory governments agreed to implement in April
1995. It commits the Commonwealth, State and Territory governments to
review anticompetitive legislation and regulations, setting out the principles for
such review. The guiding principle is that legislation should not restrict
competition unless it can be demonstrated that:
·  the benefits of the restriction outweigh the costs to the community as a
whole; and
·  the objectives of the legislation can only be achieved by restricting
competition.
Governments are required to develop a timetable for legislation reviews and,
where appropriate, to reform all existing legislation that restricts competition by
the year 2000. They must also publish an annual report on their progress
towards this objective. If the review issue has a national dimension or effect on
competition (or both), a national review may be determined. Without limiting
the terms of reference, the review should:
·  clarify the objectives of the legislation;
·  identify the nature of the restriction on competition;
·  analyse the likely effect of the restriction on competition and on the
economy generally;
·  address and balance the costs and benefits of the restriction; and
·  consider alternative means for achieving the same result, including non-
legislative approaches.
The Treasurer released on June 28 1996 a comprehensive schedule of
Commonwealth legislation reviews to commence over the next four years,
including reviews of Australia’s ASAs and the International Air Services
Commission Act. These two reviews were subsequently combined and referred
to the Commission for inquiry on the 12 December 1997.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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C THE AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL AIR
SERVICES MARKET
This appendix provides a statistical overview of the market for Australian
international air services. Statistics are used to describe the nature of Australia’s
international scheduled passenger and freight markets, the charter market and
passenger and freight movements at Australia’s international airports.
C1 Australia’s international air passenger market
International travel to and from Australia has more than doubled since 1986;
inbound foreign tourism particularly has been a major source of growth. The
most significant change in the composition of passengers arriving in Australia
has been the substantial increase in the relative importance of the Asian market
over the traditional European market. Arrivals from Japan experienced the
strongest individual market growth since 1986. New Zealand has consistently
been the largest individual passenger market.
Growth has been largely but not entirely driven by leisure travel. Strengthening
economic links with Australia’s Asian neighbours have also generated strong
demand for business travel.
Australia’s largest carrier, Qantas, had the highest individual passenger market
share in 1997. The total market share attributable to Australian airlines has
increased slightly since 1986.
Total international passenger movements
The total number of passengers carried to and from Australia on both scheduled
and non-scheduled flights increased from approximately 6.1 million in 1986 to
14.8 million in 1997.1 This represented an average annual growth for inbound
and outbound traffic of 8.3  per  cent and 8.6  per  cent respectively, where
                                            
1 This included 14.1 million revenue passengers on scheduled flights and 700 000 passengers
who were either non-revenue passengers (those who paid less than 25  per  cent of the
standard air fare as defined by ICAO) or passengers on charter flights (DTRD unpublished).
The capacity approved for passenger charter flights was approximately 98 000 seats in 1997
(Figure C7); actual passenger numbers on charter flights would be expected to have been
less. Thus, scheduled passengers comprised around 99 per cent of total passengers in 1996.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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inbound traffic and outbound traffic refer to all passengers arriving at or leaving
Australia respectively. The greatest annual increase occurred in 1988 —
coinciding with the World Expo 88 and Bicentennial celebrations — when
inbound traffic and outbound traffic increased by 15.3  per  cent and
16.2  per  cent respectively. Annual growth for inbound and outbound traffic
slowed markedly in 1989 — partly as a result of the domestic pilots’ strike —
and in 1991, during the worst of the world wide recession (Figure  C1).
Passenger traffic then entered a period of strong growth.


































Note: Inbound and outbound passengers refer to the arrival or departure of Australian residents or overseas
visitors, through Australian airports, which have been recorded on incoming or outgoing passenger cards.
Source: ABS 3401.0 (unpublished).
Inbound traffic
The 7.5  million arrivals in Australia in 1997 comprised around 4.4  million
overseas visitors, 3  million returning Australian residents and around 78  000
permanent settlers (Figure C2). Around 97 per cent of the arrivals were short-
term.
The growth in inbound traffic since 1986 largely reflects an increase in short-
term overseas resident arrivals which have grown at an average annual rate of
10.9 per cent. This has led to a decline in Australian resident arrivals relative to
overseas resident arrivals. In 1986 the number of Australian resident arrivals
(around 1.5 million) was slightly greater than the number of overseas residentC   THE AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES MARKET
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arrivals (around 1.4 million) but the situation had reversed by 1997. Permanent
arrivals have not changed greatly over the period.












Note: Permanent arrivals (within the permanent and long-term arrivals category) include travellers who held
migrant visas, New Zealand citizens who indicated an intention to settle, and those who were otherwise eligible
to settle (such as overseas-born children of Australian citizens). Long-term arrivals (within the permanent and
long-term arrivals category) include Australian residents and overseas visitors whose period of stay overseas or in
Australia respectively was greater than 12 months.
Source: ABS Cat no 3401.0 (unpublished).
Travel for the purposes of leisure has accounted for the majority of the growth
in short-term overseas visitor arrivals since 1989. Leisure has remained the most
common purpose of travel for short-term overseas visitors over the decade.
There were 2.1 million overseas visitors in 1989, of whom leisure accounted for
around 1.6  million, business travel for 300  000 visitors and ‘other’ about
200 000. The number of short-term overseas visitors had grown to 4.3 million
by 1997, of whom 3.3  million travelled for leisure, 700  000 travelled for
business, and 240  000 were included in the ‘other’ category (Figure  C3).
Rounding errors account for the difference between the stated total and the sum
of the three components.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Note: Business also includes travel for the purpose of convention/conference, employment and education. Leisure
includes travel for the purpose of visiting friends/relatives and holidaying. Other includes other travel and
purposes not stated.
Source: ABS Cat no 3401.0 (unpublished).
Outbound traffic
The 7.4 million departures from Australia in 1997 comprised around 4.3 million
overseas visitors, around 3 million Australian residents visiting another country,
and around 30  000 Australian residents intending to settle permanently in
another country2. Around 98  per  cent of the departures were short-term
(Figure C4).
The growth in outbound traffic since 1986 largely reflects an increase in short-
term departures of overseas visitors, which have grown at an average annual
rate of 11.3 per cent. This has led to a decline in Australian resident temporary
departures relative to overseas visitor departures. In 1986, the number of
Australian resident temporary departures (around 1.5  million) was slightly
greater than the number of overseas visitor departures (around 1.4 million) but
the situation had reversed by 1997. Permanent departures did not change greatly
over the period.
                                            
2 Rounding errors account for the difference between the stated total and the sum of the three
components.C   THE AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES MARKET
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Note: Permanent departures (within the permanent and long-term departures category) are defined as Australian
residents (including former settlers) who stated on departure that they intended to settle permanently in another
country. Long-term departures (within the permanent and long-term departures category) include Australian
residents and overseas visitors whose intended stay overseas or period of stay in Australia respectively was
greater than 12 months.
Source: ABS Cat no 3401.0 (unpublished).
Travel for leisure is the major reason for short-term Australian resident
departures. Leisure travel accounted for around 2.1 million of the approximate
2.9 million short-term Australian resident departures in 1997. Departures for
business have grown as a proportion of the total, accounting for 26 per cent in
1997 (Figure C5), compared with 20 per cent in 1989.








Note: Business also includes travel for the purpose of convention/conference, employment and education. Leisure
includes travel for the purpose of visiting friends/relatives and holidaying. Other includes other travel and
purposes not stated.
Source: ABS Cat no 3401.0 (unpublished).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
260
Passengers by city pairs
Around 34 per cent of the total scheduled international passenger traffic to and
from Australia in 1997 was between ten city pairs (Table  C1). Sydney was
Australia’s main international gateway, with six of the top ten city pairs and all
of the top five involving traffic to and from Sydney. Auckland and Singapore
each appeared three times in the top ten city pairs. Singapore is a major hub for
Qantas and the base for Singapore Airlines (which has 7 per cent of Australia’s
international passenger market) (Table C2).
Among the top ten city pairs, Los Angeles–Sydney had the largest increase in
numbers of passengers between 1986 and 1997. Osaka–Sydney had the second
largest increase in passenger numbers. Passenger numbers for Tokyo–Sydney
increased rapidly from 1986 to 1990, rising from around 200 000 to around
507  000. The growth then levelled off as numbers began to rise rapidly for
Osaka–Sydney — to around 327  000 in 1997. Traffic for Australia’s top
international city pairs was relatively small when compared with the busiest city
pairs in the world. The busiest city pair in the world was Hong Kong–Taipei,
with around 4.1  million passengers (in the year ended December 1995)
compared with Sydney–Auckland’s approximate 721 000 passengers (in the 12
months ending 31 March 1995) (ICAO 1996b).







Of total — 1997
no. no. % %
Auckland–Sydney 610 302 749 137 23 5.3
Los Angeles–Sydney 155 290 703 281 353 5.0
Singapore–Sydney 301 084 562 450 87 4.0
Hong Kong–Sydney 243 726 513 448 111 3.6
Tokyo–Sydney 201 240 462 183 130 3.3
Singapore–Perth 184 282 423 035 130 3.0
Auckland–Brisbane 164 015 389 949 138 2.8
Auckland–Melbourne 156 849 354 810 126 2.5
Osaka–Sydney 0 326 935 na 2.3
Singapore-Melbourne 177 638 319 438 80 2.3
Other city pairs 3 624 011 9 297 244 157 65.9
All city pairs 5 818 437 14 101 910 142 100.0
na Not applicable.
a These data are for uplift/discharge traffic, the number of passengers who travel between a city pair on one stage.
It differs from origin/destination traffic, which is the number of passengers who travel between a city pair at
which their journeys start and finish. The data include only revenue passengers travelling on scheduled flights.
Revenue passengers are defined as those paying 25 per cent or more of the standard air fare as defined by ICAO.
Source: DTRD (unpublished).C   THE AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES MARKET
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International passenger market share
During 1997, 52 passenger airlines operated scheduled services to and from
Australia. This reflected an increase of 20 carriers operating in the Australian
market since 1986, and can be associated with the growth in inbound tourism.
Ten of the 52 passenger airlines in 1997 accounted for around 82 per cent of
Australia’s international passenger market, and none of the remaining 42
airlines had more than 2 per cent of the total market. Qantas had the highest
individual market share in that year (39 per cent), followed by Air New Zealand
(10  per  cent), Singapore Airlines (7  per  cent), Ansett Australia and Japan
Airlines (4 per cent) and United Airlines (4 per cent) (Table C2).
The Qantas market share had decreased from 42  per  cent in 1986 which
approximately equals Ansett’s 4 per cent gain since it commenced international
flights in 1993. Nevertheless the number of passengers flying Qantas more than
doubled from 2.5 million to 5.4 million, reflecting the growth in the market.
Market shares also changed significantly for some of the other airlines during
this period. Air Pacific and Continental Airlines dropped out of the top ten,
being replaced by Japan Airlines and Ansett International. Japan Airlines’
increased its passenger numbers by 427 per cent between 1986 and 1997, (the
highest growth of comparable airlines) reflecting the growth of traffic between
Japan and Australia. Japan Airlines’ market share increased from 2.0 per cent to
4.4 per cent over the period.
Malaysia Airlines’ share of the total Australian passenger market increased from
2.5 per cent in 1986 to 4.2 per cent in 1997 reflecting a percentage increase in
passenger numbers of 310  per  cent. United Airlines’ market share increased
from 2.8  per  cent to 4.2  per  cent over the period, while British Airways lost
market share in going from 5.2 per cent to 3.3 per cent.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Table C2 Airline shares of Australia’s international passenger
















% ’000 % ’000 %
Australian airlines
Qantas Airways
a 121 2 454 42.2 5 428 38.5
Ansett Australia na 0 0.0 626 4.4
National Jet Systems
b na 0 0.0 4 0.0
Asian Express Airlines
c 0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Foreign airlines
Air New Zealand 102 671 11.5 1354 9.6
Singapore Airlines 126 416 7.1 940 6.7
Japan Airlines 427 118 2.0 621 4.4
United Airlines 260 165 2.8 594 4.2
Malaysia Airlines 310 143 2.5 587 4.2
Cathay Pacific Airways 86 269 4.6 500 3.5
British Airways 51 305 5.2 462 3.3
Garuda Indonesia 128 183 3.1 417 3.0
Other 135 1 095 18.8 2 571 18.2
Total 142 5 818 100.0 14 102 100.0
na Not applicable.
a Qantas data include its subsidiary Australia Asia Airlines.
b Service commenced January 1996.
c Dedicated freight only service commenced December 1996.
Source: DTRD (unpublished).
Australian passenger airlines (Qantas, Ansett International and National Jet
Systems) accounted for just under 43  per  cent of Australia’s international
passenger market in 1997 (Table C2). The Australian share of the international
passenger market in 1986 was only slightly different at just over 42 per cent.C   THE AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES MARKET
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C2 Australia’s international air freight market
The Australian international freight market has grown rapidly in recent years.
The value of air freight transported in and out of Australia has more than
doubled in the past decade. International air freight is predominantly carried in
the belly holds of passenger aircraft, supplemented by dedicated freight services
and additional informal freight charter flights. The main goods transported are
low bulk and high value per kilogram. Sydney is Australia’s most important air
freight transport hub.
Qantas had the highest individual market share in 1997, carrying almost one
third of all air freight transported.
International freight movements
Six dedicated freight carriers carried freight to and from Australia in 1997,
along with 46 passenger airlines. The other six passenger airlines servicing the
Australian market did not carry freight. Ninety per cent of air freight travels in
the belly holds of passenger aircraft (sub. 52, p. 9).
International air freight — commodity shares
Goods transported by air freight are usually low bulk and high value, and/or
time sensitive (including perishables). The Australian Chamber of Commerce
and Industry (sub. 26, p. 8) indicated that Australia’s primary air freight exports
in 1994 included nonmonetary gold, perishable goods, and manufactures
(including computer and office equipment, electrical machinery and appliances,
non-metal manufactures and pharmaceuticals). Half of the perishables exported
by air freight were seafood. Other important categories of perishables are fruit
and vegetables, meat and flowers (HRSC 1996). Exports by weight are
overwhelmingly perishable primary products (Qantas sub. 25, p. 5).
Imports transported by air freight mostly consist of high value, high technology
manufactured goods, such as computers and other electronic parts
(sub. 25, p. 5).
Machinery comprised 29 per cent of air freight exports and 57 per cent of air
freight imports in 1996–97 by value (Figure  C6). This included computers,
other electronic parts, office machines, transport equipment parts and electrical
machinery. Manufactured goods (including non-metal manufactures) comprised
18  per  cent of exports and 27  per  cent of imports. Chemicals, including
pharmaceutical products made up 6  per  cent of exports and 12  per  cent of
imports. The ‘other’ category (including nonmonetary gold) comprised
40 per cent of exports and 3 per cent of imports.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Freight by city pairs
The top ten city pairs for freight between Australia and foreign destinations
accounted for around 47 per cent of the total scheduled freight (tonnes) carried
to and from Australia in 1997.3 Just as Sydney is the major source or destination
for passengers, so it is for freight (Table C3). Sydney was in all of the top three
freight city pairs and five of the top ten freight city pairs in 1997. Auckland and
Singapore each appeared three times in the top ten city pairs. They also both
appeared twice in the top five city pairs. After Sydney, Melbourne is the most
important gateway for freight. It appeared three times in the top ten city pairs
for freight in 1997, compared with twice in the top ten city pairs for passenger
traffic.
















Note: Figures are indicative only, because in adhering to legislative confidentiality provisions the ABS combines
some of the international standard components to prevent disclosure. Data show the shares by value.
Source: ABS (1997b).
There was strong growth in freight transported between the top ten city pairs
between 1986 and 1997 (Table C3). The largest percentage increase in tonnes
of freight was for Auckland–Brisbane (303 per cent). However this was from a
relatively low base.
Auckland–Melbourne also experienced strong growth over the period. Freight
transported between the city pair grew by 24 000 tonnes (or 292 per cent). The
next highest percentage growth was for Hong Kong–Melbourne (236 per cent).
Auckland–Sydney had the largest exchange of freight in 1986 as well as 1997
but its market share was larger in 1986 (9.8  per  cent) than in 1997
(7.8 per cent).
                                            
3 It should be noted that city pairs do not necessarily reflect the origin of freight. Goods
manufactured in Adelaide may be transported overseas via Melbourne, for example.C   THE AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES MARKET
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Table C3 Top ten Australian–international city pairs, by freight










% tonnes tonnes %
Auckland–Sydney 107 24 439 50 610 7.8
Singapore–Sydney 144 15 319 37 403 5.8
Hong Kong–Sydney 231 11 165 36 945 5.7
Singapore–Melbourne 201 11 254 33 910 5.2
Auckland–Melbourne 292 8 375 32 849 5.1
Hong Kong–Melbourne 236 8 277 27 787 4.3
Los Angeles–Sydney 113 12 059 25 732 4.0
Tokyo–Sydney 78 13 256 23 611 3.6
Singapore–Perth 93 11 827 22 784 3.5
Auckland–Brisbane 303 3 801 15 300 2.4
Other city pairs 166 128 966 342 441 52.7
All city pairs 161 248 739 649 371 100.0
Note: Data include freight carried on scheduled flights only.
Source: DTRD (unpublished).
International freight market share
The top ten carriers by freight (tonnes) accounted for around 80 per cent of
Australia’s international air freight market in 1997. None of the remaining 42
carriers had more than 2 per cent of the total market. This reflects a pattern
similar to the international passenger market shares. Qantas had the highest
individual market share in 1997 (29 per cent), followed by Singapore Airlines
(12 per cent) and Air New Zealand (11 per cent), Cathay Pacific (8 per cent),
Malaysia Airlines (4 per cent) and Japan Airlines (3 per cent) (Table C4).
The freight market shares of Qantas and Ansett have changed since 1986 in a
similar way to their passenger market shares. The freight market share of Qantas
decreased from 35 per cent in 1986 to 29 per cent in 1997. Ansett commenced
international flights in 1993 and its market share increased to 4  per  cent by
1997.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Other airlines in the top ten which experienced significant changes in market
share were Cathay Pacific, Polar Air Cargo and British Airways. Cathay
Pacific’s market share increased from 5  per  cent to 8  per  cent and Polar Air
Cargo’s increased from zero to 3 per cent. British Airways, as with its passenger
market share, lost freight market share, down from 5 per cent to 3 per cent.
Table C4 Carriers share of Australia’s international freight
market, 1997
a




b 190 773 29.4
Ansett Australia 25 278 3.9
Asian Express Airlines




Singapore Airlines 76 529 11.8
Air New Zealand 68 789 10.6
Cathay Pacific Airways 51 455 7.9
Malaysia Airlines 27 141 4.2
Japan Airlines 22 022 3.4
Polar Air Cargo 18 000 2.8
United Airlines 17 294 2.7
British Airways 15 954 2.5
Other 128 051 19.7
Total 649 371 100.0
na not applicable.
a Data include freight carried on scheduled flights only.
b Qantas data include its subsidiary Australia Asia Airlines.
c Service commenced December 1996.
d Service commenced January 1996.
Source: DTRD (unpublished).
The four Australian freight carriers (Qantas, Ansett, Asian Express Airlines and
National Jet Systems) carried 35 per cent of Australia’s international freight in
1997 (Table C4). Australian carriers had the same market share in 1986.C   THE AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES MARKET
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C3 Passenger and freight movements at international airports
Five of Australia’s international airports handled 97 per cent of the scheduled
international passenger traffic in 1997. Australia’s busiest airport, Sydney’s
Kingsford Smith airport, had around half of total passenger and freight
throughput (Table C5). Melbourne was the second busiest airport by passengers
(2.4  million) and tonnes of freight (163  000). It was closely followed by
Brisbane in passenger numbers (2.3 million) although Brisbane had only 74 000
tonnes of freight. Sydney and Melbourne together had 78 per cent of freight
throughput and 66 per cent of passenger throughput.
Sydney’s Kingsford Smith airport was consistently the busiest airport in
Australia for both freight and passengers over the decade 1986–1997.
Melbourne airport was the second busiest in terms of freight for the whole
period of time, while Brisbane was catching up to Melbourne’s passenger
throughput. Adelaide airport was relatively stagnant in terms of growth in
freight and passengers.






no. % tonnes %
Sydney 6 879 040 48.8 341 553 52.6
Melbourne 2 370 948 16.8 162 500 25.0
Brisbane 2 285 798 16.2 73 511 11.3
Perth 1 399 514 9.9 45 971 7.1
Cairns 745 110 5.3 13 290 2.0
Adelaide 208 890 1.5 10 608 1.6
Darwin 171 319 1.2 1 765 0.3
Norfolk Island 16 176 0.1 144 0.0
Coolangatta
a 13 822 0.1 0 0.0
Christmas Island
a 3 895 0.0 21 0.0
Hobart 3 689 0.0 6 0.0
Port Hedland 3 209 0.0 0 0.0
Broome
a 260 0.0 0 0.0
Townsville
b 240 0.0 0 0.0
Total 14 101 910 100.0 649 371
c 100.0
Note: Data include passengers and freight on scheduled flights only.
a International operations commenced: Coolangatta Dec. 1996, Christmas Island Nov. 1993, Broome Jan. 1996
b International operations ceased October 1994.
c Numbers for individual airports do not exactly sum to the total due to rounding errors.
Source: DTRD (unpublished).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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C4 Australia’s international air services charter market
The charter market in Australia is small relative to the scheduled market.
Passenger charter capacity approved was 245 Boeing 747 equivalent units (or
approximately 98  000 seats) in 1997 (Figure  C7). The total number of
passengers who flew in and out of Australia in the same year (including
passengers on scheduled flights) was 14.8 million. The seats available on these
flights (which is a better figure for comparison with charter capacity approved)
would have been even greater.
Freight charter capacity approved was also a small fraction of the freight
transported on all international flights in 1997. Freight charter capacity
approved in 1997 was 199 Boeing 747 equivalent units (equivalent to 19 900
tonnes). The amount of freight transported on scheduled flights was
649 000 tonnes (Table C4). Again, the capacity available on these scheduled
flights would have been even greater.
An upward trend from 1990 to 1995 was apparent for passenger charter
capacity approved (Figure  C7). This was associated with the sustained high
growth rates in passenger traffic after 1991 (Figure  C1). This trend was
followed by a pronounced downturn in approvals for passenger flights in 1997.
This could partly reflect the completion of some market testing and
development which began after the growth of inbound tourism in 1992. Charter
flights may have been converted to scheduled flights or discontinued. By
comparison, little discernible trend is evident for freight charter approvals.








1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
passengers freight
Note: Figures are for the capacity approved only, so are only indicative of the capacity actually operated. Not all
non-scheduled flights require approval — for example, programs of passenger charter flights by aircraft with a
capacity of 10 or fewer seats do not require approval. Boeing 747 equivalent values for passenger services were
calculated by totalling the number of seats available on charter passenger services approved and dividing by 400.
Freight services were calculated similarly using a factor of 100 tonnes. When the number of seats or the tonnes of
freight available on an aircraft was not clear, numbers were based on the normal seat configuration or payload.
Source: DTRD (unpublished).C   THE AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES MARKET
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D AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS COVERING SERVICES
Australia is party to a number of international trade agreements covering trade
in services including the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the
Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Agreement and the Australia–New
Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA).
However, only the ANZCERTA explicitly covers international air services. The
other agreements either exempt or do not specify commitments related to air
transport. This appendix provides a brief description of the agreements and their
relevance to international air services.
D1 The General Agreement on Trade in Services
The GATS resulted from the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations
concluded in 1994. Following the Uruguay Round, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) was established as the institutional framework to oversee
the GATS and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
All WTO members are required to accept the GATS along with the GATT as
part of the so-called ‘single undertaking’ outcome of the round. Nonetheless,
members have some discretion over the industry sectors to which the GATS
rules apply.
Coverage
The objective of the GATS is to provide a discipline for removing measures that
restrict trade in international services. Such measures covered by the agreement
include laws, regulations, procedures, decisions and administrative action.
The GATS applies to four different modes of supplying services in the
international market. These are:
·  cross-border supply of services — that is, the supply of services from the
territory of one member to the territory of another;
·  cross-border consumption of services — that is, the consumption of
services from the territory of one member in the territory of another
member;INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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·  commercial presence — that is, the commercial presence of suppliers from
one member in another member’s territory; and
·  presence of a natural person — that is, the temporary movement of natural
persons between members for the purposes of providing a service.
The GATS has a combination of general and specific commitments. Members’
general commitments are to apply a set of general obligations and disciplines
across all applicable services trade. Members’ specific commitments are to
apply ‘market access’ and ‘national treatment’ provisions to service sectors and
sub-sectors which they nominate (subject to qualifications and conditions with
respect to maintained measures, market access and/or national treatment)
(Hoekman 1995).
General commitments
The GATS general commitments are intended to apply across all members and
the majority of industry sectors. The core general commitment is the most-
favoured nation (MFN) principle which requires that each service or service
supplier from a member be treated no less favourably than any other foreign
service or supplier (article II) (Hoekman 1994).
The MFN principle applies across all service types unless they were explicitly
exempted by a member. Members cannot add exemptions after the agreement
commences, and should remove them within ten years. Exemptions are also
subject to review and negotiation in subsequent trade liberalisation rounds.
Another general obligation applies to the formation of regional trade agreements
among members (article  V). Such agreements must: involve substantial
coverage across service sectors (and should not exclude any mode of supply);
eliminate the majority of discriminatory measures among parties and/or prohibit
new ones; and not raise the overall level of barriers in trade in services to
outside parties for the sectors covered.
Members, when recognising other members’ standards, are required to be non-
discriminatory. They must not apply for the purposes of restricting trade. Other
provisions relate to the transparency of all general measures and additional
international agreements affecting trade in services.
A number of general commitments relate to the regulatory practices of
members, some of which are only general in the sense that they apply to the
service sectors actually scheduled by members. The other general commitments
cover mainly transparency and competitive behaviour and safeguard measures
which enable members to address balance of payments difficulties or to protect
public morals, health, security, consumer protection and privacy.D   AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS COVERING SERVICES
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Specific commitments
The specific commitments of GATS oblige members to apply the ‘market
access’ (article XVI) and the ‘national treatment’ (article XVII) provisions to
the service sectors which they schedule. Within each service sector, members
can also list limitations on coverage by mode of supply and any particular
protective measures which they wish to retain that serve to market access and/or
national treatment.
Ninety service sectors are covered under the specific commitment provisions —
or 58 per cent of the total services categories defined in the United Nations
Central Product Classification. Sixty-two per cent of these commitments had no
limitations imposed with respect to market access and 71 per cent had no
limitations with respect to national treatment. Business services accounted for
the highest percentage of specific commitments with no limitations (IC 1995).
Australia’s commitments
Australia made few MFN exemptions under the general commitment provisions,
and included a relatively high number of service sectors under the specific
commitments provisions.1 It has been argued that the commitments made imply
little liberalisation of Australia’s international trade in services (IC 1995).
Australia’s specific commitments include some services related to air transport
(see below).
Australia maintained general rules on market access and national treatment
across all sectors covered by its specific commitments. Like many other
members, these apply conditions on foreign investment and the temporary
movement of people (IC 1995).
Treatment of air services
Negotiations on air transport services as part of the Uruguay Round were
difficult. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (sub. 52) indicated that
the main difficulty is reconciling the multilateral MFN-based GATS regime
with the existing international air services system (which is based mostly on
bilateral reciprocal regulatory arrangements).
                                            
1 Under the MFN exemption provisions of the general commitments, Australia had submitted
three exemptions as at 1 January 1995. These apply to audiovisual and financial services.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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The GATS Annex on Air Transport Services specifically excludes traffic rights,
however granted, and services directly related to the exercise of traffic rights.2
Thus, the GATS does not affect obligations under bilateral agreements with
respect to these services.
However, there are three exceptions to the Annex where GATS commitments
do apply:
·  aircraft repair and maintenance services (excluding line maintenance);
·  selling and marketing of air transport services; and
·  computer reservation system (CRS) services.
The nature of the GATS means that these services will only be covered to the
extent that parties to the GATS agreement have listed or scheduled them as
specific commitments. And relatively few countries have scheduled the above
three categories of air transport services in the agreement (Hoekman 1995).
Categories in which key GATS members have undertaken specific commitments
and any listed MFN exemptions are summarised on Table D1.
Australia has scheduled aircraft repair and maintenance services and CRS
services. Apart from the general conditions that apply to all sectors, the
commitment for aircraft repair and maintenance services is unbound for cross-
border supply because there is a ‘lack of technical feasibility’ (GATS 1994).
The GATS coverage of air transport services is limited but the Council for
Trade in Services is committed to review periodically (and at least every five
years) developments in the air transport sector and the operation of the Annex to
consider widening the application of the GATS to the air transport sector. The
GATS and the Annex on Air Transport Services are due to be reviewed in or by
2000.
                                            
2 ‘Traffic rights’ are defined as the right for scheduled and non-scheduled services to operate
and/or to carry passengers, cargo and mail for remuneration or hire from, to, within or over
the territory of a member, including points to be served, routes to be operated, types of
traffic to be carried, capacity to be provided, tariffs to be charged and their conditions, and
criteria for designation of airlines (including such criteria as number, ownership and
control).D   AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS COVERING SERVICES
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Table D1 Member countries’ scheduled commitments for air









Australia Yes No Yes No




Yes Yes Yes Yes (sales and
marketing and
CRS)
Hong Kong No No No No
India No No No No
Indonesia No No No No
Japan Yes Yes Yes No
Republic of
Korea
No Yes Yes Yes (CRS)
Malaysia No No No No
New
Zealand
No Yes Yes No




Singapore No No No Yes (CRS)
Switzerland Yes No No Yes (selling and
marketing and
CRS)
Thailand Yes Yes (includes
CRS)





Yes No No Yes (selling and
marketing and
CRS)
Note: Does not describe the actual level of guaranteed market access and national treatment which a member has
undertaken to provide in the services listed. These vary from member to member and can only be determined by
examining each member’s schedule of specific commitments.
a Canada’s MFN exemption on tax refers to exemption from taxes on income and capital of a non-resident person
earned in Canada from the operation of aircraft in international traffic on the basis of reciprocity with the country
in which the person resides.
Source: DFAT (sub. 52, pp. 4–5).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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D2 Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation Agreement
The leaders of APEC economies3 signed the Bogor Declaration in November
1994 agreeing to work towards the goal of free and open trade and investment
by 2010 for industrialised economy members and by 2020 for the developing
economy members. The following year, member economies outlined a range of
liberalisation, facilitation and economic and technical cooperation initiatives in
the Osaka Action Agenda which gave effect to the Bogor Declaration.
Members, at subsequent meetings in Manila in 1996 and Vancouver in 1997,
reaffirmed and detailed actions and commitments taken to implement the Osaka
Action Agenda.
Coverage
The Osaka Action Agenda comprises general principles, a framework for the
process of implementation, and specific actions directed at achieving
liberalisation and facilitation of trade and investment among APEC member
economies. Unlike WTO agreements, the resolutions are not binding on
members and there is no scope for sanctions against non-complying members.
The general liberalisation and facilitation principles in the Osaka Action
Agenda include:
·  comprehensiveness, whereby liberalisation and facilitation are directed at
addressing all impediments to trade and investment;
·  consistency with the WTO framework of trade liberalisation;
·  comparability of trade and investment liberalisation and facilitation;
·  non-discrimination among members and a commitment to reduce barriers
with non-APEC economies as well as with APEC economies;
·  transparency of laws, regulations and administrative procedures which
affect the flow of goods, services and capital among members;
·  restraint from using measures that would effectively increase levels of
protection;
·  simultaneous, continuous and differentiated timetables for the process of
liberalisation, facilitation and cooperation;
                                            
3 The APEC member economies party to the Bogor Declaration are Australia, Brunei,
Canada, Chile, China, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico,
New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, Thailand
and the United States. Peru, Russia and Vietnam were admitted as APEC member
economies in November 1997.D   AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS COVERING SERVICES
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·  flexibility in the issues regarding the liberalisation and facilitation process,
reflecting the diverse nature of the members; and
·  economic and technical cooperation to aid liberalisation and facilitation.
APEC member economies also agreed to undertake specific actions across a
range of trade and investment matters or other policies that bear on trade and
investment. Concerning services, members agreed to reduce restrictions on
market access progressively, and to provide for MFN and national treatment for
trade in services. The guidelines for achieving this specify that each APEC
economy should contribute positively to the WTO negotiations on trade in
services, expand commitments under the GATS on market access and national
treatment, eliminate MFN exemptions where appropriate, and consider further
actions to facilitate supply of services. Members also agreed to undertake
‘collective actions’ in some services, including transportation.
Specific agreements about investment, competition policy and deregulation also
may directly affect services and transportation. The agreement covering
investment requires members to work towards liberalising their investment
regimes and provide for MFN and national treatment. With regard to
competition policy, members agreed to aim to introduce or maintain effective
and adequate competition policy and/or laws and associated enforcement.
Under the deregulation agreement, members will endeavour to eliminate trade
and investment distortions arising from domestic regulations. However, the
collective actions under these agreements largely comprise commitments to
develop dialogues and to improve information on these matters.
The economic and technical cooperation component of the Osaka Action
Agenda is an agreement to pursue such cooperation to achieve growth and
development objectives in the region, including the growth of trade and
investment. Thus, members agreed to support the effective operation of market
mechanisms.
Supporting the general economic and technical cooperation initiative, members
agreed to a number of common policy concepts under specific areas, including
transportation.
Treatment of air services
Unlike the GATS, the APEC agreement does not exclude air transport.
However, the non-binding nature of the agreement limits its scope to achieve
multilateral or plurilateral liberalisation of international air services in the
region.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Members agreed (under the Osaka Action Agenda) on transportation initiatives,
including resolutions about air transport. Potentially relevant resolutions under
the liberalisation and facilitation component include:
·  promotion of the implementation of International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) standards, regulations and safety measures;
·  examination of the possibility of taking appropriate steps to facilitate
privatisation or corporatisation of transportation infrastructure projects;
and
·  elimination within 10 years of requirements for paper documentation of
the key measures relevant to international transport and trade.
The economic and technical cooperation component calls members to seek to
develop an efficient, safe and integrated regional transport system. Potentially
relevant priorities include:
·  facilitating the harmonisation, coordination and transparency of transport
policies, regulations, procedures and standards;
·  promoting timely rational investment in the transport infrastructure;
·  encouraging the efficient use of existing infrastructure through the
application of appropriate trade and transport facilitation techniques;
·  promoting transport system safety and security;
·  promoting fair and equitable access to markets and a more competitive
transportation operating environment and cooperating to address
institutional constraints which affect the provision of transportation
services; and
·  facilitating the improvement of productivity, skills and the efficiency of
labour and management in the transport industry.
Members agreed on several joint activities or dialogue to support these priorities
including exploratory initiatives for airport congestion, aviation safety and
security, and future consideration of a consultation mechanism through which to
develop a well-integrated regional transport infrastructure.
APEC Transportation Working Group
The APEC Transportation Working Group established the Air Services Group
(ASG) to identify prospects for liberalising international air services consistent
with APEC objectives.
The ASG identified eight options for more competitive air services with fair and
equitable opportunity for all member economies, including:D   AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS COVERING SERVICES
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·  air carrier ownership and control;
·  tariffs;
·  ‘doing business matters’ related to commercial operations of airlines;
·  air freight;
·  multiple airline designation;
·  charter services;
·  airline cooperative arrangements; and
·  market access.
APEC Transport Ministers endorsed these eight options in 1997, and
reconvened the ASG to analyse and prioritise the eight options and develop
recommendations about the options, including how they should be
implemented.
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (sub. 52) indicated that Australia
has been actively involved in the process through the Department of Transport
and Regional Development. The ASG met in October 1997 and February 1998
to present its report on the options outlined above. One recommendation was
the progressive removal of restrictions on freight services, including the
separation of freight and passenger capacity in ASAs.
Recent liberalisation initiatives by individual members which have occurred in
the context of APEC include a commitment by the Republic of Korea to
liberalise air freight handling services by 1997 and to allow a foreign equity
ratio in air transport of up to 50 per cent by 2000, a grant of permission by
Chinese Taipei for foreign firms to set up travel agencies, and an offer by the
United states to negotiate bilateral ‘open skies’ agreements with APEC partners
(APEC 1996).
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (sub. 52) argued that the APEC
forum provides an opportunity for a cooperative and constructive approach to
liberalisation of aviation services, but that the sensitive nature of air services
issues and the consensus-based approach to APEC decision making are likely to
limit the pace and direction of aviation reform in APEC.
D3 Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade
Agreement (ANZCERTA)
The ANZCERTA came into effect in January 1983 with the objective of
liberalising bilateral trade between Australia and New Zealand. In February
1992, the Australian Government announced changes to the regulation ofINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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international air services, including a proposal to establish a single aviation
market between Australia and New Zealand under the framework of the
ANZCERTA.
Australia and New Zealand incorporated the Single Aviation Market (SAM)
arrangements into the ANZCERTA in November 1996 to liberalise aviation
services within and between each country.
The Single Aviation Market (SAM)
The Australia–New Zealand Single Aviation Market Arrangements liberalised
air services between and within the two countries. The key provisions of the
arrangements include:
·  allowing any authorised airline4 to fly unrestricted between Australia and
New Zealand;
·  permitting any such authorised airline to operate domestic services in
Australia and New Zealand, and to carry domestic passengers on
international services between airports approved for international services
in each country;
·  not limiting the number of authorised airlines that can operate services
linking any city pair combinations within and directly between the two
countries, nor the passenger or freight capacity on such routes;
·  not requiring tariffs charged by authorised airlines to be approved by
national aeronautical authorities;
·  permitting codesharing between authorised airlines (subject to relevant
disclosure requirements);
·  committing to adopt a liberal approach to the market’s charter operations;
and
·  subjecting all aviation activities (including terminal access) under the
arrangements to competition law as it applies in the relevant jurisdiction
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (NZ) 1996).
                                            
4 An authorised airline under the SAM arrangements must meet the ownership and control
requirements of the agreement or otherwise be approved by the ministers responsible for
civil aviation in both countries. It must also meet operational requirements covering security,
insurance, noise and operational authorisations from both countries. The ownership and
control requirements for such an airline are: at least 50 per cent ownership and effective
board control must be held by nationals from either country; at least two thirds of board
members must be nationals of either country; the chairperson of the board must be a national
of either country; and the airline’s head office and operational base must be in either
country.D   AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS COVERING SERVICES
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The SAM arrangement significantly liberalises air services between the two
countries, but it does not completely override the 1961 Air Services Agreement
between Australia and New Zealand. For example, it maintains restrictions on
beyond rights for both Australian and New Zealand carriers to fly to other third
countries as established in the 1992 Memorandum of Understanding (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (NZ) 1996). Entitlements for Australian and New
Zealand carriers to fly to other countries also continue to be governed by each
country’s ASAs.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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E AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL AIR
SERVICES ARRANGEMENTS
E1 Introduction
Australia operated air services arrangements (ASAs) with 51 countries, as at
February 1998 (Table  E.1). These arrangements typically comprise an Air
Services Agreement1 (which is regarded as an international treaty and is
ultimately enforceable under international law), a Memorandum of
Understanding and/or an exchange of letters.
The Department of Transport and Regional Development (DTRD sub. 33)
indicated that provisions typically contained in Australian ASAs include:
·  a guarantee of fair and equal opportunity for airlines designated under the
agreement;
·  agreement that designated carriers are substantially owned and effectively
controlled by citizens of the contracting parties;
·  agreed principles for regulating capacity and tariffs;
·  rights granted for the designated carriers of one party to conduct business
in the country of the other party;
·  protocols on airworthiness and safety;
·  agreement to cooperate on aviation security;
·  exemption from duty by both parties for aircraft fuel, spare parts and
supplies used by airlines of the other party;
·  descriptions of the routes over which agreed services can operate (usually
contained in an annex); and
·  an agreement that both parties will amend the ASA to conform with any
matter covered by any multilateral agreement into which both parties have
entered.
This appendix highlights the main provisions typically contained in Australia’s
ASAs and the significant differences among individual arrangements. It includes
                                            
1 Australia’s Air Services Agreements generally consist of a series of articles (or provisions)
and one or more annexes. The most common annex is the route annex which specifies the
routes available to designated carriers under the agreement.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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a table that summarises the existing capacity entitlements under Australia’s
ASAs and the current use of those entitlements.
E2 Designation and authorisation
Australia has pursued a policy of multiple designation of its own international
carriers since 1992. Qantas was previously the only Australian carrier
authorised to operate international services. Multiple designation has now been
incorporated into most of Australia’s recently amended or negotiated ASAs.
However, as at August 1998, single designation for Australian carriers still
existed under arrangements with seven countries and dual designation existed in
arrangements with two countries.
Designation and authorisation articles under Australian ASAs establish the
number of airlines which one contracting party can designate to the other to
operate agreed services and when airlines become authorised to operate
services.
Authorisation occurs when the other contracting party is satisfied that the
designated airline is qualified to meet certain conditions. These typically require
substantial ownership and effective control of airlines to be vested in the
nationals of the contracting party. Other typical conditions include
airworthiness standards and compliance with the laws and regulations of the
receiving party. The suspension or revocation of authorisation is allowed under
similar conditions.
To establish that they are substantially owned and effectively controlled by
Australian citizens, Australian international carriers must satisfy a number of
requirements specified by the Commonwealth Government. These requirements
were set out in a policy statement issued on 22 December 1992 by the then
Minister for Transport and Communications, and include the following:
·  at least two thirds of the Board members must be Australian citizens;
·  the Chairperson of the Board must be an Australian citizen;
·  the airline’s head office must be in Australia; and
·  the airline’s operational base must be in Australia.
Further, the Air Navigation Act 1920 prevents foreign airlines from holding
more than 35 per cent in aggregate of equity (with a limit of 25 per cent on the
total shareholding of any single foreign airline). This does not apply to Qantas.
The  Qantas Sale Act 1992 incorporates the above restrictions, with two
additional provisions: foreign persons cannot hold more than 49  per  cent ofE   AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES ARRANGEMENTS
  283
equity and Qantas is prohibited from taking any action to become incorporated
outside Australia.
The restrictions imposed by Australian authorities on the ownership and control
of Australian airlines do not automatically establish the authorisation of the
airlines under Australia’s ASAs. The foreign authorities must find the
ownership and control of the airlines acceptable before they will be authorised
under each ASA.
E3 Tariffs
A tariff article in ASAs establishes procedures for setting airfares on the agreed
services. DTRD (sub. 33, p. 16) indicated that Australia has several different
tariff regimes in its ASAs, based on the number of states that must approve the
regime before it becomes effective. As at April 1998, these were:
·  double approval — in which both states must approve a tariff; found in 34
of Australia’s ASAs;
·  country of origin — in which only the state in which the transportation
originates needs to approve the tariff; found only in Australia’s agreement
with the United States;
·  no approval needed — found only in Australia’s agreement with New
Zealand; and
·  double (or dual) disapproval — in which both states concerned must
disapprove a tariff to prevent it from coming into effect; found in 15 of
Australia’s ASAs.
DTRD indicated that double disapproval is its preferred method for Australian
ASAs. It also indicated that Australia’s policy is for tariff setting to be based on
the airlines’ commercial judgment, not government regulation (unless the
competition authorities detect anticompetitive intent) (sub. 33, p. 16).
E4 Capacity
Australia’s ASAs typically include a capacity article which states that capacity
entitlements will be established and varied by an exchange of letters and/or
Memoranda of Understanding. This allows changes to capacity entitlements
without changes to the Air Services Agreement (which would require
ratification by the Senate). Capacity entitlements are determined in this way for
two reasons: first, capacity arrangements may be changed quickly; and second,
capacity is the most frequently renegotiated provision in agreements. CapacityINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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was renegotiated with Australia’s bilateral partners more than 63 times between
January 1992 and September 1997. Capacity entitlements negotiated under
Australia’s ASAs for both Australian and foreign carriers are set out in
Table E.1.
The capacity article also generally states that there will be fair and equal
opportunity for designated airlines to operate the agreed services. This seeks to
guard against discrimination and unfair competitive practices by the other
contracting party. Often an additional clause specifies that airlines operating on
the same routes will avoid unduly affecting the services of their competitors
from the other country. This is intended to give governments an avenue to
follow if the conduct of an airline is found to be unacceptable. Dumping is an
example of conduct to which this clause could apply.
Capacity arrangements for passengers may be specified in terms of the number
of seats, aircraft types (for example, Boeing 747s), units and/or frequencies that
may operate on each agreed route each week. The capacity entitlements for
designated carriers of each country under Australia’s ASA with Canada, for
example, are 1 660 seats per week. But Australia’s ASA with Indonesia states
27 Boeing 747s per week (Table E.1). If an ASA uses numbers of aircraft types
per week, it typically includes conversion formulae to allow for alternative
aircraft to be used. The only Australian ASA to include market driven
entitlements is that with the United States: additional capacity becomes
available to airlines under this ASA if demand has grown and other conditions
are met.
The capacity allowed as at 20 June 1998 for either home or foreign countries’
carriers was almost entirely used under the ASAs with some countries
(Table  E.1). However, this does not imply that these flights were full.
Australian carriers had no remaining flight capacity to Italy2 and little capacity
left to Hong Kong, India, the Philippines and Taiwan. Further, there was no
additional capacity remaining for foreign carriers from Italy, Austria and Dubai
and little available for airlines from Malaysia, Hong Kong and Singapore.
Overall, capacity available was well ahead of passenger numbers (Figure 5.1).
Australian ASAs generally provide for codesharing. The amount of capacity
used for codesharing on a flight is usually counted against the country of the
airline selling the ticket. However, arrangements for codesharing may differ
among agreements. Some arrangements may count a minimum number of seats
or fraction of aircraft equivalent units on each flight as codeshared capacity. A
minimum of 100 seats of its capacity may be attributed to airline A, for
                                            
2 Australia is currently holding negotiations with Italy.E   AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES ARRANGEMENTS
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example, even though it has only sold five seats. This may have the effect of
preventing prospective carriers from using capacity under the same agreement.
Australian ASAs sometimes also provide for third country codesharing. Third
country codesharing generally makes two allowances: first, it allows designated
carriers to use capacity entitlements negotiated under the ASA by codesharing
on services operated by a third country carrier; and second, it allows third
country carriers to codeshare on services operated by carriers designated under
the ASA using capacity entitlements negotiated under the ASA. There are
sometimes restrictions on third country code sharing although they are
becoming less common.
Capacity under many Australian ASAs can be used for either passengers or
freight. When capacity is specified in terms of numbers of passenger seats, there
may be a substitution formula for passenger seats and freight.
The Commonwealth Government has increasingly sought to negotiate separate
entitlements for dedicated freight services. As at March 1998, there were over
50 Boeing 747 equivalents per week of dedicated capacity under 18 of
Australia’s bilateral agreements (DTRD sub. 33). Australia also recently
negotiated an ASA with Luxembourg which provided unrestricted rights for the
operation of dedicated freight services.
E5 Route rights
Australia’s ASAs generally restrict the points in Australia available to foreign
carriers. This may occur in a number of ways. Some arrangements allow foreign
carriers to operate services to a choice of certain destinations in Australia — for
example, the agreement with Kuwait specifies that any two points in Australia
are available. The choice of points may also be restricted to a list. Alternatively,
the ASA may restrict a foreign carrier’s operations to a discrete list of points
with no option to operate to unlisted destinations in Australia — for example,
Mauritian carriers are unable to operate services to Sydney because Perth and
Melbourne are the only points specified in the agreement.
Most Australian ASAs provide fifth freedom rights. These may include rights
for intermediate points between the two countries or beyond points. The use of
fifth freedom rights under an ASA depends on the approval of the third country
— for example, Singapore is allowed as an intermediate point under the
Australia–UK agreement. This alone does not allow Australian airlines to use
Singapore as an intermediate point on the way to the United Kingdom; this
route is only available because the United Kingdom has agreed to it and
specified it as a beyond point under the Australia–Singapore agreement.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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The capacity available for fifth freedom points is sometimes subject to
restrictions in addition to those that apply to third and fourth freedom traffic.
The capacity available for third and fourth freedom traffic under Australia’s
ASA with New Zealand is unrestricted, but capacity for fifth freedom traffic is
restricted to the equivalent of 12 Boeing 747 flights per week.
E6 Consultations, amendments and settlement of disputes
ASAs establish the process for future consultations and amendments of the
arrangements. It is usually agreed under Australian ASAs that discussion or
correspondence must begin within a certain time period after the receipt of a
request for consultation unless mutually decided by the contracting parties.
Amendments are usually allowed at any time by agreement in writing. Also,
ASAs typically include a clause noting that the arrangements will be amended
to conform with any multilateral agreement into which both parties have
entered. A ‘settlement of disputes’ article provides for procedures for resolving
disputes. These procedures, which commonly include consultation and
arbitration, are provided as a last resort.301
F MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF
LIBERALISED INTERNATIONAL AIR
SERVICE AGREEMENTS
The objective of the modelling reported in this appendix is to assess the effects
of Australia’s international air services arrangements (ASAs) on the market for
air travel to and from Australia. Specifically, the project aims to:
·  assess how the entry of a new Australian international carrier such as
Ansett International affects competition, prices, Australian and foreign
economic welfare, and passenger travel to Australia in relevant markets;1
and
·  illustrate how efficiency and competitive gains from an open club
agreement can affect the economic welfare of open club members.
Model results suggest that the entry by Ansett International into the markets
considered has resulted in price reductions and increases in passenger travel and
Australian and foreign economic welfare. Model results also illustrate how open
clubs, which promote efficiency gains and free airlines from the constraints of
bilateral agreements, can increase the economic welfare of club members.
This study adopts a spatial equilibrium modelling approach whereby airlines use
their flight networks to move passengers from their origins to their destinations.
Prices and airline networks are estimated in an equilibrium that explicitly
accounts for the demand for air travel, the costs and operation of airline
networks and the strategic interactions of airlines. A technical paper supporting
the modelling is available from the Commission on request and on the
Commission’s webpage (PC 1998).
An Independent Review Panel was appointed to comment on the modelling
work in accordance with requirements under the Productivity Commission Act
1998. Panel members’ reports can be found in Attachment F1. The Commission
thanks Qantas Airways, Ansett International, the Department of Transport and
Regional Development and the Bureau of Transport Economics for their
assistance with data and their comments on the modelling framework. It also
thanks the participants at the technical seminar and modelling workshop for
their comments.
                                            
1 In this study, the term ‘price’ denotes net airfares, which are fares exclusive of discounts but
inclusive of sales commissions and overrides. Overrides are special conditions on discount
tickets — for example, for passengers who stay overnight on a Saturday.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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The appendix is organised as follows. Sections F1 to F4 introduce the modelling
framework, the flows of passengers by country and airline, the demand for air
travel, and network specification respectively. Sections F5 to F7 outline airline
behaviour, model validation and economic welfare estimates. Finally, sections
F8 and F9 present the results of scenarios modelling the effects of ‘Ansett’s
entry’ and plurilateral open club, respectively.
F1 Modelling framework
A review of the literature shows that three main approaches have been used to
determine the factors that affect prices in air travel markets (PC 1998). The first
approach uses econometric methods to test statistically whether market
concentration, demand and cost variables together explain prices better than
demand and cost variables alone. The second approach is also econometric. It
focuses either on estimating the extent of economies of density or of scale in
airline networks, or on estimating productivity differences between airlines. The
third approach is based on spatial modelling, and is the approach adopted in this
study.
The conceptual framework embodied in the model draws on three articles. The
demand specification, drawing on Gillen, Harris and Oum (1997), assumes that
airlines’ services are imperfect substitutes for each other and that customers
care about the price and non-price attributes of travel (for example, the
frequency of service).
The market behaviour of airlines draws on Lederer (1993) who showed the
existence of a (unique) non-cooperative equilibrium in an airline model that can
be adapted to the purposes of this study. His demand specification differs from
that of Gillen, Harris and Oum but also assumes that airlines compete in price
and non-price attributes of travel.
The specification of the airlines’ networks draws on the work of Hendricks,
Piccione and Tan (1995). It internalises network design and disentangles the
network passenger flows from passenger demand within an imperfectly
competitive framework.
The model is subject to a number of limiting assumptions:
·  it captures the industry at a point in time;
·  there are no economic conditions for airline entry or exit;
·  slot and gate constraints are not taken into account; and
·  negotiated capacity exceeds airline demand.F MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF LIBERALISED INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE AGREEMENTS
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The first two limitations imply that the model is a comparative static, short-run
model. No dynamic investment or entry and exit decisions are made. The third
limitation exists because the lack of city designation of passengers in the data
excludes estimation of any efficiency losses that may result from capacity-
constrained airports or from negotiated restrictions on city access. The fourth
limitation implies that negotiated flight capacities are not binding constraints on
airlines’ networks.
F2 Passenger flows by country and airline
Airlines offer a range of services, including scheduled passenger services,
freight and mail services, non-scheduled passenger services and incidental
services. Each service generates revenue. However, scheduled passenger
services provide most airline revenue and as confirmed by industry dictate
network configuration in conjunction with ASAs. Consequently, the network
model developed in this appendix concentrates on scheduled passenger services
with adjustments to airline costs to account for the absence of other revenue
sources in the model (Section F4). It should be noted that the total gains from
liberalisation estimated in the model exclude any collateral gains to freight and
mail services.
There are two sources of passenger movement data. The first source is airline
uplift–discharge information. It is an incomplete record of passenger journeys
for two reasons. First, it records people carried on planes between two cities
without regard to their initial origin or final destination. Second, it is generally
available for many foreign airlines on only one leg of the passenger journey.
Singapore Airlines, for example, offers Australians many passenger
destinations, but it only reports passenger numbers on flight legs between
Australia and Singapore. The second and better source of passenger movements
is a survey of responses by travellers for their origin–destination travel by
airline. The data are compiled in Avstats (DTRD 1998). Passenger data are for
1995, so that they are consistent in the model with the most recently published
International Civil Aviation Organization cost data (ICAO 1996b). However,
data for 1997 are used for some simulations.
Country coverage
Two levels of country coverage were used for this study. The broadest coverage
aimed to test the robustness of the model for international travel to and from
Australia. A narrower coverage was adopted for policy simulations to maintainINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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numerical tractability in the model while allowing for any possible network
effects of possible liberalised ASAs (Section F6).
The broadest coverage includes routes for travel to and from Australia for 12
foreign destinations. Nine correspond to countries or economies — Japan, the
Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and China in North Asia, and
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand in South-East Asia. The other
three correspond to regions — North America (the United States and Canada),
the United Kingdom/Ireland and the Rest of Europe.
Country pairs rather than city pairs were chosen for demand because the Avstats
passenger data for individual airlines were only available on a country pair
basis. This is not an issue for many foreign countries because there is only one
major airport (for example, in Hong Kong, Singapore, the Republic of Korea,
Taiwan, Thailand and Malaysia). However, the cost data used in this study are
city based. Therefore representative cities must be chosen for the other
countries. They are Sydney (Australia), Beijing (China), Tokyo (Japan), Jakarta
(Indonesia), Los Angeles (North America), London/Heathrow (United
Kingdom/Ireland) and Rome (Rest of Europe).
The broadest market coverage captures 78 per cent and 91 per cent of
Australian resident and foreign visitor passenger movements between Australia
and the relevant country, respectively (excluding New Zealand). New Zealand
is excluded because travel between Australia and New Zealand is not subject to
capacity constraints, although fifth freedom restrictions to third countries apply.
The Japanese, North American and European markets are by far the largest
markets (Table F1). Inbound foreign visitor flows dominate outbound
Australian resident flows in nine of the 12 markets. Japan, the Republic of
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan are particularly oriented towards foreign visitors.
In contrast, Malaysia, North America, Thailand, United Kingdom/Ireland and
Rest of Europe are only slightly tilted towards foreign visitors. Australian
resident movements exceed foreign visitor movements in the remaining four
markets (including the rest of the world), although only marginally for China
and Hong Kong.F MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF LIBERALISED INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE AGREEMENTS
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Table F1 Passenger movements to and from Australia by market,
1995
Between Australia and: Australian resident Foreign visitor Total
a
‘000 ‘000 ‘000
China 108 88 197
Hong Kong 313 284 597
Indonesia 452 282 734
Japan 88 1573 1660
Malaysia 183 228 410
North America 721 731 1452
Korea, Republic of 28 338 366
Singapore 193 414 607
Taiwan 59 308 366
Thailand 153 166 319
United Kingdom/Ireland 599 745 1344
Rest of Europe
b 544 784 1329
Rest of world
c 955 576 1531
Total 4396 6517 10912
a Numbers may not sum to total as a result of rounding error.
b Includes former USSR.
c Excludes New Zealand.
Source: DTRD (1998).
Airline coverage
Avstats origin–destination data show that passenger origin–destination travel
between two countries is dominated by their national carriers. The remaining
market share is distributed to a large number of third-country carriers, some of
which are important competitors. The modelling problem is to incorporate the
important third-country competition while keeping the problem numerically
tractable. This is achieved by omitting from a market those third-country
airlines that have a marginal impact on the model solution. The rules used in
this study for airline inclusion/exclusion are found in PC (1998).
The model’s depiction of airlines’ shares of the total traffic to and from
Australia and the number of markets served by airline are presented in Table F2.
Model shares overstate those observed in Avstats data, while the model’sINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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number of markets served understate those observed in Avstats data because of
the exclusion of third-country carriers that have marginal influence.
Table F2 Model market share by airline in travel to and from
Australia by market based on 1995
a
Airline Total share Home market
b Markets served
%% n o .
Qantas 43.1 43.1 12
Singapore Airlines 8.1 37.7 12
Japan Airlines 5.8 26.2 5
Cathay Pacific Airways 5.7 40.2 8
Air New Zealand 5.2 na 9
United Airlines 4.5 28.3 1
British Airways 4.4 16.4 5
Garuda Indonesia 4.1 34.1 4
Malaysia Airlines 4.0 51.2 7
Ansett Australia 3.8 3.8 6
Thai Airways International 1.7 29.5 4
Korean Air 1.7 34.1 2
All Nippon Airways 1.7 8.7 2
Alitalia 1.2 6.9 3
KLM 1.0 4.5 2
Sempati Air 0.9 10.9 1
Olympic Airways 0.8 5.2 3
EVA Airways 0.8 18.0 2
Lufthansa 0.6 4.5 2
Mandarin 0.6 13.2 1
Lauda Air 0.4 2.5 2
Air China 0.3 15.0 1
a To illustrate the contents of the table, consider Singapore Airlines. Singapore Airlines carried 8.1 per cent of
the total passengers in and out of Australia and 37.7 per cent of the passengers who cited Singapore as their
origin or ultimate destination. Markets comprise Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, China, Hong Kong,
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, North America, United Kingdom/Ireland and Rest of Europe.
b British Airways’ share was calculated using the United Kingdom/Ireland market. Other European carriers were
calculated using the Rest of Europe market.
Source: DTRD (1998).F MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF LIBERALISED INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE AGREEMENTS
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Qantas dominates total flows but each national airline is significant for travel
between its own country and Australia. Airlines in the model that compete with
Qantas in most markets are Cathay Pacific Airways, Air New Zealand and
Singapore Airlines. Japan Airlines, Malaysia Airlines, Ansett International,
British Airways and Thai International compete with Qantas in approximately
half the markets. The remainder compete with Qantas in only a few markets.
In total, the model with broadest coverage has 21 airlines serving 12 markets
although most markets are served by only a few airlines. The model captures at
least 93 per cent of the passengers travelling on the route for all routes except
United Kingdom/Ireland and Rest of Europe (Table F3). Policy simulation
results do not depend on these two countries.
Table F3 Model share of total passenger movements by route
based on 1995
Between Australia and: Model coverage Airlines serving the market
%n o .
China 96 11








North America 93 5
United Kingdom/Ireland 85 14
Rest of Europe 79 14
Source: Commission estimates.
F3 Demand for air travel
Aggregate demand for air travel is influenced by many factors including:
·  prices by airline and class of ticket;
·  passenger type by price sensitivity, time sensitivity and frequency;
·  seasonal demand factors;INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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·  frequency of departures/arrivals;
·  time flown;
·  number of stops;
·  city of origin and destination; and
·  nationality of carrier.
Behavioural parameters for these factors are difficult to estimate. One reason is
that the interests of passengers largely coincide with those of the airlines for
some factors. For example, passengers typically want the shortest flight with the
fewest stops. Airlines that minimise costs subject to hub-and-spoke cost
considerations fly more direct routes with shorter flight times and fewer stops.
Estimation is further complicated by the lack of observed differences in air
services by airline and in the prices paid for the air services by airline. Only by
observing differences in prices and services can the effect of these demand
factors can be estimated.
Demand in the model can be viewed as a two step process. Travellers decide
whether to travel to a given destination based on an average, quality-adjusted
price of travel to the destination. They then decide which airline to fly based on
the airlines’ relative price and frequency of service. The demand specification
relies on four estimated demand parameters: an aggregate price elasticity, an
aggregate frequency elasticity, an airline substitution elasticity, and a parameter
for each airline’s distinct qualities.2 Parameters for the first three have been
estimated and published in the literature (Brueckner and Spiller (1994), BTCE
(1997), Gillen, Harris and Oum (1997), among others). The last parameter is
estimated as a residual during model calibration. See PC (1998) for more detail.
BTCE (1997) estimated aggregate price elasticities for a number of Australian
markets (Attachment F2). Where none was available, an average of similar
countries was used (PC 1998). No estimates of frequency elasticities or
substitution elasticities were available for Australian markets. Therefore
estimates were taken from studies of non-Australian markets. Gillen, Harris and
Oum (1997) reported a median value of 0.1 for estimated frequency elasticities
in studies that attempted to measure responsiveness of aggregate demand to
increases in the frequency of flights. They also found that among econometric
                                            
2 Demand elasticities reflect the degree to which demand is responsive to changes in some
other variable. An aggregate price or, respectively, frequency elasticity of 0.1, for example,
indicates that a 1 per cent decrease in aggregate demand results if price increases or,
respectively, frequency decreases by 10 per cent. Similarly, a substitution elasticity of –2
indicates that a 10 per cent increase in an airline’s price results in a 20 per cent decrease in
its market share.F MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF LIBERALISED INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE AGREEMENTS
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studies the median value of the estimated degree of substitutability between
airlines was 2.
Given that Australian estimates of substitution elasticities and frequency
elasticities are not available, validation experiments were conducted to test how
sensitive simulation results are to the substitution and frequency elasticities that
are assumed in the model and to discover a range of values for which the model
is best able to replicate observed prices and quantities (Section F7). Because of
the difficulties in estimating price elasticities noted in Chapter 6, additional
sensitivity experiments which varied the aggregate price elasticity were
conducted (PC 1998).
F4 Network specification
The physical problem the airline faces is designing a network that moves its
passengers from their origins to their destinations. In meeting passenger demand
for travel, an airline chooses the following:
·  frequency of service between cities on the network;
·  number and type of aircraft used;
·  scheduling of flights in the network; and
·  routing/paths of passenger flows across flight sectors.
But its choice among these factors is limited by:
·  airport constraints — for example, rights to gates and landing and takeoff
slots;
·  capacity of aircraft by type;
·  distances/flight times between cities on the network;
·  input lumpiness in aircraft, other physical capital, personnel and periodic
maintenance;
·  time taken to on- and off-load passengers and baggage; and
·  ASAs.
The airline’s economic problem overlays its physical problem and has a number
of aspects. One aspect is to minimise the costs of meeting passenger flows in its
network while ensuring its chosen quality of service. A second aspect relates to
airline pricing across passenger types and ticket classes for which a range of
prices is possible. The fixed costs of the network need not be recovered equally
across flights and passengers. Yield management systems, for example, seek to
fill planes by offering different fares, conditions and times to different types of
passengers (Chapter 2).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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It is beyond the scope of this project and the available data to replicate every
aspect of an airline’s network problem. Instead the aim is to develop an
aggregated annual version of its pricing and network problem which has a
solution that is approximately the same as its actual average annual behaviour.
Thus, equations in the model ensure that every airline has sufficient aircraft
capacity to carry its passengers and that passengers arrive at their destination
and return to their origin. Finally, because an aircraft on a given flight sector
can have passengers of different origins and destinations, prices in markets will
be linked through the costs of flight sectors that markets share.
Network costs in the model have two components. The first is the flight sector
component and comprises the costs incurred in moving passengers along the
flight sector. The Commission derived its flight cost estimates from Aerocost2
(BTCE 1997). The second is an overhead component and includes all
administrative expenses and the costs of ticketing, sales, commissions and
adjustments for overrides.
Flight sector costs
Flight sector costs are divided into three categories:
·  flight-specific costs are incurred no matter how many passengers are
carried and include costs such as airport landing and take-off charges, fuel
needed for an empty aircraft, flight personnel and aircraft maintenance;
·  passenger-specific costs are costs that increase incrementally with the
number of passengers (and their baggage) on board — essentially
increased fuel costs and provisioning; and
·  aircraft capital costs are an imputed hourly charge of the leased aircraft
multiplied by the block hours of the flight.3
Aerocost2 data indicate that passenger-specific costs on a flight are small
relative to total flight costs. Industry confirmed this cost structure. For example,
passenger-specific costs for a Boeing 747–400 flying with a 75 per cent load
factor from Sydney to Tokyo are approximately 15 per cent of total flight sector
costs (including the capital cost of the plane).
                                            
3 The block hours of a flight denote the time elapsed from the aircraft leaving the departure
gate to arrival at the arrival gate. Aerocost2 employs annual block hour use data in
computing the hourly charge of the lease. Annual block hour use is representative of
observed usage for each aircraft type operating in Australia. It is a consequence of network
design and may be affected by changes in ASAs. Such changes would be incorporated in
model simulations as a change in airline productivity rather than as a reduction in the hourly
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Overhead costs
The value of overhead costs was computed as being proportional to the total
flight sector costs of the network at observed quantities. This proportion was
estimated using ICAO’s breakdown of costs into various cost categories with
adjustments for freight and the above-average flight distances in the region
(PC 1998). The computation estimated an average overhead charge of $260 per
passenger. The industry provided a range of opinion on this estimate and judged
it acceptable for working purposes. Its reasonableness depended in part on how
cost items, such as maintenance, are allocated to overhead and flight costs
categories and on which sales commissions are included in the net fare.
Little information is available on how network characteristics affect overheads.
Discussions with industry suggested that the size of overheads depends on the
number of cities served (for example, airline city offices), the number of
passengers carried on the network (for example, ticketing and sales costs that
are included in net fares) and a general network size (for example, advertising).
The modelling adopts a pragmatic approach by assessing the degree to which
models need overheads to increase with the passengers carried to replicate
observed quantities and prices.4
Omitting overhead costs can have economic welfare implications. If overhead
costs were excluded from the model, then the returns covering overheads would
be wrongly identified as economic rents rather than as the return necessary to
recover costs. Prices that do not cover overhead costs represent a transfer from
producers to consumers, and cannot be sustained in the long run. The effect of
Ansett’s entry on Australian economic welfare depends in part on Ansett’s
overhead cost because overheads are incurred as a cost of entry.
Airline productivity and costs adjustments
The industry and the Bureau of Transport Economics suggested that airline
costs be adjusted to reflect:
·  the absence of freight services;
·  the differences in airline productivity; and
·  the differences in airline input prices.
The absence of freight services in the model can make the industry appear less
profitable because the model attributes all the costs of flying to passenger
                                            
4 For example, one industry source suggested an imputation of a share of overhead as a
charge per revenue passenger kilometre. Unfortunately, time did not permit constructing a
model and performing the relevant simulations with this overhead assumption.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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services even though some costs are shared with freight. Also, differences in
airline costs and productivity should be included in the model because airlines’
costs differ according to their relative productivity and the input prices they
face. In response to these views, the Commission made four adjustments to the
Aerocost2 base estimates: two for freight costs, one for individual airline
productivity and one for labour costs.
The marginal cost of a shared input is covered by the marginal revenue of all
airline services that share it. Neglecting the marginal revenue of freight services
implicitly imposes too high a marginal cost on passenger services. The share of
freight services revenue in scheduled flight revenue is taken to be an estimate of
the adjustment to shared flight costs for the marginal revenue from freight
service. Aerocost2 flight-specific costs and capital costs are reduced by 15
per cent to account for the exclusion of freight services (PC 1998). The industry
confirmed that these adjustments lead to ‘ballpark’ estimates of flight costs for
Australian carriers.
The Commission constructed model costs for individual airlines over their flight
sectors by applying to its Aerocost2 data the differences in airline labour costs
and productivity as estimated by Oum and Yu (1995).5 Aerocost2 data were
assumed to be representative of flight costs for the Australian airlines and for
Air New Zealand.
Oum and Yu’s analysis roughly divides most of the airlines competing with
Qantas into four categories.
1. Airlines with the lowest wages, lowest input prices and low productivity
include Thai International. This combination leads to higher operating costs
but significantly lower overheads than those faced by Qantas.
2. Airlines with lower wages, lower input prices and higher productivity include
Singapore Airlines, Cathay Pacific Airways and Korean Air. This
combination leads to lower operating costs and overheads than those faced
by Qantas.
3. Airlines with higher wages, higher input prices and higher productivity
include British Airways and United Airlines. This combination leads to
similar operating costs but higher overheads than those faced by Qantas.
4. Airlines with highest wages, highest input prices and low productivity
include Japanese carriers and the other European carriers. This combination
                                            
5 The study by Oum and Yu (1995) is the most comprehensive and up-to-date study available
on different airline networks productivity levels, input prices and competitiveness.F MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF LIBERALISED INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE AGREEMENTS
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leads to significantly higher operating costs and overheads than those faced
by Qantas.
Oum and Yu (1995) did not report on all the airlines in the model. Omitted or
partly covered airlines were allocated to the categories as follows: Air New
Zealand and Ansett International are taken as being as productive as Qantas
with similar input and labour prices.6 Malaysia Airlines, Air China, EVA Air,
Sempati Air, and Garuda Indonesia are classified in the first group. Finally,
Oum and Yu estimated that Lufthansa and KLM were more productive than
Qantas with higher input prices (as in the third group). Their labour prices were
taken to be those of Alitalia.
The Commission applied Oum and Yu’s estimates of airline productivity and
cost differences to flight sectors in the following manner. Airline flight sector
costs were adjusted for all the productivity differences that Oum and Yu
estimated and only for the differences in labour prices according to labour’s
share in flight costs. Other flight costs were not adjusted because most other
costs, such as navigation charges, landing costs, fuel costs and provisioning
costs, will be similar for any airline operating over the same flight sector.
Overhead costs, although not included in Oum and Yu’s analysis, were adjusted
by input price differences to reflect different prices for administration, ticketing,
office space and the like.
Oum and Yu’s estimates were not entirely accepted by industry analysts. For
example, they pointed out that some airlines include commissions in revenues
and costs while others exclude them. Because airline total efficiency depends on
a revenue-share weighted average of freight and passenger service output, the
use of revenue estimates constructed from differing revenue definitions will
lead to biased estimates of relative efficiencies between airlines. Sensitivity
analyses were performed to test whether model conclusions depend on the
estimated differences in productivity and in input and labour prices (PC 1998).
F5 Airline behaviour
A number of possible airline behaviours were considered in the study. They
include price-setting, price-taking, quantity-setting and codesharing behaviours.
Each behaviour is coupled with a network choice which is constrained by
international aviation agreements. All assume that airlines attempt to maximise
profits over their networks. Two scenarios of airline behaviour were used
extensively in the modelling work — price-taking behaviour and price-setting
                                            
6 One industry analyst suggested that Air New Zealand had significantly lower labour costs.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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behaviour.7 The results in the report are for models of price-setting behaviour.
Results for price-taking behaviour are discussed in sensitivity simulations.
Price-setting behaviour is preferred to price-taking behaviour as a behavioural
assumption for three reasons. First, discussions with industry suggested that the
airlines recognise that they have discretion in setting their prices. Second,
observed levels of market concentration suggest that strategic behaviour
between airlines is likely to be the rule rather than the exception, while the
econometric literature shows that prices increase with market concentration.
Third, the BTCE (1997) tested in a statistical sense whether published prices
and the amount of travel were jointly determined or determined in sequence. It
found that published prices were determined before the amount of travel with a
lag of about one year.
Under price-setting behaviour, airlines recognise that non-price characteristics
lead one carrier’s air travel to be an imperfect substitute for another carrier’s air
travel. Consequently, they have discretion in setting the price of their services.
Their price and network choices affect their competitors and the demand for
their competitors’ products.
Each airline takes into account the network and prices of its competitors
(essentially computing the residual demand for its product) and chooses prices
and flight frequencies to maximise its profits.8 An airline equates its marginal
cost to the marginal revenues of its residual demand, leading to price
discrimination. For example, a return price from Sydney to Tokyo may differ
from a return price from Tokyo to Sydney. Prices differ across airlines because
their marginal costs and market power differ. A lower cost airline will charge a
higher price than that charged by a higher cost airline if its market power can
support it.
F6 Model validation
Validation experiments were conducted for the model with broad coverage and
the model with narrow coverage which was developed for the policy
simulations (Sections F9 and F10). The former is based on a large number of
                                            
7 Quantity-setting behaviour, where airlines determine price levels by restricting frequency of
service in their networks, was initially tested but rejected as a working behavioural
hypothesis. The demand parameters that were needed for a valid model (discussed later)
were far outside the literature’s estimates of parameters. Time did not permit the
incorporation of codesharing in the model.
8 Equilibrium is the point at which the choices airlines assume for their competitors are
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single market formulations without network interactions. The latter is based on
a smaller number of markets with network interactions. Computing limits
precluded the construction of a network model with the broad coverage while
time did not allow applying all sensitivity experiments to the smaller network
model. However, comparisons of similar sensitivity simulations and the cost
sensitivity results discussed below indicate that the results for the broad
coverage are consistent with those for the narrower coverage.
Validation experiments were performed to assess the range of underlying
parameters and airline behaviour assumptions that lead to valid models —
models that replicate observed prices and quantities. This was done for a
number of reasons.
·  The demand, price and cost data are from separate sources. A validation
simulation tests whether the data and modelling framework can be treated
together as representative of the industry.
·  Unlike the demand and price data, the cost data are not observed in the
market. They are Aerocost2 estimates that the Commission transformed to
its cost classifications. Industry sources suggest Aerocost2 is correct to
within a range of 15 per cent. Validation experiments that vary costs by
these amounts test whether the initial assessments of the range of demand
parameters and behavioural assumptions for valid models are robust to
these changes in costs, and whether the costs are representative at all.
·  Oum and Yu’s estimated differences in airline productivity and input and
labour prices are open to question. Therefore, it is important to determine
whether conclusions about the validity of demand parameters and
Aerocost2 costs depend on their estimates.
·  The frequency and substitution elasticity parameters for the model are not
based on estimates for Australian markets. Consequently, it is useful to
assess whether the range of values for these parameters found in non-
Australian markets lead to valid models in Australian markets.9
·  Inquiry participants were sceptical of the accuracy of the initial price
elasticity estimates. Therefore an experiment using price elasticity
estimates for non-Australian markets was conducted.
·  Validation experiments exclude from future consideration those parameter
values that are not capable of reproducing observed quantities and prices
within the modelling framework. Thus, they place bounds on parameter
values for sensitivity analysis of policy simulations.
                                            
9 Qantas also warned that using elasticities for countries other than Australia could produce
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A full discussion of the validation sensitivity simulations is found in PC (1998).
The results are summarised here. The valid price-setting models suggest a
substitutability between airlines operating on Australian routes that is nearly
twice that of the median estimate for non-Australian routes and a frequency
elasticity that is approximately the median estimate for non-Australian routes.
Simulations that approximately doubled the aggregate demand price elasticity in
a valid model did not require significantly different ranges of substitution and
frequency elasticities.
Aerocost2 estimates of flight costs are found to provide reasonable cost
estimates within the industry’s suggested range of plus or minus 15 per cent.
This placed fairly narrow bounds on the range of substitution and frequency
elasticity parameters that lead to valid price-setting models. In addition, the
demand and cost results are not overturned when airlines’ costs are assumed to
be identical. This implies that Oum and Yu’s estimates would have to
understate grossly the degree of input price and productivity differences among
airlines to overturn previous results.
Valid price-setting models leave little or no room for overhead costs to be
allocated to passengers as a per unit charge. Instead marginal revenue is set
equal to marginal flight sector costs to replicate observed prices and quantities.
Overhead costs act as barriers to entry and allow airlines to price above flight
marginal costs. The profitability of the airline will then depend on whether the
wedge it drives between its operating costs and the price of its service covers
the overhead costs of its network. Thus, the valid price-setting model depicts an
international air travel market in which market power does not guarantee
airlines significant economic rents. Airlines can make profits or losses as market
conditions dictate. This is because travellers, after accounting for frequency
advantages, view flights offered by the various airlines as highly substitutable.
F7 Economic welfare estimates
The model measures the economic welfare benefits of liberalisation by
consumer surplus and airline profits for both domestic and foreign markets.
Economic welfare changes in an economy are the sum of changes in consumer
surplus arising from air services in the country and the profits of its national
carrier(s). Given that prices are net fares, consumer surplus will include not
only the consumer surplus of travellers but also any profits and taxes further
along the marketing chain from the net fares.
This is a partial equilibrium analysis, so it does not measure the economy-wide
benefits of any increase in tourism that may occur as a result of liberalisation.
Airport congestion, pollution and impacts on government revenue and priceF MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF LIBERALISED INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE AGREEMENTS
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characteristics of air travel are not addressed. Nor is the spill-over effect on
freight measured. It is presumed that any capacity increases in response to
liberalisation will have a neutral effect on freight profitability, although they
will result in more freight being carried.
Two partial equilibrium effects do point to likely economy-wide effects,
however. Changes in total passenger travel indicate the direction of change in
those air services activities that are needed regardless of the nationality of the
airline. For example, all air travel to Australia requires baggage
handling, boarding gate staff, air traffic control and terminal
infrastructure. Therefore, the export of aviation services is not
limited to exports by the Australian carriers. Increased air travel to
Australia will lead to a general increase in the demand for all these
services. These increases are not included in the calculations of the
economic welfare analysis.
Changes in net tourism to Australia are used as an indicator of the direction of
change in profits of industries associated with travel (such as tourism).10 Net
passenger movements are better than inbound visitor movements as an indicator
of the effect on tourism services because they account for changes in the
numbers of Australians that travel abroad (and not at home).
F8 Effect of Ansett International’s entry
One aim of current Australian policy is to encourage new (Australian) entrants
in the air services market. Ansett International has entered a number of Asian
markets, but the outstanding question is how Ansett’s entry has affected prices,
travel and economic welfare in Australia and in the other countries it serves.11
This question is answered using the price-setting model as described above.
Model results suggest that Ansett’s entry:
·  reduced airfares;
·  increased passenger flows to Australia; and
                                            
10 Net passenger movements are inbound visitor movements minus outbound resident
movements. A positive projected change means that inbound visitor passenger movements
grew by more than outbound resident passenger movements. When net passenger movements
are negative (more Australian outbound traffic than foreign inbound traffic), a positive
projected change means the difference grew smaller. When net passenger movements are
positive, a positive projected change means the difference grew larger.
11 This study does not account for recent changes to Ansett’s network as a result of the Asian
economic crises.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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·  increased Australian and foreign net economic welfare.
Sensitivity simulations, discussed below, were conducted to test the sensitivity
of these results to changes in model assumptions. Model results are found to be
generally robust.
Two years, 1995 and 1997, are used for simulating the effects of Ansett’s entry.
As Ansett’s market share increased in a number of markets from 1995 to 1997
(Table F4), results for 1995 would tend to understate the effects of Ansett’s
entry. Total demand also increased in this period.
Simulations are conducted by removing Ansett from the model to estimate what
the market would have been like if Ansett had not entered it (PC 1998). Other
airlines’ cost structures are assumed not to change when Ansett is present,
though flight sector costs change to reflect altered network choices.
The effects of Ansett’s entry on the market can be placed in three categories:
cost, competition and demand. The cost effect of Ansett’s entry hinges on
Ansett’s costs relative to the industry. In the network model, Ansett is likely to
have lower costs than the industry because Ansett’s direct service is less costly
than the indirect service offered by third-country carriers.12 The competitive
effect of Ansett’s entry is increased competition in price and frequency. Both
cost and competitive pressures should reduce prices and increase frequencies of
service. The demand effects relate to product differentiation and the frequency
of service offered by the larger number of airlines.
                                            
12 Results reported in the draft report did not have a large cost effect, because the model was
based on the single market models described above. Results reported here rely on the
network model and therefore differ from those in the draft report.F MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF LIBERALISED INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE AGREEMENTS
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Table F4 Ansett’s model market share, 1995 and 1997, and
growth in total passengers, 1995–1997
a
Ansett’s market share Growth in passengers
Market 1995 1997 1995–97
%% %
China 13 13 43
Hong Kong 17 18 6
Indonesia 10 14 36
Japan 8 9 6
Malaysia 1 10 22
Korea, Republic of 0 10 43
Taiwan 2 18 19
Total 8 12 18
a Computed from base data used in the model. Only includes carriers in the model. Ansett had minimal Korean
market share in 1995 and was not included in the model for 1995.
Source: Commission estimates based on DTRD (1998).
One feature of the demand specification and parameter values in the model is
that consumers prefer (with total frequency remaining constant) more frequent
service on a few airlines to less frequent service on more airlines.13 That is,
although consumers benefit from the lower prices induced by increased
competition, they face an offsetting effect of reduced flight quality through the
spreading of frequencies over more airlines. In fact, increased competition can
reduce consumer surplus if no significant increase in aggregate quantity occurs
and dominant airlines reduce their frequency of flights (PC 1998).
In addition to the frequency effect, Ansett’s entry offers the opportunity for
greater product differentiation. Product differentiation increases observed
aggregate demand by better serving existing demand and tapping into latent
demand.14 For example, if Ansett introduced a new non-stop service between
two cities then, even though the airfare for travel between them may not change,
                                            
13 For example, passengers who miss flights can board the next flight offered by the same
airline without undue delay. Similarly, time-conscious business travellers can travel on the
same airline at times that allow them to coordinate with appointments at their destination and
a return to their origin without undue delays.
14 Latent demand is demand that would otherwise not be served. Incumbents airlines have
incentives to create product diversity but only if it increases current profits. In contrast,
entrants have enhanced incentives to create product diversity precisely because it takes
profits away from incumbents.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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observed travel between them would increase because people residing in or near
one of the cities obtain better service.15 Some existing passengers fly more
frequently. Other people who would not fly indirectly now choose to fly
directly. In this example, however, the source of the increased market diversity
reflects both Ansett’s decision to provide the service and governments’
decisions to negotiate it. It is not possible to unravel the two. Consequently, the
following results reflect both. The simulation assumes that Ansett successfully
differentiated its service from those of its competitors.
Results
Ansett’s entry is estimated to decrease price and increase quantity in every
market it entered in 1995 and 1997 (Table F5). The price and quantity effects
tend to be larger for those markets where Ansett obtained higher market shares.
For example, the least affected markets are Malaysia, the Republic of Korea and
Taiwan in 1995 where Ansett had little market share. By 1997, however, Ansett
had increased its market shares. Its estimated effects on prices and quantities are
therefore greater in 1997 than in 1995.
Ansett’s entry leads to price increases in the Republic of Korea in 1995 through
its entry’s effects on its competitors’ price and frequency choices. Ansett’s
entry forces third country airlines to use smaller aircraft to maintain their
frequency as they lose market share. Smaller aircraft are more expensive to
operate over the flight sectors in the model. Therefore prices increase.
The increases in quantity imply an increase in some aviation services in
Australia regardless of the nationality of airlines.
                                            
15 Lederer represents this as a reduction in the total cost of travel which includes, for example,
the passenger’s valuation of time in travel, possible delays and the convenience of a non-stop
flight.F MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF LIBERALISED INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE AGREEMENTS
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Table F5 Estimated changes in price and quantity by market from
Ansett’s entry, 1995 and 1997
Between Australia and: 1995 1997
Prices %%
China -4.1 -4.4
















a Ansett had minimal Korean market share in 1995, and was not included in the Korean demand for 1995.
Source: Commission estimates.
Ansett’s entry is also estimated to have increased Australian and foreign
economic welfare in 1995 and 1997 (Table F6). In addition to the increase in
economic welfare, Ansett’s entry is estimated to have redistributed airline
profits to consumer surplus through lower prices.16 In both years, the resulting
economic welfare effect, although substantial, is much smaller than the
underlying transfer of profit to consumer surplus.
                                            
16 These results are presented in an aggregated manner to protect detailed confidential data
provided by airlines.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Table F6 Estimated changes in Australian and foreign gross
profits, consumer surplus and economic welfare from
Ansett’s entry, 1995 and 1997
1995 1997
Australian $m $m
Profits (gross) -41.6 -57.5
Consumer surplus 70.0 89.9
Economic welfare 28.4 32.4
Foreign
Profits (gross) -75.9 -121.8
Consumer surplus 88.3 153.5
Economic welfare 12.4 31.7
Source: Commission estimates.
Ansett’s entry increases consumer surplus for both Australian and foreign
consumers in every country except for the Republic of Korea in 1995
(Table F7).  The Korean market in 1995 experiences a price increase which
reduces Korean consumer surplus. For Australian consumers, the major gains
are achieved in Hong Kong and Indonesia in both 1995 and 1997. For foreign
consumers, the gains are largest in Japan, although Japan’s gains are not nearly
as big a share of the increase in foreign consumer surplus in 1997 as in 1995.
Projected changes in net passenger movements can be examined to gain a sense
of the likely impact of Ansett’s entry on the demand for tourism services in
Australia (Table F8). Ansett’s entry leads to larger positive net passenger
movements or smaller (in absolute value) negative net passenger movements for
four of the countries (Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Taiwan) in
1995 and for all countries except China in 1997. The changes in net passenger
movements tend to reflect price reductions from Ansett’s entry. That is, if net
passenger movements are positive (more inbound visitors than outbound
residents), then Ansett’s entry leads to a bigger positive net passenger
movement and consequently a percentage increase in net passenger movements.
The negative net passenger movements for China, Hong Kong and Indonesia in
1995 reflect a tilt in Ansett’s passengers towards outbound resident movements
that is greater than that for the industry. Total net passenger movements are
estimated to increase by 2 per cent.F MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF LIBERALISED INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE AGREEMENTS
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Table F7 Estimated changes in Australian and foreign consumer
surplus from Ansett’s entry by market, 1995 and 1997
Between Australia and: 1995 1997
Australian consumer surplus $m $m
China 5.5 7.6


















a Ansett had minimal Korean market share in 1995. It was not included in the Korean demand for 1995.
Source: Commission estimates.
The increase in total net passenger movements is larger in 1997 (3.7 per cent)
than in 1995 (2 per cent). This is because the estimated price effects for
Malaysia, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan are larger in 1997 than in 1995,
leading to a larger increase in net passenger movements in both absolute number
and percentage.
Despite their large percentage changes in 1997, changes in net passenger
movements for China and Hong Kong make only a small contribution to total
net passenger movements. Indonesia and Japan are the most important markets
in determining total net passenger flows. The results for China and Hong Kong
reflect the balance in the market between the Australian resident and foreign
visitor flows, leading to a small base value for net passenger movements. Thus
even though the price reductions from Ansett’s entry induce a small change inINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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net passenger movements and a small contribution to total net passenger
movements, the percentage changes in net passenger movements are large.
Table F8 Estimated changes in net passenger movements to and















a Net passenger movements are inbound visitor movements minus outbound resident movements.
b Ansett had minimal Korean market share in 1995. It was not included in Korean demand for 1995.
Source: Commission estimates.
Sensitivity results
The main results of the Ansett simulations are that Ansett’s entry reduced
airfares, increased passenger flows to Australia and increased Australian and
foreign net economic welfare. These results were tested in sensitivity
experiments against the following alternative behavioural, cost, and demand
scenarios:
·  airlines act as price-takers;
·  Ansett does not increase product diversity;
·  airlines have identical productivity and input prices; and
·  demand parameters are different (but the model is still valid).
The price-taking scenario is interesting because it explores the cost and demand
effects of Ansett’s entry without any competitive effects. That is, Ansett’s entry
cannot increase price competition, because airlines are assumed in the scenario
to act as price takers. The significant result of this scenario is that Ansett’s entry
is more likely to be welfare enhancing if it reduces industry costs or if it
contributes to product diversity.F MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF LIBERALISED INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE AGREEMENTS
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The second scenario assumes that demand is diverted to new entrants without
drawing on any latent demand. It is a ‘worst case’ scenario for Ansett’s entry to
be economic welfare improving because it assumes Ansett’s international
network was not significantly different in its city or client focus from that of its
competitors. That is, despite profit incentives, it did not, or could not because of
ASAs, differentiate its service from that of other airlines and simply diverted
passengers from them. Under this scenario, consumer surplus gains are still
obtained, but they do not outweigh the profit declines of incumbent airlines.
The third scenario assumes there are no productivity or input price differences
among airlines. The main results are the same for this scenario. The importance
of this result, given that airlines have cost differences, is that differences in
airlines costs would have to be considerably greater than those estimated by
Oum and Yu to reverse the model’s results. Although the industry criticised the
assumptions of the productivity estimates, the industry’s suggested alternative
productivity differences are not large enough to overturn the significant model
results.
Finally, the major results for prices, total and net passenger inflows and
economic welfare are unchanged for changes in demand parameters that still
lead to valid models. The pattern of economic welfare changes is altered
somewhat for more price elastic aggregate demand. When aggregate demand is
assumed to be price elastic (the alternative suggested by Inquiry participants),
the economic welfare gains are positive and larger in absolute value relative to
the reduction in airline profits. That is, the efficiency gains of Ansett’s entry are
increased relative to its redistributive effects.
F9 Effects of a plurilateral open club
The Government asked the Commission to assess various options for reform of
Australia’s ASAs. One option is a plurilateral open club characterised by a
single liberal ‘open skies’ agreement applying to all club members (Chapter 9).
The network model developed for the Ansett entry simulations was used to
explore how freeing up airline networks and competition in an open club affects
the economic welfare of club members. Because of limitations to the model,
data and scenarios, simulation results are illustrations, not predictions, of how
the economic forces unleashed by an open club agreement could transform
international air travel markets inside and outside the open club. The results
illustrate that open clubs that allow airlines to achieve efficiency gains and to
construct their most profitable networks increase the economic welfare of club
members.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Network effects in open clubs and modelled scenarios
Current ASAs place constraints on airline networks. Open clubs release club
members from these constraints inside the club and can tangentially affect
markets for travel to non-member countries. Model simulations explicitly
consider the two likely network effects of open clubs:
·  open club airlines become more efficient; and
·  open club airlines can enter all open club markets and fly directly between
any two ‘foreign’ countries in the club.
Less efficient airlines in an open club are forced to lift their game or leave club
markets. More efficient airlines will face greater competition as other airlines
improve their efficiency. Incentives to improve efficiency will increase because
profit opportunities are enhanced for any airline that improves its efficiency or
carves out a larger slice of the market. Finally, improvements in network
management may spill over from open club markets to all markets in the
airline’s network.
The airline efficiency gains effect is modelled as follows. All airlines in the
open club are assumed to attain a benchmark level of efficiency as estimated by
Oum and Yu (1995).17 The assumed increase in efficiency is due to competitive
pressures within the club. No incumbent airline exits any market.
Under current ASAs, airlines of open club members must fly through their
home country or obtain fifth freedom permission in order to fly passengers from
one foreign country to another. Under the open club, they can choose to fly
directly between the foreign countries in the club, or set up hub and spoke
networks with hubs in other member countries to fly passengers between any
two spoke countries within the club. Consequently, airlines of open club
members will be able to enter any market within the club and construct
networks on the basis of market fundamentals with only those restrictions
imposed by the capacity- and freedom-dictates of ASAs with non-member
countries.
Market entry with direct flights is modelled as follows. Club airlines can fly
direct flights between any two countries in the open club. They can also enter
markets for travel between other club members (Japanese carriers can enter the
Australia–Hong Kong and Australia–China markets. Chinese carriers can enter
the Australia–Japan market.). Each entrant is assumed to add five per cent to the
                                            
17 Oum and Yu (1995) estimated that Cathay Pacific is the most efficient airline among the
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size of the market.18 It does this by tapping into latent demand for travel, for
example, by providing better connections or departure times than incumbents
provide. No incumbent airline exits any market.
The effects are used in three scenarios:
·  scenario A applies efficiency gains and market entry with direct flights
between foreign countries;
·  scenario B applies efficiency gains only; and
·  scenario C applies market entry with direct flights between foreign
countries.
Scenario A reflects that, by freeing airlines to form their most profitable
networks, open clubs will unleash many effects. The final two scenarios allow
the respective economic effects to be separated.
The choice of club members is illustrative and not based on any expectations by
the Commission of the likelihood of any of the countries entering into such a
club. The simulations assume the following club, country, market and airline
coverage:
·  open club members are Australia, China, Hong Kong and Japan;
·  country, market and airline coverage is that for the Ansett simulations
(markets for travel between Australia and China, Hong Kong, Indonesia,
Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Taiwan); and
·  the club airlines are Ansett, Qantas, China Airlines, China Southern
Airlines, China Eastern Airlines, Cathay Pacific, Japan Airlines and All
Nippon Airlines.
Club membership was chosen because the distances between China, Hong Kong
and Japan allow hub and spoke networks to be set up by all club members in
any of the countries. In addition, aircraft can fly one long sector from Australia
and be turned around to fly a short sector in the northern part of the club within
a day, arriving at the final destination at a convenient hour for travellers and
within airport curfew times. The latter feature increases aircraft utilisation and
the revenue each aircraft can generate in a day. Without the club, aircraft
arriving from Australia may have to sit for an extended period at a foreign port
to obtain desirable departure and arrival times before returning to Australia.
                                            
18 Five per cent was chosen for illustrative purposes. It is less than one half that observed for
Ansett in its smallest market. Thus it represents a minimum market penetration that entrants
would aim to achieve. Nevertheless, the Commission stresses that this is an assumption only
and the results flowing from it are illustrative, not forecasts. A greater or lesser level of
additional traffic could be assumed, thereby affecting the magnitude but not the direction of
the results.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Limitations of open club scenarios and their implications
Three limitations of the open club scenarios bear specific mention:
·  Oum and Yu’s efficiency estimates are representative of uniform
differences in efficiency between networks;
·  assumptions are made in the scenarios regarding airline entry, exit, and
product differentiation; and
·  markets are limited to those involving travel to and from Australia.
The limitations have important consequences for the interpretation of results.
Efficiency estimates
Oum and Yu (1995) formulate their efficiency estimates by constructing indices
of inputs and outputs for each airline. The output index is calculated using a
revenue weighted average of each airline’s passenger and freight service output
adjusted for average stage length. If these adjustments aggregate outputs
correctly, then the estimated efficiency differences are attributable to the
relative ability of airline management to produce output with the least amount
of inputs.
Three reservations must be stated. First, even if Oum and Yu’s methodology
and interpretations of efficiency are correct, the estimates are only as good as
the data used and the data’s comparability across airlines. ICAO data were the
primary source of industry information for Oum and Yu. As noted by the
industry, airlines use different accounting definitions which may undermine the
comparability of ICAO data across airlines. Second, their aggregation of airline
output may have deficiencies. For example, other output characteristics, such as
the number of cities served or the frequency of service, are omitted
(Kirby  1986). The omissions would bias efficiency estimates favourably
towards airlines that have lower frequencies of service and serve fewer cities
because both characteristics increase network costs for the same number of
passengers carried in a network. Third, Oum and Yu did not estimate efficiency
and input prices for the Chinese airlines. Chinese airlines efficiencies and input
prices are assumed to be those estimated for Thai Airways.
If Oum and Yu’s estimation and interpretation of efficiency differences are
reasonably correct and Thai Airways costs and efficiency are representative of
those for Chinese airlines, then Scenario B offers insights into the direction of
change that efficiency improvements will push the industry. However, given the
above reservations, a more conservative interpretation is that they are a specific
formulation of the general effects discussed above and thus illustrate those
general effects for a special case.F MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF LIBERALISED INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE AGREEMENTS
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Entry, exit and product differentiation
The directions of change in airline profits, consumer welfare and, therefore,
economic welfare by country depend on the assumption of no exit.
Under the efficiency gains scenario, the assumption of no exit implies that all
airlines improve their efficiency. When all airlines improve to the benchmark,
the benchmark airline suffers reductions in profits, because by assumption it is
the benchmark. In contrast, the inefficient airlines enjoy increases in profits,
because by assumption they improve to the benchmark, competing more
vigorously against their erstwhile more efficient competitor.
An alternative and no less plausible assumption is that open club airlines
achieve the benchmark efficiency because efficient airlines force inefficient
airlines to exit the market. The opposite effect on airline profits would be
observed in this case: Efficient airlines increase their profits as they dominate
markets and inefficient airlines suffer reductions in profits as they lose market
share or exit the market.
In the context of direct flights with market entry, the assumptions of no exit and
of a modest increase in product diversity imply an unknown a priori net effect
on consumer surplus that depends on three factors. First, an assumed entry with
no exit of incumbent airlines increases the number of airlines serving a market.
Prices can be expected to decrease from the increase in competitors. Second,
new entrants on routes are also assumed to add modestly to product diversity,
increasing consumer surplus. However, the modest increase also limits their
ability to compete effectively in the market. Finally, entry confronts the
consumer preference for more frequent service on fewer airlines. The net effect
on consumer surplus is only known after the simulation is completed.
In reality, the industry has indicated that a significant market presence is crucial
to compete effectively. Obtaining a minimum market presence may not be an
optimal strategy. Instead the optimal strategy may be attaining a large market
presence. In this case, the product diversity that taps into latent demand may
also take customers from incumbents. A long-run outcome may see one or more
airlines exit the market.
Travel to and from Australia
Because of data limitations,19 the model does not explicitly account for markets
between non-Australian club members (for example, the market for travel
between Hong Kong and Japan). Consequently, the simulation cannot provide
                                            
19 For example, for non-Australian routes there were no price data or passenger origin-
destination data as found in Avstats.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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estimates of the total economic welfare effects of the open club. In particular,
its estimates omit:
·  increases in Australian airline profits and Australian economic welfare
from Australian airlines’ entry into completely foreign markets;
·  decreases in foreign airline profits from Australian airlines’ entry into
completely foreign markets; and
·  increases in foreign consumer surplus in travel between two foreign
countries from Australian airlines’ entry into those markets.
Implications
Given the limitations of the model and the modelled scenarios as described
above, the most reliable estimates of changes in profits, consumer surplus and
economic welfare are for open club members in total; they are reported here.
Individual country estimates are not reliable and depend strongly on scenario
assumptions; they are not reported.
For example, the use of the efficiency estimates and the assumptions of airline
entry and exit imply that model results for changes in profits by airline are
direct consequences of scenario assumptions and not consequences of any
underlying economic behaviour in the model. Therefore, estimated changes in
profits by airline in markets for travel to and from Australia have little
descriptive worth. They are even less appropriate as estimates of changes in
profits by airline for all markets in the open club, because, as noted above, the
exclusion of completely foreign markets omits likely increases in profits for
Australian airlines and likely reductions in profits for foreign airlines. However,
the estimated changes in profit for all airlines in club countries are more reliable
and relevant, because they do not imply specific winners and losers. They
estimate the total effect on profits across all airlines reflecting the net change in
profits among airlines.
Results for Australian markets
The net economic welfare gains in all three scenarios show a large gain for club
members and a small loss for non-club countries (Table F9). The principal
reasons for the results can be traced to the modelled effects of open clubs:
·  As club airlines’ productivity improves, their costs fall and they compete
more vigorously against other airlines by cutting their prices or increasing
the frequency of their services.
·  Freed from the constraints of current ASAs, all club airlines redesign their
networks to serve their markets to and from Australia better. In doing soF MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF LIBERALISED INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE AGREEMENTS
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they can offer both direct flights and indirect flights in a hub and spoke
system. Direct flights keep costs down while the hub and spoke system
increases frequency of service.
·  Market entry by club airlines on routes increases competition because it is
assumed that no incumbent airlines leave. The competitive pressures of
entrants increase with their size because large entrants compete more
strongly against incumbents in frequency and ticket prices.
Scenario A combines all these effects. Scenario  B isolates the first effect.
Scenario C isolates the second and third effects. But there are some important
interactions between the three effects, so that the results of Scenario A are not
simply the sum of results for Scenarios B and C. The separate impacts of
Scenarios B and C are discussed first before their combined impact in
Scenario A is analysed.
Scenario B results
Scenario B shows that the main beneficiaries of efficiency improvements are
consumers (Table F9). The consumer surplus gains in club countries are nearly
ten times the size of the increased club airline profits. In non-club countries,
consumer surplus increases whilst the profits of non-club airlines fall. In
addition, the fall in profits for all airlines (club and non-club combined)
suggests that efficiency gains are passed on to consumers, while airlines that
improve their efficiency take profits from their rivals.
Efficiency gains are passed on to consumers in lower prices and increased flight
frequencies. Consumer surplus increases in both club and non-club countries as
a result. Prices in non-club markets fall because club airlines become more
efficient in all their markets, and they lower prices to passengers flying to non-
club destinations. Examples of this could be more efficient uses of aircraft
which are used in club and non-club countries. In addition, the competitive
lessons learned in open club competition can be applied in non-club markets
too. These lessons could be in the areas of network design, fleet usage and
marketing, among others.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Table F9 Estimates of changes in net economic welfare from
various open club scenarios
ab
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C
Efficiency gains plus
direct flights and market
entry by club airlines on
routes to and from
Australia
Efficiency gains Direct flights and
market entry by club










Economic welfare 253.2 167.6 42.8
Non-club
members




Economic welfare -6.3 -0.4 -4.6
a Estimates exclude economic welfare effects in markets between non-Australian countries in the club. These
could not be estimated due to the lack of data on prices and passenger flows (by origin–destination and airline)
between non-Australian countries in the club.
b Markets covered are between Australia and: China, Japan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Taiwan
and Indonesia.
c Club countries are Australia, China, Hong Kong and Japan. Club airlines are Ansett, Qantas, China Airlines,
China Southern Airlines, China Eastern Airlines, Cathay Pacific, Japan Airlines and All Nippon Airlines.
Source: Commission estimates.
Airlines that become relatively more efficient (all club airlines except the
benchmark) gain at the expense of those that become relatively less efficient
(non-club airlines and the benchmark). Consequently club airlines’ profits
increase in total, while non-club airlines’ profits fall. Competitive forces compel
club airlines to pass on some of these cost savings to consumers through lower
prices. This would create pressures for non-club airlines to either join the club,
improve their efficiency or scale back their presence in markets served by club
airlines.F MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF LIBERALISED INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE AGREEMENTS
333
Scenario C results
In Scenario C, the assumed increases in the number of airlines competing on
routes between club members lead to price reductions in most club markets,
profit declines for club and non-club airlines, and consumer surplus and
economic welfare gains in club countries.
The price falls in Scenario C are driven by increased competition in the markets
that club airlines enter and by their ability to cut costs by flying passengers
directly to their final destinations. Club airline profits fall in Scenario C mainly
as a result of the price falls. Non-club airline profits fall because they are unable
to modify their networks to reduce costs while club airlines enter markets and
restructure their networks.
Consumer surplus increases in open club countries because prices fall,
frequency increases and the number of airlines connecting some club countries
to Australia rises. Consumer gains in club countries are more than twice as large
as profit losses. Economic welfare increases as a result.
Non-club consumer surplus declines marginally. This result is not surprising
since non-club flights remain constrained and cannot benefit from the open
club’s improved network design or greater competition. In fact, the increase in
direct flights by some club airlines out of Australia reduces the number of
flights in some airlines’ hub and spoke networks. This reduces their frequency
of service to non-club destinations and adversely affects the consumer surplus
of those non-club countries.
Scenario A results
The results of Scenario  A are best explained as the efficiency gains of
Scenario B compounding the competitive and network effects of Scenario C —
improving productivity enhances the competition of freer networks. In
particular, Scenario A shows:
·  greater profit declines in moving from Scenario  C to Scenario  A come
mostly at the expense of airlines in non-club countries ($8 million
reduction in club profits compared to a $25 million reduction in non-club
profits); and
·  more vigorous competition increases consumer welfare by approximately
20 per cent more than the sum of Scenarios B and C would suggest.
In addition, the combined effects of efficiency gains and direct flights with
market entry lead to considerable gains in club member consumer surplus and
economic welfare with, by comparison, small changes in club airline profits.
For non-members there is a net economic welfare loss, despite the spill-overINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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efficiency benefits from open club airlines, because non-club airlines lose
competitiveness to club airlines.
The gains in club members’ consumer surplus are because the three open club
effects have increased the vigour of competition, resulting in prices being
pushed down.
The combined effects of productivity improvements, network design changes
and market entry have a compound, rather than additive, effect on the degree of
competition within the club. Within the club, new entrants compete with
incumbents on price, frequency and cost, raising the level of competition above
that in Scenarios B and C. Unlike Scenario  B, incumbents cannot afford to
retain some of the benefits of the productivity improvement, because new
entrants can undercut them by charging prices that are closer to reduced costs
faced by club airlines. These price effects are reflected in the consumer surplus
and profit results across the three scenarios.
The deep price cuts within the club in Scenario A result in open club consumer
surplus rising substantially. For club countries the increase in consumer surplus
is greater than the sum of consumer surplus gains in Scenarios B and C.
Non-club consumer surplus increases as club airlines’ productivity gains and
frequency increases spill over into their non-club operations. Because there is
no entry to these markets, the effects of Scenario A are approximately the sum
of those for Scenarios B and C.
In Scenario A, club airlines sustain a net fall in the profits on their operations to
and from Australia which is a result of these price falls. Consumers benefit from
lower prices, increased frequency and greater choice. This result indicates that
most of the benefits from the efficiency gains and improved network designs are
passed on to passengers. The change in the net economic welfare of club
countries is strongly positive because the gains in consumer surplus more than
offset the combined profit declines of the eight club airlines.
Non-club countries suffer a small loss in their economic welfare as a result of
the open club. This is because the profit decreases suffered by their airlines are
greater than the gains in consumer surplus by non-club residents. Both effects
are driven by the price falls to non-club destinations.
Network design changes as a result of the open club
Simulations A and C show that club airlines create new networks which utilise
direct flights and hub and spoke systems. These new network designs permit
airlines to fly lower cost direct flights from a club member, while increasing
frequency of service via a hub and spoke system. These changes are illustratedF MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF LIBERALISED INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE AGREEMENTS
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for Ansett, Cathay Pacific and Qantas (Table F10). Scenario B reflects the old
network constraints which prevent Ansett and Qantas using Hong Kong as a
hub and Cathay from flying its passengers directly to Japan from Australia.
Table F10 Shares of passengers flying from Australia to selected
open club destinations using direct and indirect routes,
selected club airlines



















Australia to Japan 58 42 0 100 63 37
Australia to
China
0 100 0 100 0 100
Ansett
Australia to Japan 100 0 100 0 100 0
Australia to
China
0 100 100 0 0 100
Qantas
Australia to Japan 100 0 100 0 100 0
Australia to
China
94 6 100 0 94 6
Source: Commission estimates
Table F10 shows the network changes in both Scenarios A and C are:
·  Cathay Pacific chooses to fly most of its Australia–Japan passengers
directly, rather than flying all of them through its Hong Kong hub. It
continues to fly the remainder of these passengers via Hong Kong.
·  Ansett switches to using Hong Kong as hub for all its China bound
passengers, who are flown to Hong Kong then transferred on to smaller
aircraft for the flight to China.
·  Qantas continues to fly the vast majority of its open club passengers
directly to their destinations from Australia. However, it too finds HongINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Kong a useful hub for marginally increasing the frequency of its services
to China, thereby giving it a competitive advantage.
The unconstrained networks of the open club allow airlines to construct
networks that provide better services in both price and quality terms. As the
sectors that club airlines are allowed to fly increase, the airlines are able to
increase flight frequency by establishing hub and spoke networks to service
passengers flying between club countries. The model results show that Hong
Kong is preferred as a hub over Beijing and Tokyo. Club airlines weigh up the
cost savings from lower cost direct flights against the competitive benefits of
greater frequency to many of their destinations by using Hong Kong as a hub.
Airlines choosing to set up hub and spoke systems also incur marginally higher
costs as they trade off higher costs from operating smaller aircraft on some
flight sectors serving a hub against the competitive advantages of increased
frequency.F MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF LIBERALISED INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE AGREEMENTS
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Attachment F1 Independent reference panel reports
Dr Christopher Findlay, Associate Professor, Department of
Economics, University of Adelaide
The modelling work undertaken by the Commission for this inquiry is a novel
and valuable tool for policy analysis which is relevant to the terms of reference.
The model structure is built upon up-to-date analytical methods. It is a novel
approach to the analysis of policy reform in this sector. There are few examples
of such techniques applied to these questions and the Commission’s work is at
the forefront of research in the field. Once the report is released, the modelling
work is likely to receive considerable attention from the community of
researchers in this field.
The modelling work applies the available statistical evidence on relevant
parameters. An analysis of the sensitivity of the results to choices of parameter
values is also applied where that is judged to be useful and insightful.
The model constructed is best applied to the comparison of scenarios in which
various dimensions of policy are changed. Its estimates of the effects of policy
change are credible, in terms of their orders of magnitude, and understandable,
in terms of the directions of their effects. The policy is not designed for use as a
forecasting device.
The model can be and has been applied to a series of experiments which are
relevant to the inquiry. These include the analysis of the effects of the
introduction of a multiple designation policy and other reforms to international
policy, in particular, the adoption of an open club model. The choices made of
base cases against which to compare the policy changes are relevant and
insightful. The sets of results include a series of indicators including price,
quantity and welfare effects which are relevant to policy analysis.
Like all good modelling work, the application of the techniques used here not
only produces sets of results which indicate orders of magnitude associated with
particular policy changes. It also contributes to the clarity and specificity of the
policy changes proposed. In addition it highlights side effects or feedbacks that
occur as a result of policy changes which might otherwise have gone unnoticed.
Finally, it permits the division of the total effects of a policy change into various
components, which is an important contribution to our understanding of the
origins of the results.INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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Dr Ralph Snyder, Associate Professor, Department of Econometrics
and Business Statistics, Monash University
In my capacity as a Reference Panel member I have read documents provided
by the Productivity Commission, met with the modelling team, attended two
workshops run by the Productivity Commission and have been a discussant at
one of these workshops. I have written a detailed interim report that highlighted
shortcomings in earlier documentation20 of the model. Most of the concerns
outlined in the interim report have been adequately addressed in more recent
documentation.21
Overview of model
The model has been developed to gauge the impact on airfares, costs and
quantity of travel of:
·  current negotiated capacity restrictions;
·  the entrance of Ansett into the international market; and
·  alternative bilateral and multilateral policies.
An implicit objective has been to examine the effect of these factors on
consumer surplus and aggregate welfare.
The model is really two distinct mathematical constructs of two forms of
competition:
·  oligopoly where airlines have discretion over price but maximise profit on
the assumption that the prices of competitors remain unchanged (Bertrand
solution); and
·  perfect competition where airlines have no discretion over price. Profits
are maximised subject to prices determined by aggregate demand and
supply conditions in the market place.
General opinion at the first workshop, with which I concur, was that the
oligopoly model was the best description of the type of competition currently
prevailing in the international airline industry.
Given the complexity of industry operations the model itself is both large and
complex. Products, of which there are a large number, are distinguished by
                                            
20 ‘Blue Sky’ Modelling of Australasian Air Travel and technical appendix.
 Update on Costs, Profits and Validation Simulation.
 Further Update on Sensitivity Simulations.
21 Impacts of Competition Enhancing Air Service Agreements: A Network Modelling
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source and destination city pairs. An airline’s product demand is assumed to
depend on:
·  its own price;
·  the prices or ‘outputs’ of competitors;
·  flight times;
·  number of intermediate stops; and
·  flight frequency.
Other factors mentioned, but not modelled due to constraints on development
time, are class of ticket and seasonal effects.
All models involve a spatial ‘production function’ consisting of a network of
interconnecting flight paths. Costs are divided into those that are directly related
to the:
·  number of passengers;
·  frequency of flights;
·  fixed costs associated with cities in the network; and
·  fixed costs associated with the network as a whole.
The constraints consist of:
·  flight limitations imposed by airline agreements;
·  restrictions on arrivals and departures;
·  logical network constraints on flows of passengers and aircraft; and
·  plane capacity constraints.
Substantive comments
Given its size and complexity, it is no simple matter to validate a model of this
kind. Attention to detail in documentation can be critical. Earlier shortcomings
made it difficult to crosscheck the computer code, written in the GAMS
modelling language, with the model specification. Although current
documentation is greatly improved, the GAMS code still does not cross-
reference equations by equation number. This makes it difficult for someone
external to the team to directly assess the code. Over the short period of my
contact with them, however, the modelling team proved to be very professional
in all other respects. It would therefore surprise me if the computer
implementation were not correct. General opinion at the first workshop, with
which I concur, is that the model specification seems to be a reasonable
response to the objectives of the Inquiry. The specification is based on standard
microeconomic concepts. The one exception, the network concept, was neededINTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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to adequately represent the various flight paths of the airlines. I am satisfied that
the model specification is logically sound.
A long run model ideally addresses the objectives of the Inquiry. By necessity,
however, a short run model was built. Some costs were fixed. Airline numbers
were also fixed. It is now appropriately stated in their documentation that any
results effectively apply at a point in time
To elaborate this point, any results from the model should be qualified by the
following considerations:
·  the model does not allow for the impact of changes on the structure of
networks and their costs. New network configurations might emerge from
a relaxation of entry barriers;
·  the model cannot properly account for the behaviour of potential entrants.
There is little evidence upon which objective deductions can be made;
·  it ignores the potential impact that competition could have in reducing
technical inefficiency22 with current technology. Again there is little
evidence to draw on; and
·  it ignores the pressure for greater technological change wrought by
additional competition.
The modelling group found it difficult to obtain good estimates of price
elasticities. When this problem was raised with industry people at the second
workshop, general opinion was that the estimates used in the model were not
particularly reliable. Some doubts about the results of the model, given this
particular difficulty, were expressed. Further sensitivity analyses may or may
not dispel this view.
To conclude, it should be emphasised that the value of a model does not lie
solely with its capacity to produce reliable results. Important benefits are often
gained in practice from the process of model building. Model building provides
a systematic way of learning about the phenomena under investigation, offering
a focus for inquiry that transcends its mathematical form. It supplies a
conceptual framework to order thoughts and systematically explore ideas. Thus
the process of model building can inform those more general lines of inquiry
that ultimately feed into policy formation. This was probably the major benefit
of the current model for the Inquiry.
                                            
22 The term ‘technical inefficiency’ is used here in its conventional economics sense.F MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF LIBERALISED INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE AGREEMENTS
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Attachment F2 Demand elasticity estimates
Table F11 Estimates of airfare demand elasticities for leisure and
business travel to and from Australia
Leisure travel Business travel




Germany -1.23 -0.50 -0.55 –
Italy -0.56 -0.29 * -0.19
United Kingdom -1.79 -0.14 -0.21 -0.20
Japan -0.79 -1.16 -0.24 –
Korea, Republic of -0.50 -1.14 -0.20 -0.40
Taiwan -0.83 -1.19 – *
Indonesia -1.46 -0.48 -0.62 -0.01
Malaysia -0.78 -0.95 – -0.29
Singapore -1.86 -0.54 -0.22 -0.12
Fiji -0.80 -0.53 * *
New Zealand -0.68 -0.23 -0.16 -0.34
United States -1.85 -0.64 -0.45 –
Note: Travel demand equations were estimated using quarterly data from March 1986 to June 1994.
* The BTCE could not estimate statistically robust models for these countries.
– Variable was omitted from the model as it added no further explanatory power.
Source: Adapted from BTCE (1995).INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES
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